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Arms Control & Disarmament



A QUARTERLY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
WITH ABSTRACTS
AND ANNOTATIONS

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Arms Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH
ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS

Prepared by the
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PREFACE

Arms Control & Disarmament attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, German, and Russian languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. Titles in the Cyrillic alphabet are transliterated according to the Library of Congress system, but with ligatures omitted. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, call numbers are given for all cataloged and classified materials. Uncataloged and unclassified materials are designated by symbols indicating the custodial divisions of the Library in which they can be found. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

Matters of fact and opinion presented in *Arms Control & Disarmament* are solely the responsibility of the authors of the items abstracted, and their inclusion does not constitute endorsement by either the Library of Congress or the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Information about the periodicals cited can in most instances be obtained readily from standard reference works.

The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,700 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate may be used verbatim or in a modified form; they are designated "author's abstract," "author's summary," etc.

Library of Congress Location Symbols

(Uncataloged and Unclassified Materials)

Chi Kor	Chinese and Korean Section
LL	Law Library
Newsp	Newspaper Reading Room
P&GP RR	Periodical and Government Publication Reading Room
Sci RR	Science Reading Room
Slav Rm	Slavic Room

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I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

A. GENERAL ANALYSES OF BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

938
Berreby, Jean-Jacques. [STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES OF OIL] Impératifs stratégiques du pétrole. Politique étrangère, v. 30, no. 6, 1965: 498-516.
JX3. P6, v. 30

Discusses the West's dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the influence of the commodity on international relations in general as well as on the policies of Middle Eastern countries themselves. At a certain point in time, between nuclear war and small limited wars, "oil can become an essential strategic resource that needs to be assured and protected at any price." In peacetime, however, political means--not military bases and pressures--serve best to counter the essentially political dangers that threaten the flow of Middle Eastern oil to the West.

939
Deutsch, Karl W. THE FUTURE OF WORLD POLITICS. Political quarterly, v. 37, Jan./Feb. 1966: 9-32.
JA8. P72, v. 37

Theories of international relations tend to be utopian; the future of world human relations is viewed sometimes with optimism, sometimes with pessimism; yet in almost all cases theorists of the future tend to attribute more formative influence to particular interests and factors, overestimate the role of the elite in the conduct of international affairs, and underestimate "the impact of popular initiatives and popular participation." Futuristic theories have neglected the two revolutionary transformations affecting the international political system: the universal spread of literacy and the steady decline of agricultural employment, with the concomitant increase of urbanization. As the masses become more literate, more sophisticated, and more mature, their interest in the political increases. Future rulers will discover that broader popular participation in political life will necessitate greater preoccupation with domestic issues and less attention to foreign affairs. Already "governments are in increasing danger either of being so attentive to foreign policy and world-wide alliances that they lose their popularity at home, or of being so solicitous of preserving their popularity at home that they begin to give less and less attention to international affairs." Countries are becoming more difficult to govern; even more difficult will it be for them to be governed by another nation, by foreigners. Intervention in the national affairs of other states will thus become unfeasible. The current dissolution of the great ideological blocs already predicts the future world of irreducible nation-states. If nuclear weapons can be kept from these nations (the five present nuclear powers, backed by the authority of the United Nations, might act in unison to stem proliferation), we may live to see the gradual atrophy of war. Certainly states cannot be territorially frozen to their 1945 boundaries; perhaps a system of peaceful change will gradually evolve, reviving the era of land purchases. The United Nations might serve as broker, receiving bids from nations that wish to purchase additional land unneeded by its present owners. If the world does not blow itself up, a great era of self-transforming societies may appear by the years 2000 or 2020. The present difficulties in international affairs are part of "the dangerous and painful but infinitely promising process of growing up" through which mankind is passing.

940
Duchacek, Ivo. NATIONS AND MEN: INTERNATIONAL POLITICS TODAY. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966. 390 p.
JX1395. D79

A "concise introductory text in international politics." Part one deals with the human factor--why people react in what way--and is based on data from statesmen's memoirs and psychologists' studies. Parts two through four cover statehood, nationalism, and internationalism. "Why nations act as they do" is discussed in part five. Part six deals with the conflict between ideals and realities. Seven and eight describe foreign policy techniques, including negotiation, the use of third parties, disarmament, war, collective security, and "balancing" in the nuclear age.

941
FOREIGN POLICY IN A POLYCENTRIC WORLD. Survey, no. 58, Jan. 1966: 3-214.
DK1. S549, 1966

Contents. --Twenty years after, by Leopold Labedz. --On polycentrism, by Raymond Aron. --American globalism, by Z. K. Brzezinski. --Containment and after, by Desmond Donnelly. --Neutralism and polycentrism, by Peter Lyon. --Russia, the one-party system, and the third world, by Richard Lowenthal. --China and the Communist movement, by G. F. Hudson. --Polycentrism and proliferation, by Erasmus, pseud. --Nuclear prospects and foreign policy, by Curt Gasteyger. --Strategy of survival, by Morton A. Kaplan. --The European revival, by K. A. Jelenski. --EEC and Comecon, by John Pinder. --Europe in East-West relations, by George F. Kennan. --Alternative to partition, by Jacques Freymond. --Politics as the art of the impossible, by André Fontaine. --German unification and the power balance, by Wilhelm Cornides. --Roads to European unity, by Mark Bonham-Carter. --The origins, by Wilfred Knapp. --The Polish question, by Alexander Bregman. --The turning point, by Louis J. Halle. --Germany in the cold war, by Evelyn Anderson. --The Khrushchev era, by Hugh Seton-Watson. --China and the cold war, by John Gittings. --Russia and the international order, by W. Zimmerman.

Commemorates the 10th anniversary of the journal with essays describing the very fluid contemporary international scene. The first group of papers treats "the emerging realities" of the polycentric world, the second the unification of Europe, and the third the "cold war in retrospect."

942
Galtung, Johan. INSTITUTIONALIZED CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A THEORETICAL PARADIGM. Journal of peace research, no. 4, 1965: 348-397. AS9.J6, 1965

In this article the need for permanent mechanisms of conflict resolution, i.e. mechanisms that can decide who is the winner and who is the loser, and distribute sanctions, punishments and rewards among the parties and terminate a conflict, is pointed out. Twelve mechanisms of this kind are discussed in the article: mechanisms where neither party to the conflict participates (chance mechanisms, oracles), mechanisms where one party participates (ordeals) and mechanisms where both parties participate (regulated warfare, fights, duels, legal duels, verbal duels, debates, mediation/arbitration, court processes and voting). It is pointed out that these mechanisms sometimes function as mechanisms of direct conflict resolution in the sense that the winner in the mechanism also wins in the underlying conflict and that the loser loses both places. Thus, ordeals were used to distribute property. But the mechanisms were also often used in a more indirect or independent way: they focused the attention of the parties to a conflict on something new, they functioned as a safety-valve, and they brought some kind of compensation to the loser. The article then discusses at length fifteen conditions that seem important for the institutionalization of a conflict resolution mechanism. It is pointed out that these conditions probably are complementary to each other in the sense that if some of them are satisfied, then it is less necessary that the others are, but that the mechanism will be more firmly rooted the more conditions are satisfied. Some consequences of this principle are pointed out. Finally, the possibility of institutionalized conflict resolution in the field of international conflict is discussed, and a mechanism based on a combination of world wide television debates between spokesmen of the parties to the conflict, voting by the whole world population, and a set of well-known rules of international behavior is analyzed. The propositions of the article are illustrated by means of scattered reports on the various mechanisms, with a concentration on ordeals, legal duels and common-sense knowledge of court processes. (Summary supplied)

943
Haas, Michael. SOCIETAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF WAR. Journal of peace research, no. 4, 1965: 307-323. AS9.J6, 1965

Are domestic social conditions related to the incidence of international aggression? One way of approaching this question is to look at the justifications for war; however, a study of the verbal rationale for war does not lead very far scientifically, since the same argument is equally useful for peace or war. A second approach, called the 'prerequisites' approach, attempts to isolate societal factors which predispose states to engage in war. A review of empirical findings in this second area reveals the following: Democratic polities have less foreign conflict than authoritarian political systems; totalitarian countries fall in between. Rich countries have more foreign conflict than most of the economically developing nations of the world. High unemployment and high urban population density, two indicators of domestic stress, are associated with high levels of foreign conflict. Three out of four types of nonconformist behavior are related positively to war propensities. Domestic social conflict behavior correlates directly with foreign conflict, especially when the conflict is expressed anomically; passive deviance, alcoholism deathrates and suicides, is also high among countries which most frequently engage in war. But homicide is related inversely to war. Nearly all of the factors which correlate positively with foreign conflict are, in turn, related to urbanization. The exception is the type of political system, since non-democracies are found mostly in rural countries. In very few cases, nevertheless, does the magnitude of the correlation exceed .30. (Summary supplied)

944
Hamon, Léo. [NUCLEAR POWER AND DETERRENCE--ALLIANCE AND NEUTRALITY] Puissance nucléaire et dissuasion--alliance et neutralité. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Feb. 1966: 234-257. D410.R45, v. 22

Nations will seek to preserve their own personalities even when allied with stronger powers. Thus 20th century attempts to abolish neutrality have been repudiated by the third world and the more aware second-rank allied powers. A significant influence on the present trend toward more supple alliances and outright neutrality is the state of nuclear technology. As a result of this technology all cities are vulnerable to destruction, all nuclear strike forces (however small) remain largely invulnerable, and more and more nations are potentially capable of developing their own nuclear forces. An alliance with a nuclear power, even if the nuclear guarantee is not unconditional, provides the nonnuclear ally with "a protective uncertainty" to scare off potential aggressors. But alliances no longer assure the protected nation that the nuclear ally will intervene on its behalf. France justifies its nuclear strivings with the thought that "nuclear war is too tragic a thing to be automatically linked to an alliance." While an alliance may increase deterrence for certain nations, the state of the world protects neutrals from great-power attack; such an attack cannot be tolerated because of the advantages that would accrue to the unpunished aggressor in the eyes of others. The balance constantly shifts between the four major factors that influence the decision for alliance or neutrality: commitments involved, influence gained, protection provided, and price paid in concessions or restrictions. "At present neither the evolution of military technology nor the feeling of global security engendered by the prolonged absence of war adds weight to the factors favoring alliance." When an ally acquires his own nuclear weapons he is much freer to weigh the advantages (increased deterrence and combat strength) and disadvantages (required concessions and costs) of alliance with a great nuclear power. Because the effect of nuclear weapons has been to increase autonomy and independence, the choice between neutrality and alliance has become less vital for the security of most states. If alliances are to survive they must become more acceptable--coordinated rather than integrated, variable rather than exclusive. Although in many cases alliance will be preferred to neutrality (even if only for political reasons), we may expect the latter to increase in the evolving nuclear age.

945
Héraud, Guy. [EUROPE OF PEOPLES] Ein Europa der Völker. Europäische Begegnung, v. 6, Jan. 1966: 2-5. P&GP RR

Suggests the establishment of a European federation based on regions (each ethnically homogeneous and of a size comparable to Provence, Lombardy, or Hesse) to preserve intimacy between the citizen and the state.

This system, Hêraud feels, should replace the present one of sovereign states and their by-products, e.g., assimilation of ethnic minorities, and aggravation of tensions to the point of war. Professor Hêraud rejects the idea of the Pan-European State as being conducive to mass grouping of people, bureaucracy, oppression, and irresponsibility.

946
Langholm, Sivert. VIOLENT CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THE LOSER'S REACTION: A CASE STUDY FROM 1547. Journal of peace research, no. 4, 1965: 324-347. AS9.J6, 1965

The essay is the result of preliminary work on an investigation of the institution of dueling as a conflict resolution mechanism. The presentation builds upon the analysis of an official extrajudicial combat from 1547, where the losing party's reactions are known through the work of the author Brantôme. Combats of this type were to determine conflicts of honor; the question of the participants' honor was to be determined by their valor. In the cultural milieu valor was in general a condition sine qua non of a nobleman's honor, a factor which has certainly contributed to the combat's general acceptance as a conflict resolution mechanism. The combat ceremonial implied a complete system of control initiatives to prevent other factors than valor, for example inequality in weapons, from being able to determine the outcome. At the same time, however, one finds in the milieu a very general assumption that other factors, as for example chance, luck, destiny and God's interference, can actually determine victory and defeat. In part this promotes direct acceptance by giving the loser something to hold responsible for his defeat. Besides this there is the consequence that one can lose without losing honor. Along with the victory itself, a number of other circumstances, e.g. clever and courageous battle, lack of surrender, etc. become criteria of valor. In this way both parties can go from the battle in possession of the disputed value, honor. The conflict resolution mechanism thus becomes value-generating. (Summary supplied)

947
Lanyi, George A., and Wilson C. McWilliams, eds. CRISIS AND CONTINUITY IN WORLD POLITICS: READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. New York, Random House [1966] 753 p. (A Random House book in international relations) JX1308.L3

A collection of readings designed "to serve as an introduction to the study of the crises and continuities of international political life." The selections range among diverse viewpoints through history: from Machiavelli to J. David Singer; from Karl Marx to Hugh Seton-Watson; from Sigmund Freud to Thornton Read; and from George Orwell to Morton A. Kaplan.

948
McKay, Vernon. COOPERATION FOR ORDER IN AFRICA. Current history, v. 50, Mar. 1966: 129-134, 178. D410.C82, v. 50

Four security subsystems--the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations in Africa, bilateral defense agreements with great powers, and inter-African bilateral security arrangements--together comprise an ad hoc system for African security and order. Domestic instabilities and specific interstate conflicts such as the hostility between black Africa and the Portuguese territories, South Africa, and Rhodesia as well as the practice of aiding insurgents in neighboring countries complicate the task of creating order and security. The OAU has played a deterrent role and contributed to the settlement of some border disputes, but has had little success in dealing with subversion. It is difficult to judge the effectiveness of the United Nations in maintaining African security by example of its one experience--the Congo. African leaders are cautious about a future U.N. role in their continent. France has signed treaties with 11 African countries, most of which permit the African state to request French assistance for internal or external defense. But the French consider these arrangements "neither a right for Africans nor a duty for France." Two other bilateral defense arrangements (Britain-Libya, U.S.-Liberia) have never been called into action. To date there have been few bilateral security agreements between African states; perhaps the reported Kenya-Ethiopia pact of 1963 to cooperate against Somalia's irredentist threat signifies a future trend. "Africa's means of ensuring security and order thus remains ad hoc and unsystematic, with large gaps and discontinuities in its machinery."

949
Mates, Leo. CAUSES OF TENSION AND OUTLOOK FOR IMPROVEMENT. Review of international affairs, v. 16, Nov. 20, 1965: 5-7. D839.R4, v. 16

Responsibility for the worsening situation in Southeast Asia belongs not solely to Communist China but also to the tension and conflict generated by the process of decolonization the area is undergoing. Great and turbulent struggles are being waged inside the emerging countries as they move toward ethnic, political, and social independence. The "creation of nationhood" is difficult to achieve in Southeast Asia, for the colonial system was such that the imperial powers exerted influence on every aspect of life. "Decolonization is, therefore, not simply emancipation from foreign power but a profound renaissance and the initiation of a many-sided revolution encompassing all the historical transformations and dislocations through which the nations of Europe passed in the last few hundred years." Economic growth, a necessary element in the process of decolonization, can be a major source of tension and conflict within each country and oftentimes between the several Asian countries. Expansion of the developing countries' interests into neighboring regions tends to exacerbate existing tensions. Conflicts are not confined to relations among the developing countries. Friction exists between the industrially advanced and the emerging countries. In some instances clashes between the liberation movements in Asia and Africa and the industrialized states of the West have resulted in armed conflict. The industrialized nations should remember that the emerging countries must receive economic and social assistance as "a genuine international action designed to solve the crucial problems of the world economy." When aid is given for political interests, political tensions are only increased. The various conflicts in Southeast Asia have one thing in common: "their source must be sought in a mutually interdependent complex of problems, in the over-all trend noticeable in that part of the world today." While Communist China is in a position to aggravate these tensions, its policies in Southeast Asia are not the main source of the conflict there. To destroy or defeat China as the source of conflict would be destructive to Southeast Asia itself and would probably bring about general or nuclear war. In the eyes of smaller nations the

efficacy of China's position in Asia lies in its link with the great powers. China's apparently disruptive behavior should not create in the rest of the world a self-defeating attitude toward easing tensions in Southeast Asia. Positive economic and social activity with a view toward coexistence can reduce tensions in Asia and assist China in acquiring legitimacy in the international community.

950
Meutter, Léon de. [PEACE, ATTEMPT AT A DEFINITION] La paix, tentative d'une définition. Europe en formation, no. 66/67, Sept./Oct. 1965: 20-21.
P&GP RR

Defines true peace as an internal phenomenon, internal to the individual, state, or world. A veritable noninternal (international) peace cannot exist except as a diplomatic fiction. Also, internal (national) peace is a false peace in a pluralistic era of sovereign and armed nation-states. Such a pluralistic system alternates between war and false peace, which is frequently called armed peace, cold-war peace, or between-war peace.

951
Moussa, Farag. [CONTEMPORARY DIPLOMACY: BIBLIOGRAPHIC GUIDE] Diplomatie contemporaine: guide bibliographique. Geneva, Centre européen de la dotation Carnegie pour la paix internationale, 1964.. 199 p. LL

A select, annotated bibliography on the practice of diplomacy, with emphasis on works published in the new states and after 1944-45. Fifteen languages are represented, with approximately three-fourths of the works cited appearing in English or French. The bibliography is preceded by a section on the general state of the literature in several subject areas, including diplomatic law and practice, classic bilateral diplomacy (e.g., embassies, diplomats, negotiation), contemporary bilateral and multilateral diplomacy (e.g., summit and minister-level diplomacy, special missions, commercial and economic diplomacy, international conferences and organizations), special problems (e.g., protocol, language, military attachés), Afro-Asian diplomacy, and Soviet diplomacy.

952
[PREREQUISITES FOR PEACE] Conditions de la paix. France-Inde, v. 15, 3d quarter, 1965: 14-15.
P&GP RR

No expert's theory based on economics, politics, sociology, or religion, however technically perfect, will achieve peace. To implement such a theory would require force, which is a contradiction of peace. To rely on systems for creating peace is to abdicate individual responsibility for building a prerequisite inner peace. War is caused by man's enslavement to worldly goods and ideologies, religious, political, national, etc. Your daily behavior is what will decide whether there is peace or war in the world. The problems of the world are your problems on a bigger scale. "The way to peace is simple. It is the way of truth and love." These conditions cannot exist where there are beliefs and dogmas.

953
Ratcliffe, A. L. [THE MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION AT THE YEAR'S END: A REVIEW AND OUTLOOK] Die militärpolitische Lage am Jahresende: ein Rückblick und Ausblick. Wehrkunde, v. 14, Dec. 1965: 613-623. U3.W396, v. 14

In 1965 little progress was made toward solution of significant military-political problems or toward a reduction of tension in the world's trouble spots. Technology has cheapened and simplified the production of nuclear weapons, and with over 700 atomic reactors in operation the production of fissile materials for military use can scarcely be prevented. Military expenditures have increased, while three-fourths of the world goes hungry. The Geneva disarmament negotiations have proven futile--nuclear nations refuse to renounce their weapons and technologically advanced nonnuclear nations will not sacrifice their nuclear potential without a reciprocal gesture from the great powers. The split in the Western camp has deepened and it becomes increasingly difficult to reconcile policy divergencies between nuclear, powerful nonnuclear, and small states. Except for the German problem the major foreign policy efforts have been shifted to arenas beyond European borders. The Communist bloc is also breaking out of its mold, and Eastern Europe is seeking a renewed relationship with Western Europe. NATO's periphery is beset with problems--Cyprus, internal strife in Greece, Turkish overtures to the Soviet Union, Iberian instabilities, and uncertainty about Arab developments. China is strong, confident, and imbued with the idea of the revolution. SEATO appears meaningless, while Asia is in the throes of a change apparently unpropitious for the West. African and Latin American countries are in various stages of disarray and threatened by revolution. Despite the gloomy picture, calculated general war is improbable. But escalation of peripheral conflicts is a distinct possibility. The old image of the world has become unreal, but the search for a new truth is bringing unpredictable dangers to the fore.

954
REGIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. Indian journal of political science, v. 27, Oct./Dec. 1965: 167-254. JA26.I5, v. 27

Papers presented at the 27th "Indian Political Science Conference, Mysore, 28th, 29th & 30th December 1965."

Contents. --In defence of regionalism in international affairs, by B. L. Garg. --Regionalism and world peace, by V. P. Gupta. --Regionalism and the U.N., by T. N. Pant. --NATO's role in world affairs, by C. Devadanam. --The Middle East organisations: a critical review, by S. C. Bhowmick. --The League of Arab States, by Sushil Chandra Singh. --Economic regionalism, E. C. M. and international relations, by B. B. Jena. --Prospects of European integration, by Biswamohan Misra. --Pakistan, pacts and Kashmir, by Surendra Chopra. --Islam in international politics, by Narayan Hazary. --Regional pacts and India, by R. K. Das. --S.E.A.T.O. --a regional defence plan, by R. H. Sharan.

Covers the history, characteristics, and implications of regional arrangements in general and describes specific cases. The papers represent one of three groups of essays resulting from the 27th Indian Political Science Conference.

955
Research Conference on Behavior in Organizations, University of Georgia, 1962. STUDIES ON BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS: A RESEARCH SYMPOSIUM. Edited by Raymond V. Bowers. Athens, University of Georgia Press [1966] 364 p.
HD38.R39, 1962

Partial contents. --Organizations: basic issues and a proposed typology, by Paul P. Van Riper. --Relations among organizations, by Harold Guetzkow. --A social psychological approach to the study of negotiation, by Joseph E. McGrath. --Leviathan: an experimental study of large organizations with the aid of computers, by Beatrice K. Rome and Sydney C. Rome. --Putting organizations research to use, by Cecil E. Goode.

Papers presented at a conference sponsored jointly by the University of Georgia's Social Science Research Institute and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research. The conference reflects the Air Force's deep interest in research on "the nature of human organizations from small aircraft crews on the one hand to large, potentially hostile nation-states on the other." Van Riper's contribution proposes a typology of organizations with reference to 11 basic organizational variables. A typology of interaction between organizations is the focus of Guetzkow's paper. McGrath first defines the process of negotiation, then discusses three primary strategies available for studying it, and finally presents a conceptual framework and an experimental paradigm for carrying out such studies. A computer-simulation program for analyzing large-scale organizations is described by Beatrice and Sydney Rome. Cecil Goode's paper, the last in the volume, offers suggestions for utilizing organizational research and outlines the organizational problems of the Federal Government and of Government-sponsored research projects.

956
Rummel, Rudolph J. A FOREIGN CONFLICT BEHAVIOR CODE SHEET. World politics, v. 18, Jan. 1966: 283-296. D639.W57, v. 18

Sets forth and explains the categories used in a code sheet designed to record and systematize data gathered regarding foreign conflict behavior, such as the severance of diplomatic relations, border clashes, withdrawal of aid, and threats.

957
Schwarzenberger, Georg. POWER POLITICS: A STUDY OF WORLD SOCIETY. 3d ed. New York, Praeger [1964] 614 p. illus., map. (The Library of world affairs, no. 18) JX1308.S35, 1964a

Partial contents. --Tactics of international politics. --The functions of international law. --The functions of international morality. --The dialectics of peace-making. --Peace-making in 1919. --The United Nations: basic decisions. --The United Nations: the pacific settlement of international disputes. --The United Nations: collective security. --The United Nations: regulation of armaments. --The United Nations: functional international co-operation. --The United Nations: protection of human rights. --The United Nations: international trusteeship. --World society under the United Nations: structure and trends. --Peace studies.

Treats the pacific aspects of international politics in historical perspective, as well as exploring more generally the relations between sovereign states.

958
Scott, Andrew M. THE REVOLUTION IN STATECRAFT: INFORMAL PENETRATION. New York, Random House [1965] 194 p. (Studies in political science, PS51) JX1395.S35
"Selected Readings": p. 177-186.

Comprehensively analyzes the growth of informal relations between nations as a development that has "changed the nature of the modern state and altered the functioning of the nation-state system." In a time when national boundaries have become "porous," the techniques of informal penetration give the cold war its unique flavor. First laying down the theoretical groundwork for his discussion, the author goes on to examine informal attack, as exemplified by the Nazi and Soviet experiences; the "revolution in American statecraft," with its proliferation of participation in international organizations and its ventures into covert and overt political interference in the affairs of other nations; and the roles played by disloyalty and ideology in informal access. He examines, in conclusion, the impact informal penetration has on the nature of power, patterns of internation conflict and competition, international stability, the role of international organizations, and the nature and functions of both the nation-state and the nation-state system.

959
Sikorskii, Vsevolod M. [THE WORLD REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL-REFORMISM] Mirovoi revoliutsionnyi protsess i sovremennyi sotsial-reformizm. Minsk, Nauka i tekhnika, 1965. 432 p. HX314.S55

Contents. --Modern right-wing social-democracy and its ideological-political positions. --The revolutionary character of the modern epoch and its reflection in the crooked mirror of reformism. --Reformist fabrications concerning social relations in the Socialist nations. --How reformist theoreticians have "eliminated" the worst defects of capitalism. --War and revolution: peaceful coexistence according to the reformists. --Right-wing Socialists and the national liberation struggle of peoples. --Reformist "forecasts" of the future and the main road of mankind.

In conditions where social revolution has become a practical matter for hundreds of millions of people, the social reformists are seeking new ways to struggle against the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution and are carrying out this struggle on a scale much broader than before. This book is intended as a criticism of Western European right-wing social-democratic views on the question of the character, essence, and importance of the most important revolutionary processes, which constitute the main content of the contemporary epoch. The author has devoted particular attention to denouncing those conceptions and arguments recently advanced by the right-wing leaders of European social-democracy to pervert or refute the 1960 statement of the Communist Party and the new program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. (Translation of supplied summary)

960
Sommer, Theo. [WORLD POLITICS IN THREE CIRCUS RINGS: COEXISTENCE AND CONFRONTATION OF THE GREAT POWERS] Weltpolitik in drei Manegen: Koexistenz und Konfrontation der Grossmächte. Die Zeit, v. 21, Feb. 15, 1966: 1. AP30.Z39, v. 21

Of the three cold wars going on today--the Western-Soviet, the Sino-American, and the Sino-Soviet--the latter two will influence the world situation more than the former. Despite the expected escalation of the Sino-American cold war and the almost-imminent break in diplomatic relations between Moscow and Peking, there is little chance in the foreseeable future for a Soviet-American alliance against China. How-

ever intensification of the Sino-Soviet and the Sino-American conflicts will probably ease Western-Soviet tensions--the original cold war. At first the Soviet Union will most probably continue its policy of selective coexistence with the West, viz "coexistence on some fronts, conflict on other." Due to Russia's competition with China for world Communist leadership, it can hardly afford full cooperation with the West, especially in Vietnam. A possible expansion of the Soviet-American confrontation to Southeast Asia might transpose the Washington-Moscow stalemate to that part of the world. When the decision had to be made, America neglected timely consultations with its European allies on whether the Vietnamese War should escalate. Today the containment of Red China lies very much in the interest of Europe, and the European interest requires sharing in the decision as well as the responsibility of executing it. Certain lessons from the original cold war may be applied to that in Asia. First, Communist expansion cannot be limited without the presence of American armed might in the threatened area. A local effort to withstand the Communist threat is the second necessity. Finally, the West must exercise caution "not to humiliate the expansionist power or threaten its very existence," so as not to limit the possibility of favorable changes in the enemy's attitudes. The duty of Europeans is to counteract dogmatism in the conduct of the cold war in Asia. This they can do most effectively by criticizing the modalities rather than the principles of that war, which they should recognize as being in their best interest.

961
Vernant, Jacques. [THE VIETNAMESE CRISIS AND THE NUCLEAR DILEMMA] La crise du Vietnam et le dilemme nucléaire. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Jan. 1966: 132-136.
D410.R45, v. 22

In coming years two related problems will dominate international relations: the Asian situation and its effects on U.S.-Chinese and U.S.-Soviet relations; and the claims of nonnuclear powers for nuclear weapons. No one knows where the Vietnam crisis will end and what complications it will engender, but Europe will certainly feel its effects. As long as this war continues the Soviet Union will refuse to sign a nonproliferation agreement with the United States. Washington wants to resist the German pressures that would make a nonproliferation treaty impossible, but it also is trying not to clash with Germany. Using delaying tactics, Washington is trying to convince Britain and France to accept a nonnuclear status so that equality within NATO can be reestablished. The situation is one of expectation. France, Britain, and the United States have the same objectives; for the sake of peace they should be able to coordinate their policies. But a more general improvement depends primarily on U.S.-Soviet relations.

962
Vorob'ev, N. N. [SOME METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF GAME THEORY] Nekotorye metodologicheskie problemy teorii igr. Voprosy filosofii, v. 20, Jan. 1966: 93-103. B8.R9V6, v. 20

Discusses methodological considerations of game theory, taking into account certain philosophical considerations of chance, probability, and the like. The problem of antagonism in gaming (when both sides are equal and diametrically opposed in their interests) is given particular attention.

963
Weizsäcker, Carl F. von. [ABOUT WORLD POLICY PROGNOSES] Über weltpolitische Prognosen. Europa-Archiv, v. 21, Jan. 10, 1966: 1-15.
D839.E86, v. 21

Lecture delivered Dec. 6, 1965 in Bonn to the German Foreign Policy Association's Study Group Dealing with Arms Restrictions, Arms Control, and International Security Problems.

The reliability of the analytical methods employed for political prognostication--and ultimately the accuracy of the prognosis--is a function of the time-span between the present and the projected future. An analysis of the existing possibilities (i.e., the next few decades) has at its command methods far more precise than those available for forecasting the distant future. The further appraisals go in the attempt to sketch future horizons, the weaker appear the premises on which they rest. But between these dim outlines and the vivid shapes of the immediate future is a vast area offering a special kind of perspective for prognostication of possible political strategies. The world's present state of being, qualitatively speaking, has little in common with a reliable world peace. Yet "the final occurrence of an institutionally secured peace is almost inescapable." Present forms of power politics are quite distinct from those of the past. It follows that they differ radically from future ones. Prognostication for the present era of insecure world peace requires, for the most part, only contemporary concepts of power politics. All modern major forms of that system of politics--hostile bipolarity, multipolarity, and cooperative bipolarity--tend to repeat themselves in turns. Inherent in the cycle are both the danger of a world catastrophe and the chance for a permanent stabilization of world peace. One may assume that the great divergency of estimates on the likelihood of world war will persist throughout the next several decades. It will be accompanied by a strong awareness among the world's leading statesmen of the awful risk the outbreak of such a war would represent for all powers. One may presume therefore a progressive intensification of peace efforts, rather than their relaxation, by all world powers. But lacking certainty that this will actually happen, the West should at least attempt to retain those elements that have proven conducive to peace. And the most important of these elements for our time lies in consolidating the bipolar balance of power to assure (and perhaps improve) such imperfect stability as has already been gained. With regard to Germany's future it should be generally realized that the hostile bipolarity of the world balance of power and the reunification of Germany are mutually exclusive. On the other hand, a multipolar loosening of the presently congealed status quo in Europe, a policy pursued by De Gaulle, leads nowhere without full Soviet support, which is unlikely to occur.

964
Wolfenstein, E. Victor. VIOLENCE OR NONVIOLENCE: A PSYCHOANALTYIC EXPLORATION OF THE CHOICE OF POLITICAL MEANS IN SOCIAL CHANGE. [Princeton, N.J.] Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1965. 45 p.
HM281.W65

Explains the personality factors involved in the use or non-use of violence by political leaders. The cases of Gandhi, Nasser, and Lenin are discussed in terms of early-life experiences. General propositions that can be drawn from these cases are that "for any given individual, (a) the lower the level of active guilt, the

greater the propensity to use violent means; (b) the greater the degree of masculine identification, the greater the propensity to use violent means; (c) the greater the perceived dangerousness and animosity of the enemy, the greater the propensity to use violent means."

965
Zinn, Howard. THE HEALTHFUL USE OF POWER. American journal of orthopsychiatry, v. 36, Jan. 1966: 90-95. RA790.A1A5, v. 36

"Presented at the 1965 annual meeting of the American Orthopsychiatric Association, New York, New York."

Institutional change can be effected in any of three ways: war, revolution, and gradual reform. War can be considered as violence from without, revolution as violence from within, and gradual reform as deferred violence. War prior to the nuclear era, although costly in terms of destruction and death, could be rationalized in terms of social ends. Costs and consequences were measurable. With the advent of the hydrogen bomb no social change, however desirable, is worth the toll of an atomic war. Revolutions have historically been less costly than wars, and their "relatively small amount of violence" considered worth these costs. But in the modern world popular uprisings are not feasible. Revolutions can no longer be contained; they invariably affect the context of international affairs and involve confrontations of hostile major powers. Thus revolution, too, has been eliminated as an instrument of social change. The American system has been said to epitomize the remaining means, gradual reform. Yet the United States has solved most of its major social and economic problems through some of the bloodiest upheavals of modern times (the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, and many labor riots). Parliamentary or legislative reform has proved chimerical. It may well be that power as it is used by the civil rights movement--to effect the greatest change with the least harm through direct nonviolent action--is the only technique left to man in his quest for self-realization.

B. FOREIGN POLICIES OF STATES AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. General Analyses

966
[AFTER MR. EBAN'S VISIT: ARMAMENT IS NOT THE PRINCIPAL QUESTION WRITTEN ON THE AGENDA] Après la visite de M. Eban: armement n'est pas la principale question inscrite à l'ordre du jour. Observateur du Moyen-Orient et de l'Afrique, v. 10, Feb. 4, 1966: 3-4. DS41.02, v. 10

In Paris Israeli and French Foreign Affairs Ministers Eban and Couve de Murville considered the possibility of a Tashkent-type solution for Middle Eastern difficulties. Mr. Eban emphasized diplomacy, leaving the question of weapons (at the moment Israel's troubles stem not from procurement hardships, but from the increasing activities of traveling arms salesmen) to the Defense Ministry. In Washington he will seek a clarification of U.S. Middle Eastern policy. This he feels is especially necessary in the light of President Johnson's proposal (advanced in his message to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament) of a stronger security system for states that renounce nuclear weapons. Israel and the United States have both indicated interest in mediation in the Middle East, perhaps led by the United Nations. The Arab countries, however, and especially Egypt, have displayed considerable hostility toward such Tashkent-style initiatives.

967
Akademiia nauk SSSR. Institut istorii. [FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS TODAY: AN ANSWER TO FOREIGN AUTHORS] Vneshnepoliticheskie problemy sovremennosti; otvet zarubezhnym avtoram. Edited by A. N. Krasil'nikov, A. M. Nekrich, and A. O. Chubar'ian. Moskva, Nauka, 1964. 251 p. D644.A455

Partial contents.--On some enemies of general and complete disarmament, by V. M. Khaitsman.--Flimsiness of the American theory of "arms control," by Iu. M. Sheinin.--Anticommunism in American historiography of the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R., by B. I. Marushkin.--On the arguments of the enemies of a peaceful settlement in Europe, by I.S. Kremer.--For an end to the "cold war," for disarmament, peaceful coexistence, and cooperation of states, by V. G. Poliakov.

A collection of essays intended to correct the statements of those Western historians, publicists, and political figures who "try to distort the position of the Soviet Union on cardinal problems of foreign policy today and to embellish the actions of the Western powers." Western works on disarmament, foreign policy, military strategy, and nuclear deterrence are cited extensively and criticized.

968
Clair-Louis, Jean. [COMMUNISM AGAINST COMMUNISM] Communisme contre communisme. Revue militaire générale, no. 10, Dec. 1965: 625-641. U2.R48, 1965

Includes summaries in English and German.

Two different civilizations and races (the Russians and the Chinese) are embroiled in a bitter duel. In the 19th century the old Chinese empire was the loser, but since the world wars China has learned its lessons well. Peking is the extremist ready to use any means; unlike the Soviet Union it is represented by a respected and powerful Marxist. The nuclear bomb, primarily an answer to U.S. nuclear threats, strengthens China's position in its rivalry with the Soviet Union over Outer Mongolia. Chinese troops, the Soviet commanders know, are capable of quickly crossing the Soviet border. That a modern army would attempt this is improbable, but the thought of infiltration scares the Kremlin's marshals. One further reason for this fright is the demographic disequilibrium that will eventually compel China to pour its human surplus into Outer Mongolia and southeast Soviet territory. Nonetheless Soviet aid continues to flow (though China pays a price), because to abandon China means to open the door to the United States. Disequilibria between rich and poor communism "constitute the threat of certain war in Southeast Asia and the world," unless the West hurries to meet the political and economic problems posed by the fact that one out of four people in the world is Chinese. And these Chinese Communists are now hardening their attitudes, growing to detest the sated Westerner, submitting like robots to discipline, and being raised in the tradition of fighting and killing. What to do with these nearly one billion people? First try to know them--through direct contact, discussion, and negotiation--and thereby try to break down the wall of distrust erected against "barbarian" foreigners.

969
Fleming, D. F. THE FAILURE OF COLD WAR I. War/peace report, v. 6, Feb. 1966: 5-9.
P&GP RR

Reviews six current books on the cold war, U.S. atomic policies, and NATO, and in so doing questions the merit of Washington's postwar policies toward Russia, communism, and the security of the world in general. The United States is blamed for the failure to resolve the present cold war because of its insistence on military solutions to problems that are social or economic. America's expenditures for military assistance to foreign governments as protection against the spread of communism and for its own monstrous defense establishment have in a sense provided the impetus for continuance of the cold war--stage I having been fought with the Soviet Union and now stage II being waged with Communist China. NATO proved an artificial response and presently stands in the way of a solution to the German problem. One solution--that the world community needs a security system that is universal in scope--is given by Richard Barnet and Marcus Raskin in their book, After Twenty Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe. Other books reviewed are: Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam; David Horowitz, The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American Policy in the Cold War; Seymour Melman, Our Depleted Society; Desmond Donnelly, Struggle for the World: the Cold War, 1917-1965; and Charles O. Lerche, Jr., The Cold War . . . And After.

970
Lavergne, Bernard. [VARIATIONS IN GENERAL DE GAULLE'S FOREIGN POLICY EXPLAINED BY THE PERMANANCY OF THE GOAL HE SEEKS] Les variations de la politique du Général de Gaulle expliquées par la permanence du but recherché. Année politique et économique, v. 38, Dec. 1965: 461-469. D410.A6, v. 38

This article was originally written for and published in Blätter für Deutsche und Internationale Politik, v. 10, Dec. 1965: 1029-1033.
D839.B57, v. 10

De Gaulle's foreign policy has been consistently guided by one motive--liberation of Europe from new world political controls. Having failed to attract Great Britain and Germany to policies less dependent on the United States, he turned to the East without breaking ties with his American ally. De Gaulle, "as all intelligent people," never believed in the myth of a Soviet invasion threat in Europe. His attitude toward NATO is, for this reason, difficult to pinpoint. As a military man he does not think weapons can be abandoned and he probably agrees with the doctrine that a European military force for dealing with future dangers is necessary. However he considers an integrated and U.S.-dominated NATO to be unpalatable. Against this background it is important to point out that Germany has erred in alining itself so closely with the United States, because U.S. policy is based on the fiction that the Soviet Union aims at conquest of Europe. What Germany has gained from nuclear weapons installations is not security but assured destruction in a war. Military power cannot advance the reunification goals of the Federal Republic. American policy toward the Soviet Union and NATO and unreasonable German territorial demands have brought the world to an incipient state of war; we must hope the Germans and Americans return to reason before it is too late.

971
Miksche, Ferdinand O. [WHITHER EUROPE?] Was wird aus Europa? Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Feb. 10, 1966: 86-87. U3.W38, v. 10

The contention that General de Gaulle's policies have forced the Federal Republic into a choice between France and the United States is only partly true. In reality the Americans, annoyed by his actions, also bear their share of responsibility for the strained relations between the French and Germans. A future policy for Europe can be built up only around a Franco-German partnership. The main objective of a far-sighted American policy would therefore be to encourage Franco-German cooperation, so as not some day to leave behind a defenceless Europe, with disastrous results for the USA. The preliminary stage towards a "united Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" would be a united Western Europe as equal negotiating partner for the Soviet Union. At the moment, however, the Soviet Union is seeking to prevent the unification of Western Europe and to drive the Federal Republic into neutralism. The Soviets are interested first and foremost in a global agreement with the United States and tend to regard it of secondary importance to exploit de Gaulle's autocratic policies as an instrument to split the Western camp. As a result of misleading propaganda, however, Paris is indulging in the illusion that France is the most popular country in Europe. Out of ignorance, the West often overlooks the fact that the Germans also have many friends in Eastern Europa and that the East has traditionally always occupied the front rank among German interests. The key to the most important German problems now lies in Moscow. (Abstract supplied)

972
Miksche, Ferdinand O. [THE YEARS 1970-1980] Die Jahre 1970-1980. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Mar. 10, 1966: 151-155. U3.W38, v. 10

The hasty decolonization by the West of its possessions in Asia and Africa was premature, and contributed to the inability of most new nations to establish a competent and politically stable government. Having obtained their freedom, the new nations embarked on a thoroughly irresponsible and negative policy of anti-colonialism, which has been considerably exploited by the Soviet Union. Soviet and American policies have focused on these areas, each for different reasons. Both are anticolonialist and both support nationalism: Moscow follows Lenin's advice that nationalism in former colonial countries constitutes the first step toward communism; the United States believes that the nationalist movement will stop communism. Yet most of the Third World countries in their agitation consider the United States to be the utmost example of imperialism. Besides the drastic difference between the standard of living in the West and in the Third World, which is bound to grow, there are ample additional reasons for an ever-increasing unrest in that part of the world. The emotional force the unrest represents is, for the Soviet Union, a more effective deterrent against the West than its own nuclear force. Several factors contribute to the gradual shift of the world's main center of tensions from Europe to Asia, Africa, and Latin America. One seems to be an almost certain prospect that the race between production and hunger on those continents will be won by hunger, and another is the political-military emergence of China as a superpower.

973
Monday Club, London. Foreign Affairs Study Group. THE ROLE OF SUBVERSION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Edited by D. G. Steward-Smith. [London] 1965. 46 p. HX518.S8M6

Outlines the challenge of Communist subversion as nonmilitary in nature but nevertheless highly dangerous and directed primarily against the Third World. The study, which is to be submitted to the Conservative Party Foreign Policy Committee, asserts that diplomacy, trade, indigenous Communist Parties, international organizations, non-Communist political parties, peace movements, neo-imperialism, trade unions, youth organizations, cultural activities, propaganda, police and armed forces, communications, national minorities, geographical location, and "anti-anti-communism" are all potential instruments of Communist subversion. The techniques employed by the Communists in Czechoslovakia and Zanzibar are analyzed as illustrating "subversion in action."

974
Needler, Martin C. UNDERSTANDING FOREIGN POLICY. New York, Holt, Rinehart, & Winston [1966] 280 p. E744.N4

Seeks to contribute more to a general understanding of foreign policy than to a detailed knowledge of it. The author's lectures on American policy provided him with the approach for this book, which is "designed to serve the interested layman as well as the undergraduate as a general introduction" to the subject.

975
Prague. Ústav pro mezinárodní politiku a ekonomii. FOREIGN POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT, 1964. Prague, Institute of International Politics and Economics [1964] 62 p. JX5371.P75

Contents. --Conditions of origin and development and the content of the policy of non-alignment, by Jiří Štěpanovský. --The main features of Indian foreign policy and the struggle for the conception and application of the principle of non-alignment, by Jindřich Kovář. --The evolution and role of non-alignment in the policy of the African states, by Václav Opluštil. --New elements in the foreign policy of the Latin-American countries, by Antonín Seifert.

Describes the foreign policy of nonalinement as being proper to those developing countries that are not alined with any particular military, economic, or political bloc and not interested in joining the capitalist world system. These countries are said to favor peaceful coexistence and international cooperation among states of differing social systems.

976
Richthofen, Bolko von. GERMANY'S EASTERN FRONTIER AS DISCUSSED IN RECENT PUBLICATIONS. Central Europe journal, v. 14, Apr. 1966: 117-119. DB200.7.S74, v. 14

Bolko von Richthofen has screened recent news items, articles, pamphlets and books on both sides of the Iron Curtain, registering opinions of both Communist and non-Communist commentators and authors on the crucial issue of Germany's territories East of the Oder and Neisse Rivers, now under Polish administration. He has found that there definitely are responsible Polish writers and officials who share the opinion of men like the late Carroll B. Reece, for example, that Germany should not yield its claim to those areas, that to do so would not further but only delay the cause of international law, human rights and peace and stability in Europe. (Abstract supplied)

2. Unilateral Policies

977
Bobrow, Davis B. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST CONFLICT SYSTEM. Orbis, v. 9, winter 1966: 930-952. D839.O68, v. 9

National history and experience predispose Chinese Communist leaders to structure their perceptions of and reactions to reality in certain ways, and, unless the West understands this highly important background, the formulation of valid policy will be impossible. Based on Chinese leaders' current models of four past wars (the Anti-Japanese War, the People's Liberation War, the Korean War, and World War II) the present analysis proves the Chinese Communist conflict system to contain seven major roles: the major enemy, enemy puppets, the phony ally, the masses, Communist compromisers, the decisive backer, and the protagonist. Largely ignored are the parts played in conflict by international organizations, true neutrals, and true allies. Conflict is enacted in four periods: prelude to the war, period of active defense, period of offense, and outcome. The major role-players act out their patterns of betrayal and heroism until the conflict concludes with changes basically favorable to the protagonist. If current situations are analyzed in this light the Soviets are seen to occupy not the role of decisive backer but phony ally, playing Washington and Peking off against one another to Moscow's advantage. The Vietnamese War fits the model poorly, for the role of decisive backer is unoccupied and the conflict is occurring outside the homeland of the protagonist. Chinese leaders are thus deferring their decision and hoping that the 1965 American buildup represents merely a final offensive. The United States can turn the structure of Chinese perceptions to its own advantage by realizing that negotiation will be accepted only during the first or third stage of conflict and will be viewed as a show of weakness during the second, or offensive, period. U.S. policymakers must also be aware that the role of mediator is not recognized by Chinese Communist leaders; accommodation will require direct contact.

978
Chavichvily, Khariton. [U.S.S.R., SECOND RUSSIAN EDITION OF THE MONGOL EMPIRE]. L'URSS seconde édition russe de l'empire mongol. [Geneva] Perret-Gentil [1965] 47 p. DK266.C42

Condemns the oppression practiced by the Soviet Union and maintains that its "peaceful coexistence" is a time-gaining ruse during which the Communists can confuse and undermine democracies. The danger is that fear and demoralization, partially caused by pacifist propaganda and disarmament conferences, are duping people. The solution is for the West to unite in firmness and to accept peaceful coexistence with the condition that the right of self-determination be granted to the Soviet Union's subject peoples. To concede to Soviet blackmail will not save the peace but will increase the likelihood of war by instilling confidence in the Russian adventurers.

979
Cleveland, Harlan. THE OBLIGATIONS OF POWER: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. New York, Harper & Row [1966] 168 p. E840.C6

Because of its great power the United States cannot (and should not) escape global involvements. Its task is to create "a workable world order." The threat of a large-scale nuclear war seems almost to have disappeared, but a world of small wars has evolved as the alternative. Americans, to avoid employment of their ultimate weapons, "must constantly be using more limited forms of power, serving (sometimes without being invited) as the world's leading peacemakers and peace-keepers." The United States is probably the only nation technically and politically capable of this action. The policeman's role, essential in any civilized society, is one that can be shared, and the United States must seek to "widen the community of the concerned" and bring other nations into the peacekeeping effort. Since the Truman administration America has sought to contain communism while expanding freedom and human rights (the "underdeveloped area of international relations"). Increasingly there is hope for success in this endeavor. How can the United States foster peace in a world characterized by diversity? Peace must be viewed as a "process" of growing cooperation (rather than as a single job or goal) to be achieved pragmatically--the settlement of a boundary dispute, a standing international peace force, a common market, a hunger or literacy campaign, and many other "urgent and obvious" steps. The functional approach to international cooperation is the most promising. Especially urgent are the issues of disarmament and nuclear-weapons proliferation. These are problems "beyond ideology." A major U.S. task is to frustrate the world's leaders who rely on force to further their ambitions. For this the United States requires "international force in the service of international law." U.S. responsibilities in the coming years are enormous--to "convert the Soviet Union to peaceful cooperation, to prevent or regulate the spread of nuclear weapons, to tame Far Eastern Communists, and to codify and enforce the ethic of mutual intervention." Also to be dealt with are "the growing gap between the rich and the poor countries, the need for some regulation of population growth, as well as the problem of building the institutions of cooperation."

980
Coddington, Alan. POLICIES ADVOCATED IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS BY BRITISH NEWSPAPERS. Journal of peace research, no. 4, 1965: 398-404. graphs. AS9.J6, 1965

Examines "the extent to which various types of solutions to conflict situations are advocated by British national daily morning papers in their editorials" and compares "the distributions of different types of solution advocated in domestic affairs and in foreign affairs." Eight papers were sampled. Solutions were graded on a six-valued scale.

981
Fulbright, James William. THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA. Minority of one, v. 8, May 1966: 13-16. AP2.M55985, v. 8

"Full text of Senator Fulbright's statement, made on March 7, in connection with the hearings on China which opened the following day before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which Mr. Fulbright is Chairman."

Traces China's relations with the Western imperialist powers during the 19th century. Senator Fulbright attempts to show how greatly China's humiliation under Western hands has influenced the attitude of its Communist leaders toward the West and prepared the way for the belligerence and hatred now directed toward the United States. "It is of great importance that we try to learn something more about the strange and fascinating Chinese nation, about its past and its present, about the aims of its leaders and aspirations of its people." The shortage of experienced experts on Chinese affairs in the U.S. Government is deplorable. The growing tendency of Americans to think of the Chinese people not as human beings but as a menacing abstraction and the Chinese habit of regarding the United States as "the embodiment of an evil idea" threaten to produce a military confrontation between the two nations. "The Chinese today, like Americans a hundred years ago, are in an agitated and abnormal state of mind. It is not only within our means but, as a great and mature nation, it is our responsibility, as U Thant so wisely pointed out, to try to understand the causes of China's agitation and to try to find some remedy." It is for the purpose of providing a forum through which the American people and the U.S. Government can increase their knowledge of China that the Committee on Foreign Relations has undertaken the public hearings on Communist China.

982
Furniss, Edgar S. FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER DE GAULLE. Current history, v. 50, Apr. 1966: 209-213, 242-244. D410.C82, v. 50

De Gaulle's approach to the world is simple--it is made up of sovereign states which alone "set events in motion, for good or for ill." France was ignored in the past because it failed to utilize its capacities fully. It has a worldwide mission and responsibility--to establish general peace--toward which De Gaulle is aiming with "vigor" and "consistency." The United Nations should be organized in accordance with the law of sovereignty. Independent actions taken by individual members in the name of the United Nations are not in accordance with the Charter. Because the authoritative Security Council contains the world's powerful states it should seat Communist China. De Gaulle's behavior in the Common Market crisis that began in June 1965 was designed to prove that the only realistic European organization is one built upon cooperation among sovereign states. A more significant stake for the French leader has been the future of the Western alliance. He favors the alliance if organized loosely, while he deplores NATO, which is integrated and a device of U.S. domination. If alliances were loosened and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union included in European functional agreements, a "viable continental system" might evolve. This is the grand Gaullist design. "For all its domestic antidemocratic flavor, Gaullism is far more than a deluded, selfish scheme to resurrect the Europe of the seventeenth century. With logic based on national interest and persistence born of decades of national service, the president sees in a European past, when France was a directing force, a valuable guide to surmounting the dangers of the present, and removing Europe from the list of potential sources for a new and more successful effort at human self-destruction."

983
Grant, Donald. VIETNAM: THE VIEW FROM THE UNITED NATIONS. Progressive, v. 30, Apr. 1966: 18-21. AP2.P8655, v. 30

Criticizes U.S. efforts to bring about a peaceful conclusion to the Vietnam War under the auspices of the United Nations. The author believes that President

Johnson has been less than candid, and that talk about the need for showing good faith when taking negotiating positions implies just that, and nothing more. U.S. rejection of Mr. Thant's suggestions, Mr. Goldberg's inability to convince the President not to bomb North Vietnam, and the Ambassador's switch in support of this aggressive policy have cast doubts in the minds of United Nations members of U.S. intentions. The author concludes it is "high time that Goldberg started to talk sense to the American President, and in terms that Mr. Johnson cannot ignore." General Assembly President Fanfani's role as mediary between the United States and North Vietnam is mentioned.

984

Gt. Brit. Central Office of Information. Reference Division. BRITAIN AND THE UNITED NATIONS. [Prepared for British Information Services. London, 1964] 92 p. JX1977.2.G7A52, 1964

Summarizes Great Britain's participation in the varied activities of the United Nations since its inception. Chapters on "The United Nations and the Cold War" and "United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations" spotlight the roles London has played in attempts to achieve disarmament and to resolve some of the major international crises. Great Britain's position, as expressed by Mr. Wilson, is this: "It is our intention whenever the opportunity arises--or, failing to arise, can be created--to take initiatives in disarmament."

985

Grosser, Alfred. [THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC] La politique extérieure de la Ve République. Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1965. 190 p. DC412.G75

Contents.--Balance sheet of the Fourth Republic.--General de Gaulle's concepts.--Algeria.--From the Community to cooperation.--Franco-German relations.--Europe.--Military policy.--The Atlantic alliance, the U.S.S.R., and China.--Balance sheet and conclusion.--And now.

Traces De Gaulle's foreign policy achievements, which the author deems few and misdirected. "France's post-war foreign policy has been dedicated to the contradictions of a nation that was formerly master of its destiny and able to profoundly influence others' destinies and that is now too imbued with history to be content in the role of a Switzerland but also too limited in economic and military force to be one of the arbiters on the international scene." De Gaulle's foreign policy has not managed to transcend France's limitations. He possesses prestige but little influence. France must renounce present foreign policy goals--"nationalism," "prestige" considerations, and the idea of "freedom of action"--in favor of cooperation and international justice if it is to participate in history's evolution. The author feels his exposition of De Gaulle's foreign policy, a policy that has isolated France, clearly shows the need for a reorientation.

986

Hinton, Harold C. COMMUNIST CHINA IN WORLD POLITICS. New York, Houghton Mifflin [1966] 527 p. DS777.55.H55

Contents.--Background.--Communist China on the world stage.--Communist China as an Asian power.--In conclusion.--Bibliographical note.--Index.

"Represents an effort to understand and communicate as much as possible of what is significant about the important, interesting, and complex subject that is the foreign policy and relations of Communist China." Part 1 of the book examines the roots of China's foreign policy and how it has grown over the past 15 years. In part 2 Maoism, the objectives and instruments of foreign policy, the Sino-Soviet alliance and subsequent dispute, and China's relations with Middle Eastern, African, and Latin American countries are discussed. Communist China's role in Asia, from its participation in the Korean War to its policies in South Asia, makes up the major part of the study. The conclusion deals with the impact of the Chinese nuclear explosion, its relation to the fall of Khrushchev, and the future course of Chinese foreign policy in terms of "a basis for some comments on what steps the United States might take to protect its interests in the face of the Chinese challenge."

987

Hunt, E. L. Roy. THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE. University of Florida law review, v. 18, winter 1965: 398-429. LL

Reviews American interests and policy in the Caribbean with emphasis on the following questions related to the Panama Canal: "(1) Why is the United States discussing a new treaty if it is under no legal compulsion to do so? (2) Why has Panama taken no action to terminate unilaterally the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903? (3) Why has the world community made no move toward internationalizing the Canal, thus assuring the most inclusive possible use of such a vital waterway?"

988

[IMPERIALISM AND WORLD OUTLOOK] Imperialismus und Weltanschauung. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, v. 14, no. 2, 1966: 133-206. B3.D4, v. 14

Contents.--Concerning the relation, in the ideology of German imperialism, between world outlook and the dominant political-social idea, by D. Bergner.--Concerning the crisis of bourgeois philosophy and its ideological development, by W. Heise.--"Industrial society"--ideology and reality, by D. Noske.--World outlook and "critical sociology" in the United States, by I. S. Kon.

Papers delivered in connection with the forthcoming (March 31-April 2, 1966) conference on "imperialism and world outlook" organized by the East German Academy of Sciences' Philosophy Section and by the Philosophy Institute of Martin Luther University, Halle-Wittenberg. In the foreword to the collection Prof. Bergner, representing the organizers, underlines the belief that the development of socialism in the German Democratic Republic is conditioned by fight against the restoration of imperialism in West Germany. "The existence of two states on German soil embodies two antagonistic social systems" and thus constitutes a class struggle, an integral part of which is Marxist-Leninist philosophy's fight against the bourgeois philosophy. Within that context Marxist-Leninist philosophy condemns "the system of ideological preparation for war, including subversion directed against the Socialist States" and ideas.

989

Kerven, Daniel. [PEKING'S PLACE IN THE WHOLE "SOCIALIST CAMP." II. CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY] La place de Pékin dans l'ensemble du "camp socialiste." II. La politique internationale de la

Chine. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Jan. 1966: 15-48. D410.R45, v. 22

The world's most populous nation occupies a delicate geographical position, and this fact is a major determinant of its foreign policy. China borders directly on the Soviet Union and on lands considered a bulwark of U.S. security. One can pose but not answer the question of whether Chinese activity is a sign of aggressive tendencies or simply a preoccupation with security. Chinese-Russian competition is a dominant factor in Peking's relations with its neighbors. This is evident in policies toward nearby Socialist nations--Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam. In these countries China has the advantage of physical proximity, but the Soviet Union can offer more economic and military aid. In the west and south China seeks to normalize relations with Burma, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Pakistan. It is interesting to compare these peaceful efforts with Chinese policies of force carried on in other regional territories. By example Peking tries to demonstrate that it will act in a friendly manner toward those countries that have a positive attitude toward China. "Crises" characterize China's interaction with certain other neighbors--India, Sikkim, Bhutan, Thailand, Indonesia, and Japan. Largely responsible for China's military offensive against India is a wish to embarrass Soviet policy there or to contest the Soviet role in Asia. Moreover, Peking would like to wrest Sikkim and Bhutan from Indian control so as to extend its own influence along the southern slopes of the Himalayas. In Thailand Chinese activity advocating violence has followed the curve of U.S. penetration there. In Indonesia it has recently suffered a serious and lasting setback. Its main concern in Japan is to weaken U.S.-Japanese ties and to thus benefit from Japan's economy. Finally, China is in a state of conflict with its Southeast Asian neighbors, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. More precisely, though, these conflicts are between the United States and China.

990

Khrushchev, Nikita S. [TOWARD THE VICTORY OF REASON OVER THE FORCES OF WAR!] K pobede razuma nad silami voiny! Moskva, Izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1964. 431 p. DK275.K5A495

The speeches, interviews, and writings of Chairman Khrushchev on Soviet foreign policy and the international situation that were published in the Soviet press during 1963. Problems of disarmament and peaceful coexistence are frequently referred to and discussed.

991

Kimche, Jon. [WHAT THE RUSSIANS WANT IN THE MIDDLE EAST: SOVIET STRATEGY AT THE CROSSROADS] Ce que veulent les Russes au Moyen-Orient: la stratégie soviétique à la croisée des chemins. Observateur du Moyen-Orient et de l'Afrique, v. 10, Jan. 28, 1966: 13-14. DS41.O2, v. 10

A survey of the writings of contemporary strategic thinkers shows their basic failure to comprehend what the Soviet Union plans to do, on a global level, to challenge the military (nuclear and conventional), diplomatic, and economic superiority of the United States in the world. Many Western experts estimate that Soviet disadvantages in these areas are great enough to discourage a concentrated effort to overcome some or all of them. Typical of the tendency to neglect Soviet "grand strategy" are two otherwise exceptional works--Thomas W. Wolfe's Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads and Walter Laqueur's Russia and Germany, a Century of Conflict. These authors have painted well some aspects of contemporary Soviet developments but have left unanswered one essential question: "How will the Soviet Union set about establishing an equilibrium of power on the world level?" The Soviet Union is aiming at preservation of the status quo in Europe and equalization of the U.S.-Soviet balance of power elsewhere. Moscow, striving to escape its inferior position, may choose to make the Middle East and Africa "play, in the 20th century, a role similar to that played by the European balance of power in the 19th."

992

Malecki, Alexander. POLISH FOREIGN POLICY AND CO-OPERATION WITH YUGOSLAVIA. Review of international affairs, v. 16, Nov. 20, 1965: 3-4. D839.R4, v. 16

Polish foreign policy aims in two directions: toward Europe in terms of maintaining the integrity of Poland's frontiers, and toward the rest of the world in terms of peaceful coexistence. In Europe Poland is mainly concerned with the "revengeful tendencies" of the Federal Republic of Germany and the possibility that Germany might soon acquire nuclear weapons. To avert the increase of tensions and avoid threats to Poland's security, the sovereignty of East Germany and the existing Oder-Neisse frontier should be acknowledged. Limited arms control measures suggested by Poland--a nuclear free zone in Central Europe, a nuclear weapons freeze, and formal consideration of Europe's security problems--offer other ways to contend with the problem of European security and Germany. Poland's social system, oriented as it is toward the Socialist bloc, has alined Poland with the segment of the world that is struggling for national liberation and independence. Poland feels that the practice of peaceful coexistence is a universal endeavor, not a selective one as some of the Western countries would advocate. "Peace is indivisible" and universally applied coexistence "creates conditions for the elimination of the remains of colonialism, the strengthening of independence of the newly liberated countries, and for the struggle of the working classes for social progress in capitalist countries." In support of these ideals, Poland offers moral and economic assistance to such countries, promotes the work of the United Nations, and seeks universal membership for the Organization. Over the past few years Poland has found it shares a common interest with Yugoslavia in pursuit of peaceful coexistence and lessened international tensions, and has experienced developing relations with Yugoslavia "within the framework of this policy of unity, solidarity, and all-round co-operation with all the socialist countries."

993

Pellissier, Edouard. CHINESE TACTICS IN AFRICA REVIEWED AND CRITICIZED. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations on Africa, no. 334, Mar. 1, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 34,342) p. 1-4. P&GP RR

"CSO: 4500-N."

"Translation of an article . . . in the French-language periodical Lumière (Light), Fianarantsoa, No 1556, 6 February 1966, page 3."

The issue of eventual or actual Chinese "subversion" in Africa has been raised in the wake of recent military coups d'état. Although Peking has aided certain "liberation movements" (in Cameroon, Niger, and Congo-Leopoldville), its role has been exaggerated. Chinese aid is offered for the purpose of gaining a political foothold in selected countries. It is often accused of expansionist plans. More exactly, its aim is to encourage "a relentless struggle opposing 'imperialism' and principally the United States." The existence of guerrilla zones creates a favorable climate for Chinese-style revolution; thus the Rhodesian rebellion aids Peking's cause. Military leaders overthrew the political regimes in the Congo-Leopoldville, Dahomey, the Central African Republic, Upper Volta, and Nigeria in order to "restore reason to agitated opinion." But their efforts will not lead to peace until, among other problems, the Rhodesian crisis is settled.

994
Reynolds, P. A. THE FUTURE OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY. International studies, v. 7, Jan. 1966: 401-418. JX18.I55, v. 7

This paper discusses what Britain's foreign policy should be but makes no predictions on what it will be. A specifically "British" foreign policy "has no future, except in the short run." Great Britain certainly is incapable of assuring its own defense in the thermonuclear age. For security it depends on the United States. Possession of national nuclear weapons lacks purpose, because Britain could not use them without incurring totally destructive retaliation. It is improbable that on Britain's little islands a second strike capacity could survive nuclear aggression. Strategic reliance on the United States does not require political subservience: "The nature of the strategic stalemate between Washington and Moscow among other factors makes possible a spectrum of types of association, from close alliance to virtual non-alignment, only provided that assurance of the ultimate protection of the U.S. deterrent is not lost." Because U.S. protection is assured, strategic considerations need not play as great a role as economic and diplomatic ones. In fact the future health of Britain lies in closer relations with Europe, which is its single greatest trading partner, its partner for the technological and financial cooperation that is necessary for scientific progress, and a potentially open market for the complex manufactures that are Britain's strength. Thus Britain's strategic considerations emphasize relations with the United States and its economic problems call for more emphasis on relations with Europe. "If any conflict should arise the economic arguments would seem to dominate strategics." Depending on the evolution of the Common Market, Britain's relations with the United States, the Commonwealth, and the Communist world will be affected--indeed the likely direction is a loss of foreign-policy autonomy in these areas but a greater voice in European affairs and foreign policies. The British role East of Suez will be shared because "its policy in these areas is properly part of the policy of the European and Atlantic grouping as a whole to which its allegiance must now belong."

995
Shigeharu, Matsumoto. THE FUTURE OF U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS: A LETTER TO AN AMERICAN FRIEND. Japan quarterly, v. 13, Jan./Mar. 1966: 17-26. DS801.J274, v. 13

In Japan certain reservations and the possibility of policy turnabouts (with regard to Vietnam, estimates of the Red Chinese danger, trade with Communist China, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, a settlement of the Okinawa question) irritate that country's relations with the United States. Japanese sentiment is basically antiwar and this, added to doubts about what the United States can accomplish in Vietnam, makes for less than enthusiastic cooperation with the United States. Many fear that prolongation of the Vietnamese War will lead to a U.S.-Chinese confrontation--an event that would split Japan into pro-American and antiwar factions. Dissatisfaction with the 1960 Security Treaty is widespread. Some kind of U.S. umbrella is doubtless necessary, but the holder now shows difficulty "in understanding the psychology of those who shelter under it." Low morale characterizes Japan's Self-Defense Force. The only way to make it live up to its name "would be to allow it, within a fixed area of responsibility, to conduct separate operations of its own." Such a solution requires "very thorough reconsideration of the treaty." Japan would be willing to contribute positively to its alliance with the United States through peacetime economic and technological aid in Southeast Asia. Given the strong feelings the Japanese exhibit against war, what Americans should avoid are demands that might "push the political situation in Japan to the point where stability is lost and cannot be regained."

996
Shmygov, Georgii F. [THE WEAPON OF IMPERIALIST EXPANSION] Orudie imperialisticheskoi ekspansii. Minsk, "Belarus'," 1965. 106 p. HC60.S48

This brochure describes the imperialist policies of the United States toward the developing countries. Indicating the important problems facing liberated countries, it reveals the essence of so-called U.S. "aid." Such assistance in no way helps to resolve these problems but is a simple weapon for the imperialist expansion of state-monopoly capital, aiming at the social-economic and military-political enslavement of these young states and foisting upon them the capitalist way of development. Imperialist "aid" is contrasted with the unselfish, productive assistance offered by countries of the Socialist system, which responds to the basic needs of the young states and the interests of their independence and progress. (Translation of supplied summary)

997
Tütsch, Hans E. DE GAULLE'S POLICY TOWARD THE COMMUNIST EAST. Swiss review of world affairs, v. 15, Jan. 1966: 3-5. D839.S9, v. 15

De Gaulle's policy toward the Communist blocs rests on assumptions "which are partly correct, partly debatable and partly unprovable." His idea of Europe--from the Atlantic to the Urals--is based on a completely outdated geographical concept. His plan for a "Europeanization" of the German question disregards the fact that only the Soviet Union could offer Bonn reunification, "and it would do it in its own and not in France's interest." In the event that West Germany loosened its ties with the United States, Germany would most probably lean on the Soviet Union, the strongest nation in Europe, rather than on France. Although French and Soviet interests run parallel in several areas (e.g., Vietnam) the political realities speak against the "concertation" of their respective efforts. France acting alone is not in a position to tip noticeably the world political balance. De Gaulle's policy toward Peking rests

on the assumption of a possible, even probable, Sino-American confrontation, which he would like to avert. Hence his desire for the neutralization of Southeast Asia. On the other hand he dismisses the threat of war from the Soviet Union as negligible. In sum, these sometimes questionable appraisals of the motivating forces of current history and the present distribution of power may well predetermine the success or failure of De Gaulle's policy.

998
U.S. Dept. of State. Office of Media Services. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: ASSIGNMENT OF THE CENTURY [Washington] Dept. of State; [for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965] [20] p. illus. ([U.S.] Dept. of State. Publication 7948. General foreign policy series, 206)
D844.U49

Commemorates International Cooperation Year with examples of the thousands of ways in which "the greatest part of America's foreign relations activity comes under the heading of international cooperation." These projects include air transportation, water desalination programs, space activities, economic progress, and many foreign exchange programs.

999
U.S. Foreign Service Institute. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS: REPORT ON THE SEMINAR HELD AT THE FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE, JANUARY 11 TO FEBRUARY 5, 1965. Prepared by L. F. Andrieth [and] H.I. Chinn [Washington, 1965] 109 p. Q127.U6A5334

Treats in syllabus form the effects of science and technology on the development and execution of U.S. foreign policy. Included are course objectives and content, evaluation of the seminar, lecture outlines, and selected summaries of the lectures. The lectures themselves were on definitions, principles, and concepts of science, technology, and foreign affairs; applied science in international affairs; and the role of science in international organizations.

1000
Varma, Shanti P. STRUGGLE FOR THE HIMALAYAS: A STUDY IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS. Jullundur, University Publishers [1965] 342 p.
DS480.85.V3

Contents.--Historical background.--Prelude to military invasion.--The Chinese invasion and after.--A reassessment of foreign policies.

Studies the foreign policies and events related to the Chinese invasion of India in 1962. An attempt is made to assess and understand the motivations behind the invasion, the subsequent ceasefire, India's national defense policy and seeming lack of preparedness for the invasion, the impact the invasion may have had on India's domestic policy, and India's role in Southeast Asia.

1001
Zhigalov, I. I. [THE STRUGGLE IN THE BRITISH TRADE UNIONS ON PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE (1955-1964)] Bor'ba v tred-iunionakh Velikobritanii po voprosam voiny i mira (1955-1964). Voprosy istorii, v. 41, Jan. 1966: 66-87. D1.V6, v. 41

The article stresses that Great Britain is the birthplace of trade unionism. The trade union movement in that country has a number of specific features compared with other industrially developed capitalist countries. It can exert a powerful influence on the country's policies, which is of great international significance considering that Britain is the second biggest nuclear power in the Western world and an active participant in Nato. Drawing on extensive factual material, the author gives a concrete historical analysis of the attitude of the trade unions affiliated to the British TUC toward such major international problems as the Suez aggression, the nuclear problem, the struggle for peace and disarmament, etc. The article devotes particular attention to those phenomena in the trade unions which testify to a definite evolution in their attitudes toward war and peace in 1955-1964. Pointing out that the struggle of the British trade unions for peace and disarmament was extremely complicated in character and developed very unevenly, I. I. Zhigalov at the same time shows that their attitude to the political struggle in the period under review signifies a step forward compared with the situation which obtained in the past. Trade-union opposition to the military and political plans of the country's imperialist circles has exerted a definite influence on the serious differences over military and foreign policy, which have been mounting in British society during the past decade. (Abstract supplied)

3. Bilateral and Multilateral Policies

1002
Allen, Richard V. [NEW COMINTERN AGAINST MAOISM?] Neue Komintern gegen den Maoismus? Aussenpolitik, v. 17, Mar. 1966: 182-186.
D839.A885, v. 17

The 30th anniversary of the Seventh Comintern Congress of 1935 gave the Soviets a motive for unfolding their world revolutionary strategy against China and its militant version of communism. In commemorative articles, conferences, and single speeches by leading Soviet theoreticians the principles of the United Front were declared to be valid and timely in today's struggle with the West as when they were adopted in 1935. Furthermore, allusions to the necessity of a new organization modeled after the old Comintern were not lacking. Richard V. Allen, the author of the present contribution, is the head of research at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies, U.S.A., and the Chairman of the Study Program on Communism at that center. (Translation of supplied abstract)

1003
Berger, Peter. [THE PRINCIPLE OF "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" AND THE DANUBE AREA] Der Grundsatz der "friedlichen Koexistenz" und der Donauraum. Der Donauraum, v. 10, no. 4, 1965: 218-224.
DB443.D6, v. 10

A documented analysis of the Soviet bloc's policy with regard to the Danube area--which serves as a testing ground for fluctuations in the Communist doctrine of peaceful coexistence. The author dismisses the possibility of truly friendly international relations in that area as long as ideological and other tensions (largely caused by Communist policy) persist there. He quotes from frequent Communist references to threats to peace in the region.

1004
Catholic Church in Germany. Bishops. [MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 5, 1965 TO THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS OF POLAND] Botschaft der katholischen Bischöfe Deutschlands an die katholischen Bischöfe Polens vom

5. Dezember 1965. Europa-Archiv, v. 21, Jan. 10, 1966: D17-D19. D839.E86, v. 21

Reprinted from the German Catholic News Agency's (KNA) document no. 35, Dec. 7, 1965.

Full text of the German Catholic bishops' answer to the November 18, 1965 message from the Polish bishops appealing for reconciliation between their two peoples. The authors express their hope that relations between both peoples will be influenced by Christian charity and forgiveness. They point out instances of Polish-German cooperation in history and express their regret for injustices done the Polish nation by Germans during wartime. They also recall hardships suffered by the Germans expelled from the Oder-Neisse territories and assure the Polish bishops that the expellees' insistence on "the right to a fatherland" does not carry any aggressive intent with regard to Poland. The message is signed by Joseph Cardinal Frings, Archbishop of Cologne, and by 41 German cardinals, archbishops, and bishops.

1005

Catholic Church in Poland. Bishops. [MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 18, 1965 TO THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS OF GERMANY] Botschaft der katholischen Bischöfe Polens an die katholischen Bischöfe Deutschlands vom 18. November 1965. Europa-Archiv, v. 21, Jan. 10, 1966: D11-D17. D839.E86, v. 21

"Presented at the Second Vatican Council in Rome."

Reprinted from the German Catholic News Agency's (KNA) document no. 32, Dec. 2, 1965.

Full text of the message from the Polish Roman Catholic bishops to their German counterparts appealing for reconciliation between the Polish and the German peoples. The message points out the historical causes of the Polish antagonism toward Germans, and contends that the Oder-Neisse boundary between the two nations "is a matter of existence for Poland." Expressing their hope for Polish-German reconciliation, the Polish bishops stress the common Christian and Western traditions of both nations. The message is signed by Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, Poland's primate, and by 35 Polish archbishops and bishops.

1006

Duroselle, J. B. WHAT HOPE FOR EUROPEAN UNITY? Christianity and crisis, v. 26, Feb. 21, 1966: 22-24. BR1.C6417, v. 26

Careful to distinguish between American "leadership" in Western Europe and Soviet "domination" of Eastern Europe when referring to the "double satellization" of Europe, those who advocate European unity view the task differently. The Eastern and Western boundaries are not precise, and hence it is difficult to define the extent of Europe. Does it consist of the Common Market Six only or does it extend from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains? History demonstrates the diversity of unity that Europe has experienced. For the present, precluding enforced unity, "we are faced with two forms of voluntary unity: complete unity in the form of a United States of Europe [Monnet's or Hallstein's Europe] or incomplete unity, the Europe of the concert, unity in diversity [De Gaulle's Europe]." Monnet's idea--to achieve political integration through economic integration and the Common Market--differs from De Gaulle's concept in that the General will not subordinate political integration to obtain economic integration. "Integration" is an unpalatable word to De Gaulle; he suggests "that a political 'Europe of States' be superimposed on the economic Common Market"; in other words, a concert within which the European states retain their independence. On the strategic level Monnet favors continuance of European dependence on U.S. power; De Gaulle sees Europe as a third force in its own right. Eventually, the answer may come from the East in the form of modification of the Soviet Union's Eastern European policy and opposition towards reunification of Germany. Then there would be no great urgency for a European force "since partnership with the U.S. might be counterbalanced by partnership with a transformed Russia."

1007

Erven, L. FRANCO-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT. Review of international affairs, v. 16, Nov. 20, 1965: 8-9. D839.R4, v. 16

Traces the course of Franco-Soviet relations over the past 75 years. General de Gaulle's current interest in improving relations with the Soviet Union is causing concern to France's Western allies, who interpret the new rapprochement as a divisive element in the Atlantic Alliance. Fear of a militant Germany, a mutual concern of France and Russia, has motivated formal mutual assistance agreements between the two countries. It was West Germany's inclusion in NATO that caused Russia to terminate a previous Franco-Soviet agreement of this type. De Gaulle has been largely instrumental in removing the anti-Soviet feeling in France in anticipation of a new, more friendly relationship. While major policy differences do exist between the two countries, their views of conditions in Europe and those affecting European security--"attitudes towards the problems of emancipation of European policy from American hegemony and towards the German problem"--provide a basis for wider rapprochement. Other European countries are also changing their attitudes toward the Soviet Union. "However, the French revision has a much wider significance, because it is not limited only to the improvement of bilateral relations, as is generally the case with the rest of the European allies, but it also covers the establishment of political co-operation on problems of general international, world, and particularly European significance, making thus an opening, so to say, of the western policy towards the East."

1008

Eschenburg, Theodor. [THE GERMAN QUESTION 1966] Die deutsche Frage 1966. Die Zeit, v. 21, Apr. 12, 1966: 3; Apr. 19: 5-6; Apr. 26: 6. AP30.Z39, v. 21

A scholarly analysis of many aspects of the German reunification problem. Prof. Eschenburg discusses the various ways to achieve reunification, including (1) free elections and (2) gradual confederation of the German Federal Republic with the German Democratic Republic. Confederation would require recognition of the German Democratic Republic by Bonn. Were confederation to come about, the German Democratic Republic would use the system for sponsoring Communist subversion and infiltration in West Germany. Through the maintenance of press censorship it will continue to defend itself against West German political influence on its own territory. The author suggests that the best climate for overcoming East-West differences would be relaxation of tensions, which would require inter alia a state of accommodation between the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. Prof. Eschenburg considers Bonn's overemphasis on legalistic aspects of the problem (e.g. its recommendation that the principle

of self-determination be applied in the German Democratic Republic) to be an obstacle to a viable reunification policy. He concludes that the legacy of two different economic-political systems in an eventually reunited Germany will contribute to prolonged domestic difficulties.

1009
Florin, Peter. [UNITED MUST WE DEFEAT IMPERIALISM] Den Imperialismus vereint schlagen. Einheit, v. 21, Jan. 1966: 103-110.
HX6.E4, v. 21

The forces of peace, democracy, and socialism have grown stronger economically, politically, and militarily during 1965. Recently, increased contacts between the Socialist and capitalist nations of Europe have facilitated "the search for forms and methods" of ensuring East-West peaceful coexistence. The capitalist world, despite its evident economic growth, increasingly has been entangled in imperialist contradictions, of which the present NATO crisis is but one. Bonn's obstructionist policy with regard to East-West coexistence, disarmament, and European security stands in sharp contrast to official British and French manifestations in favor of an East-West détente. In the last year the Communist parties have drawn closer together, with the exception of the Communist Party of Red China. The latter, given to "ultrarevolutionary" phraseology, has tried to split the Communist movement in newly emerged states. The rejection by the Communist Party of China of a proposal to cooperate with the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in formulating a common policy against the United States aggression in Vietnam merely encouraged American imperialism. The Chinese Communist leaders' open efforts to provoke a public controversy within the world Communist movement are opposed by most Communist parties. Peking's policy has lately suffered a number of successive failures due to poor evaluation of the international situation. Chinese policy has been at odds with the "development requirements" of Afro-Asian and Latin-American countries, and by its anti-Soviet direction has damaged "the anti-imperialist forces." The proclaimed political course of Red China is disproportionate to the nation's actual strength and potentialities.

1010
Fontaine, Andre. LE MONDE DISCUSSES FRENCH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. Washington, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1965. 17 p. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 33, 291)
P&GP RR

"CSO: 3801-D."

Translation of a three-part article in Le Monde, Nov. 17, 1965: 1-2; Nov. 18: 8; Nov. 19: 6.
Newsp

Soviet society and the Soviet economy are undergoing changes, but these do not erase the fundamental differences that divide capitalist and Socialist states. What Khrushchev's successors are seeking is a genuine East-West relaxation, one that will permit the diversion of armament investments to other purposes; their major diplomatic and political efforts are directed at maintaining the status quo, i.e. the East European buffer between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist world. Two obstacles bar the way to a U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on the status quo--the war in Vietnam (which China is unwilling to settle because it believes the Russians are waiting only for Asian peace to resume their dialogue with the United States), and the school of thought in Washington that a nonproliferation treaty with Russia would unhappily alienate Germany from the United States. At this juncture France has a role to play. Franco-Soviet rapprochement can be justified by economic considerations, but most importantly by a community of interests on the political level, especially in the case of Germany. France and Russia agree on the Oder-Neisse frontier and on the undesirability of a German nuclear force. Their motives for this agreement differ. Despite the realization that MLF-type proposals were designed to obtain permanent German renunciation of nuclear weapons, the French say that such plans whet German appetites, and the Soviets claim that through such proposals the United States is opening itself to blackmail that will cease only when Bonn has a nuclear arsenal. The French would reward voluntary renunciation with German reunification, while the U.S.S.R. would keep Germany in "a reduced status ad infinitum." Regardless of motives, Moscow can see no harm in cooperating with De Gaulle on discouraging the multilateral force. De Gaulle's flirting with Moscow is a deterrent tactic, intimating to President Johnson what will happen if the MLF or a similar project is pursued. "In the final analysis the development of Franco-Soviet relations depends more on President Johnson, and secondarily on Professor Erhard, than upon General de Gaulle and Mr. Kosygin."

1011
Garder, Michel. [THE FOURTH WORLD WAR] Le quatrième conflit mondial. Stratégie, no. 7, Jan./Mar. 1966: 89-102.
U162.S78, 1966

The 20th century has been characterized by an almost uninterrupted state of conflict that can, however, be divided into four phases: World War I, World War II, East-West cold war, and religious cold war between the Soviet Union and China. The East-West war has evolved into peaceful coexistence; the war between communisms has earned the title of the major world conflict. Generally violence or conflict in the Third World favors the Chinese position, while reconciliation and compromise give the advantage to the Soviet Union. This applies in the case of the Vietnamese War, which is but one of the fronts of the fourth world war. Recently China has suffered losses --pro-Chinese factions have been making little headway--and the U.S.S.R. has increased its prestige at China's expense. "It is difficult to predict how much longer this 'religious cold war' can last. However, in view of its implacable character it could easily come to a close with the end of 'revolutionary communism.' Because of this the fourth world war may constitute the last act of the drama which began in 1914."

1012
Grosser, Alfred. [FRANCO-GERMAN DIFFERENCES] Divergences franco-allemandes. Allemagne, v. 18, Jan./Feb. 1966: 1-23.
DC59.8.G8A59, v. 18

Franco-German relations are in a state of crisis but not near severance. In this case it is difficult to separate misunderstanding from genuine differences. Germany, like other Common Market countries, resents such French diplomatic methods as secrecy and unfriendly diplomatic pressure. More importantly, the political priorities of the two countries diverge. Both advocate European unity, but German security considerations emphasize the Atlantic frame of reference. In France the majority opinion thinks of Europe as an end in itself. France has extra-European ambitions, the drive to make France decisive in world

politics. German politics, on the other hand, are almost exclusively oriented to European problems. For security reasons Germany demands participation in strategic nuclear decisionmaking; France would deny this right in the interests of détente and German reunification. Germany, to be sure, has relaxed its attitude toward Eastern Europe. This thaw in German rigidity has brought its thinking closer to French conceptions, but the process of thawing has been "slowed by the European crisis and the deep distrust that General de Gaulle's global policies inspire."

1013
Hsin, Wen. FRANCO-AMERICAN ANTAGONISM DEEPENS. Peking review, v. 9, Jan. 28, 1966: 18-19. DS701. P42, v. 9

"Franco-American conflict has become the principal contradiction within the disintegrating imperialist camp." Mainly by challenging Washington's hegemony in the Western bloc the French have taken the offensive in this confrontation. France has opposed U.S.-Soviet domination in international relations; it objects to U.S. participation in the Vietnamese War; and it opposes U.S. nuclear policies in NATO, demanding a complete overhaul of the Organization. In 1965 France attacked the gold exchange standard, subsequently withdrew from it, and returned its dollar holdings to the United States for gold. Other European countries followed suit, which action resulted in an outflow of gold that endangered the stability of the dollar in the capitalist world. In the United Nations France refused to share the Congo expenses; General de Gaulle accused the United States of manipulating the resolutions on the Korean aggression; and, in the Security Council, France denounced U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. NATO integration had been a burning issue between France and the United States for some time when, finally, France openly opted for "national independence" and "Europe for the Europeans." De Gaulle has announced that France "will end, so far as we are concerned, the subordination described as integration . . . which places our destiny in the hands of foreigners." France wishes to have nuclear power of its own. It definitely opposes West German accession to nuclear sharing and, ultimately, West German plans for an integrated Europe in which Germany would dominate. In response to West Germany's overtures to the United States in this regard, France turned down Bonn's plan to hold a meeting of the Common Market countries to discuss political cooperation. Washington's attempts to interfere in France's internal affairs were to no avail. "France under de Gaulle cannot be expected to bow to Washington's dictate and play second fiddle to the United States in tackling the problems of Europe."

1014
Huizinga, J. H. DE GAULLE, "FÉDÉRATEUR MALGRÉ LUI?" NATO's fifteen nations, v. 10, Oct./Nov. 1965: 20-22. UA646. F5, v. 10

In spite of recent actions interpreted as tending to fracture the concept of Atlantic unity, De Gaulle may yet be recognized as the force that brought about the unification of Europe. De Gaulle's policy has forced the Europe of The Six to establish a single market for their agricultural products. In doing so the French have created a political web that may prove to be the cohesive force needed to bring about unity. Because the import duties on The Six's agricultural products are in dispute, the Commission of the European Economic Community has suggested that it be given authority to distribute the money from a communal treasury. The French have tried to backpeddle out of this situation, but they may be caught in the web they themselves have spun to advance nationalistic aims. They appear to have strengthened the other European nations' will to proceed with unification plans. At the same time these nations are hoping to blunt the De Gaulle initiative and policies which may ruin Europe's chance to become an equal of America and Russia. De Gaulle's nationalism and crude anti-Americanism will pass with his death, but the catalytic effect of his policies may bring Europe closer to unification.

1015
Imhoff, Christoph von. [A DIALOGUE BETWEEN GERMANS AND POLES] Ein Dialog zwischen Deutschen und Polen. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, Feb. 1966: 100-109. D839. A885, v. 17

A recent memorandum of the Evangelical Church in Germany and an exchange of letters between the Polish and German Catholic bishops have aroused a spirited and sometimes passionate discussion on the present state of German-Polish relations and on the future coexistence of the two nations. Baron Dr. Christoph von Imhoff analyzes these documents together with their backgrounds and points to the necessity of continuing the newly started German-Polish dialogue, which may eventually lead to the normalization of relations between the two nations. Now that Germany has reconciled itself with France and Israel the time has come to do the same with regard to Poland. The Polish-German dialogue has displayed weakness and strength, put some matters right and some wrong. These things must be judged, however, according to their relative values. Nothing has yet been pronounced final, and nothing has been made irreversible. (Translation of supplied abstract, modified).

1016
Luchsinger, Fred. CHRISTIAN BRIDGES ACROSS THE ODER. Swiss review of world affairs, v. 15, Jan. 1966: 6-7. D839. S9, v. 15

Appraises three recent Christian documents calling for a Polish-German reconciliation: the September 1965 memorandum of the Evangelical Church of Germany ("On the Situation of the Expellees and the Relations of the German People with Its Eastern Neighbors"); the December 1965 message from the Polish Roman Catholic bishops, inviting the German bishops to participate in celebrating the millennium of Poland's Christianization; and the German bishops' acceptance of the invitation. The author contends that in a given, completely frozen situation the Church messages constitute an important step toward Polish-German reconciliation on such issues as the boundaries problem and the question of German reunification. He points out that since "the political questions that divide the two peoples have moral roots," a solution of the German-Polish problem is impossible without recognition of this fact. Warsaw's irrationally negative reaction to the Polish bishops' message shows the Polish Government "does not wish to enter on the bishops' proposals of reconciliation and rapprochement, for reasons which obviously must be sought in its solidarity with Moscow and the latter's increasingly heated anti-German campaign."

1017
Madariaga, Salvador de. BOOKS. Swiss review of world affairs, v. 15, Mar. 1966: 19. D839. S9, v. 15

Important for European unification efforts is the elucidation of pertinent political realities. Of these the most recalcitrant problems seem to come from contrasts between British and the Continental institutions as well as deep-rooted differences between the French and the British national characters. A recently published work, Speaking European by W. Horsfall Carter (London, 1965), "is an admirably impartial book, in which the genuine, objective obstacles with which Britain had to contend in order to join an integrated Europe are clearly and cogently set out." Britain's traditionally negative policy toward institutional supranationality stands in sharp contrast to some of its own initiatives for European unification, such as Churchill's call for a Council of Europe, March 21, 1943. De Gaulle's France has displayed a similarly negative attitude toward supranational institutions. But Carter's contention that "for the states possessing powers of decision . . . the national context marks the limits of the scope and range of government" is wrong. He claims that none of the four great powers is "yet disposed to accept coercion by any outside authority." The fact is, however, that in several instances they have. Undiscriminating rejection of all concepts of a European Government, sound and unsound ones, does not solve the problem of sheer anarchy, in which several sovereignties now coexist in Europe.

1018
NATIONAL LIBERATION AND THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE [editorial] Political affairs, v. 45, Feb. 1966: 1-15. HX1. P57, v. 45

Second of a two-part series. Part one, entitled "War and Revolution," was abstracted as item 537 in v. 2, no. 2, of this bibliography.

Lin Piao's article "Long Live the Victory of People's War" (first published in Jen Min Jih Pao, Sept. 3, 1965) is marred by many oversimplifications and erroneous interpretations of modern phenomena. Lin's assertion that each people struggling to free itself from imperialist domination must rely solely upon its own military means, as the Chinese people did in their fight against Japanese aggression, is quite dubious. Just as China could not have emerged victorious over imperialist Japan had not the Axis nations been defeated by the anti-Fascist coalition of world powers, so the people of Vietnam cannot defeat the U.S. military machine without the support and assistance of an anti-imperialist coalition. According to Lin the oppressed peoples are expected to overthrow imperialism through their individual efforts. "The obvious effect of such an approach is to isolate the national liberation struggles from other struggles against imperialism, to divide the anti-imperialist forces." The combined strength of all anti-imperialist forces is essential for success in the national liberation movement. Lin once again is guilty of a universal application of the experience of the Chinese revolution when he declares that anti-imperialist revolutions must be led "by the proletariat and the genuinely revolutionary party armed with Marxism-Leninism, and by no other class or party." Whether a revolution is anti-imperialist, however, hardly depends upon the class or classes directing it. Lin's failure to appreciate the importance of all revolutionary processes also foments divisiveness among the anti-imperialist forces. Most serious is his assertion that Moscow and Washington dream of a Soviet-U.S. arrangement for world domination. "There can be little doubt that the split in the world Communist movement encouraged U.S. imperialism in its decision to escalate the war in Vietnam, and equally little doubt that its continued existence gives further encouragement to this policy." Lin's pessimistic appraisal of the importance of the working masses in imperialist societies--and especially in the United States--is lamentable. With their allies in other nations the American people must deter Washington from actions likely to lead to nuclear war and oppose on a broad scale the war policies of the Johnson administration.

1019
A PLEA FOR PEOPLE'S WAR: PEKING'S MANIFESTO FOR WORLD REVOLUTION. Current scene, v. 3, Oct. 1, 1965. 10 p. P&GP RR

Quotes extensively from a speech by Lin Piao on China's foreign policy, which appeared in Peking Review, Sept. 3, 1965. The author comments on Peking's view that the Asian, African, and Latin American nations should, if necessary, risk "world conflagration or national disintegration for the decreed goal of world communism."

1020
R., G. [THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST BLOC] Le conflit sino-soviétique et le bloc communiste européen. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Mar. 1966: 466-476. D410.R45, v. 22

The ideological and nationalist-political quarrel that is pitting Russia against China is causing repercussions on Socialist Europe's mutual relationships and foreign policies. The dispute has caused the birth of "polycentrism"--Togliatti's heresy a few years ago--which is now the essential rule for the conduct of inter-party relations. The Soviet Union, which formerly relied on constraint, uses persuasion in its dealings with East Europe. Still, the policies of the latter are restricted to a fairly small field of maneuver. Internally each East European state has experienced some changes: a degree of liberalization, forced by the intelligentsia, which plays Moscow against Peking; a weakening of the Communist Parties; the advent of different factions (nationalist, pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese) and a corresponding decrease in stability. The Warsaw Pact has remained politically coherent. In the final analysis all the Eastern European leaders are Communists and aware that their interests are best served by alliance with the Soviet Union. This is especially true in foreign policy issues. The Sino-Soviet dispute has scarcely affected attitudes on the "European question" because "the unanimous desire for security is stronger than that for emancipation." The Soviet Union has developed the practice of augmenting its efforts in the Third World by imposing and directing aid programs from East European nations. Recently these states have shown themselves more reluctant to carry a heavy aid burden. The European Communist bloc is evolving in the direction of a traditional alliance, although for a long time Moscow's domination, albeit in new forms, will continue.

1021
Radmann, Martin. POTSDAM AGREEMENT AND 20 YEARS LATER. [Dresden, Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1965] 48 p. DD259.2.R23

Presents East German arguments that the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement have never been carried out. West Germany is criticized for its rearmament policies, for participation in the NATO defense arrangement, and, particularly, for a desire to obtain nuclear weapons. Walter Ulbricht, Chairman of the

German Democratic Republic State Council, is quoted thusly: "The price of reunification is disarmament, renunciation of revanchism, the establishment of a democratic order in West Germany in which nobody will be expected to live with atom bombs and murderers. The price is restoration of normal relations between the two German states and to the European nations and peoples. This price corresponds exactly with the terms of the Potsdam Agreement on eradicating nazism and militarism."

1022
Ramsey, James A. THE CRISIS IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. Foreign service journal, v. 43, Mar. 1966: 20-22. JX1.A53, v. 43

The confusion and uncertainty besetting the Atlantic alliance is characteristic of the contemporary world. Emotional censure of General de Gaulle will not add to American comprehension of the disruption of cohesion and solidarity in NATO. The United States must realize that the European world today is quite different from what it was in 1949. "Today NATO is no longer a group of like-minded partners in a common enterprise." Historical development treats all alliances, Holy or otherwise, with equal disdain. If an alliance fails to account for changes among its own member nations and in its opposition's forces, that alliance fails to suit the immediate international situation and becomes quite fragile. NATO has succeeded so well that the threat it originally meant to counter--a powerful hostile power with a different ideology--has been altered. Today the problems facing NATO are largely of a political character. The experience of the proposed multilateral nuclear force (MLF) indicates the extent to which exclusive concentration on military problems has aggravated political issues. The MLF would have accorded West Germany a position of priority among the NATO land forces, thereby antagonizing the Soviets and possibly changing the power structure of the alliance. "Obviously it is not in the interests of France, or for that matter of any other NATO member, including the Federal Republic itself, that the Germans should be granted a preponderant role in the armed forces of half a continent so long as their political quarrel with the East remains unsettled." Perhaps a more reasonable approach to the problems of NATO would include temporary shelving of the question of nuclear sharing and concentration on creating a position from which a settlement with the Soviet Union may be achieved. An adjustment of East-West differences no longer seems impossible. The alliance should struggle to overcome its inertia and inhibitions and actively pursue an East-West settlement, "not just as one of several contingencies, but as a definite goal towards which concrete steps can and should be taken as soon as possible."

1023
Roucek, Joseph S. TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AND THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT. Ukrainian quarterly, v. 21, winter 1965: 357-370. DK508.AU66, v. 21

Rival territorial ambitions along the 4,500-mile Sino-Soviet border in Central Asia have traditionally bred tension between the two nations and are continuing to do so. More than just the interests of Moscow and Peking are at stake currently; Central Asian peoples, neither Soviet nor Chinese, are held under the rule of the rival regimes in the region. Local nationalism could erupt on either side of the border at any time. That the border's present form was delineated only very recently presents a further destabilizing factor. Russian imperialism in Central Asia can be traced as far back as the Middle Ages; adventure, escape from the law, and the lure of fur have all pulled Russians eastward. Only Outer Mongolia separates Russia and China in Central Asia. This state is recognized by both nations as independent, but it is in fact a Soviet protectorate. Discrepancies in its border with China as well as in the Sino-Soviet borders are a potential source of trouble. Sinkiang, China's "Wild West," is an area of the highest strategic importance, having provided invasion routes into China throughout history; it is also a hotly disputed Central Asian region where Soviet disruptive influences are continually felt and countered by China. Peking is making increasingly extensive use of the province, moving in Chinese immigrants to assure Chinese influence, and locating many strategic industries in this out-of-the-way region. It is "the focal point of current border trouble." In sum, although a border war between China and the Soviet Union is unlikely to erupt immediately, both countries are highly sensitive about their Central Asian boundaries, and troops have been moved into these regions. The effects of open hostility along the border may be to give "small and weak peoples their chance to realize self-determination."

1024
Schaetzel, J. Robert. [THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND EASTERN EUROPE] L'Alliance atlantique et l'Europe de l'est. Informations & documents, no. 225, Mar. 1, 1966: 4-11. P&GP RR

Cites some of the opportunities in Europe that have been opened to the West as a result of the thaw in the cold war. These include increased East-West trade, possible political rapprochements, and a chance to contribute to the softening of the political environment in the East European nations. However, the author cautions against too great a relaxation in the Western camp, especially as this would affect NATO and united political action.

1025
Ströhm, Carl G. [IS NATIONAL COMMUNISM POSSIBLE?] Ist Nationalkommunismus möglich? Christ und Welt, v. 19, Jan. 7, 1966:3. BR4.C37, v. 19

Assesses a current political trend, among East German Communist intellectuals, toward nationalism. Since no East German national consciousness exists, the movement will eventually have to seek its identification with all-German national feeling and all-German problems, which would tend to draw it away from communism. Given the present balance of power Moscow will never allow "any of its borderland satellite states to be washed away" from the bloc or to repeal communism. On the other hand Moscow will be unable to prevent greater autonomy among East European nations, and this force will someday project itself into the political situation in East Germany.

1026
THE UNITED NATIONS IS AN EXCHANGE FOR US AND SOVIET POLITICAL DEALS. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations of political and sociological information on Communist China, no. 322, Jan. 19, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 33,793) p. 56-61. P&GP RR

"CSO 3575-D."
"Translation of an editorial in the Chinese-language newspaper Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily), Peiping, 27 December 1965, page 4."
Chi Kor

U.S. and Soviet satisfaction with the results of the 20th session of the U.N. General Assembly leads one to believe that this session "has done a great many evil things." Once a tool of U.S. imperialism, the United Nations is now becoming an exchange for political deals between Washington and Moscow. Although Gromyko did deliver a perfunctory speech condemning U.S. aggression in Vietnam, the Soviet representative later had several private conversations with Dean Rusk, in which the two men pledged that their countries would not stir up a crisis in Europe because of the events in Southeast Asia. Thus the United States was given a free hand to divert some of its European forces and supplies to Vietnam. Similar U.S.-Soviet deals have been reached concerning the Dominican Republic and the Indian-Pakistani conflict. For several years now Moscow and Washington have shown their willingness to collaborate in the formation of a U.N. standing army, which they consider an effective instrument for suppressing the world revolutionary movement. Efforts toward ratification of a nonproliferation treaty are intended to preserve a nuclear monopoly for the two powers. When Ambassador Goldberg stirred up an anti-Chinese tide by slandering the Chinese people before the General Assembly, Soviet Representative Federenko responded with a half-hearted speech of only 12 minutes. The imperialists and revisionists have made the United Nations their instrument against world progressive forces. U.N. misdeeds will increase, now that Moscow has concurred in the designs of the American imperialists. "However, the more misdeeds are committed by the UN, the sooner will its bankruptcy come. Such is historical dialectics."

II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

A. MODERN WAR

1. General Analyses

1027
Geneste, Lt-Colonel, [RETURN TO EQUILIBRIUM] Retour à l'équilibre. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Jan. 1966: 94-103.
D410.R45, v. 22

SAC pilots have been reassigned as gunners (playing bridge underground and watching the red light that determines the fate of, say, Smolensk); the concepts of the B-47, Thor, Jupiter, and Atlas have become outmoded; who can dare predict the life span of any new weapon? Now it would require 20 to 80 missiles to be certain of destroying one of the 600 U.S. Minutemen in hardened sites. The Soviet Union's ICBM arsenal could destroy only a small fraction of these; thus its strategy must be directed toward population targets. But, Soviet waging of a nuclear countercity war would mean assuring their own destruction. Meanwhile a debate rages in the United States over "how much is enough?" Proponents of minimum deterrence say U.S. power is now sufficient. The wary, asserting that a "damage limiting strategy" is as vital as deterrence, call for many thousands of missiles; and the hard-liners think even more are necessary so that a total counterforce defense can come into being. But whatever the size and abilities of the strategic force it cannot cope with every problem in the world. There exists a chasm between the unthinkable, which is strategic bombing, and all other forms of war. The latter can be waged without fear of activating the former--escalation is no longer deemed automatic. Short of initiating strategic bombing the freedom of U.S. land forces (with aerial and naval support) is almost unlimited. As strategic weapons grow ever more fearful the chasm will widen, and more types of military action will be feasible this side of it. Thus a good strategy, flexible response, requires a balance between strategic and other forces, because each is useless without the other. The Government is organizing a "strategic retreat" in this direction and its results to date are encouraging. Strategy may soon be as sophisticated as technology.

1028
Nicolas, Marius-Paulin. [NOTES ON WAR] Notes sur la guerre. Défense de l'homme, v. 18, Dec. 1965: 11-13.
AP20.D37, v. 18

Collected vignettes on war--the responses it elicits from the public, from certain philosophers, and from the press; its extent; and its morality.

1029
Perret, Louis. [AIRPOWER AND DETERRENCE] Puissance aérienne et dissuasion. Forces aériennes françaises, v. 20, Feb. 1966: 156-169.
UG635.F8F66, v. 20

In the decade after World War II a nuclear monopoly and bomber delivery fleet gave the United States overwhelming military superiority in the world. But its power was too destructive to use; its freedom of political and military action was even reduced; its nuclear arsenal could not prevent Communist victories in Eastern Europe, in Korea, in China. Through this era the Soviet Union was employing more successful, if less spectacular, strategies--limited peripheral wars, subversion, guerrilla warfare, peace offensives, nuclear blackmail. After 1955 both sides possessed nuclear deterrents, and by 1960 stability had become a main ingredient of the game. Both players had strong conventional forces and their own spheres of influence; military vulnerability was reciprocal. Means for ensuring rapid intervention and automatic reaction have been emphasized in strategic and tactical planning since 1960--automation of information, warning, and aerial defense systems; permanent alert systems; increased capacity, range, and speed of transport vehicles; unmanned weapons systems; large research budgets; systems for decreasing the vulnerability of retaliatory forces. Soviet and U.S. armament efforts have a similar purpose, which is "to be instantaneously prepared for all forms of combat and all forms of retaliation." Nonetheless stability remains relative. Because the two great powers fear confrontation, other nations believe nuclear war is out of the question and are therefore bolder in initiating peripheral wars. Strategy has been intellectualized, political-military calculations and strategems have pushed the use of military force into the background. Still the plane, outmoded in general war, is an important weapon for transportation, land or naval support, and certain air defense tasks. The strategic use of planes can replace the strategy of massive deterrence or allow a power to deal with aggression within the framework of limited war.

1030
Prokop'ev, Nikofor P. [ON WAR AND THE ARMY: A BRIEF SKETCH] O voine i armii; kratkii ocherk. Moskva, Voen. izd-vo, 1965. 293 p.
U21.2.P7

Contents. --Marxism-Leninism on the origin and class nature of wars. --The character and type of wars in the modern epoch. --The social nature and significance of the army. --Marxism-Leninism on defense of the socialist fatherland. --The reactionary, aggressive nature of modern imperialist military policy and ideology. --On Soviet military science. --The control of the Communist Party over the armed forces: the foundation of the foundations of Soviet military construction.

This book is devoted to the basic problems of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. It recounts the origin, character, and type of wars; the social nature and significance of the army and Soviet military science; and the aggressive nature of the military policy and ideology of modern imperialism. The author surveys all these problems against the background of the radical changes being wrought in the international arena, the revolution in military affairs,

and the problems set before the Soviet armed forces by the 22d Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. (Translation of supplied summary)

1031
Sagazan, Hubert de. [REFLECTIONS ON MODERN COMBAT] Réflexions sur le combat moderne. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Feb. 1966: 297-314.
D410.R45, v. 22

Two characteristics--the subversive and the nuclear--dominate modern war. Nuclear predominance stems from the fact that science has revolutionized some important aspects of armed conflict; namely, firepower, speed, and access to information. Subversion (including psychological and propaganda campaigns and guerrilla warfare) prevails, because the masses, rather than territory, have become "the stake and lever of all politics." Subversive warfare is not the holding of territory but the winning of popular allegiances. Subversive-style war can calm down or even prevent general war, decide the outcome of general conflict, and serve as the last resort for nations defeated by superior armed force. Successful counterguerrilla forces use their adversary's tactics. Nuclear weapons, the second factor in modern war, require new defense doctrines. Besides a strategic weapons system a nation needs a modern battle corps to counter the aggression of armies. To avoid nuclear defeat this corps must be widely dispersed and mobile on the land, in the air, and on the sea. In the event the battle corps is routed, the nation needs a territorial defense program. France's Operational Territorial Defense (Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire), intended to confront the threat of enemy subversion, must also be prepared to absorb "the remnants" of the battle corps as commandos, in order to "continue the struggle in the form of a generalized guerrilla war. Thus, at its limit, modern combat comes around to subversive combat." Nuclear weapons do not reduce the primacy of the human factor; to national education falls the task of instilling belief in the cause to be defended and "demystifying" the population in regard to the potential dangers of nuclear conflict. We have not yet reached the nuclear age because we know only its destructive side. When nuclear energy is domesticated "all man's means will have grown so vastly" that nuclear weapons will at last be proportionate to them.

1032
Schuster, Edward J. THE IMPACT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ON WAR. Social justice review, v. 58, Jan. 1966: 360-364. HN37.C3S64, v. 58

Geopolitics--encompassing the multiple time-space correlatives of combat--is no longer a static concept. Science and technology have affected many of war's aspects: military principles, strategy, and tactics; personnel; military intelligence; plans, operations, and training; administration, logistics, and supply; implications for political, economic, and social institutions; and psychological ramifications. The mobility and flexibility of new weapons systems have altered the principles by which war is waged. Surprise and security have become more essential than ever before. Decentralization calls for soldiers and sailors who are at once specialists and generalists. Modern war also has drastically affected economic organization and sociological needs. Furthermore it "militates against political maturity, responsibility, and self-government." The terror of total war tempts men to ask for peace at any price; it obliterates the fact that even in the modern world some things are worth fighting for.

1033
Verberie. [THE EUROPEAN SHIELD IN NATO] Le bouclier européen dans l'OTAN. Revue militaire générale, no. 1, Jan. 1966: 67-80.
U2.R48, 1966

Includes summaries in English and German.

A shield parries blows. It will not be needed if the blow is never delivered (i.e., if deterrence is successful). Advocates of diversified defense forces argue that massive retaliation is inherently incredible in cases of limited aggression and that a shield is needed to parry, if not deter, these limited attacks. Aggression is a feasible course of action if the initiator does not fear initial massive retaliation and if he considers himself able to control the resulting escalation or to withdraw. A. U.S.-U.S.S.R. confrontation can end in compromise (with one side accepting a moral defeat) or nuclear exchanges. The side having the greater military strength at the scene of conflict is advantaged --it can compel the opponent to choose between withdrawal and resort to its nuclear weapons (e.g., the Cuban confrontation). Because of U.S. commitments a Soviet act of aggression in Europe would theoretically obey the laws of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Thus such an aggression would seem absurd. But were it to occur, NATO could be presented with the need to choose between acceptance of the fait accompli and damaging escalation. Were the Soviet Union confident that the escalation could be controlled, it might undertake the aggression. In consequence Western Europe is obligated to "persuade the Soviet Union that in the event of aggression no compromise solution would be accepted." Its initial riposte must both demonstrate its determination not to surrender and halt the aggressor at the iron curtain. To perform these tasks West Europe must have sufficiently large forces in a forward and concentrated position, and the forces should be armed (in part) with tactical nuclear weapons. The last condition would require an allied accord for regulating the use of small nuclear weapons. The forces of such a shield are intended to prove that violence is unprofitable. Decisions cannot be sought in tests of strength on the battlefield because nuclear arsenals dominate the situation. But the possibility of violence below a certain threshhold necessitates the existence of conventional forces, especially at national borders.

1034
VIEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH A CORRECT WORLD OUTLOOK. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Communist China digest, no. 162, Jan. 26, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 33,893) p. 14-22.
P&GP RR

"CSO: 3503-D."

From an article by Han Tung-pi, Li Ch'ing-k'un and Yü Tzu-chung, Peiping, Kuang-ming jih-pao, Aug. 27, 1965. Chi Kor

One must understand the relationship between man and weapons before he can deal with the problem of nuclear weapons in correct revolutionary fashion. "In war, man can display a stronger fighting power and defeat his enemy only with the aid of weapons, while weapons can assert their full power only when they are mastered and used by man." Man is the stronger factor, and, if politically and ideologically aware and fighting for a just revolutionary cause, he will defeat superior weapons. The more sophisticated weapons technology becomes, the more vital is man's role. When the United States possessed an atomic monopoly it tried to demoralize the revolutionary peoples with

threats of destruction so it could win without fighting. The modern revisionists play the same game in asserting that nuclear weapons have changed the nature and law of war. Undoubtedly the killing capacity of these weapons is tremendous, but they have not obviated war as "a special means for solving the conflicts between opposing classes and nations." Moreover nuclear bombs are not totally destructive. China is not developing nuclear weapons because it superstitiously believes that they are all-powerful. "We believe that since the U.S. imperialists can blackmail and threaten the people by brandishing atom bombs, it is entirely necessary for the revolutionary people to develop atom bombs to break this blackmail and guard against this threat." It is bourgeois to believe that weapons are decisive, and anti-revolutionary to recoil before the threat of massive military (but not political or ideological) power.

1035
Winbauer, Alois. [UNBALANCED SCALES? STRATEGIC CONCEPTS OF EAST AND WEST] Waage ohne Gleichgewicht? Die strategischen Konzeptionen von Ost und West. Wehr-wissenschaftliche Rundschau, v. 15, Dec. 1965: 673-682.
U3.W485, v. 15

The strategy of the West, as well as that of the Soviet bloc, rests on the assumption that the adversary, despite his assurances to the contrary, is actually planning an aggressive war. Hence both strategies are essentially defensive in character, although this is true of the Soviet one to a lesser degree, due to the aggressive quality of Communist ideology. All Soviet strategists, from Sokolovskii to Malinovskii, agree that although the next war will be primarily nuclear, massive conventional combat forces will be needed to secure victory. They believe that, given present conditions, each military confrontation between nuclear powers must inevitably lead to general nuclear war. A merely numerical comparison between the Soviet bloc forces and those of NATO gives a distorted picture of the actual strength of both camps. Several factors, e.g., dispersion of NATO forces as compared to geographical concentration of Soviet forces, contribute to the better strategic position of the Soviet bloc. The present NATO strategy rests on the principle of first-line defense, namely the Iron Curtain line (as contrasted to the former concept of defense on the Rhine), and on the notion of gradual deterrence (as contrasted with the former NATO concept of total deterrence). This strategy holds that limited, conventional wars need not escalate into total nuclear war as long as certain precautions are taken by the attacked party. There is, however, no clear delineation (areawise and timewise) of where limited war ends and total war begins.

2. Major War

3. Limited War

1036
Gerasimov, G. [THE FAILURE OF "LIMITED WARFARE"] Krakh "ogranichennoi voiny." Aziia i Afrika segodnia, v. 9, Oct. 1965: 2-5. illus.
DS1.S7, v. 9

The Eisenhower doctrine of massive retaliation was founded upon a strategy that encouraged widespread development of air and naval forces at the expense of ground forces. From 1961, in keeping with the flexible response and limited warfare concepts advanced by Maxwell Taylor and accepted by John F. Kennedy and Robert McNamara, the United States began to increase the numerical strength of its ground, airborne, and amphibious forces. By this means the U.S. war machine was adapted to fight the national liberation movement. Vietnam is the laboratory and testing range for limited warfare. Despite the lesson of the Korean War--when U.S. airpower ruled the skies but military victory was unattainable--there are still those who argue that aerial bombardment by itself can win the Vietnamese War. Unbiased observers will agree that the bombings are little more than an expression of imperialist spite, of scant real effect. The U.S. ground offensive in Vietnam has even less chance of success. Generals Mark Clark and MacArthur, chastened by Korea, repeatedly warned that the United States could not win a land war in Asia. Increased American deployment in Vietnam cannot enhance the chances of victory, for U.S. troops and materiel will be needed in ever greater numbers simply to substitute for the losses and desertions suffered by the South Vietnamese Army. As disillusionment intensifies and defections mount, the United States will be forced to fill the ranks with its own troops; thus America will be irrevocably committed to an Asian war. "The cause of American failures is the absence of the political and psychological foundations necessary for the successful prosecution of military actions." This problem does not confront the enemies of the United States. The Rand Corp. recently sent two scholars to investigate the motivation of the South Vietnamese guerrilla. Their report, which was not published, affirmed that the Viet Cong are motivated by considerations of social justice. It is this spirit that accounts for the Viet Cong victories and explains the inadequacy of the strategy of limited warfare as a means to suppress the national liberation movement.

1037
Lal, Mukut B. THE KASHMIR ISSUE. India quarterly, v. 21, Oct./Dec. 1965: 345-374.
D410.I44, v. 21

Traces the Kashmir dispute from 1947 to the Indian-Pakistani war of August-September 1965.

4. Unconventional War

1038
AN ARMCHAIR GUIDE TO GUERRILLA WARFARE. Esquire, v. 65, Mar. 1966: 88-93.
AP2.E845, v. 65

Gives examples (many of which are illustrated) of the armaments, personal equipment, strategy, and tactics used by both sides in the Vietnam fighting; and sketches the careers and teachings of the seven "high priests of guerrilla warfare."

1039
Fall, Bernard. SEVENTEEN LITTLE WARS NOBODY TALKS ABOUT. Esquire, v. 65, Mar. 1966: 93.
AP2.E845, v. 65

Summarizes very briefly the origin and course of numerous guerrilla wars--"little wars"--that are currently being waged all over the world.

1040
[IS GUERRILLA WARFARE AN ALL-POWERFUL WEAPON? MODERN ARMED FORCES ARE FOLLOWING SIX PRINCIPLES IN AN ATTEMPT TO DEFEAT IT] La guérilla est-elle une arme absolue? Les armées modernes mettent en pratique six principes pour essayer d'en avoir raison, by XXX. Planète, no. 26, Jan./Feb. 1966: 64-71. P&GP RR

Although guerrilla warfare represents the most recent appearance of an "absolute weapon," no weapon has ever been able to maintain absolute superiority in the long run. Countermeasures and a doctrine of antiguerrilla warfare are being developed through the work of specialists and through study of antiguerrilla actions taking place all over the world. That the guerrilla can be defeated is demonstrated by the Philippines experience. Six principles for combating guerrillas are converging as a doctrine: (1) Organize false guerrilla commandos for intelligence purposes. (2) Use science to develop modern weapons and equipment suited to new types of warfare. (3) Separate the guerrillas from the population by resettling the latter. (4) Take the offensive. (5) Raise local counterguerrilla militias. (6) Don't underestimate the white man and the West. The United States is tackling the guerrilla war problem in serious fashion. Strike Command has four army divisions, located in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Okinawa, and Germany. It also uses other units and maintains close contact with the Central Intelligence Agency. The United States "foresees a permanent antiguerrilla organization, legislative modifications to justify the direct intervention of American armed forces throughout the world, and the creation of organs to enable this army to perform such interventions in peacetime under the best possible conditions." Because the Soviet Union refrains from supporting guerrilla movements, the battle is waged between the West and the underdeveloped. It would be premature to state that the West is destined to lose the fight.

1041
THE WAR: THE STRING RUNS OUT. Time, v. 87, Feb. 4, 1966: 21-26. AP2.T37, v. 87

Reviews the debate between administration and congressional spokesmen, and the rationale behind the decision to resume bombing of North Vietnam after the 5-week lull failed to bring any favorable response from Hanoi government.

B. MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1042
AEC DEVELOPS STANDBY NUCLEAR TEST PLAN USING SPACE LAUNCHERS. Aviation week & space technology, v. 84, Feb. 7, 1966: 31.
TL501.A8, v. 84

The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has reported to Congress its readiness to conduct nuclear weapons tests in space and at high altitudes should the 1963 test ban treaty be abrogated. This standby capability is reportedly based on "large launch vehicles developed as nuclear device carriers and small instrumentation rockets for diagnosis." ICBM and anti-ICBM systems would be tested, with evaluation of the effects of nuclear explosion upon these systems constituting an important part of the program. A highly instrumented air fleet has also been readied for diagnosis and sampling purposes. "The program is geared to resume testing of stockpiled nuclear weapons and entire weapons systems within two months. The testing of experimental devices designed to explore new concepts of nuclear weapons technology could start within three months, and testing of the effects of detonations on military systems in six to nine months." The AEC report also dealt with progress in underground testing and in decreasing nuclear-warhead vulnerability to antiballistic countermeasures.

1043
[THE AIRPLANES OF THE BUNDESWEHR] Die Flugzeuge der Bundeswehr. Flug-Revue, no. 1, Jan. 1966: 43-46. TL503.C524, 1966

Data on the number and type of West Germany's military aircraft, in table form, followed by drawings of 21 planes. The information pertains to 34 types altogether, including technical characteristics of each and the service to which it belongs, as well as planned replacements by other types. Whenever a certain aircraft is manned by an American-trained crew the chart so indicates.

1044
Alexander, George. PISTON LAUNCH SYSTEM FAVORED FOR SPRINT. Aviation week & space technology, v. 84, Jan. 17, 1966: 54-55, 57, 59, 63-64. illus. TL501.A8, v. 84

Describes the launch technique to be employed for the Sprint antimissile missile, which is a part of the Nike-X antiballistic missile defense system. Called "pop-up," the technique "uses a gas-driven piston to eject Sprint from its underground launch tube and to impart some initial velocity to the missile."

1045
BNTW. [COOPERATION WITH OTHER EUROPEAN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES] Zusammenarbeit mit anderen europäischen Flugzeugindustrien. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Mar. 10, 1966: 128-129.
U3.W38, v. 10

Discussing the Plowden Report in the House of Commons on February 1, Aviation Minister Frederick Mulley stated that the main object was the creation of a European aircraft industry through association with other European countries. There was already cooperation with France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Holland on airframe, engine and missile projects, and he was planning to discuss the airbus project with the new Air Minister Pisani in Paris before the end of February. The difficulties facing multilateral cooperation must be overcome, as all European countries were in the same position. The idea of a European conference was welcome, but detailed preparation was needed, and it could not take place before the beginning of next year. It was obvious that development costs must bear a reasonable relationship to the market. It should not happen again that such a costly project as the TSR.2 was developed on a purely national basis. Cooperation with other European partners on all military and on all major civil projects must be the aim. The more costly the development, the greater must be the market. Turning to variable geometry aircraft, the Minister said that these projects were of great importance for future defence requirements. (Abstract supplied)

1046
Baar, James, and William E. Howard. SPACECRAFT AND MISSILES OF THE WORLD, 1966. [New and rev. ed.] New York, Harcourt, Brace & World [1966] 104 p.
UG630.B2

Presents technical and pictorial data on civilian manned spacecraft and boosters, scientific satellites and their boosters, military manned and unmanned satellites and boosters, strategic and tactical missiles, antiballistic missiles, and the history of space exploration and rocketry. The final chapter, entitled "Space-Missile Guide," includes information about the principal manned-spacecraft and missile systems, a glossary of relevant terms, the principal space-missile ranges of the world, and the principal contractors and government agencies involved in the field.

1047
Beecher, William. CHEMICALS VS. THE VIET CONG--"RIGHT," OR "WRONG"? National guardsman, v. 20, Feb. 1966: 3-6. UA42.N24, v. 20

The increasing acceptance of the use of tear gas and defoliating agents in Vietnam has established a precedent for the use of non-lethal agents. In this type of warfare, where the insurgents intermingle with and use the civilian population for a shield, the use of disabling chemical agents rather than heavy explosives and napalm is humane. Those opposed to the use of chemical agents cite the adverse publicity that greeted their introduction into the Vietnam War and the past history of fear resulting from the use of lethal gas in World War I. They condemn the U.S. refusal to sign the Hague Treaty of 1899 against the use of gas and fear that the Soviets, as well as the North Vietnamese, will resort to the use of nonlethal agents against the United States and allied forces. Nonlethal gas can prove fatal to some people, infants, the aged, and the unhealthy. But it has flushed the Viet Cong and saved lives, although any mention of this fact may well get lost in emotional and propagandistic denouncements by the enemy and opponents of the use of gas in any form.

1048
Bielau, Hermann. [RED CHINA'S "AIR FORCE"] Die "Luftmacht" Rotchinas. Wehrkunde, v. 15, Jan. 1966: 38-43. U3.W396, v. 15

Information and statistics on Chinese Communist scientific institutions concerned with aeronautics, the aeronautics industry, the air force, rocket development, and civil aviation.

1049
Brownlow, Cecil. ANTI-SAM WEAPON DEVELOPMENT STRESSED. Aviation week & space technology, v. 84, Mar. 21, 1966: 26-28. TL501.A8, v. 84

"Efforts to counter the threat of Soviet-built SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missiles on a short-range, quick-fix basis to meet the needs of Vietnam have top Defense Dept. priority in the limited war field." Electronic countermeasure devices are being developed along with ways of destroying the surface-to-air missile (SAM) without putting the attacking aircraft in danger from the SAM site's protective cover. An advanced "launch and leave" capability is sought--possibly one in which the missile can be guided to the target though launched from outside the 25-mile slant range of the Soviet missile. A sensor to home in on the power source of the SAM site is one such possibility. The Shrike antiradar missile being used in Vietnam is not locking onto the target firmly when confronted with the quick burst of the SAM radars. The power source, however, remains on while the SA-2 operates. Improvements in the Shrike missile and in the Walleye, which is also being used, are under way to the extent that industry is already receiving contracts for radar homing, warning, and countermeasure systems.

1050
Brownlow, Cecil. COMBAT FORCES NEW LIMITED WAR STUDIES. Aviation week & space technology, v. 84, Mar. 28, 1966: 90-94. TL501.A8, v. 84

Summarizes the various projects under study to improve U.S. limited war tactics and equipment. The Air Force alone has 1,500 projects "designed to improve its limited and special air war capabilities in Vietnam in various stages of research, development, test and engineering."

1051
Brownlow, Cecil. LIMITED WAR PROBLEMS CHALLENGE INDUSTRY. Aviation week & space technology, v. 84, Mar. 14, 1966: 26-29. TL501.A8, v. 84

One of the lessons of the war in Vietnam is that equipment to fight an effective limited war cannot always be developed in a peacetime environment. Army, Navy, and Air Force aerospace officials are giving increased attention to the requirements for waging a limited war ("everything short of a nuclear war") in the period after 1970, when limited war will probably be the biggest threat. The services are turning to industry to assist them in developing a range of equipment from "complete aircraft systems to disposable parachutes." Work is getting underway on tactical fighters, assault airlift equipment, armed helicopters, ways to provide effective night capability for both close support and interdiction strikes, and equipment to detect enemy operations and materiel in the field. Increased capabilities are also sought in target marking, aerial reconnaissance (improved infrared and radar equipment, use of laser beams, and faster processing of films), and use of assessment cameras to record mission results immediately. Presently available air-to-ground missiles have proved disappointing in performance in Vietnam. "Extended 'launch and leave' capability that can be employed both day and night so that the pilot can dispatch his missile at a safe distance from the target without having to battle his way through its close-in anti-aircraft defense" is a prime goal of the Air Force.

1052
Cabiac, Roger. [THE UNITED STATES REMAINS TRUE TO THE MANNED AIRCRAFT] Die USA bleiben dem bemannten Flugzeug treu. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Feb. 10, 1966: 72. U3.W38, v. 10

Two recent Pentagon decisions--to order a fleet of advanced FB-111 fighter-bombers and to develop a new variable geometry aircraft for the U.S. Navy--throw an interesting light on the American attitude to the future of the manned aircraft. The decisions will certainly have been influenced quite appreciably by experience in Southeast Asia, where of 150 U.S. aircraft lost through enemy fighter and anti-aircraft action a mere six have been shot down by the 150 or more air-to-air missiles launched in North Vietnam. Incidentally, the variable geometry VFAX is to be ready for service by 1972, two years before the rival Franco-British model. Must America always be allowed to fill every gap, while a disunited Europe . . . talks? (Abstract supplied)

1053
Caldwell, Turner F. SEAPOWER--KEY TO NEW OCEAN MARKETS. Undersea technology, v. 7, Jan. 1966: 31-35. V210.AIU5, v. 7

A review of Navy oceanographic research and the various antisubmarine warfare (ASW) systems and weapons. The author is Deputy Director of the Navy's ASW program.

1054
Carter, Luther J. NUCLEAR CARRIERS: STUDIES CONVINCE THE SKEPTICS. Science, v. 151, Mar. 18, 1966: 1368-1371. Q1.S35, v. 151

Examines the arguments over the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of nuclear-propelled naval surface vessels that have been advanced by Secretary McNamara,

the U.S. Navy, and Defense Dept. systems analysts in light of Secretary McNamara's decision to add three new nuclear aircraft carriers to the U.S. fleet. The higher cost of nuclear carriers is said to be offset by the increased number of aerial sorties they launch. Whether favorable experiences with nuclear carriers will lead to approval of additional nuclear surface craft (such as the proposed nuclear frigate), is uncertain. However U.S. involvement in Vietnam-type conflicts may well give rise to new concepts and tactics in which unsuspected advantages of nuclear ships will be realized.

1055
Christ, Rolf F. [NEW-GENERATION COMBAT AIRCRAFT: DEVELOPMENT TRENDS IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT] Kampfflugzeuge der neuen Generation: Entwicklungen und Trends auf dem Militärflugzeugsektor. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Jan. 10, 1966: 35-40.
U3.W38, v. 10

In any forecast concerning military aircraft development allowance must always be made, regardless of the technical aspects, for higher politics. Even a slight change in policies entails a corresponding change in military strategy and hence in the requirements for new military equipment. Nevertheless the basic principle in the procurement of any new weapon remains unaffected, namely that it must achieve the maximum possible effect for the minimum possible financial, technical and personnel investment. Arms manufacturers, in this case aircraft producers, must constantly seek to reconcile conflicting military requirements in a single aircraft type, which must be as cheap as possible while at the same time being extremely effective and uncomplicated. Since the outbreak of local conflicts is more likely than the danger of a global atomic war, the tactical aircraft is at present much more important than the strategic. The accompanying article gives an outline of technical and military developments in the military aircraft field, with special reference to overall trends and the future outlook for manned military aircraft.

(Abstract supplied)

1056
Ceuzin, Paul. [STRIDA II OR AUTOMATIC AERIAL DEFENSE] STRIDA II ou la défense aérienne automatique. Sciences et avenir, no. 228, Feb. 1966: 85-89. Q2.S475, 1966

The French system for gathering, handling, and representing information relevant to defense of the national air space. This system is the electronic STRIDA-II, the most complete and effective of operational air defenses. Whatever air defense system NATO chooses under its project NADGE, it will contain the same elements as STRIDA II and thus will assure French industry a minimum of 160 million francs worth of work.

1057
DOD REASSESSES RED THREAT. Missiles and rockets, v. 18, Jan. 31, 1966: 10. UG630.M54, v. 18

Presents the key points of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's testimony before a House Armed Services subcommittee holding hearings on strategic bomber cutbacks. Secretary McNamara's report reassessed U.S. concern over Communist China as a potential nuclear threat and reflected his optimism regarding U.S. antimissile defenses against this threat. Significance was attached to the report because of its presentation of "1) estimates of the ability of those U.S. forces charged with assured destruction of enemy targets to complete their mission in the face of a Soviet ICBM force and 2) a defensive posture considerably better than that now postulated by U.S. intelligence." McNamara discussed the survival and reliability factors of U.S. missile forces, the role of the manned bomber, the strategy of damage limitation, and antimissile defense systems in general.

1058
Eldridge, Lute. [INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM LITTON LN-3] Trägheits-Navigationssystem Litton LN-3. Flug-Revue, no. 3, Mar. 1966: 37-38.
TL503.C524, 1966

Inertial navigation, a relatively new term in aviation, is, to many, an enigma and the means by which it is maintained seem to be a system of "miracle gadgets". The author, one of the most-experienced F-104 test pilots, is attempting to explain unsophisticatedly how this rather sophisticated device works and how it differs from previous or other navigation systems. The fundamental difference in operation is its independence from electronic aids outside the aircraft. Since the LN-3 (and its successors) does not radiate any energy it cannot be detected, jammed or misled. This inertial navigation system is able to determine the instantaneous position of the aircraft by processing acceleration signals to produce velocity information which is in turn converted to distance traveled. The system itself is composed of five major assemblies which control, detect and compute basic information and transmit this to the appropriate aircraft avionics equipment. The key element of the LN-3 system is the inertial platform which isolates the inertial elements from the aircraft through a four-axis mechanism. Lute Eldridge describes the operation of this as well as the computer for earth-reference navigation, the adapter unit for servo systems for pitch, roll and heading angles, the align control unit and the control unit which enables the pilot to select the desired mode of operation. (Abstract supplied)

1059
Fayolle, P. [THE TEST CENTER IN LANDES] Le centre d'essais des Landes. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Mar. 1966: 447-465. map.
D410.R45, v. 22

Describes the physical setup, administration, and operations that are carried out at France's test center in the southwest region of Landes. The center is devoted primarily to the firing and study of ballistic missiles.

1060
Franks, H. G. N-A-D-G-E CAN SPELL SAFETY. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 10, Oct./Nov. 1965: 55-57.
UA646.F5, v. 10

Attributes to nuclear deterrence the "incredible" maintenance of peace during the past 20 years. In this context, the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) is described as an important addition to preparedness. The costs as well as the management of NADGE are to be shared proportionally among the NATO countries, and currently three international industrial consortia--the ITT group, the Hughes group, and the Westinghouse group--are competing for the NADGE contract. When it is completed the project will have significant civil applications as well as the capability to give instant warning of air attack on NATO.

1061
Getler, Michael. BALLISTIC MISSILES RULED OUT IN VIETNAM. Missiles and rockets, v. 18, Mar. 7, 1966: 12-13. UG630.M54, v. 18

The Defense Department development program to evaluate the effectiveness of using ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads against North Vietnam evidently has suffered from an application of "the Pentagon's cost-effectiveness measuring rod." When Soviet-built antiaircraft missiles threatened U.S. air superiority over North Vietnam last fall, "open support for pursuing the potential of tactically used ballistic missiles as one way to avoid excessive aircraft losses in attacks against high-attrition-rate targets was voiced within DOD and the military." Virtually every surface-to-surface-missile contractor prepared proposals at that time. But improved evasion tactics and countermeasure equipment have since reduced U.S. air losses to Communist missiles. Problems of targeting and expense--as well as important political considerations--have also militated against use of missiles in the Vietnamese War at this time, although the Defense Department remains aware that any future increase in aircraft attrition rates may raise the cost-effectiveness of ballistic missiles.

1062
Getler, Michael. MCNAMARA OUTLINES MOL SCHEDULE. Missiles and rockets, v. 18, Feb. 28, 1966: 14-16. UG630.M54, v. 18

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara has outlined the U.S. defense posture for the next 5-year period in his annual budget report to Congress. Tactical warfare requirements, the manned orbiting laboratory (MOL), and anti-ICBM systems are highlighted in the statement. The schedule for design definition, specifications development, and firm cost proposals for the MOL is outlined as aiming toward contract awards in the fall. Because U.S. defense interests have shifted from the European theater to Southeast Asia, particularly to Vietnam, increased funds are requested for procurement of conventional ordnance systems. Expanded research on the tactical warfare problems encountered in Vietnam is emphasized, although without additional funding at present. In discussion of strategic defensive forces, opposition to the continued development and possible deployment of antiballistic missile defense systems seems to be softening. An "exoatmospheric version of Nike-Zeus," which would provide adequate defense against Chinese or Soviet ICBM attacks, has been developed and is available should deployment be found necessary. Several other programs will receive increased attention next year including the Army's air defense missiles, the Navy's point defense surface missile system, and a wide variety of research and development projects.

1063
Gilbert, Marc. [THE REFINED TERROR] La terreur raffinée. Nouvel observateur, no. 63, Jan. 26, 1966: 16-17. AP20.O2, 1966

A renowned chemical warfare technician once rejoiced, "With gas you can expect everything, one can do anything to a man." Thousands of American doctors agree but do not rejoice. They have established an association, Physicians for Social Responsibility, to work against chemical and biological weapons. This group is of the opinion that the military has fewer qualms about the use of ever-more-perfect chemical-biological weapons than about initiation of spectacular nuclear destruction. Yet these silent and wondrously effective weapons pose a greater danger. Among nonlethal chemical weapons are tear gases, agents that hinder breathing or cause nausea, gases that attack the skin and whose long-range effects can be dangerous, and personality-altering drugs. Colorless and odorless lethal gases that act on the lungs and nervous system are being produced. Military specialists emphasize the "clean war" that biological weapons permit by killing people and leaving the buildings. Such weapons will reintroduce plagues that required centuries to eliminate; they can ravage entire continents because the problems of treating them are nearly insoluble. Scientific protest is most "pathetic" in the United States where the stocks of such weapons are largest. But the Soviets recognize the danger and--before Vietnam--showed themselves willing to discuss the issues involved.

1064
Heiman, Leo. [ARMORED INFANTRY, QUEEN OF THE BATTLEFIELD] Panzergrenadiere--Könige des Schlachtfeldes. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Feb. 10, 1966: 111-112. U3.W38, v. 10

A recent world-wide survey by top military experts revealed that few nations understand the importance of armoured infantry or appreciate its decisive impact on future conflicts. Only the Federal Republic, France and Israel have solved the problems of armoured infantry deployment and tactics, but even they still fail to treat their armoured infantry as a separate fighting force with its own tactical and strategic doctrine. Hitherto--and this still applies to all other countries--armoured personnel carriers have been regarded almost solely as reliable means of transport to provide infantry support for the tanks, but rarely as efficient fighting vehicles in their own right. The article describes in some detail Israeli experience with armoured vehicles in their operations against the Arabs and then summarizes the conclusions reached by the team of experts. A good APC must be capable of use as both transport and fighting vehicle, provide protection from bullets, shell splinters and the like, as well as from heat and blast from distant atomic explosions, and offer facilities for all weapons to be fired simultaneously in all directions while the vehicle is in motion. The ideal organic weapon is a 20-mm gun mounted in a revolving turret to the right of the driver. Tactical organization also needs replanning to meet modern combat conditions. Performance required: load 2 to 3 tons, range without refuelling 300 to 400 miles, ability to climb 50 to 60% gradients and scale 20 to 30-inch obstacles, fully amphibious and sealed against chemicals, poisons and dust. (Abstract supplied)

1065
Herzfeld, Charles M. BMD AND NATIONAL SECURITY. Survival, v. 8, Mar. 1966: 70-76. U162.S9, v. 8

Reprinted from the Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Nov. 22, 1965.

Within the next few years the United States may opt for a ballistic missile defense (BMD). Multiple factors must be taken into account. Conceptually there are three types of defense systems--the "launch defense system," which kills attacking vehicles shortly after they are fired; "mid-course régime" defense, aimed at destroying vehicles while they are beyond the earth's atmosphere; and "terminal defense," which intercepts and destroys the attacking objects on their reentry trajectory. In terms of cost and reliability only the last is feasible at present. Technological problems of constructing an adequate defense system (of detecting, verifying, intercepting, and killing

enemy weapons) are formidable. The U.S. Army is now spending between $200 and $300 million a year on developing its Nike-X antimissile defense system. The Defense Department is devoting approximately $120 million a year to longer range BMD problems, giving particular attention to methods of discriminating between real targets and confusion devices. The Air Force and Navy are conducting penetration aid (confusion device) programs for thwarting enemy defenses. What are the strategic advantages or disadvantages of BMD? A worthwhile city ("soft-area") defense system must be highly effective. While probably never impenetrable, it will serve to "raise the entrance price." An enemy could build enough missiles to compensate for city defense relatively easily, but he might not do so. Without this defense a few missiles could destroy many cities. BMD for cities would be effective against accidental, poorly executed, and third country attacks. It would require a fallout shelter program. BMD for one's own missiles ("hard-point defense") is simpler and potentially cost effective. Actual implementation of BMD might accelerate the arms race. But discontinuation of research and development would be unwise, for to be second in effective BMD systems could be tragic.

1066
Holifield, Chet. HOLIFIELD DEMANDS NUCLEAR-POWERED FLEET: CHAIRMAN OF JOINT HOUSE-SENATE COMMITTEE WARNS PENTAGON AGAINST FURTHER 'PROCRASTINATION.' Navy, v. 9, Mar. 1966: 14-16, 36-37. VA49.N28, v. 9

Partial text of a speech "marking the keel-laying of the new submarine USS NARWHAL," Jan. 17, 1966.

America's nuclear submarine force is vigorous and growing, yet it would never have existed without the efforts of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The Defense Department would not give the necessary support to the building of the first two atomic submarines; today it refuses to finance a nuclear-powered surface Navy. The "cost-effectiveness" studies on which its refusal is based are totally unrealistic. They assume that fuel for conventional vessels will be in unlimited and unhampered supply; yet who cannot remember "when the beaches along our Atlantic coast were soaked with oil from sunken tankers and our ability to provide fuel for our fighting forces was seriously threatened?" The Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, after exhaustive study, has determined that for a truly effective American fighting force each new warship built should be powered by nuclear energy. The examples of the U.S.S. Enterprise and Bainbridge show that nuclear propulsion provides an extraordinary advantage in terms of combat-readiness and mobility. National security must take priority over dollars.

1067
[IS THE ANTIMISSILE MISSILE WITHIN U.S. REACH?] Le missile anti-missile est-il à la portée des Etats-Unis? Sciences et avenir, no. 228, Feb. 1966: 123. Q2.S475, 1966

Tells how the United States has technologically resolved the problem of intercepting a missile-borne attack with the Nike X system, which would be made up of Nike Zeus and Sprint antimissile missiles, extraordinarily refined radar systems, and computers. It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the system as presently envisaged, but its immense costs are known and the United States balks before them.

1068
Lamarsh, John R. INTRODUCTION TO NUCLEAR REACTOR THEORY. Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., [1966] 585 p. (Addison-Wesley series in nuclear engineering)
QC787.N8L3

Outlines the "fundamental physical principles underlying the operation of a nuclear reactor." The presentation is for readers who possess a background in atomic and nuclear physics and mathematics through advanced calculus.

1069
Lamy, M. [THE "DIAMOND" PROGRAM] Le programme "Diamant." Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Jan. 1966: 49-54.
D410.R45, v. 22

A review of the technological information acquired in carrying out the French satellite programs and its present and potential civilian and military applications. From the 1961-65 series of rocket and satellite tests the military program "Basic Ballistic Studies" has gained much useful data for the realization of the strategic nuclear force.

1070
Leavitt, William. CONCURRENCY: 1966--USAF'S TECHNOLOGICAL RESPONSE TO VIETNAM. Air Force and space digest, v. 49, Mar. 1966: 84-85, 87-88. UG633.A65, v. 49

Examines the response of the Air Force Systems Command to the airpower needs of the Vietnamese War. The effect of antiguerrilla and jungle warfare requirements upon the Air Force Armaments Laboratory at Elgin AFB is discussed. The war in Southeast Asia is shown to have accelerated development programs both within the Air Force and U.S. industry. "For the Air Force research-and-development community and for the industry that has traditionally backed it up with ideas and expertise . . . an enormous job, symbolized by the complexities of Vietnam, lies ahead."

1071
Lepotier, Adolphe. [THE FRENCH NAVY IN 1970] La marine française en 1970. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Mar. 1966: 477-490.
D410.R45, v. 22

Far from being superceded by new weapons developments, navies offer some of the best means for utilizing them. The nuclear submarine armed with thermonuclear missiles is a most persuasive deterrent. In addition to deterrent power the military must possess plausible means of intervention in the form of modern, if not nuclear, weapons systems. The navy has an important contribution to make to tasks other than strategic deterrence; e.g., participation in overseas intervention operations, protection of maritime communications (especially important because of dependence on imports) and of the national territory, logistics support, and attack on enemy lines of communication and naval forces. The cost of naval construction has skyrocketed, while requirements for the protection of shipping have remained constant. The French Navy is now requesting a greater effort in construction of its antisubmarine force. The navy will not soon be large enough to be deployed in strength wherever needed and few ships will be available in metropolitan waters. Forty percent of warship construction for 1965 to 1970 will be devoted to submarines, because these weapons are to serve as both strategic missile platforms and combat ships. By 1974 the navy will be the heart of the

strategic nuclear force by virtue of its nuclear-powered submarines. Care must be taken to maintain an effective "conventional" air-naval force at the same time, in order to protect the strategic forces and the nation and to permit a policy of graduated intervention.

1072
Lippy, Lester J. INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT IN ICBM BASE ACTIVATION. Human factors, v. 7, Aug. 1965: 387-400. T58.A2H8, v. 7

The period from 1954 to 1964 is often referred to as the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) era by the Air Force and Aerospace Industry. This decade covered the period of research, development, design, and test of ICBM's, their ground support equipment and the activation of strategically located bases with facilities, equipment and support services. During this period, the Atlas, Titan and Minuteman became operational. The management, organization, and responsibilities for the activation of a Titan II Operational Base (Davis-Monthan, Arizona) are herein described. Concurrency and specific examples of management actions in solving problems under field conditions to assure delivery of a complete Weapon System are explained. (Author's abstract)

1073
Mamaev, E. [FROM THE HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. FLEET IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD] Iz istorii razvitiia flota SSHA v poslevoennyi period. Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, v. 7, Jan. 1965: 106-114.
DK50.A3, v. 7

Describes the surface and undersea craft comprising the U.S. fleet and discusses the evolution of the U.S. Command's views on the role best suited to various types of naval forces under contemporary conditions. Particular attention is given the development of naval nuclear forces and the attitude of U.S. naval chiefs toward naval aviation, including the effect of the Polaris and other types of ballistic weapons systems.

1074
Mirskii, Z. [LABORATORY OF WAR AND AGGRESSION] Laboratoriia voiny i agressii. Aziia i Afrika segodnia, v. 9, Oct. 1965: 11-13.
DS1.S7, v. 9

A recent issue of U.S. News & World Report has described in detail the many new types of armaments being used for the first time in Vietnam by the Pentagon. This news caused no sensation in the United States, for it is common knowledge that American militarists have been using South Vietnam as their laboratory and testing range for new weapons, strategy, and tactics. From attack aircraft to rifles, from helicopters to grenade launchers, every type of instrument of destruction is being tested against the Vietnamese freedom fighters. Many weapons outlawed by international convention (such as rifle-fired, dartlike bullets having a dum-dum effect and chemical defoliants that turn jungle into wasteland and produce nausea and vomiting in man) are being employed, and their Pentagon inventors can justify their use only on the grounds that they are helpful in jungle warfare. Yet success in Vietnam has eluded the Americans. The French newspaper Figaro recently announced that the United States is considering the liquidation of its elite counterinsurgency corps, the Special Forces, because of its lack of success against the Vietcong. As the U.S. doctrine of "special warfare" slowly deteriorates, increasing numbers of regular military units will be needed in Vietnam. The Pentagon will then find it necessary to revert to methods of general warfare, thereby exhibiting to the world its open aggression against the Vietnamese people.

1075
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DEFENSES AGAINST THEM. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations on Communist China's science and technology, no. 250, Dec. 1, 1965. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 33,099) p. 47-72.
P&GP RR

"CSO: 11782-D."

"A translation of chapter 9 of the Chinese-language book Yuan-tzu-neng Ti Yuan-li Ho Ying-yung (Theory and Applications of Atomic Energy), revised edition, Peiping, July 1965, pages 267-293."

Explains the basic principles of nuclear weapons and explosions. Various types of nuclear bombs are sketched, and photographs of the first Chinese bomb test are included. Despite the claims of the "imperialist warmongers" that nuclear weapons are indefensible, methods of protecting populations from the effects of nuclear explosions can be devised.

1076
Ohio State University Conference on Economics of Research and Development, Columbus, 1962. ECONOMICS OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, edited by Richard A. Tybout. [Columbus] Ohio State University Press [1965] 458 p.
T175.045, 1962

Partial contents.--Policy issues involved in the conduct of military development programs, by Burton H. Klein.--The interaction of government and contractor organizations in weapons acquisitions, by Paul W. Cherington.--U.S.-EURATOM collaboration: an experiment in international research and development, by Philip Mullenbach.--System and functions of EURATOM, by Hans K. Sauer.--The mutual weapons development program, by Richard U. Sherman, Jr.

Papers on weapons acquisition and international collaboration in research and development. Mr. Klein's essay, originally published as a Rand Corp. Study, analyzes the conduct of military research and development, and illustrates the nature of policy formulation. He cites the significant steps in estimating cost, effectiveness, and performance of a new weapon system. Mr. Cherington examines the present U.S. pattern of relying on private industry for production of weapons and supplies, including the interactions and relationships involved. He covers systems' production phases, and analyzes the Government's ability for project management. Mr. Mullenbach traces the economic aspects of the U.S.-EURATOM collaboration in nuclear power development, the respective objectives the U.S. and the Six have been trying to achieve, the economic and political obstacles encountered, the economic lessons learned from the experience, and what these factors presage for the future. Mr. Sauer assesses the European attempt at multilateral peaceful development of atomic energy. He specifically touches on the organization and functions involved in research and training, dissemination of information, health protection, security patrol, the creation of a nuclear common market, and the possibility of nuclear weapons acquisition by other countries. Mr. Sherman examines the origin of the Mutual Weapons Development Program, its cost and accomplishments, and its possibilities for the future.

1077
Pay, Rex. TRACK PLANS MACH 6 NOSE CONE TESTS. Missiles and rockets, v. 18, Mar. 21, 1966: 26, 28.
UG630.M54, v. 18

Describes the captive missile test track facilities at Holloman Air Force Base, N. Mex. Here experiments are being conducted to test the blast effects of a nuclear weapon burst near an incoming warhead. Current plans at Holloman are "to drive a nose cone to Mach 6 on a monorail sled, separate it, let it fly through the blast wave from several thousand pounds of TNT, and catch it in a bin full of sand and sawdust."

1078
Pergent, J. [NEW GUIDED WEAPONS] Neue Lenkwaffen. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 132, Mar. 1966: 139-140. illus.
U3.A43, v. 132

Describes the characteristics of small rockets built by the French firm Nord-Aviation, which is a pioneer in this type of weapon. Technical data (dimensions, weight, range, load, control, and speed) are given for the surface-to-surface rockets SS-11, SS-12, and ENTAC, as well as for the air-to-surface missiles AS-20 and AS-30. Data are also presented on the prototypes of the new generation of missiles that are jointly built by France and West Germany: HOT and MILAN (both with an "infrared automatic guidance system") and remotely controlled ROLAND ("with radar-optical and radio guidance system"). Briefly discussed are other automatically guided weapons that have been developed by France and West Germany jointly or separately.

1079
Pergent, J. [WHAT IS CHINA'S REAL ATOMIC POTENTIAL?] Quel est le potentiel atomique réel de la Chine? Est & ouest, v. 17, July 1/15, 1965: 15-17.
D839.A822, v. 17

How China has produced two atomic bombs is somewhat of a mystery. Its own means would not have produced the material required for even one explosion. When it was cooperating with the Soviet Union China's atomic industry was experimental, and is only now being converted to military plutonium production. Similarly a program of high-grade uranium production has not advanced beyond its early stages. Thanks to "atomic scientists trained . . . in the West and technical teams trained according to Soviet methods," the Chinese have so far been successful. China's indigenous nuclear weapons program is under way. The country owns abundant uranium ore resources and, with good management, can achieve great progress in the atomic field by 1980.

1080
Perret-Gentil, J. [CHEMICAL WAR] La guerre chimique. Revue militaire suisse, v. 110, Oct. 1965: 479-483.
U2.R5, v. 110

The characteristics of nuclear war being fairly well known, attention is being redirected to chemical warfare, where the arsenal has been greatly expanded. A complete protective suit and early warning are the requirements for survival against substances that attack the nerves (Tabun, Soman, Sarin, XV). A class of psychochemical substances renders its victims helpless for a certain period of time. These chemicals are particularly dangerous because the symptoms are not usually detected until it is too late to take countermeasures. Officials and officers could easily be reached by small quantitites of psychochemical agents. Other chemicals work indirectly on man by poisoning. his food or water--small quantitites can theoretically kill thousands. Or chemicals may be used to starve the enemy by destroying his food supply. "The poisonousness of today's war substances can be estimated a thousand times greater than that of former combat gases. Moreover, a few kilos suffice to attain what would have formerly required many tons of material." The agents of chemical war are so diverse in their effects that one particularly suitable one can be found for each situation. They act over wide areas and are truly strategic weapons. In a state of constant development and refinement, they do not come under the 1925 ban on asphyxiating gases.

1081
Plattner, C. M. LIMITED-WAR CONCEPTS WEIGHED IN BATTLE. Aviation week & space technology, v. 84, Jan. 31, 1966: 42-46.
TL501.A8, v. 84

In their need to ferret out the Vietcong guerrillas, battlefield and Pentagon commanders have found the war in Vietnam to be a "major proving ground for limited-war concepts and equipment." Some of the major problems encountered thus far include the need for adequate target detection and "new ways to fight the war more effectively with the equipment at hand." Targeting at night may be improved by low-light-level television, infrared devices, or side-looking radars, all of which are in the research stage right now. Electronic countermeasure systems are receiving more attention for detection and jamming purposes. Local climatic conditions and terrain constitute still another problem. The sand on the landing beaches has done severe damage to engines and rotary blades. The need to experiment with existing equipment has resulted in the satisfactory use of high-speed jet aircraft for air support. Two programs that have been successful in ferreting out enemy supply routes are the Army's Lightening Bug and the Air Force's Snipe Hunt.

1082
Ricard, G. [STOL-AIRCRAFT BRÉGUET 941] Das STOL-Flugzeug Bréguet 941. Luftfahrttechnik. Raumfahrttechnik, v. 12, Jan. 1966: 17-25. illus. diagr.
TL503.L825, v. 12

A detailed technical appraisal of the components of the French aircraft STOL-Bréguet 941, which is designed to serve as a versatile military carrier of cargo and troops in tactical operations.

1083
Rougeron, Camille, and others. [ROCKETS AND ASTRONAUTICS] Fusées et astronautique. Ouvrage publié sous la direction de Camille Rougeron et Jean Bodet, avec la collaboration de J. Corbeau [et al.] Paris, Larousse [1965, c1964] 415 p. illus.
TL782.5.R65

Contents. --The rocket: decline and rebirth, by Camille Rougeron. --Rocket propulsion, by Jean Bodet. --The solid-fuel rocket, by Jean Corbeau. --The liquid-fuel rocket, by Jean Corbeau. --Rocket planes, by Roland de Narbonne. --Missile guidance, by Yves Joffrin. --Missiles, by Roland de Narbonne. --Ballistic and semi-ballistic missiles, by Camille Rougeron. --Antimissile missiles, by Camille Rougeron. --Missiles and nuclear war, by Camille Rougeron. --Rockets and artificial satellites, by Jean Bodet. --Space navigation, by Yves Joffrin. --Scientific satellites, by Jean-Paul Perrin. --Telecommunications satellites, by Jean-Paul Perrin. --Rockets and meterological satellites, by A. Villevieille. --Military satellites, by Camille Rougeron. --Physical conditions in space, by J. Gauzit. --New systems of space pro-

pulsion, by Jean Bodet. --Toward the moon and planets, by Jean Bodet. --Table of satellite launchings and space probes through November 30, 1964.

An indexed and generously illustrated collection of essays on various aspects, military and civilian, of rocket development, especially that since 1957.

1084
ROYAL AIR FORCE BOMBER COMMAND. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 10, Oct./Nov. 1965: 40-46. illus.
UA646. F5, v. 10

Describes the mission and equipment of Great Britain's strategic bomber force.

1085
Shang, Shan-tsui. SHIPBOARD USE OF ATOMIC POWER PLANT INSTALLATIONS. Washington, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1966. 46 p. diagr., tables. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS: 34,071) P&GP RR
"CSO: 11979-D."
"Translation of an article . . . in the Chinese-language periodical Chung-kuo Tsao-ch'uan (Chinese Journal of Shipbuilding), Shanghai, No. 2, 15 June 1959, pp. 17-38."

Reports current worldwide shipboard use of nuclear powerplants and elaborates their economic characteristics and problems. Various types of shipboard nuclear power installations are described. "Discussion will focus on the feasibility of the gas-cooled reactor and the closed-type gas turbine as a shipboard atomic power plant installation."

1086
Sidel, Victor, and Robert M. Goldwyn. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGIC WEAPONS--A PRIMER. New England journal of medicine, v. 274, Jan. 6, 1966: 21-27.
R11. B7, v. 274

Explores for the physician the history and present characteristics of chemical and biological warfare agents. Early detection, protection against these weapons, treatment of victims, decontamination, and immunization are also mentioned. In conclusion the legal and moral implications of the use of chemical and biological weapons are emphasized.

1087
Sokol, Anthony E. [LAND, SEA, AND AIR FORCES] Land-, See- und Luftmacht. Marine Rundschau, v. 63, Feb. 1966: 1-9. V3. M3, v. 63

In none of the 40 wars that have been fought since 1945 have nuclear arms been used--this despite widespread opinion about the decisive character of these weapons in modern warfare. A new weapons system, like any other system, has natural limitations that preclude its playing a dominant role over other forces. The essentially deterrent character of nuclear arms reduces their chances of being employed in a military operation, strategic or tactical. Hence the importance of conventional land, sea, and air forces, particularly in limited wars. The effectiveness of each weapon system depends on the environment in which the system can best utilize the locomotive and transport capabilities that together comprise its strength. This strength can be measured by a formula, MV^2 (M= mass; V= velocity), which rules out a natural superiority of one kind of force (e.g. nuclear) over all others, and which rules out the idea that a new kind of force alone would be able to win a war. In many instances throughout military history claims were made that there could be no effective defense against a new kind of weapon. Each time such prophecies proved wrong. In the long run defense techniques effectively answered new challenges. There is reason to believe that this process is still at work.

1088
SPACE DEFENCE SYSTEM. Spaceflight, v. 8, Feb. 1966: 48-49. TL787. B725, v. 8

Describes the Space Defence System--"a global network of radar, radio and optical sensors that supplies North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) with tracking information of all satellites and maintains a complete information catalogue of space vehicles." While the system is essentially a military one, providing defense against space weapons, it is an invaluable source of scientific data on space activity.

1089
SPECIAL REPORT ON LIMITED WAR. Aviation week & space technology, v. 84, Mar. 14, 1966: 26-33, 72-81; Mar. 21: 26-29, 58-86; Mar. 28: 29-30, 35-37, 90-94.
TL501. A8, v. 84

A series of articles describing the facilities and weaponry being utilized, improved, or developed to conduct the war in Vietnam--and possible future limited wars--more efficiently.

1090
Stambler, Irwin. THE NEXT ICBMS. Space/aeronautics, v. 45, Mar. 1966: 56-64.
TL501. A786, v. 45

Reports recent improvements in U.S. ballistic missiles and forecasts some improvements probable for the ICBM's of the 1970's. Greater targeting capability, payload flexibility, guidance accuracy, and range are cited as the most important qualities of the new Minuteman 2. Evasive warheads and invulnerable launch sites are said to provide the prime area for future improvement of the U.S. deterrent force. The author feels that deterrence is effective only as long as it is sufficiently superior to enemy forces. "If we are to maintain an effective deterrent power, steady R&D on advanced ICBM technology will be needed throughout this decade, leading to the beginning of an active hardware development program at the start of the 1970s."

1091
Surikov, B. [THE PENTAGON AND THE MOL] Pentagon i MOL. Aviatsiia i kosmonavtika, no. 2, Feb. 1966: 93-95. TL504. V45, 1966

In August 1965 the President of the United States announced that his country would begin work on a Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL), a project so exclusively military in its purpose that several generals from the Pentagon were named its directors. Reactionary U.S. journalists immediately lauded the decision as one that would make the United States the first power to acquire a military potential in outer space. More responsible segments of world society expressed their alarm and indignation at this introduction of the arms race into the cosmos. The real purpose of U.S. space research thus became obvious to all. Although careful observers of the U.S. space effort have long noted the military applications of projects such as the Gemini series, they were nevertheless surprised by the frankness with which U.S. leaders have characterized the military uses of the MOL. From radio reconnaissance to the destruction of "non-American" satellites, the MOL is expected to perform military activities impossible for unmanned orbiting stations. But world space experts doubt the success of the MOL. Some specialists have argued that the vast problems connected with the project

cannot be solved within the timetable announced by the Pentagon; others assert that it would be easier and less expensive to develop earth-based equipment and unmanned space objects capable of performing the functions now assigned to the MOL. Aggressive undertakings like this serve only those who seek to ignite another world war: the American militarists, and representatives of big business in the United States.

1092
Twiss, Robert L. [STRATEGIC F-111 AFTER ALL] Doch strategische F-111. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Feb. 10, 1966: 79-80. U3.W38, v. 10

The United States Defense Department has decided to proceed with development of a bomber version of the variable sweep-wing F-111 fighter-bomber, which is being produced by the General Dynamics Corporation at Fort Worth, Texas. President Johnson has authorized expenditure of 1.75 billion dollars to produce a force of 210 high-speed FB-111 bombers to enter the Air Force inventory between 1968 and 1971. The decision to proceed with the FB-111 rather than a new system favoured by the Air Force--the AMSA or Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft--has met with mixed reactions in the United States. Proponents of the FB-111 point out that the plane will be in service years sooner than an AMSA could be, and that the FB-111 will greatly increase the nation's strategic power. Opponents argue that the United States should hasten development of AMSA to replace the aging B-52 subsonic bombers. For budgetary reasons NASA has deferred the first unmanned Voyager planetary mission from 1971 to 1973 and scheduled new Mariner flights to Venus and Mars. (Abstract supplied)

1093
Ulegla, I. JOINT INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR RESEARCH CELEBRATES TENTH ANNIVERSARY. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet press materials on arms control and disarmament, no. 2, May 9, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 35,379) p. 44-48.
P&GP RR
"CSO: R-7000-D."
Translated from Leninskoe znamia, Mar. 26, 1966.
Slav Rm

Discusses the history, purposes, membership, and activities of the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research at Dubna, Bulgaria. Information on the number of scientists engaged at the Institute and the academic and professional activities of the staff is supplied. Institute exchange programs with scientists in Eastern and Western nations are described.

1094
U.S. Library of Congress. Aerospace Technology Division. SOVIET LAUNCH-VEHICLE TESTS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN: COMPREHENSIVE REPORT [by W. Hrubiak. Washington] 1965. 36ℓ illus., form, map. (Its ATD report 65-83.)
TL507.U67, no. 65-83
Bibliography: leaves 34-36.

A comprehensive report on the Soviet launch-vehicle tests performed in the Pacific from Jan. 1960 through Jan. 1965. Based upon open Soviet literature and two West German sources, this report analyzes the announcement data, area data, and actual test data of each test series. Translations of Tass news releases on the series are included.

1095
[UNITED STATES: THE MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND] États-Unis: le Military Airlift Command. Air & cosmos, no. 140, Feb. 19, 1966: 42-43.
P&GP RR

Organization, equipment, and uses of the U.S. Military Airlift Command (MAC), which is now used for both strategic and tactical transport missions. The system is designed to assure the deployment and support of U.S. forces in any theater of operation accessible by air. More than any other branch of the Air Force, MAC's development has been dominated by constant progress in aeronautic techniques.

1096
VIETNAM SPURS NAVY WEAPONS ADVANCES. Aviation week & space technology, v. 84, Mar. 21, 1966: 28-29. TL501.A8, v. 84

Describes the accelerated activities at the Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, Calif., in acquiring improved air-to-ground weapons and fire-control systems. The Vietnamese War is the spur both for improvement of existing systems and for development of systems to satisfy future requirements. The Shrike antiradar missile and the Walleye glide bomb with television guidance system are receiving attention, as well as general problems such as target acquisition, accuracy, and delivery techniques. "With the growing acceptance of the principle that conventional ordnance will continue to be the main type used in limited wars in the future years, there is increasing interest in finding ways to build a deterrent value into conventional weapons along the same lines as the strategic deterrent aspects of nuclear bombs."

1097
Yaffee, Michael L. VIET SPURS TACTICAL MISSILE DEVELOPMENT. Aviation week & space technology, v. 84, Mar. 28, 1966: 29-30.
TL501.A8, v. 84

Catalogs and describes the several tactical missile systems that are being improved or developed for combat use in the Vietnamese War. The air-to-surface systems involved include the Shrike antiradiation missile, the Walleye unpowered air-to-ground missile, the Condor (a powered version of Walleye), the Maverick, ARM (a successor to the Shrike), and the helicopter-launched TON. Surface-to-surface weaponry includes 5-inch shore bombardment rockets (Bomroc) and a landing-force-support weapon program. Sparrow, Sidewinder, and Phoenix air-to-air missiles are undergoing improvements, as are the surface-to-air systems known as Sea Sparrow and Chaparral.

C. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES OF STATES AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. General Analyses

1098
Abosch, Heinz. [GERMAN ARMAMENT AND CAPITALISM] L'armement et le capitalisme allemands. Année politique et économique, v. 38, Dec. 1965: 450-455. D410.A6, v. 38

A review of Fritz Vilmar's Armament and Disarmament in the Late Stages of Capitalism (Rüstung und Abrüstung im Spätkapitalismus, Frankfurt, 1965). The book is held to be worthwhile for its statistics on defense spending in various countries and its observations on the relationships between capitalism, economic classes, welfare spending, employment, and armaments. Vilmar believes democracy, economic

socialization, and planning must be instituted before capitalist armament policies can be successfully fought.

1099
Beaufre, André. [CHANGES IN THE STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE] Les transformations de la stratégie de dissuasion. Revue militaire suisse, v. 110, Nov. 1965: 489-501. U2.R5, v. 110

Translation of an article originally appearing in Schweizer Monatshefte, Aug. 1965. AP32.S47

New concepts are necessary to an understanding of contemporary problems of war and peace. In their strategic thinking French theoreticians, unlike their American counterparts, proceed from abstract general ideas to concrete techniques--a method which has unveiled some important concepts. Today's strategy must probe political, psychological, diplomatic, economic, and military factors. It must be a total strategy. War and peace are practically indistinguishable. From this state of permanent struggle (in "peacetime" or war) some new ideas have emerged. First is the ability to choose the level of force employed, of which there are three main categories: cold, conventional, and nuclear war. Cold war actions are circumscribed by the deterrent threats of conventional and nuclear war; conventional war actions are similarly deterred by the danger of nuclear war. Action is possible on each level to the degree that the threat of a higher level deterrence (escalation) is not present. Important in the mechanism of deterrence, and therefore responsible for the amount of freedom of action allowed, are two other ideas: stability and instability. A level is held to be unstable if one (or both) of the adversaries considers action on that level advantageous, and stable if the action is deemed excessively risky. Between the Soviet Union and the United States the nuclear level has stabilized--both sides possess invulnerable retaliatory forces that erase any hope of victory in nuclear war. Stability on the nuclear level (that is, mutual deterrence) has reopened the possibility of large-scale conventional war. Still, former fears of escalation remain to inhibit the outbreak of a great war. No longer is it sufficient to show the potential aggressor that NATO could win the war. The aggressor must be made to feel uncertain about the response of the attacked--a degree of nuclear credibility (or deterrence) must be restored. This uncertainty or credibility is enhanced by the existence of several nuclear centers. America's opposition to nuclear polycentrism is a product of its outmoded fear of accidental war. Europe's greatest threat is the eruption of Central European crises. To meet this it must study and coordinate allied deterrence strategy, particularly in "peacetime" situations.

1100
Beaufre, André. CONTEMPORARY STRATEGY. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 10, Oct./Nov. 1965: 48-50. UA646.F5, v. 10

Strategy in the present era is total; that is, it encompasses not only military force but also political, psychological, economic, and even police force. Although "total strategy" is not a new concept, until recently it was not credible to the 20th Century mind. The demand for unconditional surrender by Germany in World War II provides an excellent example of the mistaken concept that civilian and political factors can be ignored during war. That there is no essential difference between peace and war in the opposition between nations is now an accepted fact. Strategy, then, chooses the best methods in a given situation to force the enemy to yield; its key is freedom of action, which may be limited by the enemy or by events far removed in the world scene. Among the various strategies available is deterrence, made salient by the advent of nuclear weapons. By their very nature, nuclear weapons must not be considered offensive arms but rather war-deterrents. A certain amount of nuclear instability must be maintained, however, for an excess of nuclear stability "reintroduces the danger of conventional wars." Deterrence must be manipulated to prevent war and to prevent rapid and big changes in the political balance. Indirect strategy complements nuclear strategy and is that strategy which tends to achieve political objectives with a minimum of force. Since deterrence is incomplete and neutralizes only atomic and conventional war, indirect strategy can be employed through such diverse means as propaganda and revolution. The "salami method" and protracted conflict are both indirect strategies. The one inches forward, while the other hangs on until the enemy wearies. Indirect strategy has been rendered of paramount importance by deterrence; in order for the West to avoid defeat under its "impressive but passive nuclear umbrella" it must have a thorough understanding of indirect strategy.

1101
Beaufre, André. [INTRODUCTION TO THE STRATEGY OF ACTION] Introduction à la stratégie de l'action. Stratégie, no. 7, Jan./Mar. 1966: 5-12. U162.S78, 1966

Theoretical remarks on the strategy of action, which, as opposed to deterrence, is designed to coerce others into doing, or allowing you to do, what you want. Use of the strategy is complicated; one must understand the historical-political context and also choose the means best suited for directing history where he wills. General Beaufre comments on the debate: where does strategy end and politics begin? "Total strategy, which is essential in this era as never before, is not a military phenomenon but an indispensible governmental technique," a method of thinking and acting.

1102
Boissière, Claude. [FRANCE AND DETERRENCE] La France et la dissuasion. Forces aériennes françaises, v. 20, Jan. 1966: 23-35. UG635.F8F66, v. 20

Strategy is the "sometimes veiled but always respected rule of the international game." Today's strategy of deterrence--a function of suicidal nuclear weapons and the shrinking of the world--is coextensive with politics rather than a continuation of politics by other means. French acquisition of nuclear weapons must be viewed in the international context, which is a gigantic struggle for survival by all states. Simultaneously the United States and the Soviet Union seek to establish their own hegemony over the world, and this quest has produced a world governed by a "hegemony of East-West antagonism." No one can escape the effects of this East-West conflict, but the "middle powers" are politically, economically, and ideologically strong enough to resist the fate of weaker states, which is to serve as battlefields for the East-West struggle. Only the "indocile" middle states (France, China) can escape complete satellization, and they manage this by taking the offensive, by also playing the game of deterrence. Nuclear weapons proliferation heightens the uncertainties of strategic calculation; fear of crossing the nuclear threshhold makes the giants prudent in their actions toward smaller nuclear states, and it is thus the latter can gain freedom of

action. To be viable deterrence must be combined with indirect (economic and ideological) and "genetic" (future weapons research) strategy. France's deterrent power is irreplaceable "in a world in which survival is the ability to safeguard one's own strategy and to express and defend one's rights on the international stage." Middle powers can gain a freedom of action by realizing their own defense. Still their freedom is restrained and limited by the condition of permanent conflict that great power strategy imposes on the world.

1103
Delmas, Claude. [14 ESSAYS ON NUCLEAR WAR: POLITICS AND STRATEGY] Quatorze essais sur la guerre nucléaire: politique et stratégie. Informations & documents, no. 225, Mar. 1, 1966: 12-16.
P&GP RR

Reviews essays by Bernard Brodie (on the new civilian strategists and their mathematical game-theory approach to thinking), William W. Kauffmann (on McNamara's doctrine of graduated deterrence and the requirements this puts on the Atlantic alliance), Albert Wohlstetter (on nuclear arms sharing), and Henry Kissinger (on European defense problems). These essays are contained in La Guerre Nucléaire: Quatorze Essais sur la Nouvelle Stratégie Américaine [Nuclear War: Fourteen Essays on New American Strategy], Paris, Editions Stock. Because nuclear strategic-technical problems are widely misunderstood, or because Europe still thinks in prenuclear terms, U.S. strategic policy is much criticized. Engagement in Europe is basic U.S. policy. What cause difficulties are the "ideas and means by which this policy can best respond to expectations from both sides of the Atlantic."

1104
Elble, Rolf. [THE ROLE OF THE HUMANITIES IN MODERN STRATEGIC PLANNING] Die Rolle der Geisteswissenschaften in einer modernen strategischen Planung (II). Wehrkunde, v. 14, Dec. 1965: 639-644.
U3.W396, v. 14

Strategy and economics are linked in diverse and vital ways: the importance of economic strength needs hardly be mentioned; industrial-managerial science provides tools and personnel for strategic planning. Many questions of strategy--tension forecasts, conflict resolution, human aspects of conducting war--are amenable to sociological analysis. Psychological tools have only recently been recognized as indispensable in national preparation for resistance and in the analysis of strategies to avoid armed conflict. Law too is related to strategic planning--on the one hand it is pointless to establish a dictatorship (if the goal of the strategy is to defend democracy) in order to facilitate military planning, and on the other hand, in extraordinary situations, military exigencies may require temporary alterations in the law (Emergency Acts, etc.). "The sciences as a complex system influence the similarly complex system of strategy." We are unable to comprehend either system in its totality but must bring as much as possible of the former (social science as well as physical science) to bear on strategic planning.

1105
Gandilhon, Jean. [MILITARY TRENDS AND APPLICATIONS IN SPACE POLICY] Tendances et réalisations militaires en politique spatiale. Revue militaire générale, no. 10, Dec. 1965: 567-586.
U2.R48, 1965

Includes summaries in English and German.

The United States and the Soviet Union both justify military intrusion into initially "peaceful" national space programs as defensive actions made necessary by the possible aggressive use of space by the other side. As space research developed it became difficult to separate the concepts of peaceful exploitation and military application. Today "strategic space rivalry" has become an accepted fact. The military is concerned with near and planetary space. In this first domain it can use civilian scientific and practical achievements (e.g., geodetic, surveillance, or communications satellites) or it can study the data revealed in civilian tests from a military viewpoint. The go-ahead that was granted the Manned Orbital Laboratory project provides a clear indication of how much use the military has made of civilian experience. Von Braun's recent assertion that the power that first establishes itself on the moon will strategically dominate the world shows the military's concern with outer space. This judgment is perhaps ill-considered; innumerable technological problems as well as high costs reduce the potential value of a lunar military base, and it is difficult to imagine that the first moon base can be used to forcefully prevent the installation of a second. Projects to get man to the moon, and to other planets also, are being vigorously pursued. Europe too is undertaking space ventures, though nothing comparable to American or Soviet achievements will be reached without close financial, scientific, and industrial cooperation. Whatever is accomplished, it is to be hoped that the results of feverish space activity will be used for the benefit of man, and not for the prestige of nations.

1106
Gretton, Sir Peter. A MARITIME STRATEGY FOR BRITISH DEFENCE. In Royal United Service Institution. Journal, v. 110, Nov. 1965: 301-308.
U1.R8, v. 110

A lecture delivered at the Royal United Service Institution on Apr. 7, 1965.

Development of nuclear weapons has greatly complicated the task of formulating maritime strategy. Allied navies can have little role in a general nuclear war; military convoys between ports ravaged by nuclear attack hardly seem conceivable. Modern maritime forces should be designed to play roles in limited conflict and peacekeeping operations, despite the reluctance of NATO strategists to alter their plans for a protracted nuclear conflict. Although constant political turmoil throughout the world provides a rationale for the maintenance of effective British naval forces, Britain can no longer depend upon an island chain of bases for deployment of its power. The proposed joint service task force, which should include a troop ship and Royal Air Force support, "can be used as a visible threat; it can be held unseen over the horizon, ready when required." A limited war aimed at destruction of Western sea communications can cripple Britain's trade, hinder the fight to contain communism, and prevent Western aid to developing nations. "Here then is our weakest point, and indeed the weakest point of the West." Nuclear stalemate may encourage enemies to attack this weak point, to disrupt Western economies. Communist China may see interference with trade east of Suez as its best hope to isolate and eventually dominate India and retard the development of other Asian nations. NATO planners must be made to realize the importance of maritime strategy, to recognize the potential threat posed to Western shipping, and to admit that attacks by conventional means, not general nuclear war, constitute the main area of concern to modern naval forces. A full-scale attack

upon Western shipping is not likely. "I think the danger is from sporadic, guerrilla-type attacks in many different parts of the world, which would be difficult to counter and disrupting to commerce."

1107
Gundel, B. H. TO CHECKMATE THE REDS. Ordnance, v. 50, Mar./Apr. 1966: 512-515.
UFl.O67, v. 50

The events of the Cuban missile crisis suggest that the Soviet Union may be preparing a calculated series of future East-West confrontations. Is the United States prepared to counter these challenges? Seven years of preparation, feint, and planted misinformation preceded the Soviet move to alter the balance of power by erecting missiles in Cuba. "It should be noted that the first and only direct challenge to U.S. superiority in the nuclear age was accompanied by nuclear détente and distraction of the United States through means of the test ban." The next 25 years may witness several Soviet challenges simultaneously engineered and based upon improved strategic weapons, antimissile systems, and biological weapons. Were the United States to take the lead in deployment of an antiballistic missile, the Soviet Union would have to match U.S. development by sacrificing other objectives. The United States must develop superiority at the tactical level, lest the most industrially powerful nation on earth find itself helpless before primitive armies. Nuclear disarmament should be initiated only when Washington feels "sure that it has a proven capability for maintaining the peace with noncataclysmic weaponry alone, thus making it safe to disarm at the other end of the spectrum where the weapons of mass destruction are." This capability must certainly include preparedness for biological warfare. The conflict doctrine of the Communist system promises a sustained drive for technological superiority. "The Soviets are not only willful and energetic, but they are also excellent chess players, and their early moves in the game often prepare for much later sequences which may not be evident to the novice." The enormous potential of the United States, applied skillfully and forcefully at the most vulnerable points of an opponent's forces at the proper time, can guarantee victory in any form of conflict the enemy may choose.

1108
Howard, Michael, ed. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF WAR; ESSAYS PRESENTED TO CAPTAIN B.H. LIDDELL HART ON HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY. New York, Praeger [1966, c.1965] 377 p.
U19.H75

Contents.--Jomini and the classical tradition in military thought, by Michael Howard.--Clausewitz and the nineteenth century, by Peter Paret.--Command and staff problems in the Austrian Army, 1740-1914, by Gordon A. Craig.--European military thought and doctrine, 1870-1914, by Jay Luvaas.--Doctrine and training in the British cavalry, 1870-1914, by Brian Bond.--Liddell Hart and the French Army, 1919-1939, by André Beaufre.--Doctrine and training in the German Army, 1919-1939, by Robert J. O'Neill.--Liddell Hart and the British Army, 1919-1939, by Sir Frederick Pile.--British strategic doctrine, 1918-1939, by Norman Gobbs.--The American approach to war, 1919-1945, by Maurice Matloff.--The development of Soviet military doctrine since 1918, by J.M. Mackintosh.--American strategic doctrine and diplomacy, by Henry A. Kissinger.--Problems of an alliance policy: an essay in hindsight, by Alastair Buchan.--Training and doctrine in the British Army since 1945, by Alun Gwynne Jones (Lord Chalfont).--The making of Israel's Army: the development of military conceptions of liberation and defence, by Yigal Allon.--Liddell Hart biographical summary.--Classified bibliography.

Essays written by students and scholars who have been influenced by the writings of Captain Liddell Hart. The essays are written in a broad historical framework, developing a single theme: that of "the development of strategic and tactical theory in the West from its origins in the eighteenth century until our own day, and the interaction of this theory with the actual practice of and preparation for war by soldiers and statesmen."

1109
Kahn, Rashid A. STRATEGY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. Pakistan horizon, v. 18, 3d quarter, 1965: 247-251.
DS376.P32, v. 18

Traces the use made of the Indian Ocean for strategic purposes. Different Western and Asian countries have controlled or used this critical waterway of Southeast Asia many times. After World War II the United States filled the vacuum left by the decline of British power in the Indian Ocean. India's desires for a dominant role in the strategy of the area are looked upon with apprehension by Pakistan, Indonesia, and other countries of Southeast Asia. "It is a matter of great satisfaction that these countries are almost unanimous in expressing their firm opposition to the introduction of United States nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean area and the offer of a joint nuclear-umbrella for it."

1110
Luchsinger, Fred. "GIVE ME PLACE TO STAND, AND I WILL MOVE THE EARTH." Swiss review of world affairs, v. 15, Mar. 1966: 1-2.
D839.S9, v. 15

The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in space "is and remains a function of the East-West conflict" due to its political, economic, and military implications and potentials. Contrary to some Western speculations, the present Soviet leadership has accepted and enlarged Khrushchev's expensive space program despite the mounting difficulties it faces at home and within the bloc. The enormous investment and energy put into that program "can be justified only by an aim of overriding political importance," viz the latent communist ambition to dominate the world. The functions and other features of certain space programs of both the United States and the Soviet Union undoubtedly indicate the military importance of space exploration. The possibility of finding mineral resources on the moon portends economic competition in space. If "prestige acquired in the forefront of space exploration" can be utilized as an element of political power--which seems to be exactly the case--then both superpowers, lacking an effective détente between themselves, have no choice but to proceed with the space race. This in turn enhances the existing East-West tensions rather than reducing it.

1111
McCain, John S. SHOWDOWN AT SEA. Daughters of the American Revolution magazine, v. 100, Feb. 1966: 92-97. E202.5.A12, v. 100

"An address delivered October 12, 1965 at Norfolk, Virginia, to the 54th annual conclave of the American Association of Port Authorities."

Events of the Second World War, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and the Gulf of Tonkin incident prove that mastery of the sea is crucial to the security of

the United States. It is true of all wars that they are won "by a man with a gun on his shoulder taking over a spot with all his attendant heavy equipment which can only be gotten there by ship." Today the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in a total "wet war," which involves not only navies "but also the merchant marine, oceanography, and fishing industry." As well as land areas in general Communist expansion may soon take as its target areas directly influenced by seapower. For America the oceans can serve as a means to project national policy without incurring international political problems. To date the "most profound change in the history of warfare has been the extended inland reach from mobile bases at sea," namely the Polaris missile. Because U.S. military commitments are far-reaching, mobility is an important ingredient of effective defense. The oceans provide three types of mobility: geographic, political, and tactical. "Every type of military power can be projected from mobile bases at sea--airpower, gunpower, manpower and missile power." The merchant marine becomes involved when one considers that the potential strategic bottlenecks in world trade coincide with areas of political instability and tension: the Panama Canal, the Straits of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and the Straits of Malacca. The greatest threat to U.S. ocean routes is the huge Soviet submarine fleet--"built specifically to establish a capability of driving a steel wedge down the Atlantic Ocean, cutting the lifeline between Europe and America." Consequently antisubmarine warfare has become an important element of military seapower. Overall, seapower is instrumental in executing the policy of graduated deterrence, for "seaborne striking forces can apply any degree of military power required."

1112
Odescalchi, Edmond P. GEOPOLITICS AND THE IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT. Midwest quarterly, v. 7, winter 1966: 155-164. A530.M5, v. 7

In the end, the ideological conflict of modern times will be settled in terms of geography, through a contest over disputed territory. "Ideology must be translated into geography if it is to be defended or expanded through military or political means." Ideological conflicts are not rare in history. The struggle between Christendom and Islam, the religious wars following the Reformation, the attempts of the Turkish Sultan to extend his control over the entire Moslem world, the more recent Russian nationalism that has tried to extend its influence by means of Marxist ideas--all these conflicts were determined by ideological motivations. But ideology has never prevailed over the geopolitics in state policy. The encouragement given the Sublime Porte by the Christian kings of Europe (who saw in Moslem conquest of central Europe an antidote to Hapsburg pressures on their borders) and Cardinal Richelieu's participation in the Thirty Years War on the Protestant side are not isolated examples. Geopolitical considerations are at the base of East-West confrontations today. Soviet opposition to German and Chinese access to nuclear weapons is explained by the fact that the Soviet Union is trapped within a geopolitical vise. "Present Chinese pressure from the East will certainly intensify the Soviet Union's already solid determination to block the unification of Germany." The Communist ideal of ideological unity has no appeal when China sees Russian encroachment upon a Chinese sphere of influence, as Vietnam indicates. The Soviet Union and the United States will contradict the principles of the United Nations (an ideology both of them claim to favor) when national interests of a geographical nature warrant. Yet Soviet-U.S. support for the United Nations is readily obtainable (as in the India-Pakistan clash) when the question becomes one of restraining China. U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic illustrates how well the United States has grasped geopolitical realties involving spheres of influence.

1113
Ollion, Général. [POLITICS AND STRATEGY] Politique et stratégie. Politique étrangère, v. 30, no. 6, 1965: 479-485. JX3.P6, v. 30

Strategy and politics are two distinct disciplines, and the relationship between them must be thoroughly studied. Strategy is essentially the pursuit of political goals by coercive means, made necessary when normal (diplomatic, economic) politics encounters insurmountable obstacles or direct threats. The subordination of strategy to politics is not a new concept, but it must receive particular attention because today, as never before, the whole national life can be threatened by other powers, and because the maximum use of armed strength for coercion entails its own severe dangers. The need to find other means of constraint is pressing. Where individual freedom is respected, total strategy--requiring that all public and private activities be oriented toward certain defined objectives--can be applied only in special circumstances. The passage from political to strategic modes of action must be easy, fast, and reversible. Coercive means must always be available for rapid response. A simple answer cannot be found to the question: How can these demands be met and how should the change in style of action be organized? Certain principles are, however, relevant: (1) the national interest must be defined; (2) potential decisionmakers must be instructed in the distinction between politics and strategy and in determining the circumstances that would require passage from one to the other; and, finally, (3) the future must be studied with the methods of both politics and of strategy. Problems concerning the relationship between the two disciplines at any point in time will be capable of solution only if important decisionmakers become involved in such a task of thought and education.

1114
Pilisuk, Marc, and others. WAR HAWKS AND PEACE DOVES: ALTERNATE RESOLUTIONS OF EXPERIMENTAL CONFLICTS. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 9, Dec. 1965: 491-508. JX1901.J6, v. 9

Explores the cooperative ("Peace Dove") and noncooperative ("War Hawk") partner patterns in the two-person, two-choice Prisoner's Dilemma experimental game. The influence of personality variables, the experimental setting, and early differences in play were discussed in terms of the outcome--whether pairs of partners became Hawks, Doves, or Mugwumps (innocuous). Reciprocal behaviors at an early stage of interaction appeared to have major importance in the formation of patterns for the duration of play.

1115
Potapov, Ivan N. [POSTWAR DOCTRINES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FLEETS OF THE IMPERIALIST STATES] Poslevoennye doktriny i razvitie flotov imperialisticheskikh gosudarstv. Moskva, Voen. Izd-vo, 1966. 260 p. VA40.P66

Contents. --Postwar doctrines and development of the U.S. naval fleet. --The endeavor to create a "common" military doctrine for the aggressive NATO bloc. --Postwar doctrines and development of the naval fleets of England and France. --Postwar doctrines and development of the fleets of West Germany, Italy, and Japan.

This book elucidates the content of those military doctrines held by the major imperialist states after the end of the Second World War that determined the development of the composition of their military naval fleets during this period. It contains information on the composition of the military naval forces of the major imperialist states during the development, formation, and operation of certain military doctrines; basic tactical and technical data on shipbuilding during the war years and the postwar period is cited. The dependence of military doctrine upon social structure, state problems of domestic and foreign policy, and the economic condition of the nation is examined. (Translation of supplied summary)

1116
Powell, Enoch. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WORLD POWER. Listener, v. 75, Feb. 17, 1966: 227-228, 247. AP4.L4165, v. 75

Large-scale, nonnuclear military operations and violent disturbances of the balance of power can and will continue to take place when the interests of the great nations are at stake. In such situations the major nuclear states will not only abjure nuclear weaponry, but will leave a wide cordon sanitaire between the military instrumentalities they unleash and other actions that could be construed as signals for the initiation of nuclear exchanges. On the other hand the lesser powers feel that launching a nuclear assault on an enemy about to destroy them might be their only safety in a world where major powers would be "unwilling to commit hara-kiri" for the defense of an ally. Thus the prospect of preventing proliferation by treaties of mutual guarantee is slight; lesser states realize that the giant states would hardly risk their own destruction to save one small state somewhere in the world that was threatened with extinction by another state. The probable existence of two or three major nuclear powers plus a somewhat larger number of minor but significant nuclear powers--the number of smaller states that will find it practical or desirable to get a nuclear armory is narrowly limited--does not confirm Lord Chalfont's view that the world is on the way to total destruction unless means are quickly found to extinguish the nation state. Nuclear war resulting from pure mischance, miscalculation, or insanity cannot be ruled out, but national and international self-interest would call for rapid demonstration that the act in question was truly accidental or insane. Nuclear war resulting from actions by a state that exaggerated its own strength is unlikely too; modern weaponry insures that a leader like Napoleon or Hitler would strive to achieve his aims with the maximum cordon sanitaire between his methodology and the invocation of nuclear weapons. On balance, nonnuclear warfare between all sorts and conditions of powers will probably continue to be waged in the nuclear age. And restrictions on the use of military force may be tighter than they have been since World War I, to insure that nonnuclear conflicts remain so.

1117
Scalapino, Robert A. VIETNAM AND WORLD PEACE. Vietnam perspectives, v. 1, Feb. 1966: 3-21. P&GP RR

Inquires into the implications of the Vietnamese War for the East-West balance of power in Southeast Asia and the world. Prof. Scalapino reviews and documents Hanoi's and Peking's political tactics and goals. He speculates on the courses of action open to Hanoi and the impact each might exert on the further fate of the conflict (or its settlement). He enumerates and defines elements on which American policy in Vietnam should be based in order to bring about a negotiated peace settlement and avoid falling into extremes of adventurism on one hand or capitulation on the other. Prof. Scalapino suggests that United States policy toward the Communist world, including Red China, adopt "a two-channels approach": Western cultural and trade exchange with Communist nations as well as "Chinese involvement in world decisions critical to all of us"; and Western readiness to meet force by force in case Red China continues "acting on the creed that change can only be produced by violence." The author recommends U.S. perseverance in opposing Communist aggression in Vietnam and concludes that such a policy will eventually pay off with stability, neutralization, and prosperity for the entire region, thus contributing to world peace.

1118
Schaffer, Bernard. RECENT WRITINGS ON WAR. Australian outlook, v. 19, Aug. 1965: 213-217. DU80.A947, v. 19

Reviews and categorizes two decades of published work on war, strategy, and related problems. The author uses as a takeoff point Neville Brown's Nuclear War: the Impending Strategic Deadlock (1964), Seymour J. Deitchman's Limited War and American Defense Policy (1964), and the abridged edition of Quincy Wright's A Study of War (1964).

1119
Schuldt, Erwin. [AIR WAR IN VIETNAM] Luftkrieg in Vietnam. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Mar. 10, 1966: 169-172. U3.W38, v. 10

Surveys the role of air warfare in the present stage of the Vietnam War as well as the chance of escalation. The author feels the lack of adequate sea and airport facilities inhibits South Vietnamese and U.S. forces from applying "incisive measures." He gives detailed data on the strength of the United States air forces (including air cavalry, naval aircraft, and aircraft carriers) stationed in that region. The Vietnamese War will cost the United States $25 to $30 billion annually. Since the Communists believe the United States is not ready to carry "the whole burden, with all consequences involved, of the struggle for South East Asia," one must expect a sharp increase in North Vietnam's military commitment as well as general escalation of the war.

1120
Senghaas, Dieter. [BACKWARD GLANCE AT CLAUSEWITZ] Rückblick auf Clausewitz. Atomzeitalter; Information und Meinung, no. 2, Feb. 1966: 39-46. P&GP RR

Describes Clausewitz's views on war "as pure science" and as an instrument of foreign policy. The author reviews futile efforts to apply Clausewitz's concept of the interrelationship between war and policy to the modern age.

1121
Ströhm, Carl G. [WHEN DE GAULLE VISITS MOSCOW--WILL EUROPE'S INTERESTS BE REPRESENTED?] Wenn de Gaulle Moskau besucht. Werden Europas Interessen vertreten? Christ und Welt, v. 19, Jan. 21, 1966: 1. BR4.C37, v. 19

The French-Soviet community of interests consists of similar attitudes toward the war in Vietnam and of a common desire to see the American role in Europe diminished, Germany confined permanently to its present boundaries, and the German Federal Republic prevented from nuclear decisionmaking of any kind. On the question of Germany's partition both sides have different views. German Gaullists overlook the fact that France, like the United States, bases its policy on the continuation of the status quo in Europe for the next several years. On the other hand a "French-Soviet ring" aimed at perpetuation of the German partition is hardly possible, due to "too great differences, qualitative and quantitative, between both partners." The erosion of the ideological positions adopted by the West and the East in the fifties must necessarily have its impact on each bloc's policy, which will be less concerned with ideological questions and more with political interests. Thus NATO, as an ideological, anti-Communist alliance, has little chance of survival beyond the year 1969. It can and will endure as a community of interests of Western nations, and in that capacity it will contribute its share to the world balance of power. The direction taken by De Gaulle is correct. But his advancement of French national interests before all others limits his chances of achieving East-West accommodation in Europe. The work initiated by De Gaulle should now be taken over and continued on a much broader basis by Bonn without repetition of his errors. The French President's visit to Moscow calls for formulation by Bonn of a new policy that will more fully serve German interests.

1122
Villon, Pierre. [THE GERMAN PROBLEM FROM THE VIEWPOINTS OF RIGHT AND LEFT] Le problème allemand dans les perspectives de droite et de gauche. Démocratie nouvelle, Jan. 1966: 37-42.
D839.D45, 1966

The anonymous suggestion for NATO reforms that recently appeared in Politique Étrangère is reportedly an expression of official French thinking. [The article appeared in v. 30, no. 3 of the magazine and was abstracted as item 193, v. 2, no. 1 of this bibliography.] The author envisages the formation of a small, Carolingian Europe, which is led by France as the sole possessor of a nuclear force. For some time powerful Germans have been talking of a European alliance (with its own nuclear weapons) that is similar in principle to De Gaulle's proposals. And it is very possible that De Gaulle might make some concessions on nuclear sharing in exchange for agreement on his Carolingian scheme. If realized, such a "European" defense system would allow quicker German acquisition of nuclear weapons and give more weight to Bonn's demands on U.S. policy. It would also endanger peace. Even a simple integration of defense forces and logistics could involve France in a war begun by revanchist provocation on Germany's Eastern frontier. The French force de frappe whets Bonn's nuclear ambitions. Indeed the minimum concessions that NATO members have made to German nuclear demands are menacing. The McNamara committee for NATO nuclear consultations is "the first step on the way to recognition of West German equality, on the way to annulment of the 'discriminatory' clause of the Paris Agreements." To be sure De Gaulle is a realist. He does not dismiss German ambitions or believe that they would disappear within a supranational Europe. But he fails to see how little control France would have over events--how fragile is French political superiority compared with German material superiority. Advocates of a European state or an integrated defense system, who would tie France to a reactionary and expansionist Germany, are inspired by monopoly capital. Instead of humoring German nuclear ambitions it is possible to isolate the social and political forces that promote them, to force Germany to move in the direction of peace. A peace treaty and recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier would weaken German revanchism. The Left can only gain by discarding cold war myths; its national independence policies cannot be nationalistic; it must show its support of détente and disarmament.

1123
Zilliacus, Konni. [GREAT BRITAIN AND THE DAMMING UP OF CHINA] Grossbritannien und die Eindämmung Chinas. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 11, Mar. 1966: 183-188.
D839.B57, v. 11

Contends that contrary to Washington's evaluation Red China has neither conducted an aggressive policy nor intends to stage military aggression anywhere. The author believes that London and Washington differ greatly in this opinion. The article refers to recent pronouncements by British Labour, Conservative, and Liberal leaders critical of U.S. policy towards China. Long excerpts are also given from the recent writings of Dr. Malcolm Caldwell, lecturer at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, who stresses Red China's peaceful policy and intentions. Zilliacus fears the United States contemplates a preventive war against China.

2. Unilateral Policies and Strategies

1124
***[pseud.] THE 10TH YEAR OF THE BUNDESWEHR: PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS, 1965] Das zehnte Jahr der Bundeswehr. Leistung und Erfolg 1965. Wehrkunde, v. 14, Dec. 1965: 629-633.
U3.W396, v. 14

Describes the present state of the West German Armed Forces--size, recruitment and training programs and needs, organization, budget, long-term planning, and weapons. Now consolidation and internal improvements rather than further expansion are emphasized. The German Defense Minister is said to view armament policies as one means of encouraging science and the economy in the fields of research, technology, and production.

1125
Barclay, C. N. [BRITISH FORCES "EAST OF SUEZ"] Die britischen Streitkräfte "ostwärts von Suez." Wehrkunde, v. 15, Feb. 1966: 74-77.
U3.W396, v. 15

A report on British defense forces east of Suez--the Middle East Command and the Southeast Asia Command. The author sketches their strength, distribution, and special problems such as armament, logistics, and bases. British military operations in Kuwait (1961) and Borneo (1962-63) are described to illustrate the strategic and tactical problems of these special defense forces. The motives for the British presence east of Suez are to block Communist expansion and to insure peace until the unstable states in this region are capable of managing their own affairs.

1126
Beebe, Lucius. REVOLUTION FOR EXPORT: THE ROLE OF THE PLA. Revue militaire générale, no. 10, Dec. 1965: 654-664.
U2.R48, 1965

Includes summaries in French and German.

China's politically controlled People's Liberation Army (PLA) is a major influence on foreign policy and "a revolutionary army charged with the mission of supporting China's national aspirations." Types of military equipment and training are determined by the PLA's intended role as a guerrilla force in neighboring territories, not by exigencies of national defense or internal security. The common peasant soldier is strong, "fatalistically brave," and imbued with hate for the U.S. imperialists. His tools are light, mobile, simple, and require only a minimum of logistical support. The troops of the PLA "can move anywhere, in any weather, over any terrain, and be effective." China will not be content within its present boundaries; it feels a call of manifest destiny. But its leaders are pragmatic and thus pursue an expansionist program not by overt military means but by insidious support and direction of supposedly indigenous revolution. The threat that China can call into action a 2.5-million-man army tempers counterrevolutionary efforts, and its new nuclear power "serves as the added might that impresses indigent neighbors and deters recalcitrants from too close association with the West."

1127
Berezhkov, V., and D. Volskii. THE FACTS BEHIND AMERICA'S ESCALATION. New times, no. 10, Mar. 9, 1966: 30-40. D839.N483, 1966

Recreates the various stages of intensification in the U.S. "peace offensive" in Vietnam. Confronted by protests at home and isolation abroad, the U.S. Government is said to have undertaken the diplomatic measures toward settlement and initiated the pause in the bombing of North Vietnam only to mask its aggressive intentions. The 14 points of the "peace program" announced by Washington on January 3 are analyzed in detail. The authors argue that the United States has steadfastly refused to begin negotiation on the basis of this program, even when suitable situations presented themselves.

1128
Brownlow, Cecil. NEW STRATEGIC WEAPONS PUSH POSSIBLE. Aviation week & space technology, v. 84, Mar. 7, 1966: 75, 79, 81. TL501.A8, v. 84

"Development and deployment of advanced strategic weapon systems, an endeavor on the downgrade in Defense Dept. thinking and budgeting over the past few years, appears to be on the verge of a partial comeback." The future threat from Communist China, intelligence that the Soviets are beginning to deploy a crude antimissile system, and fears that U.S. strategic strength vis-à-vis Soviet strategic capabilities is declining all stimulate renewed interest in the Nike-X antiballistic network. The Defense Department remains convinced that the best countermeasure to Soviet antimissile defense is improvement of the penetration capabilities of U.S. nuclear warheads; accordingly it will concentrate on advanced versions of the Minuteman and Polaris missiles, as well as new weapons (the advanced manned strategic aircraft, the short-range attack missile, etc.). But Chinese belligerency and the prediction of Chinese strategic capabilities for 1975-80 make it "virtually certain that the $10 billion anti-Chinese version of the Nike-X will receive approval from the Defense Dept." Secretary McNamara, however, prefers to delay initiation of a full-scale program of development. "At present, the Nike-X, as a development effort, is scheduled to receive $447 million in Fiscal 1967."

1129
Cariappa, K.M. OUR DEFENCE AGAINST CHINA'S THREAT TODAY. Radical humanist, v. 29, June 20, 1965: 295, 298. DS401.R27, v. 29

Argues that time and economic factors make it impossible for India to build up an adequate defense system against the Chinese threat without outside help. Since the Soviet Union and China are "brothers" India must turn to the West for significant military aid and for a nuclear umbrella. "Let 'non-alignment' and 'non-violence' be only memories of. . . ideologies in the past."

1130
Case, Frank B. RED CHINA'S SEAPOWER. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 45, Dec. 1965: 3-10. Z6723.U35, v. 45

Communist China has embarked on a major expansion of its naval and merchant fleets. As an emerging world power, and one which sees the United States preeminance in Asia as being due to naval power, China is determined to establish hegemony through sea power in Asia and possibly the western Pacific. So far the Asian free world has not given this development the attention it deserves. Since their accession to power in 1949, the Chinese Communists have gradually built their navy into the largest one in Asia. In spite of evident weaknesses (when compared to the American naval presence) China is well on the way to posing a threat to other Asian nations, and both the United States and its Asian allies must devise a strategy and construct naval forces capable of meeting the rising Chinese naval threat.

1131
Derevianko, P. M., comp. [PROBLEMS OF THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS] Problemy revoliutsii v voennom dele. Moskva, Voen. Izd-vo, 1965. 196 p. U104.P85

Partial contents.--The revolution in military affairs and problems of the military press, by Marshal R. Ia. Malinovskii.--On Soviet military doctrine, by N. A. Lomov.--Military doctrine and military science, by S. N. Kozlov.--Scientific-technical progress and its influence upon the development of military affairs, by S. M. Shtemenko.--New weapons and the character of operations of armed forces, by N. A. Lomov.--New means of battle and strategy, by V. V. Larionov.--The development of campaign tactics, by I. S. Glebov.

The concept of the "revolution in military affairs" has become firmly implanted in the scientific literature and daily life of the Soviet armed forces; it reflects the basic changes realized in recent years in the armament and technical equipment of the Soviet Army and Fleet and in the methods of armed conflict. These changes, which are part of an objective, natural process, signify a new stage in Soviet military development. . . . Soviet military thinking, based upon Marxist-Leninist methodology, is attempting to elucidate all sides and features of the contemporary development of military affairs. It examines the impact of new methods of armed conflict upon military art, the organization of troops, and methods of training and educating personnel. Its conclusions and recommendations are the theoretical foundation for strengthening the military preparedness of the armed forces of the U.S.S.R. and for defending the Socialist homeland against aggressive imperialism. The present collection contains a small portion of the work published by

the military press. It indicates the material bases for the revolution in military affairs and the new methods of armed conflict, reveals the fundamental content of Soviet military art, and maps the paths for future Soviet military development. The material formulates the demands that the revolution in military affairs makes upon command, political, and technical personnel and upon every serviceman of the armed forces. The articles are closely connected to the life of servicemen and their military and political preparation. (Translation of supplied summary, modified)

1132
Desbarbieux, R. [BALANCE-SHEET 1965] Bilan 1965. Aviation magazine international, no. 439, Mar. 15, 1966: 51. TL502.A854, 1966

Resumé of French Air Force Chief of Staff Martin's press conference on air force activities in 1965, and of Colonel Glavany's speech on air force programs and weapons and materiel projections. Total flight hours decreased compared to 1964, but this was a function of an increase in jet flight hours. Operations of the strategic air force grew, and aerial defense, slated for threat evaluation and alert missions, stabilized. A tactical air force was established. Glavany spoke of the Mirages (IV, III E, III V, and III F), the ballistic ground-to-ground missile, joint Franco-British construction programs, and radar programs.

1133
Desjardins, Thierry. [OPERATION BOOMERANG] Opération Boomerang. TAM; Terre, air, mer, no. 84, Feb. 25, 1966: 25-27. P&GP RR

Describes a French Army game, Operation Boomerang, played to determine the effectiveness of troops attacked by tactical nuclear weapons. No doubt a future war will be nuclear, although it will not necessarily involve an exchange of strategic weapons. The purpose of the maneuvers is to reduce the psychological effects on troops of tactical nuclear weapons, which are, essentially, refined conventional weapons.

1134
Dulac, Philippe. [THE ROLE OF THE NAVY IN FRANCE'S DEFENSE SYSTEM] Rôle de la marine dans le système de défense français. TAM: terre, air, mer, no. 81, Jan. 10, 1966: 38-39. P&GP RR

The tasks assigned to the navy in French defense policy, its role in deterrence, intervention, and territorial defense. The evolution of naval equipment (and its heavy costs) is discussed as well.

1135
Durkee, William P. CIVIL DEFENCE IN NORTH AMERICA: UNITED STATES. EMO national digest, v. 5, Dec. 1965: 21-22, 24. P&GP RR

Text of presentation before the Conference of the California Defense and Disaster Association, Sept. 1965.

Highlights of the U.S. program given by the Director of the Civil Defense Office of the Secretary of the Army. Mr. Durkee upholds "the theory that civil defense is organized within the legal structure of representative government," and cites proposals for expansion and specific acts by which this can be achieved.

1136
EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR CIVIL DEFENSE: PANEL "F"--PROJECT HARBOR." EMO national digest, v. 5, Dec. 1965: 11-15. P&GP RR

Extract from a series of reports originally published by the U.S. Office of Civil Defense, that emphasizes the need to have cadres of professional and technical workers ready to meet the problems of survival and recovery from a nuclear attack and presses for more popular involvement in civil defense matters.

1137
EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR INDUSTRY. EMO national digest, v. 5, Dec. 1965: 23-24. P&GP RR

Summarizes the Canadian booklet on "Emergency Planning for Industry," published in 1965 by the Department of Defence Production. The booklet sets forth specific measures to assure continuity of management; protection of personnel, plant, and equipment; and safeguarding of essential company records in the event of either peacetime disaster or military attack.

1138
Fourniau, Charles. [THE WAR AND REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM] La guerre et les conditions de paix au Viet-nam. Année politique et économique, v. 38, Dec. 1965: 434-449. D410.A6, v. 38

On two fronts--guerrilla warfare and aggression against the North--the United States is failing in Vietnam. Its policy is to win support for a pro-American government, but is is only alienating the population. Because Vietnam holds no economic or strategic interest for the United States, American leaders will not be politically able to expend the massive effort required to defeat the Viet Cong. To U.S. policymakers Vietnam is the key to the fate of all Southeast Asia; they hope that the American presence there will serve to prove the fallacy of "wars of liberation" as a policy. But the United States has already been defeated by the war of liberation and now is only proving "that it can assassinate the people it could not conquer." Vietnam is much more than a local problem. On the one hand the more entangled the United States becomes in Asia the more it is drawn toward the dangerous policy of strengthening Germany with nuclear weapons. On the other hand continuing escalation can create situations that automatically lead to catastrophe. Despite the step-up in the war it is still useful to talk of peace; world public opinion can play a decisive role. The basis for peace can only be the Geneva Accords--independence, neutralization, a coalition government, and the withdrawal of U.S. troops. By accepting such a solution the United States would win international prestige and avoid the dismal global implications of intensified war.

1139
Gavin, James M. A COMMUNICATION ON VIETNAM. Harper's magazine, v. 232, Feb. 1966: 16, 18, 21. AP2.H3, v. 232

Presents purely military arguments, which advocate a change in the present United States Vietnam policy. A cessation in the bombing of North Vietnam, a halt in the escalation of the ground war with withdrawal of troops into coastal enclaves, and intensive efforts to reach a settlement are offered by the former Army

Chief of Plans and Operations as one path to solution of the dilemma facing American policymakers.

1140
Gladkov, M. [THE POLICY OF REVANCHE AND THE MILITARIZATION OF THE ECONOMY OF THE F.R.G.] Politika revansha i militarizatsiia ekonomiki FRG. Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, v. 46, Jan. 1966: 79-83. U717.R9A27, v. 46

Although the anti-Hitler coalition at Potsdam determined to impose upon Germany complete disarmament and demilitarization, Western monopolists and militarists lost no time in making the Federal Republic of Germany a stronghold of anti-Communism and monopolistic capital. Supported by their NATO allies, West German revanchists have now found it possible to discard the masks they have worn for 20 years and enunciate a new expansionist policy that demands restoration of the German Empire within its boundaries of 1937, with the Bonn leaders serving as sole spokesmen for the entire German people. The West German army, founded upon the remnants of Hitler's officer corps, has attracted great numbers of "refugees" from the eastern German territories who are anxious to begin a new drive eastward. In an attempt to consolidate the Bundeswehr, Bonn recently announced a 5-year military plan, during which some 20 billion marks will be expended on the acquisition of military weapons and technology. No longer is West German industry willing merely to reap profits by manufacturing armaments for the United States; it now concentrates on modernizing the Bundeswehr and Luftwaffe, with particular attention to nuclear development. The British newspaper Daily Express noted a short time ago that West Germany soon will be able to manufacture enough nuclear explosive material for the production of 100 atomic bombs yearly. The Bundestag has recently prepared a series of special laws granting the government during peacetime the power to mobilize Germany's industry, transportation system, food supply, and entire population. Other new laws specify compulsory military training, the creation of a 200,000-strong "civil defense corps," and the like. There can be no doubt that these measures, intended to militarize life in West Germany as completely as possible, point the way to new military adventures. The armed forces of the Soviet Union and those of the other Warsaw Pact nations will stand ready to repel any act of aggression launched against peace-loving peoples by the Bonn militarists and their capitalist partners.

1141
[GREAT BRITAIN: AIRCRAFT CARRIERS OR BOMBERS] Grande-Bretagne: porte-avions ou bombardiers. Air & cosmos, no. 136, Jan 22, 1966: 43.
P&GP RR

Outlines the positions taken by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force on the strategic choice facing Britain: whether to devote scarce resources to a bomber fleet or to a force dependent on aircraft carriers.

1142
Grézer, Jacques O. ["ORBITAL ROCKETS" OPEN NEW MILITARY PERSPECTIVES: DANGEROUS SPACE STRATEGY] "Orbitalraketen" eröffnen neue militärische Perspektiven: gefährliche Weltraum-Strategie. Neue Politik, v. 10, Dec. 25, 1965: 14-16.
H5.N377, v. 10

Criticizes the United States and the Soviet Union for pursuing military programs in space in order to have orbital rockets and moon-based missiles. Grézer predicts these programs will transform today's military strategy. Such activities reduce chances for disarmament agreements and negate partial disarmament measures. For example destruction of outmoded bombers and ballistic missiles makes little sense, because the powers are always working on turning out more effective weapons.

1143
GROWING EXPORT MARKET: WEAPONS. Forbes, v. 97, Feb. 1, 1966: 15-16.
HF5001.F6, v. 97

In 1965 the $1.9 billion worth of arms the United States sold to foreign nations constituted a major American export. Some 30 years ago arms exporters were reviled as "Merchants of Death." Immediately after World War II most of the states that stood as bulwarks against communism could ill afford defensive armament, a breach Washington filled with military aid programs. To aid these states in economic recovery and to alleviate U.S. concern over the dollar gap, the Johnson administration appointed a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Logistics Negotiations, Henry J. Kuss. His job is to push the sale of weapons to every non-Communist country except those that might use the weapons against other non-Communist states. While the major purchasers of American arms have been the nations of Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, dollar-rich yet underdeveloped countries such as Venezuela and Saudi Arabia are also in the market. The demand has resulted mostly from the growing complexity of weapons. Few states can easily produce electronically controlled weapons systems, which are obtained more cheaply from the United States than by committing scarce talent and capital to local development and manufacture. Ten to 20 percent of America's weapons exports are arranged on a government-to-government basis, but almost all sales result from Government contacts. The biggest exporters of weapons are General Dynamics and Lockheed. The latter has realized nearly $1 billion from foreign sales since 1962. According to a company spokesman, "We had a goal of 25 percent of profits from overseas. This figure goes up and down, but foreign sales at the moment provide about that amount of operating profits."

1144
Gruening, Ernest. THE REALITY OF VIETNAM. Progressive, v. 30, Feb. 1966: 15-17.
AP2.P8655, v. 30

A critical appraisal of the Johnson administration's Vietnam policy. Senator Gruening expresses a belief that the Nation made a serious mistake in becoming involved in the conflict. He asserts, in answer to official policies, that U.S. security is not directly threatened, the domino theory is invalid, and even if the Vietnamese had set up a Communist regime they would have remained independent of the Chinese. There is no indication that the Vietnamese like the presence of American troops any better than they have that of any other foreign power. The Senator proposes that the United States follow the means set forth in the U.N. Charter (Chap. 1, art. 2 and Chap. 6, art. 33) by which nations can attempt to resolve their differences. He feels the Nation in so doing will be returning to and abiding by the rule of law. It is obvious that the United States cannot win this war, so it must find a way to honorably extricate itself from a nasty situation.

1145
Haffner, Sebastian. [THE NEW WAR] Der neue Krieg. Merkur, deutsche Zeitschrfit für europäische Denken, v. 20, Mar. 1966: 201-219.
AP30.M43, v. 20

Discusses the theoretical and historical background of Mao Tse-tung's military strategy as well as its political implications for the present and future. The author points out the differences between the basic principles of Clausewitz's and Mao's strategies and compares the latter to Trotsky's revolutionary doctrine. He concludes that Mao's proclaimed goal of world domination must necessarily result in complete bankruptcy of his strategy because of the opposition it is bound to create outside China and because such a goal can never be achieved.

1146
Heelas, Terence. TIME TO LOOK AT THE FUTURE. Sanity, Aug. 1965: 5. P&GP RR

No short-term military solution is at hand in Vietnam. But when the Chinese have the ability to destroy U.S. cities the American forces "will no more be able to operate effectively in S. E. Asia than the Russians or Chinese can operate today in the Caribbean." The question is whether the United States will accept a negotiated settlement that will undoubtedly undermine the pro-American, anti-Communist forces in South Vietnam, or will opt for the only military solution presently available, i.e., preemptive attack on China's nuclear installations.

1147
Heidt, Contrôleur Général. [THE MILITARY BUDGET FOR 1966] Le budget des armées pour 1966. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Jan. 1966: 5-14.
D410.R45, v. 22

The 1966 French military budget of 22,025 million francs must be considered in the framework of the government's economic and financial policy. Stabilization policies have clearly braked the expansion of military expenditure; since 1962 the military budget has slowly decreased from 4.9 percent of the gross national product to its present low level of 4.6 percent, military expenditures as a percent of the total budget have decreased fairly rapidly since 1960. One of the most noteworthy aspects of the budget is the fact that for the first time equipment expenditures (51.2 percent) exceed operating expenditures (48.8 percent). This relative decrease in operating expenses is chiefly due to a rapid decrease in military manpower--from over one million in 1962 to 585,000 in 1965. In the future a noticeable increase in equipment maintenance costs can be expected, both because of technological evolution and a considerable rise in fuel costs. The operating budget attaches a good deal of importance to the Pacific testing center. The budget for 1966 tends to balance outlays between new authorizations and payments. This was necessary since authorizations were rapidly accumulating without corresponding payment provisions, but to go too far in this direction might mean jeopardizing the efforts to renovate the armed forces. Financial restrictions caused reductions or delays of several projects, but others (nuclear propulsion and weapons, delivery vehicles) were increased in scope. Cost estimates for the strategic nuclear forces (50 percent of equipment payments in the 1966 budget) have greatly improved, thus putting the budget in a safer position. But, as conventional armaments estimates take insufficient account of the increase in price, orders may have to be reduced to keep within budget limits. In general the 1966 budget will be able to realize its goals but fails to foresee some increased expenditures that could threaten the financial balance of the long-term plan.

1148
Hinterhoff, Eugene. A SECOND LOOK AT BRITAIN'S ROLE "EAST OF SUEZ." Revue militaire générale, no. 2, Feb. 1966: 172-191.
U2.R48, 1966

Includes summaries in French and German.

Especially since the end of the war advocates of reducing British defense commitments as a solution to serious economic and financial crisis have been loud. Those who emphasize economic rather than security considerations suggest several unsatisfactory alternatives to the present system of bases and defense commitments. Among these are the replacement of so-called untenable foreign bases with a mobile "task force" or with a system of small island bases in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, the formation of quickly deployable "fire brigades," and the establishment of a mobile strategic reserve similar to the U.S. Strike Command. But there is no adequate substitute for the physical presence of Britain East of Suez. The purpose of commitments in the Middle East is threefold: to protect certain small states (e.g., Kuwait, Bahrain, Omar) from aggression, to prevent Soviet or Chinese entry, and to ensure an uninterrupted flow of oil to the West. If Britain were to withdraw, Soviet or Chinese influence would quickly establish itself and would work to deprive Western Europe of vital Middle Eastern oil. British commitments in Southeast Asia are also important. The whole burden of containing China cannot be put on the United States. Defense East of Suez is a responsibility of the entire free world and thus must be assumed by NATO. In this way some of the expense would be lifted from Britain, while security would not be sacrificed.

1149
Hinterhoff, Eugene. [THE SOVIET UNION'S MARITIME THREAT] Die maritime Bedrohung durch die Sowjetunion. Wehrkunde, v. 15, Feb. 1966: 91-96.
U3.W396, v. 15

Public opinion has wrongly assumed that Western strategic superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union means that the only serious Soviet threat is conventional land invasion of Europe. Russia has successfully developed "other forms of threat." In its foreign policy it has been able to deprive the West of Third World naval bases while assuring new support areas and bases for its own navy. Soviet interests in this activity extend from the North Sea to the Mediterranean to the South Pacific. Since the end of World War II progress in shipbuilding has been astonishing. One may suggest that the concentrated Soviet naval effort has occurred because--a land offensive in Europe being unthinkable--leaders desired a means of waging war that would not "unconditionally have to lead to a thermonuclear war." The heart of Soviet naval power is its submarine fleet, which has the following tasks in case of war: to blockade Western Europe, to destroy Western attack fleets, and to attack enemy coastal areas. The West has no adequate defensive system against these underwater threats. The Soviet naval air branch, surface fleet, and merchant marine have undergone expansion as well. The "most spectacular event and perhaps the strongest threat to the West" is the Soviet fishing fleet--4,000 boats and 3 million tons. About 100 of these craft are equipped to survey the ocean floor in

preparation for eventually seeding it with multimegaton atomic mines that can be detonated from afar. Such detonations could, for example, completely flood New York or San Francisco with radioactive water. The fishing fleet could also be used to launch chemical and biological weapons.

1150
HOW DANGEROUS IS RED CHINA? THE EMERGING ANSWERS. U.S. news & world report, v. 60, Apr. 4, 1966: 29-31. JK1.U65, v. 60

The opinions of China specialists on the nation's capabilities in defense, economics, and diplomacy. Their consensus seems to be that "the United States has been badly overestimating a second-rate Asian power--a China that is crippled economically and a 'paper tiger' militarily."

1151
HOW VULNERABLE IS RED CHINA? U.S. news & world report, v. 60, Feb. 14, 1966: 38-41. JK1.U65, v. 60

China can determine whether the Vietnam War will escalate into a major confrontation. What course of action will it follow? Chinese military might is vulnerable to destruction by American nuclear and conventional weapons. China could not sustain its armed forces in the field for any length of time, as its productive capabilities and lines of communication could be destroyed at will. The United States has targeted China's production centers. Its navy and air force are no match for American power. The army, huge as it is, would be denied the materiel necessary to be effective unless the United States were to attempt direct invasion of the Chinese mainland (which it would probably not do). China realizes all this, and as a consequence cannot, for the time being, back its militant words with military force.

1152
Hugo, Conrad von. [NATIONALIST CHINA'S POTENTIAL FROM THE MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL VIEWPOINT] Das Potential Nationalchinas in militärischer, politischer, wirtschaftlicher und kultureller Hinsicht. Wehrkunde, v. 14, Dec. 1965: 646-649. U3.W396, v. 14

Nationalist China is a strong power, perhaps the only East Asian power that should be taken seriously with the exception of Japan. Its standing forces number 650,000 and its equipment is modern. Militarily Nationalist China is prepared for any type of offensive or defensive fighting. Just as important, the country is economically and politically healthy. Its greatest contribution is cultural--existence as a beacon of freedom to those who are suppressed on the mainland. Red China talks loudly but is weak; the West's failure to recognize this is a strategic error. Nationalist China's ambitions to liberate the mainland are not as utopian as some people believe, although time, which permits the Communists to build better weapons, is no ally of these ambitions.

1153
[INTEGRAL PART OF THE NAVY: NAVAL AERONAUTICS] Partie intégrante de la Marine: l'aéronautique navale. Revue nautique, no. 287, Feb. 1966: 27-29. V2.R44, 1966

Describes the part played by the French Navy's air branch in naval defense missions and lists the characteristics of the planes and helicopters at its disposal.

1154
Italy. Comitato nazionale per l'energia nucleare. REPORT ON NUCLEAR ENERGY IN ITALY. Rome, 1964. 89 p. TK9079.A533

Details the history and current programs of Italy's National Committee for Nuclear Energy.

1155
Jonas, Anne M. THE NUCLEAR WORLD OF MAO TSE-TUNG. Air Force and space digest, v. 49, Feb. 1966: 70-72, 74, 77, 79. UG633.A65, v. 49

Answers to questions about Communist China's real ambitions and strategies can only be postulated from examination of some of the key factors that influence Chinese strategists. In general, however, Communist China's national policies are necessarily determined by the limited resources with which it must meet the economic needs of its people and maintain military power. Communist China would like to replace the Soviet Union as the leader of the international Communist movement and hence must prove to this worldwide audience that it is an outspoken critic of U.S. imperialism and the main support of revolutionary movements throughout the developing world. At the same time Peking must conserve its strength for a long-term struggle with the United States. Such conservation means giving maximum verbal encouragement to revolutionaries while tailoring actual support for wars of national liberation to its limited resources; it means avoiding direct conflict with the United States at this time. The Chinese do not anticipate the use of nuclear weapons in wars of liberation and there is no evidence of Chinese nuclear assistance to the developing countries. Peking does not yet have the required delivery capability to effectively use its growing nuclear power, and the Sino-Soviet dispute has made reliance on the Soviet nuclear deterrent questionable. Should nuclear war break out in Asia, China would have to fend for itself in the face of superior nuclear power. A very limited economic base makes continued nuclear development difficult, especially since modernization of the armed forces and overall economic growth are also priorities. Effective ground and conventional forces are of major importance to China's military strategy; these forces are expected to be more decisive than nuclear weapons in the victory over U.S. imperialism. The United States is not the only power in Asia with which Communist China must contend. Russia is uneasy with such a behemoth as its neighbor. The "triangular relationship" between Moscow, Washington, and Peking "is assuming new strategic dimensions." Chinese Communist participation in any nuclear arms control agreements in the near future is unlikely. China is not going to forgo continued nuclear development, because it is the key to superior power in Asia.

1156
Kissel, Hans. [THE AUSTRIAN FEDERAL ARMY--TEN YEARS] Zehn Jahre österreichisches Bundesheer. Wehrkunde, v. 14, Dec. 1965: 633-639. U3.W396, v. 14

Gives the history and composition of the Austrian Army, whose task is to maintain an armed neutrality, and judges it by its performance in the maneuvers of October 1965. Political compromises and choices (for instance a law forbidding "special" weapons such as guided antiaircraft missiles) and a small defense budget have limited its potential, but in 1961 Austria began building up an organized civilian-military-economic territorial defense and quick-response troops. The October exercises were militarily satisfactory despite materiel lacks. However, because of

its geographic situation, Austria's deterrent power will not be completely convincing until the entire population is brought into a broader system of territorial defense.

1157
Kissinger, Henry A., ed. PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY: A BOOK OF READINGS. New York, Praeger [1965] 477 p. (Praeger university series, U-588) UA23.K494

Readings that consider national security policy--"the policy area where power impinges on national objectives"--as it is shaped by such diverse factors as American strategic doctrine and defense policy, alliances, neutrality and insurgency, the control of modern weapons, and governmental organization.

1158
Krone, Heinrich. [GERMANY'S SECURITY] Die deutsche Sicherheit. Soldat im Volk, v. 16, Mar. 1966: 9. P&GP RR

Next to the problem of European integration the most vital subjects for international conference and discussion are nuclear decision-sharing within NATO by nonnuclear members and the contemplated nuclear nonproliferation treaty. These two questions are closely linked and, in the case of Germany, should be viewed from the standpoint of the nation's security. Germans are quite aware that their independent control over atomic arms would evoke a feeling of threat throughout Europe. The Federal Republic's desire not to call forth that feeling "places clear-cut limitations on German policy" in the field of nuclear weapons. The most important outcome of a recent conference between Chancellor Erhard and President Johnson--from the standpoint of German security--was their agreement to the effect that "the German Federal Republic, along with other interested partners in the alliance, should have an adequate role in nuclear defense." The Republic's security requires, above all, its participation in all essential nuclear decisions within the alliance, especially in cases involving the use of German territory as a base from which atomic weapons are put into action. Furthermore, the Federal Republic should have a full voice (not merely a veto power) in the formulation of a common strategy for the defense of Central Europe and Germany. Considering the Federal Republic's fears that a contemplated nonproliferation treaty would debar it from effective decision-sharing in nuclear matters, importance attaches to the principle considered at the Erhard-Johnson conference that "nuclear arrangements within the alliance do not represent nuclear proliferation." But of equal importance is Germany's desire that the nonproliferation treaty never be allowed to block "the road to a future European striking power," even if Europe's economic, political, and military integration seems only a distant possibility. Other important prerequisites for German accession to a nuclear nonproliferation treaty are German reunification based on self-determination of the German people, and a worldwide scope for the treaty.

1159
Leont'ev, A. [THE PENTAGON'S "BLOODY FIRING RANGE"] "Krovavyi poligon" Pentagona. Aviatsiia i kosmonavtika, no. 1, Jan. 1966: 92-95. TL504.V45, 1966

Argues that the Pentagon uses Vietnam in much the same way Hitler and Mussolini used the Spanish Civil War--as a testing ground for new weapons and policies. Colonel Leont'ev describes U.S. aerial warfare in Vietnam and compares it to the activities of the Luftwaffe during World War II. The United States is accused of initiating gas warfare against the Vietcong. U.S. aerial losses, already heavy, will increase as North Vietnam perfects its antiaircraft systems, the author asserts.

1160
Martinet, Gilles. [THE WAR OF THE BASES] La guerre des bases. Nouvel observateur, no. 70, Mar. 1966: 10-12. AP20.O2, 1966

What is at stake in France's withdrawal from NATO and its refusal to maintain allied installations on its territory can be understood in the context of NATO's emerging military strategy, which recognizes an East-West nuclear balance and emphasizes conventional conflict. Without French facilities the allies would be quickly overcome in a conventional European war. Could France threaten to or keep itself out of such a war? With bases on its territory France would be automatically led into war, unless it wished to completely destroy the allied effort. But this would not be the case were the bases located elsewhere. France has not started up the road to neutralism. Because his nuclear maneuverings were not taken seriously, and because he won nothing in the Common Market negotiations, De Gaulle has disclosed his most "credible" trumpcard. Abstention from a European conflict is only a threat, but one to which Washington must give attention. In this way De Gaulle has gained international leverage. He will not use this to solve Europe's most pressing problem--divided Germany--however, because he does not favor the military neutralization of Germany that is the key to solution. But other European forces must take the opportunity "to publicly assert what De Gaulle, captivated by his subtle game of threats and ambiguity, doesn't want to or can't say": Europe's salvation will not be attained by way of military bloc confrontation.

1161
Massmann, Karl-Friedrich. [THE ARMED FORCES OF ITALY, NATO'S PARTNER] Die Streitkräfte des NATO-Partners Italien. Revue militaire générale, no. 2, Feb. 1966: 219-235. U2.R48, 1966

Includes summaries in English and French.

Summarizes Italy's defense problems, its relationship with NATO, and the size and equipment of its army, navy, and air force.

1162
Melchior de Molènes, Charles. [AMERICAN OPINION AND NATO] L'opinion américaine et l'OTAN. Revue militaire générale, no. 2, Feb. 1966: 251-268. U2.R48, 1966

Affirms that official and public opinion in the United States is strongly in favor of a strengthened Atlantic alliance.

1163
Merton, Walter. UNITED KINGDOM CIVIL DEFENCE. EMO national digest, v. 5, Dec. 1965: 16-17. P&GP RR

"Excerpts from an address by Air Chief Marshal Sir Walter Merton . . . reprinted from the Journal of the Association of Civil Defence Officers, Vol. 12, No. 3, August 1965."

Reports Soviet capabilities to attack Great Britain, and stresses that defense planning is an absolute necessity, despite developments in achieving a test-ban treaty. The Soviet military threat still exists, and

their capability to reach prime British targets is known. The need to maintain a monitoring system and a corps of officials to organize survival plans is evident.

1164
Mignonat, Jean-Alain. [FRANCE AND SPACE] La France et l'espace. Forces aériennes françaises, v. 20, Mar. 1966: 280-298.
UG635. F8F66, v. 20

France's achievement of launching the experimental A-1 satellite into orbit from the Diamant missile last November gave it third place among the space powers. Two organizations direct the French space program: the Ministerial Commission for Armament (DMA) and the National Center for Space Studies. The first is responsible for the launching-missiles and the second, a civilian organization, for the satellites and for scientific space study. Within DMA research is conducted by the Technological Office of Missiles (DTE) and the Office of Research and Testing, which controls the firing centers. Some of France's space efforts are devoted to the European Space Research Organization. Controlled by the DTE, the "precious stone" rocket series, begun in 1959-60, has served as a basic military program of ballistic studies. At present the entire space program in France has reached the point where long-range decisions must be made. Missile and satellite programs can be expected to have considerable material repercussions and to contribute to the general welfare.

1165
Montfort, Colonel-divisionnaire. [A FOOTNOTE TO SWISS DEFENSE POLICY] En marge de la défense de la Suisse. Revue militaire générale, no. 10, Dec. 1965: 665-674. U2.R48, 1965

Outlines Swiss contingency plans in case of the outbreak of general war in Europe. Planners have carefully considered the variables, including the possibility of armed assistance from the enemies of Switzerland's invaders. Quick mobilization, since there is no standing army, is a matter of life or death. The country can be on a war footing within 2 days of mobilization orders. Assuredly any aggressor will meet a stubborn and powerful resistance.

1166
Murphy, Charles J. A STRATEGY FOR THE PACIFIC. Fortune, v. 73, Jan. 1966: 167-168, 234, 236-237.
HF5001. F1, v. 73

The United States must make and carry out a stated and explicit policy of disallowing the expansion of Chinese Communist power in Asia. To accomplish this and seal off the gaping breach in Vietnam the American task does not have to be a solitary one. Britain, in particular, and Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and South Vietnam, could be attracted into a more mutually cooperative defense system. In the North Pacific whatever strategy is invented will have to take on a convincingly Asian cast. The China that is governed by Chiang Kai-shek and Japan, two societies of sharply differing character, are not only essential links in a containment system, but also potential bridges into the rest of Asia, including mainland China. However, before the Japanese can take their place among the powers, they must find some way to abolish the renunciation of war contained in Article Nine of their Constitution. The issues of Japan's military policy and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the United States will probably loom large before 1970. Right now the United States would like to see Japan do more "self-defending in the general interest." Among other things it might at the very least build up its air defense system. Ideally Japan could eventually provide "the crucial northeast arc of a crescent of containment around Red China." Short of this Washington would be content to see Tokyo participate in a regional alliance with Taiwan and South Korea.

1167
New China News Agency. OVERSTRETCHING THE AMERICANS. Survival, v. 8, Mar. 1966: 92-94.
U162. S9, v. 8

Argues that the United States is militarily overcommiting itself around the globe, particularly in terms of available manpower. The article states that the gap between U.S. aggressive ambitions and actual strength is already unbridgeable and still growing.

1168
[ONCE MORE . . . THE STARFIGHTER] Noch einmal . . . der Starfighter. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Mar. 10, 1966: 158-164. tables.
U3. W38, v. 10

Describes the motives and the present consequences of the German Federal Republic's decision at the end of the fifties to purchase the U.S. aircraft Starfighter F-104 G for the West German armed forces, especially for participation in NATO's striking force. Bonn hoped that by so exceeding the West German commitment to NATO the Federal Republic's chances of entering "the atom club" would be enhanced. But "the interest of all allies, including the United States, in supporting the Federal Republic's efforts in that matter has since disappeared . . . [a fact] of which Chancellor Erhard must have become convinced during his recent visit to Washington." Bonn's nuclear striving is to be blamed for "the irresponsible tempo" of the organizational and technical build-up of the West German Starfighter fleet and for disregard of the economic and logistic problems involved. The author gives a detailed technical explanation of the aircraft's structural characteristics, said to be responsible for its low adaptability for other military functions than those for which it was built. Also defined are the factors determining the operational value of an air weapons system in both peace and war. The article suggests what policy the German Federal Republic should adopt to best utilize its Starfighter fleet, which is suffering at present from a shortage of trained pilots and maintenance personnel. This policy would require some temporary changes in the republic's present commitments to NATO.

1169
Petrov, M. [AMERICAN MILITARISTS ENLARGE THEIR SPRINGBOARDS FOR AGGRESSION] Amerikanskaia voenshchina rasshiriaet platsdarmy agressii. Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, v. 46, Jan. 1966: 79-83. U717. R9A27, v. 46

Senator Fulbright recently expressed the true essence of America's "defense of democracy and freedom" when he noted that U.S. policy precludes social revolution throughout the world and is designed to maintain in power the military cliques and economic oligarchies now ruling many countries. To promote this policy the American war machine has created a system of springboards from which aggression against any state can be launched. The Indian Ocean, once controlled by the British Navy, now is ruled by a new

master--the U.S. 7th Fleet. The Wall Street capitalists were quick to urge their Government to fill the void created by the dissolution of the British Empire, and today the 7th Fleet supports colonialism and forces peoples to undertake military preparations from Africa to Australia. U.S. militarists are now planning to create additional military bases and strongholds from Ethiopia to Australia to provide against any further reduction of British influence throughout the Indian Ocean. In the Pacific, American militarists continue to fortify Okinawa and the Ryukyus, excusing their actions by the claim that the United States must protect the peoples of Asia against the growing nuclear power of Communist China. The Pentagon dreams of converting all of Japan into one great springboard for aggression in Asia and hopes to convince the Japanese people that active participation in imperialist expansionist policies will best serve Japanese national interests. Preparations of this sort will aggravate the international situation and increase the peril of armed conflict.

1170
Plattner, C. M. FORCE BUILDUP KEYED TO WIDER ESCALATION. Aviation week & space technology, v. 84, Jan. 3, 1966: 16-21.
TL501.A8, v. 84

A report of the current situation in Vietnam that emphasizes the continuing military balance between the Vietcong and U.S.-Vietnamese forces. A major buildup of American forces and airpower has already taken place "to cope with possible future escalations of the war in Vietnam and to counter a further spread of Communist control in the neighboring countries of Southeast Asia."

1171
Possony, Stefan T. AGE OR EXPERIENCE? Washington report (American Security Council) Feb. 21, 1966: 1-4.
P&GP RR

Has the Soviet Union become middle-aged and lost its revolutionary fervor and desire for world domination? Russian Communism under the present Kremlin leaders has shown signs of coming of age. To predict what course may be followed by future leaders, however, would be rash. "If the 'ins' are for peace, the 'outs' very probably favor world revolution." Col. Oleg Penkovsky has testified that the Kremlin will deliver a nuclear strike whenever circumstances favor a Soviet victory. Beset by economic and political difficulties, the Soviet Union has fallen back upon the traditional Communist technique of securing a breathing space. Had Moscow really given up the dream of conquest, it would have diverted more resources to internal development. Such does not seem the case. Needed resources are being expended in great quantity upon implementation of the liberation-war concept. The difference between Chinese and Russian participation in the world revolutionary movement is that the Soviets have their eyes upon "targets more important than Saigon, Bangkok, Dar-es-Salaam, or Santo Domingo." Soviet projects include the massive propaganda and hate campaign aimed at Europe (and directed primarily at West Germany and the United States), the training of guerrilla leaders, and the manufacture of arms and supplies for insurgents. "Soviet aid, far more than Chinese aid, keeps the Vietnamese war going." The events of the recent Tri-Continental Congress held at Havana and the latest Cuban-Soviet economic agreement portend increased distribution of Soviet arms throughout Latin America and the coordination of assaults against "Yanqui imperialism." Were a second liberation front opened in the Caribbean, for example, the United States would be forced to allocate to counterinsurgency operations funds needed for deterrence. In the meantime, American superiority in strategic weapons continues to decline. If the Kremlin is indeed middle-aged, can it be that we have remained teen-agers?

1172
REFORM OF THE FRENCH TERRITORIAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION] Réforme de l'organisation militaire territoriale française. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Mar. 1966: 518-523.
D410.R45, v. 22

Surveys provisions and effects of the February 1966 decree modernizing France's territorial military organization, adapting territorial military commands and defense structures to new mobilization requirements, and enabling the entire organization to effectively fight a war on French territory.

1173
THE REPORT OF HSIAO HUA AND THE POWER OF LIN PIAO. China news analysis, no. 598, Feb. 4, 1966: 1-7. DS777.55.C4469, 1966

On January 25, 1966, the People's Daily published a "sensational" speech that had been delivered six days previously to a political departments' conference of the People's Liberation Army. The speechmaker was Hsiao Hua, head of the Central Political Department of the Army; the chief issue was high level insubordination in the army--the need to reestablish Party political control and to be truer to the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung. What trouble prompted Hsiao Hua's strong words "is anybody's guess." Professional military men are unhappy with the "preponderance of Party business in the army," they are not convinced of the claim that in war courage is superior to modern equipment, and they grumble at being subordinated to political commissars. However the army and its spokesman, Lin Piao, are being exalted in China. The Party and the nation "are supposed to be learning the spirit of the Liberation Army, the spirit of Lin Piao." The army is performing essential economic and political tasks; it is invading the cultural field, and Lin Piao has emerged as "the faithful interpreter and worshipper of Mao." What could all this mean? Possibly China is seriously preparing against the possibility of war with the United States. More probably Mao has decided that Lin Piao will be able to steer post-Maoist China away from revisionism and is thus grooming him for at least a "watch dog" role. In this context Hsiao Hua's revelations of army grumblings could take on a wider significance. Professional complaints may have been encouraged and emphasized by Lin Piao himself "as a warning to the Central Committee of the Party that no opposition [to the Maoist tradition] will be tolerated."

1174
REPORT ON VIETNAM. Business week, no. 1905, Mar. 5, 1966: 51-54, 56, 58, 60-62, 67-68.
HC431.B87, 1966

Reviews various aspects--political, economic, commercial, and military--of the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam. Political analysis indicates that the South Vietnamese Government is assuming the political initiative and weakening the Vietcong influence among the people. While the long-range view is cloudy, the immediate scene indicates that with the help of American aid and advice the political situation is no longer hopeless. Economic analysis stresses that inflation of the Vietnamese economy could hurt the war

effort. If countermeasures do not work the situation could become critical. However, if the country can survive its economic troubles the natural resources of the country provide a firm base for the development of a viable economy. As a result of the immense U.S. aid commitment, American companies have found themselves working beside the military in developing a base for the vast military commitment. Because military hardware has become so sophisticated and construction needs so great, American firms have assumed prime-contractor responsibility for the installation of the base and communications facilities essential to the U.S. presence in Vietnam. American business has also assumed a primary role in developing and repairing resources and facilities to help meet the needs of the population. To encourage this American economic investment the Agency for International Development insures Americans against losses from currency control, revolution, or expropriation by the Vietnamese government. A military analysis shows that the introduction of large-scale American forces into the conflict has enabled the U.S. to test its own battlefield tactics by employing new weapons and techniques and assessing their ability in war against Communist theories of insurgency. To date American involvement has taken the military initiative away from the Communists and has enabled American battlefield concepts to be modified or originated through experience. Military officials believe that this increased American involvement will eventually cause the communists to reassess their strategy and give up the fight.

1175
Schlafly, Phyllis, and Chester Ward. STRIKE FROM SPACE: HOW THE RUSSIANS MAY DESTROY US. New York, Devin-Adair Co., 1966. 218 p.
UA23.S342, 1966

Clearly the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev as Soviet leader resulted from his accidentally letting slip the "broad plan by which the Soviet Union intends 'to destroy the United States by nuclear weapons,' without itself being subjected to fatal, or even seriously crippling, damage from U.S. retaliation." The entire thrust of the Soviet space program is admittedly not aimed at a moon shot; there is only one other possible goal--orbital nuclear weapons that will produce a decisive Soviet victory. The war in Vietnam is nothing but a feint to divert attention from the Soviet orbital weapon threat. The Soviets, of course, are masters of deception, even going so far as to use a special language that means one thing to Communists and another to the rest of the world. And the "gravediggers"--the so-called scientific and intellectual elite in the United States--have swallowed the bait, hook, line, and sinker. Their secret plan to disarm America unilaterally has been kept from the American people through a conspiracy of money, faked research, and a gravedigger "code language," which, like that of the Soviets, means one thing to the inner circle and another to the general public. In order to win the 1964 election for the Johnson administration, for example, the gravediggers deliberately lied about the importance of manned bombers to the Nation's defense. They have consistently refused to develop new weapons. The much-praised Manned Orbiting Laboratory, passed off as America's belated entry into the field of military space uses, will actually be next to worthless as an addition to American defense. A strong deterrence has been diluted by such concepts as preemptive surrender --a monstrous sellout. Even America's churches have been taken over by the gravediggers, through the media of the National Council of Churches and flagrantly false Communist interpretations of the papal encyclical Pacem in Terris. The gravediggers have their enemies in Government summarily booted out; they frighten the public with scare-words like "escalation," "overkill," "proliferation," "accidental war," "provocative posture," "spasm reaction," and "confrontation." They have sapped the will of the nation by destroying its capacity to wage limited war. But all this can be overcome if the American people have the requisite faith in God, education for truth, political action to oust the gravediggers, a remolded public opinion, missile defense and bomb shelters, and privately developed defense weapons. "America is not only too young to die--she is too strong to surrender."

1176
STOPPING THE MISSILES. Economist, v. 218, Mar. 12, 1966: 972, 975. HG11.E2, v. 218

America continues to hesitate about setting up an antimissile system, but it is heading in this direction. If Washington does decide to go ahead with such a system, the innovation will have as profound an effect upon international politics as did the "introduction of the A-bomb in 1945, or the H-bomb in 1953, or the intercontinental missile in 1959." Such technological marvels as the Sprint missile, which can reach its airborne target missile 100 miles away in less than 30 seconds, have brought close to reality a genuine defense against an attacking rocket. Secretary McNamara believes the cost of an antimissile system will not currently be justified by its effectiveness. Some American intelligence experts assert that the Soviet Union is already deploying antiballistic missiles around Moscow and Leningrad. But this assertion is not only difficult to believe, it is irrelevant to the present decision. The only practical use for missile defense in the United States would be against an attack by a small nuclear power like Communist China. Moreover the system needed for defense against this sort of attack is much cheaper. Preliminary development of a "light" system is underway. Serious objections have been raised to its actual deployment, however. Although an effective defense on the part of both the Soviet Union and the United States will do much to restore their former strength vis-à-vis the smaller powers, nuclear duopoly is no longer politically palatable to the rest of the world. And it "is no substitute for a workable American policy towards China."

1177
Tsui, Chui-yen. PEIPING'S DESIGN IN EXPLODING ITS NUCLEAR DEVICE. Issues & studies, v. 1, Mar. 1965: 10-20. P&GP RR

Probes the political motives and consequences of the first Chinese nuclear test. The "great leap forward" in nuclear weapons development is directed against the United States, which Peking hopes to intimidate through nuclear blackmail and threats. China's expansionism, backed by its new weapons, will first be aimed at Asia. Neither negotiation, nor delay, nor impermanent destruction of China's atomic facilities can cope with the problem. The solution is to attack at Peking's weakest point--its conventional war capacity, which has been sacrificed to nuclear progress. The regime can be overthrown with a counteroffensive from the Republic of China backed by allied logistic support.

1178
Twiss, Robert L. [THE UNITED STATES BUDGET FOR 1966] Das amerikanische Budget für 1966. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Mar. 10, 1966: 135-136.
U3.W38, v. 10

United States taxpayers will be called on to support a record federal budget of 112.8 billion dollars for the year beginning July 1, 1966. In his annual budget message to the Congress, President Johnson proposed a defence budget of 58.3 billion dollars, plus just over 5 billion for NASA. Despite a sharp cut because of the Vietnam war, the space agency thinks it will still be possible to land an astronaut on the moon by 1970. The defence budget calls for substantial purchases of helicopters, aircraft and missiles, while Secretary McNamara asked for a continued high level of research and development expenditure on the Nike-X anti-missile missile. In other fields: the North American Air Defense Command is to be reorganized on April 1 into new geographical regions, the U.S. aerospace industry achieved new record sales figures in 1965 and expects to better them again this year, and Boeing is expected to begin production shortly of the Model 747 giant commercial transport based on C-5A technology. (Abstract supplied)

1179
[U.S.S.R.: SOKOLOVSKII'S "MILITARY STRATEGY"] U.R.S.S.: La "Stratégie militaire" de Sokolowski. Charivari, n.s. no. 6, Mar. 1966: 11.
P&GP RR

The recently reissued version of Marshal Sokolovskii's basic work Military Strategy makes special reference to two essential factors--the state of nuclear weapons and DOSAAF [Soviet paramilitary youth organizations]. Research by other generals, particularly Tolubko, was conducted along these lines before this new publication was issued. The question was raised whether, given U.S. strategic-weapons superiority, the Soviet Union must rely heavily on tactical armed forces. General Tolubko theorizes that company size (and smaller) units will be the most effective force in a future conflict, whether offensive of defensive. Sokolovskii praises DOSAAF and the special elements of the secret police created for destroying enemy guerrillas. In fact, following the Tolubko-Sokolovskii concept, there already exist numerous units equipped with tactical nuclear rockets. The study of modern, portable, tactical weapons is being intensified in the Soviet Union. U.S. experts believe this to be an attempt to compensate for strategic inferiority. It is essential to realize what is "hidden behind the engaging smiles of 'peaceful coexistence'...."

1180
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Department of Defense. SUPPLEMENTAL DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1966. Hearings before subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 360 p. UA23.3.A5, 1966

Hearings and reports on the 1966 defense budget and the supplemental appropriations occasioned by the Vietnamese War. A statement on "defense supplementals" by Secretary McNamara and testimony from other Government officials and military leaders are included. Many questions of military construction and equipment in Southeast Asia, antiguerrilla tactics, adequacy of air and ground forces in Vietnam, and the like are debated.

1181
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. SUPPLEMENTAL MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION, FISCAL YEAR 1966. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 89th Cong., 2d sess., on S. 2791 [and] S. 2792. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 367 p. UG633.A58, 1965a

Testimony and reports on problems related to the resolutions "to authorize appropriations during fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes" and "to authorize certain construction in support of military activities in Southeast Asia, and for other purposes." Witnesses include the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Many questions are raised and debated on the effectiveness of U.S. military action in Vietnam, technical and supply requirements, and the like. Summaries of personnel, equipment, and budget increases related to the Vietnamese War are supplied.

1182
[UNITED STATES: AERIAL DEFENSE] États-Unis: défense aérienne. Air & cosmos, no. 135, Jan. 15, 1966: 43. P&GP RR

Outlines general characteristics of the planned (effective April 1966) reorganization of U.S. air defenses. It is "amusing" that this reinforcement of defensive strength "coincides with a reduction of the Soviet threat."

1183
Van den Berk, L. J. M. STRATEGIC CONCEPTS OF THE RUSSIAN HIGH COMMAND. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 10, Dec. 1965/Jan. 1966: 58-60.
UA646.F5, v. 10

Future warfare and its form has been a topic of discussion for some time among the Soviet military elite, who have agreed that any major war would be primarily nuclear. Until recently Soviet military planners prepared for a short, intense, and decisive nuclear war. Lately, however, some new concepts have emerged to alter this certainty, among them being the idea of a war waged with nuclear weapons limited to tactical yields. Because conventional troops will bear the primary burden of combat in such warfare, a large conventional army must be maintained at a high state of readiness. But since escalation to strategic nuclear arms is still likely in such a war, with attacks coming after little or no warning, troops equipped with nuclear weapons must also be completely at the ready. Current Soviet strategy is as follows: strategic nuclear attack will be followed by the drop of paratroops over enemy territory; ground forces will then be thrown into action at the same time the navy is mobilized. As the Moscow planners see it, any future war is most likely to be an East-West war. It will be a coalition war of tremendious dimensions and will make use of both strategic nuclear weapons and conventional forces. The former are of paramount importance, but the latter cannot be ignored.

1184
Vietnam (Democratic Republic, 1946-) Ministry of Foreign Affairs. U.S. INTERVENTION AND AGGRESSION IN VIET NAM DURING THE LAST TWENTY YEARS. Hanoi, 1965. 39 p. maps.
DS557.A7A55

Contents. --First U.S. intervention in Viet Nam. --Second U.S. intervention in Viet Nam, systematic sabotage of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. --U.S.

armed aggression against South Vietnam. --The United States launches air and naval attacks on the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. --The so-called will for peace. --The sound basis for a settlement of the Viet Nam problem.

An official North Vietnamese statement interpreting American aims (defined as conquest and establishment of a military base for anti-Socialist activities in Southeast Asia) and post-1945 military policies in Vietnam. The work contains maps of main U.S. air and naval bases in South Vietnam, of the sector decreed (April 24, 1965) a "combat zone" of U.S. armed forces, and of North Vietnamese areas attacked by the U.S. Air Force from February to May 1965. One section is devoted to news photographs.

1185
Vo Nguyen Giap. UNDERSTANDING THE PARTY'S MILITARY POLICIES: PROMOTE THE PEOPLE'S WAR, RESOLVE TO DEFEAT THE AMERICAN INTERVENTIONIST AGGRESSORS. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations of political and sociological information on North Vietnam, no. 238, Dec. 1, 1965. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 33,100) p. 1-58.
P&GP RR

"CSO: 3520-S."

"Translation of an article comprising several documents by Vo Nguyen Giap in the Vietnamese-language periodical, Tuyen Huan, Hanoi, number 10, October 1965, pp. 17-45."

Contents. --Pt. 1. Some basic topics relating to our Party's military policies. --From revolutionary forces to general uprising and peoples' warfare. --From revolutionary people to revolutionary armed forces. --From correct revolutionary tactics and strategy to the military strategists of peoples' warfare. --From political base of the masses to peoples' national defense. --Thoroughly understand the class concept, the masses concept, the practical concept, to thoroughly understand the military policy of the Party. --Pt. 2. The whole country is resolved to smash the plots of the American aggressors to promote and expand the war. --The successive failures of the American aggressors' policies. --The new strategic plan of the American imperialists. --We are certain to defeat the American aggressors regardless of what situation develops. --Pt. 3. Our military obligations. --Conclusion.

Spells out the policies required of the Vietnamese for implementing the theory that any oppressed nation, no matter how weak, "if it is firmly united and follows a proper policy and is resolved to struggle for independence and peace, certainly is capable of defeating imperialism."

1186
Wallace, J. F. CIVIL DEFENCE IN NORTH AMERICA: CANADA. EMO national digest, v. 5, Dec. 1965: 18-21.
P&GP RR

Text of presentation before the Conference of the California Civil Defense and Disaster Association, Sept. 1965.

A summary of Canada's program by the director, implementation branch, Emergency Measures Organization (EMO). Mr. Wallace traces the historical evolution of civil defense emergency measures in Canada since 1948, under the guidance of EMO. Today, he says, policy is formulated by a special committee of the federal cabinet, and decisions are filtered down to the regional and local levels of government. Facilities are provided for the continuation of key elements at all levels of government, including a headquarters for regional emergency government. Thirty-four emergency headquarters care for municipal government operations, with a staff composed of both local and federal officials. The regional shared cost is 75 percent federal and 25 percent regional, with the same ratio applied to federal-local funding arrangements. Communication between the various facilities is via teletype and radio. The army is the agency responsible for warning the public in the event of attack and fallout, and maintains representatives at NORAD. The system is activated by the Prime Minister of Canada, with the army sounding the warning signals to all units. The Emergency Broadcasting System can be hooked up to all radios and TV stations. Radiological defense measures and public shelter space are being provided, and medical and hospital facilities expanded. The army will control any area attacked, with the War Supplies Agency responsible for providing consumer goods, housing, and transportation. Canada and the United States in 1952 (amended in 1963) agreed on the procedures to follow in case either, or both, were involved in a nuclear attack.

1187
Waterkamp, Rainer. [CHANGES IN SOVIET ARMAMENT POLICY] Wandlungen der sowjetischen Rüstungspolitik. Osteuropa, v. 16, Jan. 1966: 23-29.
DR1.O8, v. 16

A chronology and explanation of the changes in Soviet armament policy from the early fifties to the present. The author describes the scope and character of each change and discusses the strategic reasoning or political pressure behind it. The Khrushchev era, with its sharp differences of opinion between Soviet political leadership and the military, is treated at length. Waterkamp concludes that the present Soviet strength in missiles and nuclear weapons, although it is smaller than that of the United States and is inadequate for staging a decisive surprise attack against the United States, represents an adequate deterrent.

1188
XXX [pseud. THE ADAPTATION OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES TO A NUCLEAR WAR] L'adaptation des forces terrestres soviétiques à une guerre nucléaire. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Feb. 1966: 212-223.
D410.R45, v. 22

Diverse monographs and articles reveal an important change in Soviet military doctrine, which is now based on a nuclear Blitzkrieg followed by rapid air and ground offensives. After strategic nuclear attack the Soviet ground forces are expected to advance at an average daily rate of about 100 kilometers, destroying their opposition with tactical nuclear and chemical weapons. Irreversible steps have been taken to prepare the armed forces (and particularly the ground troops) for this genre of war. Military exercises (and those in the satellite countries as well) center about quick exploitation of the initial massive attack and the development of initiative on the part of tactical leaders at all levels. The evolution of military materiel in the following areas closely conforms with the new strategic doctrine: (1) a rapid growth in the nuclear firepower of battle corps units; (2) mass production of nuclear missiles and rockets for the ground forces; (3) stagnation of conventional artillery provisioning; (4) improved mechanization of ground forces (tanks, armored-infantry transport, mobile weapons-systems, logistical simplifications). Every effort is

being made to instruct all military levels in the exigencies of the new doctrine. It can scarcely be viewed as either a hoax or a temporary phenomenon. As Colonel-General Lomov recently stated, "In the event of a world war the possibility of armed conflict without the use of nuclear weapons has become an abstraction." A war in Europe would almost certainly involve nuclear weapons because Soviet strategists practically exclude the possibility of keeping their own nuclear strike forces in reserve against a nuclear-armed adversary. Soviet strategy entails nuclear war for several other reasons: their current doctrine ascribes a determinative role to nuclear weapons; their plans for a rapid advance by Soviet troops require widespread preliminary dislocation of the opposition; and Soviet divisions are being equipped for short-lived nuclear and chemical war (and thus are unprepared for large-scale protracted conflict).

1189
Young, Stephen M. OUR FUTILE WAR IN VIETNAM: ESCALATION WILL LEAD US INTO A HOPELESS TRAP. Frontier, v. 17, Feb. 1966: 5-7.
P&GP RR

Reviews American policy in Vietnam. Senator Young believes "we must clarify our war aims and negotiating position." The Administration should negotiate with all parties involved--the Vietcong included--cease bombing of the North, and abide with the results of a peaceful and free election in Vietnam. Russia does not seek an expansion of the war. The American presence in the country only stirs up animosity toward the United States in Asia, and America would not lose face if it withdrew from the conflict. To attempt to transform Vietnam into a Western redoubt is nonsensical. A military solution will not bring acceptance of Americans in Asia, and furthermore "South Vietnam is of no strategic importance whatever to the defense of the United States." "The fact is that the conflict raging in Vietnam is a civil war." The saving of American and Asian lives is more important than saving face. America must admit its error and withdraw. It must follow the example of France, which, as a result of withdrawing from Algeria, enhanced rather than lowered its prestige.

3. Bilateral and Multilateral Policies and Strategies

1190
Baumann, Gerhard. [BETWEEN NONPROLIFERATION AND PARTNERSHIP] Zwischen Nonproliferation und Partnerschaft. Wehrkunde, v. 14, Dec. 1965: 624-629. U3.W396, v. 14

NATO allies generally admit the necessity for changing the structure of the Alliance to accommodate new political and weapons developments. However they do not realize that a requirement for allied solidarity is an equality of rights within NATO. Neither the multilateral force nor the Atlantic nuclear force would make partnership a reality, because the decision to use nuclear weapons would remain with the United States or be subject to a U.S.-British veto power. The essential point is not the creation of additional weapons systems but rather a clarification of decision rights over existing weapons. Differing evaluations of the political-military situation constitute a stumbling block to agreement. According to present U.S. and British thinking the Communist bloc intends no attack on Europe, despite its enormous military apparatus. The Soviet Union is far more interested in avoiding armed conflict, reducing the armaments burden, and transferring the battlefield out of Europe. A U.S.-U.S.S.R. community of interests does exist, and whatever might prejudice this hopeful situation must be avoided. But judgments of the situation seem to depend on proximity to the Communist danger. Moscow is striving to make the German Federal Republic a vehicle for the breakup of the Western alliance, a fact the allies would be wise to recognize when considering disarmament agreements that disregard German interests and thus can only be detrimental to NATO cohesion. On the other hand several allied nations accord a higher priority to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons than to building a stronger NATO. If security considerations are not reinstated to the top rung of NATO priorities the free world will condemn itself to death by virtue of its own contradictions.

1191
Bechtoldt, Heinrich. [NATIONAL INTERESTS AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS] Nationale Interessen und internationale Verpflichtungen. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, Feb. 1966: 83-99.
D839.A885, v. 17

Erosion of post-war alliances and blocs has long been common talk all over the world. Several states in different blocs have each embarked on a political course that places national interests over the bloc's and heads toward the repudiation of international obligations. Yet none of the governments concerned has thus far withdrawn altogether from its bloc. None has fully renounced protection guarantees provided by its old alliance. No radical overturning of alliances can be expected to occur without a complete reversal of the ideologies on which they rest. (Translation of supplied abstract, modified.)

1192
Beller, William S. EUROPEANS FRUSTRATED IN SPACE HOPES. Missiles and rockets, v. 18, Jan. 3, 1966: 34-35. UG630.M54, v. 18

Describes European dissatisfaction with American domination of military and space research and development. President Johnson's offer of a joint space effort to Chancellor Erhard is interpreted as an invitation to the European nations to join the United States in a major space endeavor.

1193
Birrenbach, Kurt. [GERMANY-UNITED STATES--PROBLEMS OF AN ALLIANCE] Deutschland-Amerika--Probleme einer Allianz. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, Feb. 1966: 69-82. D839.A885, v. 17

A decidedly new phenomenon in modern German history is the nation's alliance with the United States. Overwhelming political reasons dictate close West German cooperation with its ally in seeking a solution to the German problem, which in its truest sense is the partition of Europe. Despite Washington's and Bonn's broad area of common goals, however, they have experienced some differences and conflicts of interest. With 20 Soviet divisions strategically located in East Germany, the threat of Soviet attack on West Germany can materialize at any moment. Strategically West Germany cannot offer a broad enough "territorial background for a conventional, high-style military operation" against the enemy's attack. Thus the question, "When, and under what circumstances, will American weapons of ultimate destruction be used?" The divergence of West German and U.S. security interests concerning the pause--the time between the enemy's attack on West Europe and the American nuclear response to it--creates a dilemma in NATO's current

strategy that can be solved only by compromise. A real conflict of interest between both capitals may develop when the Soviet counterforce power will equal the American. In such a situation conventional forces will regain "their importance as the prime military factor." German security interests require participation in determining the use of nuclear weapons and up-to-date knowledge of American nuclear planning in relation to Central Europe, an area where arms control cannot markedly relieve the basic problems. All treaties and proposals that isolate crucial German or Central European problems from the general settlement of East-West tensions, that perpetuate Germany's partition, that prejudice the solution of the German problem, or that endanger West Germany's military security must be rejected by the German Federal Republic. The best way to avert these developments would be political integration of West Europe combined with an American-European partnership along the lines proposed by President Kennedy. Since De Gaulle's policy prevents this kind of integration, the best way left open leads to development of NATO into a loose European-American community with a flexible system of crisis management. Finally, continued American engagement in Europe is of crucial importance, and to secure this commitment the European allies should substantially help the United States in carrying the financial burden of the West's defense.

1194
Brosio, Manlio. WHAT HAPPENS NEXT IN NATO? European review, v. 16, spring 1966: 7-9.
AP4. E78, v. 16

Much has been accomplished toward bringing the nations of Europe closer together, and a great deal remains to be done. Only a united Europe will be able to play an effective world role. Today The Six and the members of the NATO alliance still speak with sovereign voices. Yet NATO is not a hindrance to the idea of a united Europe. It has deterred Russia from its early aggressive policies and inclinations toward the West. At the same time the alliance relationship has allowed the NATO members to meet Russian thrusts in the Third World, knowing that their security on the Continent was reasonably assured. In terms of its purpose the alliance has succeeded. The hard fact is that Russia has never given any indication that it has altered its basic policy of enmity towards the West. NATO has by force of its being therefore kept the peace in Europe for these past years. Of course modifications and plans for its future after 1969 must be made. It can be said to critics, such as General de Gaulle and others, that the vital elements of NATO, its cohesiveness and the mutual confidence members place in one another, should bring about closer political cooperation. This must remain so, as there is no contradiction between the concepts of an Atlantic alliance and of European unity. This path remains the prime hope to assure the deterrence of aggressive designs on the part of the Soviets, and hence also to attain a basic aim of Western civilization--freedom and peace. "Let us learn the right lesson from our past experiences, and let us follow the path which has assured us peace during the last twenty years."

1195
C., F. [ADEN, SINGAPORE, AND BRITAIN'S FUTURE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN] Aden-Singapour et l'avenir britannique dans l'Océan Indien. Perspectives, no. 963, Jan. 22, 1966: 1-5.
HC10. P4, 1966
Each article is separately paged.

An account of Britain's mastery of the Indian Ocean and accesses to it, the gradual crumbling of this position, the uncertain future of the British air-ground base at Aden and naval-air base at Singapore, and Britain's continuing interest in the area. The author describes American-British plans to reinforce the Western presence in the area with the construction of island bases and points out some obstacles to these projects.

1196
Caucig, Franz von. [CENTO AND RCD--THE REMNANTS OF THE BAGHDAD PACT] CENTO und RCD--die Reste des Bagdad-Paktes. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, Feb. 1966: 110-119. D839. A885, v. 17

The Middle East Treaty Organization, established in 1955, lost its territorial link with the Arab World in 1959 when Iraq decided to withdraw from it. In the same year the alliance changed its name to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Since then its Moslem members--Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan--have shown an ever-diminishing inclination to base their military security on the West. Instead they have tried to use CENTO, in which both Great Britain and the United States also participate, as a means for economic development. In 1964 Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan established the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) aimed at the realization of commonly planned, long-range economic projects. Despite CENTO's deep involvement in certain RCD projects, some of which serve important defense purposes, the Regional Cooperation for Development has tried to maintain political independence from CENTO. Franz von Caucig, Istanbul, a long-time expert on the Middle East, outlines the causes of the changing situation in that area. (Translation of supplied abstract, modified)

1197
Combaux, Edmond. [DEBATE ON THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE] Débat sur l'Alliance atlantique. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Mar. 1966: 403-432. D410. R45, v. 22

NATO has been buffeted by two sweeping global forces--social and political revolution and nuclear technology. The alliance has proved itself an ineffective instrument for "positive action in Europe and the world." If reorganized, however, it would be capable of coping with problems engendered by the world revolution. It must be restructured so as to allow intensified political consultation and a better decision-making balance between "European opinion" and American authority. The modern technical menace is even greater than current social-political dangers. NATO's nuclear controversy centers on three questions: non-proliferation, control over nuclear arms, and Europe's future. Only if an identity of political views is achieved will nonnuclear allies agree to remain so and nuclear allies submit to common controls on the use of their weapons. Can one nation demand central control over an alliance's nuclear forces (to the detriment of the remaining allies' sovereignty) without making provisions for a system in which each nation would help define the policies which the forces are to serve (even if these policies should be disagreeable to the major power)? Proliferation is probably not as serious a problem as is sometimes maintained, because only a few nations possess the economic and scientific wherewithal for developing their own nuclear weapons. Once a power has its own nuclear weapons, what may be called "nuclear expansionism" occurs. The nation suddenly becomes a center of threats. To diminish new feelings of insecurity it begins to surround itself

with expensive protective devices (radar, more and more missile bases), some of which must be located in adjacent countries. The United States is undergoing nuclear expansionism and the technical requirements of this process seem clear in its eyes. Both the limitation (graduated response) and the rational conduct of nuclear war necessitate centralized control within the alliance according to American strategists. But France is not yet ready to accept the integration that will eventually be required. NATO must manage to reconcile the views derived from these different time perspectives. What about the future of the Atlantic alliance? A permanent organ for European political direction--a European Executive--should be created. Subordinate to this executive body there should be a nuclear-decision center with the power to command British, French, and NATO-allocated U.S. nuclear forces. The European Executive, which would include Germany, would provide an important forum for non-nuclear countries' participation in high level strategic planning. The future of the Atlantic alliance depends on the coordination of allied views, and this can be achieved on a lasting basis only through European unification.

1198
Dacier, Michel. [THE GAULLIST THREAT TO NATO] La menace gaullienne sur l'O.T.A.N. Écrits de Paris, no. 46, Mar. 1966: 5-10.
AP20.E355, 1966

Reviews and criticizes De Gaulle's NATO policy, which is said to underestimate the alliance's value while overestimating the strength of the French nuclear striking force, and to have as its goal the establishment of a French hegemony over Europe.

1199
Desbarbieux, Roland. [THE NADGE PROGRAM AND THE AIR DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE] Das NADGE-Programm und die Luftverteidigung Westeuropas. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Feb. 10, 1966: 96-100. U3.W38, v. 10

A similar article by this author appeared as "1966 . . . annee decisive pour le NADGE," in Aviation Magazine International (Jan. 1, 1966) p. 23-24.
TL502.A854

The problem of coordinating the air defences of the NATO community has become highly complex during recent years as a result of advances in the aerospace field. These defences are far from being homogeneous throughout Europe, and systems of widely differing characteristics and performance are in use in the various member countries. Some of these countries, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Britain, are modernizing their respective systems through the installation of semi-automatic equipment. Others, like France and Italy, are developing fully automatic systems, while still others, such as Denmark, Norway, Greece and Turkey, have only manual systems. Taking up an older Franco-British project, NATO in 1963 launched an extremely ambitious modernization plan for the air defence electronic infrastructure--the NADGE system--as part of the common NATO infrastructure programme. This project led to major moves within Western industry and to the formation of three consortia. International industrial groups of this scale bring considerable and often divergent political and economic interests into play and are subjected to severe technical and financial restraints. The struggle is keen. The balance of payments situation requires that the relative share of each country (United States 30.85%, Federal Republic 20%, France 12%, Britain 10.5%) in the NATO infrastructure programme, should not be exceeded in the NADGE programme. This leads to complicated rules for artificial sub-contracting and re-insurance, since each country must also receive the equivalent of its contribution in the form of contracts to be executed by the national industry. Out of the 110 million pounds sterling laid down as a strict ceiling, 19 million have already been earmarked. Rising prices will consume another 15% at least, which leaves roughly 77 million pounds to last until 1970. Such a restricted financial envelope limits the economic and technological interest of the programme. The winning consortium will gain prestige, but the profitability and utility of the operation are persistently questioned by some opponents. But even if, by the time it goes into service in what may be a new international political climate, NADGE is found to be unnecessary from a military point of view, it can serve as a useful basis for the advanced civil air traffic control organization so urgently needed in Europe. (Abstract supplied)

1200
Eden, Anthony. THE BURDEN OF LEADERSHIP. Foreign affairs, v. 44, Jan. 1966: 229-238.
D410.F6, v. 44

Any approach to the dangers and difficulties threatening the West must take as its starting-point recognition of the "overwhelming and still growing preponderant power of the United States in relation to any one of its Western allies." American power, already the greatest known in history, promises to increase, a trend that will accentuate the disparity between American and European influence. The conflict in Vietnam ranks first among all the cares besetting the American people. One need not accept the domino theory of Communist expansion to understand how little choice the United States now enjoys in supporting its Vietnamese allies; withdrawal from Southeast Asia would "encourage observers in other parts of the world to harbor doubts whether the United States would not withdraw from there also." Political and financial considerations indicate that the United States will in the future bear an even greater responsibility for the defense of the West. Europeans must not allow Soviet propaganda or spurious allegations of colonialism to detract from support of their American partner. Europe must accept its share of responsibility, while America must work to create an alliance "which is a partnership in a truer sense than was possible when Europe was at her weakest after the war." An Atlantic union based upon a federal political structure and founded upon NATO must be Europe's declared objective. A joint planning group similar to the planning body subordinated to the Joint [Combined?] Chiefs of Staff during the war might resolve many problems facing the Western allies. Such an agency might resolve some of the objections to the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force, perhaps through achieving multinational status for European tactical nuclear forces. Unless some body of this nature is created, all decisionmaking and execution of policy for Western nations will come to reside with the United States. The burden of leadership must be borne by the United States; the nations of Europe must stand ready to respond whenever the United States offers them a role in the guidance of the West.

1201
Eyraud, Michel. [THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: SHORT AND MEDIUM TERM] L'Alliance atlantique: court terme et moyen terme. Stratégie, no. 7, Jan./Mar. 1966: 103-129. U162.S78, 1966

A priority switch in U.S. foreign policy, which now accords primacy to Chinese Communist containment (particularly in Vietnam), has had far-reaching repercussions in NATO. At all costs friction with the Soviet Union--the "explicit enemy" of the United States but its "implicit ally" in the questions of China and world war III--must be avoided. According to some opinion, reconciliation with China will occur in time, but blood will be spent meanwhile. Soviet cooperation in Vietnam can only be bought at the price of modification of allied policies toward West Germany. The necessity of obtaining Soviet support (or acquiescence) for the U.S. struggle with China explains President Johnson's prudence in the immediate question of German nuclear demands and his lack of action regarding less immediate NATO problems. Recent U.S. treatment of German nuclear demands has demonstrated a feeling of impatience and suspicion. There are those, particularly in France, who believe that U.S. temporizing on alliance nuclear problems will destroy confidence, engender impatience, and make the necessary solution harder to find. The U.S. unwillingness to confront longer range necessities of NATO reform is a further source of allied dissatisfaction and frustration.

1202
Gallois, Pierre M. THE CASE FOR FRANCE. Diplomat, v. 17, Apr. 1966: 17-19.
AP2.D575, v. 17

"NATO IN ITS PRESENT FORM IS DEAD." To relate to old established forms of diplomacy and alliance systems is absurd. Nuclear weaponry makes these methods obsolete and invalidates the logic that justified the formation of the NATO alliance. Today a second-rate power in possession of nuclear bombs can solitarily deter attack from a more powerful nation. It is this one fact, ignored and ridiculed by the United States, that widens the gulf between French and American policymakers. France is attempting to prove that a "comparatively small power is able to develop its own deterrent." The fact that size, population, and industrial development no longer determine big-power status takes away some of the political advantages that formerly accrued to wealthier nations. With her relatively miniscule deterrent power France can cause Russia or even China to have second thoughts about engaging in aggressive acts against her. Risk in world affairs has assumed a new dimension. The super powers, despite verbiage to the contrary, no longer regard a mutual defense treaty as binding them to protect the nonnuclear party to the agreement. Neither the United States nor Russia, nor China for that matter, will aid another nation if it is clear that this would bring about its own nuclear destruction. The United States, by the doctrines of "flexible response," "pause," and the "multilateral force," is attempting to keep European nations under its nuclear shield. But, if and when war breaks out, the United States may avoid risking its own destruction by refusing to defend Europe. Hence Europe, particularly France, must provide for its own security, and must do so by using the only equalizer adequate to the task--a nuclear capability that will deter any aggressor. NATO nations must develop atomic forces to guarantee their own safety. Europe or any truly independent nation should not allow an external power to be the ultimate arbiter of its safety, for national interests will not always coincide even though economic and cultural heritages may be similar. Such is the case between the United States and France. Therefore from the French viewpoint NATO must be modified or disbanded.

1203
Ghosh, Radha. PARTNERS IN AGGRESSION: A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE CASE HISTORIES OF CHINESE AND PAKISTAN AGGRESSION [New Delhi, 1964] 22 p. DS480.85.G47

Although ideologically dissimilar, China and Pakistan share in a strategy directed against India. There is no hint that their "alliance" will effect a change in Pakistan's domestic or foreign policies, for it serves the same purpose as Pakistan's adherence to SEATO and CENTO--"to enhance the strategic value of Pakistan's military capability." Pakistan's ambitions are offensive. Chinese objectives in instigating a violent border dispute with India are territorial and ideological. The Chinese view eventual control of India as the key to power and influence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Chinese terms for settlement in this conflict require India's political surrender--not simply a territorial concession. Leaders from China and Pakistan see India as an "easy prey." Their common strategy is "the initiation of simultaneous action from both sides on a limited scale in 'disputed areas' so that external intervention is not activated."

1204
Giese, Fritz E. [THE GAP ON THE INDIAN OCEAN CLOSED: NEW BRITISH-AMERICAN PLANS FOR BASES ON THE INDIAN OCEAN] Die Lücke im Indik wird geschlossen. Neue britisch-amerikanische Stützpunktplanung im Indischen Ozean. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Jan. 1966: 59-61.
U3.W38, v. 10

The establishment of new bases in the Indian Ocean is designed to close the dangerous gap in the Western defence ring which yawns between the Atlantic and the Pacific. In this way the Indian Ocean, which is one of the most important shipping routes between East and West, is once again to be brought under the control of the great sea powers. The Indian Ocean is no longer to be treated as the Cinderella of Western naval strategy. (Abstract supplied)

1205
THE GREAT DEBATE: NATIONAL DETERRENCE OR ATLANTIC DETERRENCE? NATO letter, v. 13, Sept. 1965: 22-25. D845.2.A44, v. 13

Transcription of a debate programed by the Radio Section of the NATO Information Service. Participants were Gérard Jaquet, Georges Broussine, Bernard Frizell, Thomas Cadett, Stanley Burke, and Claude Guéroult. The efficacy and credibility of national and multilateral nuclear forces in deterrence, the significance of the French force de frappe, and problems of cooperation between NATO nations are discussed.

1206
H., J. [THE WARSAW PACT] Le Pacte de Varsovie. Perspectives, no. 965, Feb. 5, 1966: 1-8.
HC10.P4, 1966

Each article is separately paged.

What are the goals of the Warsaw Pact and how does its future look? Like NATO, this alliance is scarcely one of equals. At least 26 Soviet divisions plus significant air and aerial defense forces are stationed on allied territory. The East European countries account for about 63 divisions--about 15 in Poland, 14 in Czechoslovakia, 6 in East Germany, 6 in Hungary, around 12 in Rumania, and 12 in Bulgaria. Their air forces are limited to tactical support and their navies are practically nonexistent. Modernization is carried out with Soviet weapons and

parts. The objectives of Soviet military actions in 1944-45 were political, aimed at the extension of Marxism-Leninism and not military conquest. Such remains the long-range, offensive goal of the Warsaw Pact. The alliance's more immediate military purposes are to strengthen the buffer zone facing Western Europe with defenses against air and land attack. Effective defense here allows the Warsaw Pact nations greater freedom of action in other areas of the world, such as Asia. Politically the Warsaw Pact is designed to reinforce the rule of individual Communist parties, to insure "fidelity to the Party line as seen from Moscow," and to ideologically educate army youths and leaders. In Hungary in 1957 the Soviet Union demonstrated its willingness to employ force. Still East European unity on foreign policy and alliance questions is far from perfect. The Pact contains many variations and many problems. The composition of allied armed forces (the number of security forces as compared to regular forces, the percent of Party members), the degree to which East European armies resemble the Soviet army, and the number of Soviet troops stationed in a country depend on domestic circumstances. Dispite difficulties the Warsaw Pact is growing stronger in the face of widely feared West German rearmament, which, conversely, is weakening the Atlantic Alliance.

1207
Harrigan, Anthony. OUR WAR WITH RED CHINA. National review, v. 18, Mar. 6, 1966: 204-206.
AP2.N3545, v. 18

In Vietnam the United States is at war, by proxy, with Red China, which is presently attempting to establish hegemony over vast areas of Asia and expunge U.S. power from this area of the world. Vietnam is today's Pearl Harbor. The Chinese believe the U.S. people have no desire to engage in a protracted conflict, and because of this consider the Nation a paper tiger. China will nibble and swallow where it can, and when the United States is least prepared it will launch a human wave attack against it. Pacifist protestors encourage and give comfort and hope to Chinese propagandists. The Nation will not remove itself from Asia. Too many commitments and too much of past history dictate that the the United States remain a power in Asia. The present contest in Vietnam must end in "nothing less than the arresting of Peking's expansionism and the fragmenting of the Red Chinese state." Red China's leaders hope to reestablish and even extend the boundaries of the old Chinese empire. The United States is the only nation capable of stopping this move. It must not view the Vietnam War in narrow terms, but as part of a confrontation with China. A confrontation is a challenge, and the United States must form the political objective of fragmenting China as it did Japan in 1945. China must be kept out of the United Nations if a major Chinese diplomatic and psychological victory is to be prevented. The bluster and threat of force has already alarmed defeatists into acceptance of China's admittance to the United Nations. To preserve the peace the United States must exercise its veto right to keep China out. It also is a "proper instrument for protecting the security of the United States and its allies in the struggle against Red China's war of political and military conquest . . . . The veto can be the decisive weapon on the U.N. battlefield."

1208
Heiden, Horst. [NONPROLIFERATION OR EXPANSION OF THE ATOMCLUB?] Nonproliferation oder Ausweitung des Atomklubs? Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 10, Dec. 1965: 987-995.
D839.B57, v. 10

Any nuclear sharing within the Western alliance by a nonnuclear country would render completely unrealistic all hopes for an early nonproliferation treaty with the Soviet Union and other nations. Most of the Western allies reject Bonn's view that the creation of a NATO nuclear force should take priority over the conclusion of any disarmament agreement or nonproliferation treaty. Washington's position on the matter seems to be divided, but its foreign and military policies have increasingly acknowledged the fact that, under present conditions of nuclear stalemate, no intensification of armaments can possibly improve its security. A number of nations, including Spain, West Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, and India, now possess nuclear reactors exempted from the control of the International Atomic Energy Commission and able to produce uranium 235 and plutonium "not solely for peaceful uses." Almost nothing prevents these nations from starting their own nuclear-arms production. The only remedy left is to create political barriers, viz a nonproliferation treaty, against further expansion of the atomic club. Belief that the multilateral force (MLF) might save NATO ignores both the depth and the principal cause of the present NATO crisis, which lies in "the discrepancy between the organization's command structure, attuned completely to American leadership, and the power-political claims of some members." The initiative for solving European problems belongs to Europe, and of these problems the issue of security should be resolved on a transcontinental basis. Overall indications are that the Soviet Union would be receptive to a European collective effort aimed at a durable relaxation of tensions between the East and the West in Europe.

1209
Heymont, Irving. THE NATO NUCLEAR BILATERAL FORCES. Orbis, v. 9, winter 1966: 1025-1041.
D839.O68, v. 9

Treats the nature, purpose, organization, control, and political and strategic objectives of the NATO nuclear bilateral forces. The author feels that although nuclear bilateral forces might be given more attention as possible alternatives to the proposed multilateral nuclear force, they can hardly "satisfy the national aspirations of the economically revived nations of NATO which have become increasing self-assertive in political and military fields."

1210
Hirschfeld, Oswald. [MISUNDERSTANDING ON ATOM PROBLEMS] Missverständnisse bei Atomproblemen. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Jan. 10, 1966: 21-22. U3.W38, v. 10

At this turn of the year German politics find themselves in a far from happy position. The fatal controversy about participation in the MLF has obviously aroused the world's distrust towards the Germans. The question arises of whether the Federal Government's atomic policies are basically right, and--if the answer is in the affirmative--whether the Federal Government has been able to make these policies properly understood. What is certain is that our stubborn insistence on participation has awakened the suspicion that we are determined to get our finger on the trigger. The military have based their arguments on the fact that military defence requires the possession of atomic weapons and that absence of such weapons is an outright invitation to aggression. But the military should not engage in political arguments. It would appear that the Federal Government has not drawn the correct political conclusions, but merely taken over the, perhaps correct, military arguments and made them

into a political demand. This is where the mistake lies. Also it is frequently overlooked on both sides that no atomic weapons can be employed without the decision of the American President. Much more could be said on this point. In any case the situation is out of joint, and one can only hope that the misunderstandings will be cleared up and German politics find a way out of the dilemma in the new year. (Abstract supplied)

1211
Joyce, James A. NATO: THE PAINTED CORPSE. Christian century, v. 83, Mar. 2, 1966: 265-267.
BRl. C45, v. 83

Although De Gaulle's supernationalism is not the answer to the trouble with NATO, the General's attitude is indicative of the feelings of many who were once staunch advocates of the alliance. NATO "has hung around the neck of the United Nations (still 'the world's greatest hope for peace') like an albatross." All attempts to justify NATO in light of the principles expressed in the U.N. Charter are sophistic. Every local dispute submitted to the U.N. Security Council to date has been denied solution because of the contradictory purposes and objectives of the United Nations and NATO. Proliferation of war alliances, counter-alliances, and weapons of mass destruction--a grand escalation of the arms race--has been the fruit of NATO, with no real security obtained for any of its members. NATO has served the ambitions and paid the salaries of thousands of modern militarists, some of whose names "sound familiarly close to those of the nazi generals who were left over from the Nuremberg trials." NATO's "ugly offspring" include SEATO and CENTO, both of which were stillborn. It is time for mankind to realize that the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations, not threatening alliances, is the sole workable instrument for assuring peace.

1212
Kertesz, Stephen D. NATO'S DISARRAY AND EUROPE'S FUTURE. Review of politics, v. 28, Jan. 1966: 3-18.
JAl. R4, v. 28

To French President de Gaulle, NATO's integration has meant subordination of Europe to the United States. The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe has always been an American. Many of the European nations have been happy with this arrangement, for the simple reason that an American commander can probably garner more support for Europe in Washington. De Gaulle's desire is not so much to change the North Atlantic Treaty as to abolish the elaborate structure that has been built up around it since 1950. The other members of NATO are not in sympathy with De Gaulle's wishes. Just the legal problems involved in splitting up the complex ownership of installations are almost insuperable. Most commanders in Central Europe support integrated planning because they feel it is the only effective system under present world conditions. NATO could be changed either in accordance with French wishes (to a "regular" pre-1914 alliance) or in ways that would improve an already effective defense organization. It could be changed into an organization dealing with worldwide problems; it could be established as an independent nuclear power; it could be reorganized with two centers, one in Washington, the other in Europe; it could become part of a United Europe; it could even be reorganized in combination with the solution to many of the pressing problems of the Atlantic world. Yet major reorganization may not be feasible in the near future. De Gaulle's reluctance to admit any European interests other than those of France blocks many constructive solutions. At this point "agreement on basic policies among leading NATO powers would be more important than formal revision of the Treaty or organizational changes." If agreement cannot be reached, then the alliance is dead regardless of any changes. One possible compromise is to create two categories of states in NATO as there were in World War I: allied and associated powers. Thus France could have its own way and be merely associated, while most present members would opt for allied status. NATO is essential to Europe, and its crisis is urgent.

1213
Lacoste, Raymond. [GIBRALTAR AND ENGLAND] Gibraltar et l'Angleterre. Écrits de Paris, no. 245, Feb. 1966: 34-49. AP20. E355, 1966

Successive violations of its treaty obligations (originally undertaken in 1713 under the Treaty of Utrecht) have characterized Britain's relations with Spain on the issue of Gibraltar. The culmination of these violations was the transformation of Gibraltar into a non-self-governing territory in 1940. Pseudo-decolonization moves taken since 1950 are a mere strategem for undermining Spain's legal rights to codetermine (with Britain) Gibraltar's future. The fortress measures 6 square kilometers (including the "neutralized zone" annexed by Britain in 1918, which now possesses an airport) and contains 25,000 inhabitants. In 1961 a British representative explained his country's reasons for staying: prestige, unwillingness to abandon the population, and security. Located there are a missile detection station and tunnel shelters against nuclear bombs. Gibraltar is an "impregnable" station on the way to the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. In truth Gibraltar has little military-strategic value. Madrid, underlining the fact that the Soviet Union considers Gibraltar a NATO base, dislikes taking the risks of a base belonging to a military organization that does not include Spain. It has denied the rights of overflight and landing to military planes heading to the fortress. Britain would draw greater benefits from returning Gibraltar while retaining certain military privileges than from continuing its cold war with Spain.

1214
Majonica, Ernst. [EASTERN POLICY AS A EUROPEAN POLICY: THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE EAST EUROPEAN PEOPLES] Ostpolitik als Europapolitik. Die wichtige Rolle der Völker Osteuropas. Der Europäische Osten, v. 12, Jan. 1966: 12-18.
DRl. E83, v. 12

Bonn's policy toward Europe helped West Germany achieve equal partner status in the western world. However the main goal of that policy, European federation, has not yet been realized. The advantages of the federal system for Europe would greatly outweight its shortcomings. Europe's prestige in the world would greatly increase and so would its security, provided that it remains tightly linked with the United States. Germany's participation in the European reunification effort may facilitate reconciliation between Germany and its Eastern neighbors. West Europe's economic prosperity may eventually prompt the East European nations to seek, as a beginning, "a loose or indirect membership" in the European Common Market. Intensification of East-West trade and cultural relations, combined with a further advance of polycentrism within the Soviet bloc, may finally create a situation in which European reunification and federation will be feasible. Such a system, by virtue of its potential elimination of basic political tensions in Europe, may prove an asset to the Soviet Union in terms of the latter's security.

1215
Martin, Francis. SOUTH KOREA: KEEPING THE DRAGON FROM THE DOOR. Réalités [Eng. ed.] no. 183, Feb. 1966: 24-28.
AP4.R2164, 1966

U.S. policy toward South Korea during the past 13 years has been intimately related to its policy of containing Communist China in Southeast Asia. With the military and economic support it has received from the United States, South Korea has become a viable state as well as a staunch anti-Communist force in the area. It must remain so if China is to be prevented from gaining an opportunity to push America out of Southeast Asia. In spite of Seoul's promising development it does not have the natural industrial advantages of North Korea. For instance North Korea produces 1 million tons of steel a year while South Korea produces only 110,000 tons. South Korea has other problems that bear on U.S. interest in Southeast Asia. While the army holds power, which it obtained after a coup d'état, the student "intellectual" groups in South Korea represent a large and influential segment of the population. Although these groups are non-Communist, they favor reunification of North and South Korea and hence are susceptible to Communist propaganda along these lines. To maintain anticommunism in South Korea and to strengthen South Korea's position in Asia the United States is promoting stronger ties between Korea and Japan, Southeast Asia's second "Western" bastion of democracy. Despite long-standing Korean antagonism toward Japan, agreements were reached between the two countries whereby Japan would give Korea an indemnity of $300 million worth of equipment and technical assistance, a loan of $200 million for 20 years, and $300 million in private credit. In the U.S. view, however, the situation is still precarious, and the "problem of deep-rooted and lasting resistance to Communist expansion is above all a regional one."

1216
Melchior de Molènes, Charles. [INTERWESTERN AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS] Accords et désaccords inter-occidentaux. Revue politique des idées et des institutions, v. 55, Feb. 1966: 77-91.
H3.R38, v. 55

A great deal of controversy surrounds current concepts of what form the Atlantic alliance should take. The British and Americans share an Anglo Saxon viewpoint, agreeing on the necessity for NATO reforms if not on the content of these reforms. In essence the German government is at one with this viewpoint. Indeed, the "Atlanticism" of Bonn's officials has at times been so pronounced that Le Monde dubbed it "Amerika über alles." West Germany considers the U.S. protection of European liberty to be vital. It has disavowed any interest in national possession of nuclear weapons and has declared, with the United States, that NATO nuclear sharing will serve to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. The Gaullist opposition in Germany (which includes former Defense Minister Strauss) advocates a European defense organization with U.S. participation in strategic planning. Under this system Germany would doubtless receive the right of codecision in the use of nuclear weapons. De Gaulle's alliance policies (in fact his whole foreign policy) are based on the concept of the nation as a supreme entity--antecedent and superior to ideologies and temporary alliances. To him the Soviet Union is Russia and Communist China is "the eternal China" regardless of their transitory regimes. From this perspective nuclear weapons can only be national. International relations are based on power: military or diplomatic rivalry, domination and servitude. The nation is worth any moral or material sacrifice. Nevertheless in France there exists a sizable opposition to De Gaulle's basic assumptions, a fear that French nationalism will precipitate a resurgence of dangerous European and world nationalism.

1217
Miksche, Ferdinand O. [ATOMIC CHAOS: TUG-OF-WAR OVER NUCLEAR ARMS SHARING] Atomares Chaos. Das Tauziehen um das atomare Mitspracherecht. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Jan. 10, 1966: 22-24. U3.W38, v. 10

Each of the NATO countries has in the course of time arrived at a different estimate of the significance and value of atomic weapons in the common defence effort. The European countries understandably are seeking an entirely legitimate atomic alignment, though from differing national standpoints. Taken as a whole these partial or non-atomic are aiming at full possession or a voice in atomic decision, while the USA resolutely insists on defending its atomic monopoly. This explains the Americans' attempts to console their allies with all kinds of excuses and to postpone the real decision, a procedure which has annoyed all the non-atomic allies for many years. Nevertheless the Europeans do not hesitate to criticize France for having initiated an attempt at atomic emancipation through the creation of her "force de frappe." There is also no small portion of historical irony in the fact that the Federal Republic is today making the very same requests of the United States as were categorically refused to France six years ago. This experience of itself should suffice to teach the politicians in Bonn that their demands for a share in atomic decisions and the possession of nuclear weapons have not the slightest chance of success. Not even McNamara's most brilliant inventiveness in the creation of one new burial committee after another can hide this fact. That the European NATO partners in the meantime have grossly neglected their conventional defences in clamouring for atomic weapons is perhaps the most distressing aspect of the whole affair and the permament reason for the constant crises in the Atlantic defence community.
(Abstract supplied)

1218
[NATO DEFENSE EXPENDITURES INCREASED] NATO-Verteidigungsausgaben gestiegen. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Feb. 10, 1966: 90.
U3.W38, v. 10

Reports on the increased defense expenditures of NATO members in 1965. The exact figures in dollars are given for each member nation for the years 1964 and 1965. The total defense expenditures of all NATO nations in 1965 amounted to $74.24 billion, an increase of $1.6 billion over the preceding year.

1219
Norman, Lloyd. NATO'S NINE LIVES. Army, v. 16, Jan. 1966: 68-71. U1.A893, v. 16

"NATO has been declared dead or dying so many times that it must be obvious by now that it has a cat-like will to survive." There is no doubt that the problems now facing NATO--ranging from the argument on whether or not the Soviet threat has subsided, to considerations of a multilateral nuclear

force--are serious because of their number and timeliness. But these problems do not seem to be "so deep-seated that they would pull NATO asunder." European dissatisfaction with NATO largely stems from opposition to the "McNamara Doctrine" of European defense: that the U.S. nuclear guarantee is sufficient for Europe, that independent or joint European nuclear forces are redundant, and that the European members of NATO should concentrate on the buildup of conventional military forces. Europeans are convinced that a buildup of conventional forces destroys the credibility of a nuclear deterrent, thereby increasing the chances of another land war in Europe. Secretary McNamara apparently hopes that the NATO Special Committee on Nuclear Strategy will convince Germany and Britain--if not France--that another NATO nuclear force will solve no problems of European defense. The Pentagon is assured that a joint European or independent French, German, or British nuclear striking force would satisfy nothing but "the passionate demands of national pride."

1220
Pergent, J. [COMPARISON OF EAST-WEST MILITARY FORCES] Le rapport des forces militaires entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Est & Ouest, v. 17, Oct. 1/15, 1965: 19-22. D839.A822, v. 17

In central Europe Soviet and satellite armored and mechanized ground divisions are superior to any similar allied forces in the area. The Communist divisions are homogeneous and prepared for action. Soviet ground superiority is also evident in northern Europe. But these Soviet capabilities are counterbalanced, on the strategic level, by a definite Western advantage in naval power, bomber forces, ICBM's, and atomic weapons. It has been claimed that U.S. strength in most principal armaments is three to four times greater than that of the Soviet Union. "Whatever the envisaged policies, this disparity of armed forces does not play in West Europe's favor, because the Soviet military apparatus has been conceived to annihilate, from the opening of hostilities, the old Continent."

1221
ROK-JAPAN TREATY AND ASIAN-PACIFIC NUCLEAR STRATEGIC AGENCY. Global digest, v. 3, Jan. 1966: 7-9. P&GP,RR

"Condensed and translated from Akahata, Tokyo." Newsp.

The Japan-South Korea Treaty is another step toward realization of the anti-Communist Asian alliance envisaged by Washington, as well as an active measure to draw Japan into the Asian and Pacific nuclear strategic agency that is under U.S. consideration. A special NATO committee on nuclear weapons (proposed by Secretary McNamara) would supply them to Japan and establish there an agency for the coordination of nuclear strategy. Realizing the futility of SEATO as an instrument against the national liberation movement, the United States hopes to extend membership in the Northeast Asian Military Alliance to Thailand, the Philippines, India, and all other nations favoring an anti-Chinese line. By incorporating them into the nuclear strategic agency, U.S. imperialism hopes to proliferate nuclear weapons without having to remove its finger from the firing button. Japanese democratic forces must overthrow the Sato government and the Diet, oppose the Japan-South Korea Treaty, and "strike at the schemes of the United States and the Japanese reactionaries to conduct aggression in Asia and prepare nuclear war."

1222
Rieck, Joan M. [THE PLOWDEN REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION] Der Plowden-Bericht über die internationale Zusammenarbeit. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Feb. 10, 1966: 74-75. U3.W38, v. 10

In December 1964 the British Government established the Plowden Committee to determine how the aircraft industry could best serve British economic and defense interests. A recent Committee report suggests cooperation with other NATO members for development, procurement, and production of aircraft and guided missiles. According to the report aircraft market requirements rule out the nation's complete reliance on its own production. A common allied effort could greatly improve the ratio between the sale-, development-, and production-start costs, and thus could contribute to both the economy and the progress of the industry. The Committee recommends that the British Government initiate an air transportation conference between European countries to formulate a common, long-range policy regarding construction and procurement of aircraft in Europe. It proposes that the government request from Washington the abolition of import restrictions on foreign-made arms and that principal American arms producers become more open to European bidding for subcontracts. Finally the report suggests that all new orders by the British armed forces for new aircraft and missiles be subject to approval by the ministry of defense, which should first consult the allies on the possibility of cooperatively developing such a weapon. This plan has its counterpart in Washington's suggestion that national specialization within NATO could best produce certain types of arms needed by the organization.

1223
Riggert, Ernst. [NORDIC DEFENSE UNION?] Nordische Verteidigungsunion? Wehrkunde, v. 15, Jan. 1966: 32-35. U3.W396, v. 15

With NATO's future in doubt, talk of a Scandanavian military alliance has been heard. In addition to security considerations a "Scandanavian Gaullism," which resents U.S. domination, may have prompted such talk. The idea is supported as a way station to a completely disarmed North by traditional pacifist and antidefense forces in these countries, although responsible officials have approached it with some skepticism. U.S. power is a cornerstone of Norwegian and Danish defense policy, and an isolated alliance would increase their defense costs fivefold. Neither country would at present voluntarily dissociate from NATO. Past attempts to form a Scandinavian defense community collapsed, and Nordic solidarity is still probably not strong enough to support a burdensome union. Whatever form a future East-West war might take, Scandanavia would stand in a strategically valuable position and thus would be attacked in whole or in part. Its defense must take this vulnerability into account. Currently defense union discussions have no political substance, although conditions could change and the "dangers assume a new face." Neutralist voices in the Scandanavian nations may become more meaningful in decisionmaking.

1224
Sanguinetti, Alexandre. [FRENCH OPINION ON THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR THE EXISTENCE OF ONE EUROPE] Opinion française sur les conditions de l'existence d'une Europe; discorso pronunciato a

Roma, il 10 febbraio 1965, nella sede del Banco di Roma, sotto gli auspici del Centro italiano di studi per la conciliazione internazionale. [Roma] a cura del Banco di Roma [1965] 52 p. JN15.S33

Speech given Feb. 10, 1965, before the Bank of Rome under the auspices of the Italian Center for International Reconciliation Studies.

Europe must reestablish the political, military, and economic independence of the Continent, which has been usurped since 1955 by the functioning of NATO and the Atlantic alliance. The consequences of military submissiveness are severe: a Europe incapable of self-defense is threatened with the prospect of becoming the East-West battlefield. Europe's military power must be based on nuclear weapons, which in turn require unified political control. As "power equalizers" such weapons minimize the importance of geographic, demographic, and economic factors. Europe now suffers economically from American hegemony in the military and economic spheres. In renouncing self-progress in the military-technological field European countries are slowing down their entire economic development. Moreover they are losing their scientific elites, who no doubt soon will be followed by the artistic and literary elites. The vehicle of the independence required for Europe's health is unity, about which there exists no agreement on means or ends. The French are concerned with two conditions: first that the search for unity avoid a premature supranational integration, and second that Europe reject the idea of becoming a part of the "Atlantic world" in favor of becoming one of two partners in a close great-power entente between the United States and Europe. As for German reunification, only an East-West rapprochement can create the conditions necessary. The path toward this rapprochement coincides with the path to Europe's independent unity. In order to solve many of its own political, military, and economic problems and to assert its role as a "motor of history" Europe must reconcile the necessity of unity with existing national civilizations and interests.

1225
Schmidt, Helmut. [DEFENSE OR RETALIATION: A GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO NATO'S STRATEGIC PROBLEM. THE THIRD UNREVISED EDITION WITH AN ADDED CHAPTER ON THE WEST'S SITUATION IN 1965] Verteidigung oder Vergeltung; ein deutscher Beitrag zum strategischen Problem der NATO. 3. unveränderte Aufl. mit einem zusätzlichen Kapitel über die Lage des Westens im Jahre 1965 [Stuttgart-Degerloch] Seewald Verlag [1965, c. 1961] 290 p. UA646.3.S35, 1965

Contents.--NATO in 1965.--Danger of the unknown.--From Korea to Cuba.--Assessment of deterrence.--The Soviet strategy.--The dilemma of the U.S.A.--Can the present NATO defend us?--Challenges of the sixties.--Arms reduction and control.--Misunderstanding of disengagement.--Germany's interests.--NATO in the next decade.--Stability is possible.

An analysis of NATO's defense posture, first published in 1961, whose author affirms that no changes needed to be introduced in the current edition because his prognoses have proven right and his conclusions still valid. In the one new chapter, "NATO in 1965," the author expounds on the importance of the Atlantic alliance for European security, suggests greater integration of its members, and analyzes the causes of the current NATO crisis. Some explanation for the latter can be found in the Cuban crisis, which sharply increased West European skepticism toward unconditional reliance on American deterrence and policy. Cuba drastically demonstrated Europe's impotence in times of U.S. emergency, and its inability to instantly participate in "the management of an international crisis" that could draw Europe into a world war. To seek "national solutions" to this problem, as proposed by De Gaulle, would be a poor substitute for common defense strategy achieved through the Atlantic alliance, which should itself be integrated to a much higher degree than heretofore. The heart of the matter in the present NATO crisis is not a problem of nuclear arms sharing but: (1) individual aspirations of member nations for a greater independence from the United States; (2) unpopularity in many West European quarters of an automatic interlocking of the fate of Europe with that of the United States; (3) divergency of important political interests of member nations; (4) fear in certain quarters in Europe of an imminent Soviet-American settlement at the cost of the West Europe's vital interests; (5) differences between member nations in assessment of the present strategic situation; and (6) unreconcilable differences between major NATO members concerning the problem of "nuclear and conventional options." The solution of NATO's structural and organizational problems depends on a new, clear formulation of the alliance's political and strategic goals.

1226
Schneider, Fernand-Th. [THE U.S.S.R. AND NATO: ENEMIES OR ALLIES?] L'URSS et l'OTAN: ennemies ou alliées? Revue militaire suisse, v. 111, Feb. 1966: 49-67. U2.R5, v. 111

An apparent reduction of the Soviet threat to Europe has caused a loosening of NATO and has even prompted suggestions that NATO be replaced by simple bilateral defense pacts. Yet as long as the Soviet Union is militarily powerful, NATO must not dissolve. The "absence of war" is a precarious state. The direct Soviet threat may be less obvious; still the menace of indirect Communist subversion has increased throughout the world. Many obstacles to NATO's solidarity exist: a false feeling of security, U.S.-French misunderstandings, Turkish-Greek antagonism, a Soviet-U.S. pseudo-entente, the American strategy of flexible response. NATO's mission extends beyond Europe's borders. Its global tasks require that its members' policies be coordinated. NATO's structure and vision must be reformed to remake it into a partnership based on equality and a world force for liberty.

1227
Silvain, René. [NATO'S CRISIS] La crise de l'O.T.A.N. Revue de Paris, v. 73, Feb. 1966: 38-45. AP20.R27, v. 73

It is not the Atlantic alliance but NATO, its military offshoot, that is in serious danger. Europe is reacting against the transformation of NATO's official massive retaliation strategy into the U.S.-directed doctrine of graduated response. The problem is twofold--to evolve a nuclear strategy acceptable to all allies and to redefine the principle of integration. Integration of conventional armed forces is a fiction that De Gaulle will not tolerate and, in the U.S. view, merely an affirmation of hegemony. Germany wants continued integration as a device for keeping American troops in Europe, which, it believes (falsely) will force U.S. nuclear retaliation to Soviet aggression. Most probably allied troops in Germany will soon be greatly reduced. In the realm of nuclear strategy the United States has done all it can to assure its own freedom of

action. In so many words (through graduated deterrence strategy) it has informed the Soviet Union that conventional aggression would not constitute a nuclear casus belli, it has refused to install medium-range missiles in Europe because their use would bring automatic Soviet retaliation upon the United States, and it has promoted a nonproliferation agreement in order to lessen the chances of its involvement in a nuclear war. Europe is unhappy. It wants a definite guarantee of U.S. nuclear participation because it feels it would be quickly overwhelmed in a conventional war. Under present conditions, however, this guarantee is unattainable. When France possesses its own nuclear-armed atomic-powered submarines strategic coordination within NATO will again be feasible. At this point the Soviet Union, unable to determine the origin of enemy missiles, will automatically attack the United States in response to these. France's third-generation nuclear weapons, unlike its bombers and second-generation land-based missiles, will serve to trigger America's nuclear arsenal in Europe's defense. Then the "equilibrium of Western solidarity" will be reestablished and allied cooperation made simpler.

1228
Sington, Anne. CAN THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BE DECIDED UPON COLLECTIVELY? NATO letter, v. 13, Oct. 1965: 18-22. D845.2.A44, v. 13

Gives the background and transcription of a discussion among five participants in the Fourth Atlantic Conference of Young Political Leaders held at Oxford, July 1965. The French position in regard to national nuclear forces is weighed against the establishment of a multilateral European nuclear force. Problems of sharing control of nuclear forces are reviewed.

1229
Sommer, Theo. [AILING ALLIANCE--EVEN WITHOUT DE GAULLE THERE WOULD BE A NATO CRISIS] Die sieche Allianz. Auch ohne de Gaulle gäbe es eine NATO-Krise. Die Zeit, v. 21, Apr. 19, 1966: 1. AP30.Z39, v. 21

The present NATO crisis, although deepened by De Gaulle's policy aimed at disrupting the Western alliance, is due primarily to the American and the German problems. The American problem in the alliance consists of the U.S. monopoly in planning NATO's nuclear defenses. No innovation in NATO's policymaking machinery has thus far solved that problem. NATO's "decision-taking"--the actual pushing of the button--represents no problem, however, as all agree this should remain exclusively the prerogative of the U.S. President. The German problem consists of Bonn's impotence to play effectively the role of mediator between France and the United States. West Germany's isolationist policy toward the East robs Bonn of proper leverage for exerting adequate influence among its allies. With regard to France, Bonn's immediate policy should aim for: (1) political agreement between France and other NATO allies (for the eventuality of NATO's downfall), providing for clearly defined mutual assistance against aggression; (2) maintenance by France of strong links with NATO either through the German Federal Republic or the Western European Union so that the French response to aggression committed against any NATO member would be reliable and predictable; (3) assumption by the German Federal Republic of full sovereign rights over the French armed forces stationed on the West German territory in case those forces are withdrawn from NATO's control. All negotiations with France should be conducted in a manner that is the least dogmatic and the most pragmatic for the sake of preserving France's future chances of returning to "the inner circle" of the Atlantic alliance.

1230
Speier, Hans. [GERMANY'S PLACE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY] Deutschlands Stellung in der amerikanischen Aussenpolitik. Wehrkunde, v. 15, Feb. 1966: 59-73. U3.W396, v. 15

Paper delivered before the 3d international Wehrkunde meeting, Munich, Jan. 29, 1966.

Political, not cultural or historical, considerations form the basis of a defense alliance. It stands to reason then that NATO will not survive if its political expectations are not met, that is if any of the following beliefs become widespread among NATO members: the dangers that precipitated alliance have in fact disappeared; the means the alliance offers for confronting potential dangers are inappropriate; the alliance provokes rather than deters likely aggressors; burdens are unequally shared; Europe is capable of assuming its own defense; the foreign policies of certain members are inimical to the alliance's common goals. German and U.S. interests are not identical and not directed toward the same goals. Nevertheless they are compatible and served by alliance. What are usually cited as NATO's major problems--that U.S. interests have shifted from Europe to Asia, that the American nuclear guarantee has lost its credibility, that the United States and the Soviet Union are willing to make a deal at Germany's expense, and that emphasis on conventional armaments weakens NATO's deterrence--are false assumptions. Probably the fundamental cause of the current crisis is the question of nuclear weapons acquisition and the overall situation which discriminates against nuclear have-nots in diverse material and psychological ways.

1231
Strauss, Franz-Josef. TIME TO START U.S. PULL-BACK IN EUROPE? [interview] U.S. news & world report, v. 60, Apr. 18, 1966: 68-70, 72. JK1.U65, v. 60

President de Gaulle's renewed demands that the United States get out of Europe call attention to the fact that it is time for America to reduce its force commitments there. The United States needs its military power elsewhere, and there is no reason why one quarter billion Europeans cannot defend themselves. Nuclear control arrangements would not have to be fundamentally altered, since even if one or two American divisions were replaced by Europeans American custodial teams would be left in charge. Enough U.S. troops should remain in West Europe so that the American commitment continues to be perfectly clear. NATO will of course need to be reorganized. France does not wish to withdraw from NATO but only to change its role in the alliance. De Gaulle aims at preventing "non-French control over French troops in peacetime, and at maintaining French sovereignty over all French territory." It would be possible for France to maintain control over its troops stationed in other European countries simply by earmarking them for future assignment. In any case, true integration of the kind De Gaulle objects to exists only on German soil. NATO cannot function effectively without France, and some arrangements for French participation must be made. Unfortunately the average European considers the defense of the continent to be America's job. It should not be assumed, of course, that if the United States cut its forces in Europe the Soviets would do the same. Germany, and the other European nations, would have to take up the slack. But under no

circumstance should German troops be used in Western military involvement outside the NATO area, and particularly in Vietnam. As a result of the nearly century-long worldwide campaign to defame Germany, an incredibly vicious Communist propaganda assault would explode the very moment the first human being were killed in Vietnam by a German soldier. Germany's interests are at stake in Southeast Asia, but they can best be served if Germany does more of its share in Europe.

1232
Van Dusen, Henry P. US POLICY IN ASIA. Christianity and crisis, v. 25, Sept. 20, 1965: 190-193.
BR1. C6417, v. 25

A careful look at Asia today generates the feeling that no country there, even Indonesia, is interested in Communist takeover. Urgent in the mind of every Asian is the political future of the area--its relationship to communism and to Peking. Unfortunately a determination to avert communism by armed intervention or subversion is not enough, for a sort of "wave-of-the-future" fatalistic acquiescence to ultimate Communist takeover pervades Asia. Most nations around the perimeter of Asia are now protected by an American "presence." The United States has become a worldwide policeman. However a NATO-like alliance is needed for Asia. As Communist China is the main threat, one goal of a Western Pacific Alliance would be to seek an accommodation with China similar to the state of peaceful coexistence which now exists between America and Russia. Whether the Chinese-Asian situation is analogous to the Russian-European situation is questionable, but the enemy is governed by the same Marxist objectives. The argument that the United States does not belong in Asia is fallacious. America won the Pacific war in 1945 and is as involved in preserving peace in Asia today as it was then. Free Asian unity requires "a Western Pacific equivalent to NATO, a political and economic affiliation linking Thailand, Malaysia, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea (and, ideally, India, Pakistan and Australia) in common defense against subversion and sabotage, a mutual Alliance for Asian progress." Both Asian security and justification for the U.S. presence in Asia depend on establishment of this organization. Peking must be taught that aggression does not pay, that "counter-aggression against Asian Communist states no longer threatens," and that peaceful coexistence is politically and economically rewarding.

1233
Wiesner, Hans. [SOME QUESTIONS OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC'S MILITARY DOCTRINE ON THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S ARMY] Einige Fragen der Militärdoktrin der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. Zum 10. Jahrestag der Gründung der NVA. Einheit, v. 21, Mar. 1966: 348-354. HX6. E4, v. 21

The German Democratic Republic's military doctrine, as does its allies', rests on the primacy of the political over the military character of war. Both aspects are inseparable from one another. Given the sharp political contrast between both German states, the assumption is logical that a conventional war on German territory can at any moment escalate to nuclear war. The German Democratic Republic's (GDR) national mission is to prevent war from ever being staged on German territory. This maxim dominates both GDR military policy and doctrine. Changes in the character of modern warfare call for a highly sophisticated, versatile defense system for the Socialist military coalition. Modern defense measures involve a multitude of fields--political-moral, economic, scientific-technical, military, etc.--and thus a high level of political and military education for the Socialist armed forces is paramount. An act of aggression by West German imperialism against the Socialist States does not have to start at the border. A provocative act of subversion inside the German Democratic Republic would constitute aggression. It would undoubtedly be answered by sections of the working class as well as by other anti-Fascist elements in the Ruhr area, Hamburg, Mannheim, and Stuttgart. Thus an open war that develops therefrom will be a class war and a war between states. Eventually several anti-imperialist nations outside Europe will join it in fighting against the strongholds of West German imperialism. The main principle of the Socialist military doctrine is to defeat the enemy on its own territory.

4. Related Policies and Problems

1234
AGREEMENT ON COLLABORATION IN DESALINIZATION EFFORTS. Soviet atomic energy, v. 18, Jan. 1965: 94-95. QC770. A843, v. 18
"Translated from Atomnaya Energiya, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 78-79, January, 1965."
QC770. A83, v. 18

On November 28, 1964, the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement for cooperation in desalinization of water with the use of nuclear power. Soviet scientists see desalinization as a timely problem, which may be resolved by "the building of high-power nuclear reactors utilizing heat to generate electric power and to desalt water." The agreement envisages close scientific and engineering collaboration between U.S. and Soviet scientists; exchange of findings, research papers, and scientific reports; and visits by technical experts to the plants, laboratories, and facilities of the other country. Information on nuclear power projects connected with the desalinization effort will also be shared by the signatories.

1235
ATOMIC ENERGY AS A POWER SOURCE. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations on Communist China's science and technology, no. 270, Dec. 27, 1965. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 33,486.) p. 1-50. illus.
P&GP RR
"CSO: 11782-D."
"A translation of Chapter 6 in the Chinese-language book Yuan-tsu-neng Ti Yuan-li Ho Ying-yung (Theory and Application of Atomic Energy), revised edition, Peiping, July 1965, pages 133-179."

Delineates the civil uses of atomic energy, explains the production of power by nuclear reactors, and describes some typical reactors around the world. The applications of nuclear energy to ship propulsion, aviation, rocketry, and civil engineering are discussed.

1236
Beal, George M., and others. SOCIAL ACTION IN CIVIL DEFENSE: THE STRATEGY OF PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN A COUNTY CIVIL DEFENSE EDUCATION PROGRAM. Ames, Iowa, Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment Station, Iowa State University of Science and Technology, 1964. 379 p. (Rural sociology report no. 34)
UA926. R77, no. 34

Reports a "study of the social action process" involved in a county-wide civil defense education program conducted in an urban midwestern county in the fall of 1961.

1237
Beiser, Edward N. GOD AND THE DRAFT. Commonweal, v. 83, Mar. 4, 1966: 631-633.
AP2.C6897, v. 83

Throughout U.S. history military recruitment has posed problems both for Government attempts to maintain adequate military forces and for those seeking to avoid military service. Three recent Supreme Court decisions have helped to interpret the precise meaning of the phrase used in the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, "religious training and belief." The Court did not deal with the constitional questions raised but rather stressed the meaning of the statute. Congress, they concluded, deliberately chose to use the term "Supreme Being" rather than "God," thereby including all religions rather than a select few. The Court decided "the test of belief 'in a relation to a Supreme Being' is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption." Therefore the term as used by Congress did not require belief in an orthodox God. It could be a belief that took the place of a concept adhered to by the traditionally religious man. It may be conjectured that, according to the Court, to base one's appeal for exemption from military service on purely moral grounds, or on objections to specific wars, would not be valid. The status of the "nonreligious conscientious objector--the outright atheist and secularist--is much less clear." Neither Congress nor the Court has implied the existence of any constitutional right not to serve.

1238
Bohlen, Joe M., and others. COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE AND CIVIL DEFENSE. Ames, Iowa, Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment Station, Iowa State University of Science and Technology, 1964. 254 p. (Rural sociology report no. 35)
UA926.R77, no. 35

Bibliography: p. 253-254.

Probes the sociological bases of community power structures and their relationship to civil defense.

1239
Braucher, Charles L. THE MISSION OF THE PHARMACIST IN NUCLEAR DISASTER. Military medicine, v. 131, Mar. 1966: 234-244.
RD1.A7, v. 131

Contends that in the event of nuclear attack on the United States pharmacists would of necessity assume paramedical functions despite the fact that neither the American Pharmaceutical Association nor the American Medical Association consider this a suitable role for the pharmacist. In actuality the pharmacist has a biomedical background far superior to that of the general public. With training in advanced emergency medical procedures he could be of great value in a nuclear disaster. A projected hypothetical attack on Oklahoma City, for example, might leave only two physicians able to perform their duties; under these circumstances the pharmacist could scarcely be expected to stand by and "distribute cotton-balls." Precedent for a military role for pharmacists exists in the part played by assistant battalion surgeons and pharmacist's mates in World War II.

1240
Brownlow, Cecil. DOD OVERHAULS PROCEDURES FOR EXPORT. Aviation week & space technology, v. 84, Jan. 17, 1966: 26-27.
TL501.A8, v. 84

A new office, headed by Arthur W. Barber, is being established in the Department of Defense to handle export sales of military equipment. The office will replace DOD's Office of Foreign Economic Affairs and coordinate military sales with the State Department's Office of Munitions Control and the Commerce Department. The reorganization is geared toward reducing the time required to process a request to sell (hoping that 1 week will be the outside limit) and toward increasing sales. Where, in the past, several different offices were involved in the approval of an export request, Barber's office will perform this function itself. The major duties of the new office will be: "Defense Dept. munitions control, or, essentially, the department's position on whether a specific military item should be exported to a particular country upon receipt of an industry request"; "economic export control within Defense Dept. over non-military items that have a strategic significance, including metals and material"; and the "Defense Dept.'s position on the release of information concerning military hardware to another country." As the "technology" of an item is more important than the item itself, Barber's office is going to maintain a tight control over "manufacturing know-how," to prevent information from going to the Communist bloc. Sales of communications systems and light aircraft to Eastern Europe will be increased in keeping with the White House's "bridges to the East" concept. In regard to industry, the new office will give major consideration to requests for exportation of items "with relatively low dollar value as well as those with sales potentials of $50-60 million or more."

1241
CHINA'S PUSH TO CATCH UP IN SCIENCE. Business week, no. 1901, Feb. 5, 1966: 116-120. illus.
HF5001.B89, 1966

Red China's ambitious program to catch up with the West in science and engineering has been badly hampered by the nation's isolation from the most industrially advanced countries; by the lack, since 1960, of Soviet scientific-technical assistance; by China's economic difficulties (especially acute agricultural crises); as well as by the "subordination of scientific training to political dogmatism," and a dearth of middle-aged senior scientists. These are the conclusions of Dr. Chu-yuan Cheng's recent study, sponsored by the U.S. National Science Foundation on Red China's scientific and engineering manpower. According to Dr. Cheng's report Red Chinese scientific and engineering education has been focused on quantity rather than quality. In a number of areas involving new scientific fields, however, Red China has achieved results that are spectacular compared with the starting level of its efforts. These achievements are manifested mostly in the chemical, pharmaceutical, and petroleum industries, and in the field of nuclear and military capabilities. The latter include China's intensive efforts to develop "both short-range and medium-range ballistic rockets." Of the nation's 3 million workers employed in machine industries an estimated one-half serve military programs.

1242
EUROPEAN ANNUAL REVIEW. Euronuclear, v. 3, Jan. 1966: 17-34. TK9001.E8, v. 3

Capsule view of the progress, achievements, and future of the nuclear programs of 26 European nations. Also given are brief reports of Europe's international organizations dealing with nuclear energy: the International Atomic Energy Agency, Euratom, European Organization for Nuclear Research, European Nuclear Energy Agency, and Nordita.

1243
Fiore, Michael V. THE REVOLUTION OF LOGISTICS. Human factors, v. 7, Aug. 1965: 311-314. T58.A2H8, v. 7

A review of developments in logistics support over the past decade is presented. The concepts of systems engineering, the "system approach," and the need for system effectiveness in military weapons has created a revolution in the traditional concepts of engineering and logistics. One major problem has been the introduction into the traditional aerospace organizational division of engineering and logistics of several new disciplines (e.g., reliability, maintainability, personnel subsystem, value engineering, and so forth). Owing in large part to recent Department of Defense specifications, the traditional definitions and concepts of logistics must be changed. (Author's abstract)

1244
Gubarev, Vladimir S. [BIRTH OF AN ATOMIC REACTOR] Rozhdenie atomnogo reaktora. Moskva, Atomizdat, 1965. 96 p. illus. QC786.G8

A journalist's account of the U.S.S.R.'s Scientific Research Institute for Atomic Reactors at Melekess. The construction, application, and long-range purposes of the reactor located there are reported. The town of Melekess is described as a symbol of the future, a community that satisfies its needs and those of the surrounding areas by the controlled use of atomic energy.

1245
Klonglan, Gerald E., George M. Beal, and Joe M. Bohlen. FAMILY ADOPTION OF PUBLIC FALLOUT SHELTERS: A STUDY OF DES MOINES, IOWA. Ames, Iowa Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment Station, Iowa State University of Science and Technology, 1964. 183 l. (Rural sociology report no. 30) UA926.R77, no. 30

Bibliography: leaf 183.

Delves into the sociological and attitude variables related to the acceptance or rejection of new civil defense ideas in order to understand and predict how people will adopt such ideas. To this end a sample of the population of Des Moines was studied.

1246
Lowe, George E. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING PROFESSIONAL. Army, v. 16, Jan. 1966: 49-56. Ul.A893, v. 16

Exhorts the American military establishment to retain its professionalism when dealing with situations like the Vietnamese War, where military considerations must often be subordinated to objectives of "political warfare." The author urges the modern U.S. serviceman to avoid drifting toward the extremes of militarism or political involvement and to prevent the military services from becoming technocracies.

1247
Lukov, Grigorii D., and Konstantin K. Platonov. [PSYCHOLOGY] Psikhologiia. Moskva, Voen. izd-vo, 1964. 343 p. illus. U22.3.L78

Partial contents. --General problems in the psychology of training and educating fighting men. --Training and educating the fighting man in the process of political preparation. --Training and educating fighting men in the process of mastering military technology and weapons.

Elucidates briefly the basic problems of general, pedagogical, and military psychology. Much of the book is devoted to "psychological characteristics and problems of psychology in the area of activity of fighting men."

1248
McGinty, F. C. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND MAINTAINABILITY. Human factors, v. 7, Aug. 1965: 355-361. T58.A2H8, v. 7

The expanding use of nuclear energy in the power generation field is such that the maintainability aspects of design and maintenance concepts will soon be of interest to an increasingly larger number of designers, logisticians and human factors engineers. This article presents a broad-brush treatment of the effect that radiations have on maintenance of nuclear power plants. It provides examples of how an acceptable degree of maintainability is achieved on a specific military nuclear power plant despite these deadly radiations. A brief glimpse at present developmental programs that will significantly improve the maintainability of nuclear power plants is presented. (Author's abstract)

1249
Margolis, Howard. CIVIL DEFENSE: NOTES ON PROJECT HARBOR. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Feb. 1966: 19-21. TK9145.A84, v. 22

Argues and cites evidence that the National Academy of Sciences' Project Harbor Summary Report [noted elsewhere this issue] "is not an adequately precise reflection of the body of reports that came out of Project Harbor." The findings of the Academy's summer 1964 conference were not widely distributed and received attention only when the magazine of the Greater St. Louis Citizen's Committee for Nuclear Information, Scientist and Citizen, published a criticism of the report. Briefly, Project Harbor recommends a greatly expanded civil defense program including blast shelters for all residents of sizable cities. The Summary Report appears to endorse the initiation of a "fairly large blast shelter program," although the individual conference reports "discuss" such shelters and their cost but do not positively recommend their adoption on a wide scale. Mr. Margolis suggests that the conference chairman and major contributor to the Summary Report, Eugene Wigner, strongly prefers a major blast shelter program and so influenced the recommendations of Project Harbor.

1250
National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D. C. CIVIL DEFENSE: PROJECT HARBOR SUMMARY REPORT; A REPORT BY A SUMMER STUDY GROUP AT WOODS HOLE, MASSACHUSETTS. Washington, National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, 1964. 39 p. (National Research Council. Publication 1237) UA927.N24

Contents. --Acceptance and impact. --Education and training. --Strategy and tactics. --Future weapons and weapons effects. --Immediate survival. --Postattack recovery.

Condenses a thousand-page report on the general subject of civil defense; its relation to other defense

systems, particularly the antiballistic missile networks; and the need for a passive defense system that would have a continuing life even when confronted with new offensive weapons. The report summarizes the findings and conclusions of the study group's six panels, which covered the subjects listed in "Contents."

1251
ORIENTATION MANUAL ON . . . DISASTER PREPAREDNESS FOR PHARMACISTS. In American Pharmaceutical Association. Journal, v. NS6, Feb. 1966: 80-82, 85-86. RS1.A522, v. NS6

Summarizes a recent publication prepared for the Department of Defense's Office of Civil Defense by the American Pharmaceutical Association committee on disaster and national security. Requisite medical supplies to be stockpiled, the role of the general population in "medical self-help," and the pharmaceutical, administrative, and emergency medical services to be provided in the event of nuclear disaster are discussed.

1252
Petros'iants, A. M. THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL GENEVA CONFERENCE. Soviet atomic energy, v. 17, Nov. 1964: 1065-1070. QC770.A843, v. 17
"Translated from Atomnaya Energiya, Vol. 17, No. 5, pp. 323-328, November, 1964."

Reports the activities, problems, and purposes of the third U.N. international scientific and technical conference on the peaceful use of atomic energy, held in Geneva in August and September of 1964. The author applauds the many steps taken by various nations toward more widespread application of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes, but notes that "the military atom hinders the thorough development of the peaceful atom" and that "peaceful use of nuclear fuel on a widespread scale is only possible when the path to thermonuclear war is completely closed to the military atom by the efforts of the people of the world."

1253
[PLOTS AND COUPS D'ETAT IN AFRICA] Complots et coups d'état en Afrique. Croissance des jeunes nations, no. 51, Jan. 1966: 6-13.
P&GP RR

Contents.--African armed forces, by E. Milcent.--Guinea: "a permanent conspiracy," by A.V.--Dahomey: Soglo, general or president? by J.B.--Congo-Leo: Mobutu's hour, by T. Nallet.--Joseph-Désiré Mobutu: general and Congolese head of state, by E.M.--Rhodesia: independence could last, by T.N.

Portrays the role of the military in black and white Africa. E. Milcent begins with manpower statistics on the armed forces (and security forces) of 25 African countries plus Rhodesia and South Africa. For black Africa these figures are notably small; moreover the armies lack officers, equipment, and funds. Although their international role is minimal, these armies are domestically powerful and seem to be taking advantage of this to engineer coups or sow disorder. A.V. writes of a never-ending conspiracy against Guinea's authoritarian regime--plots that perhaps originate outside the country, but which, because of economic instabilities, find considerable domestic support. J.B. describes the conditions and events leading to General Soglo's assumption of power in Dahomey on December 22, 1965. The articles by T. Nallet and E.M. follow General Mobutu's rise to power, a development indicative of the subordination of civil to military power that is increasing in Africa. T.N. completes the series by rating Prime Minister Smith's staying power in Rhodesia as fairly good.

1254
Purser, Brian L. THE CMF: AUSTRALIA'S CITIZEN-SOLDIERS. National guardsman, v. 20, Feb. 1966: 10-13. UA42.N24, v. 20

The Citizen Military Forces (CMF), the Australian equivalent of the U.S. National Guard, provide the necessary manpower reserve to expand military effort in times of emergency. The history of this volunteer force indicates the valuable part its members have played in Australian defense emergencies and wars involving the Commonwealth. After World War II 3 years elapsed before the CMF was reconstituted; a regular call-up system was used to bring it up to 40,000 men by the early fifties. Today, armed with British and American weapons and equipment, the CMF affords a valuable source of immediate manpower to supplement the regular Australian Army. In civilian emergencies force members have served ably in disaster aid and other forms of relief programs, thereby filling the role of a true national emergency force.

1255
[RACING] Wettlauf. Atomzeitalter; Information und Meinung [no.] 2, Feb. 1966: 35-36.
P&GP RR

A kind of polycentrism in the world balance of power during recent years, characterized by a relaxation of discipline within each power bloc, has enabled industrial nations to increase competition between themselves in selling arms to the countries of the Third World. That competition has been subjected to almost no political control. Thus "a new indispensable minimum of international flexibility," replacing rigid bipolarism, has become increasingly costly in terms of the risks involved. Often the governments of industrial nations act as selling agents for their private arms industries. Considerable arms deliveries have recently been made by the United States to Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia; by Great Britain to Saudi Arabia; and by the Soviet Union to Syria and Egypt. France has offered the United Arab Republic 30 AMX tanks and has helped Israel to build middle-range rockets. The United States has changed its policy of not supplying arms to the Near East to a "selective supplies policy" aimed at the stabilization of the military balance in that region. Unfortunately the proliferation of modern conventional weapons invites nuclear proliferation by promoting among recipient nations a desire for weapons of still-higher sophistication.

1256
Riddleberger, Peter B. MILITARY ROLES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AN INVENTORY OF PAST RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS. Washington, Special Operations Research Office, American University, 1965. 182 p. (American University, Washington, D. C. Special Operations Research Office. Task Role. Research memorandum 65-2)
U21.5.R5

Classifies by type individual studies on the military in developing countries; selects from the literature findings and conclusions on the military's functions--social, economic, political, and military; and gives a detailed annotated bibliography by region (Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and general). "The report should provide military and academic students with a comprehensive, though not necessarily all-inclusive, perspective of our present state of knowledge, needs for further study, and, most important, the various approaches and frames of reference employed by experts who have already addressed this problem."

1257
Schulze Henne, Karl. [CIVIL DEFENSE CORPS FOR STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE ALERT] Zivilschutzkorps zur Verstärkung der Schutzbereitschaft. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Jan. 10, 1966: 56-57. U3.W38, v. 10

The creation of a German Civil Defence Corps to cope with the dangers and damage threatening the civilian population in the event of armed attack takes a logical place in civil defence planning. It supplements the preventive measures provided for under the Self-Defence and Raid Shelter Law and thus enhances the preparedness of population and industry. Only through the employment of complete units of Technical Troops is it possible to render the hard-pressed population any effectual aid and to preserve or repair vital survival and defence installations. Fully motorized, equipped with special tools and with uniform training and leadership, the Civil Defence Corps is pre-eminently suited for operations of this kind. (Abstract supplied)

1258
Schwarz, Urs. [AMERICA: POWER AND POLITICS] Amerika, Macht und Politik. Wehrkunde, v. 15, Jan. 1966: 1-7. U3.W396, v. 15

Before the beginning of the nuclear age the United States subscribed to the theory that war and politics were separate, that whenever war started politics must be subordinated to it. War was fought from a military viewpoint alone, which meant that the maximum use of power was the prime consideration ("abstract war" as Clausewitz defines it). During the Second World War a close working relationship between military men and civilian physical and social scientists subverted this traditional separation. After the war research institutes sprang up in which civilians, under contract to the military, worked on military problems as an integral part of more general problems. The nuclear age was a new era. With the establishment of NATO, politics and power could no longer be perceived as separate entities. Diplomacy and military planning were intimately linked. The danger of nuclear war brought the questions of disarmament and arms control to the foreground. And in order to negotiate these questions with the Soviet Union both political and military consequences had to be considered simultaneously. The policy of containment and the outbreak of limited conflict situations called for political and military efforts in order to realize political goals without large-scale warfare. Today American strategic planning is aimed toward developing U.S. power in directions that will enable the attainment of plausible political goals.

1259
Soum, Jean-Claude. [THE THIRD WORLD AND ATOMIC POWER] Le tiers monde: puissance atomique. Sciences et avenirs, no. 227, Jan. 1966: 18-21. Q2.S475, 1966

Outlines the possible applications of nuclear energy for economic development in the third world. Nonnuclear production of electricity and desalinization of water are, in the very great majority of cases, more economically and technically feasible. On the other hand the use of radioactive isotopes can radically improve agricultural production in most underdeveloped countries.

1260
U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Subcommittee on Research, Development, and Radiation. FEDERAL RADIATION COUNCIL PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDES. Hearings, 89th Cong., 1st sess., June 29 and 30, 1965. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965 [i.e. 1966] 697 p. illus., maps. RA569.U494

Includes bibliographies.

Congressional hearings on the protective action guides developed by the Federal Radiation Council concerning iodine, strontium, and cesium isotopes. The guides were put forth "in simple terms which the public can understand which can be used as a reference in initiating protective measures against fallout." Witnesses were heard from the American Academy of Pediatrics; the Battelle Memorial Institute's Pacific Northwest Laboratory; the U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and Health, Education, and Welfare; the Federal Radiation Council; the Greater St. Louis Citizens' Committee for Nuclear Information (and similar state bodies); and the U.S. Weather Bureau. Documents inserted into the record include reports on fallout and a summary of research projects on public health measures to minimize exposure from radioactive fallout.

1261
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY. Hearings, 88th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965. 600 p. UA23.A41675

Covers the basic issues of national security administration and offers recommendations for its improvement. Testimony by U.S. Government officials and military and diplomatic personnel examines official relations with other nations and the implementation of security policy in U.S. embassies. Subcommittee staff reports deal with national security administration, issues facing the Secretary of State and his Department, and the functions of U.S. ambassadors--their problems abroad and the assistance given them by Washington.

1262
Walsh, John. SCIENTISTS AND CIVIL DEFENSE: DIALOGUE AT BERKELEY. Science, v. 151, Jan. 7, 1966: 53-57. Q1.S35, v. 151

Reports the activities of a symposium on civil defense sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of Science at Berkeley, California. Panelists discussed the Project Harbor report; the basic case for civil defense programs; the importance of shelter programs to national survival, strategy, and planning; and other matters "relevant to the grave issues of public policy on war and defense." On many issues (including the question of whether an intensified civil defense program would escalate the arms race and thus decrease national security) consensus among the scientists was impossible to achieve.

1263
Wigner, Eugene. CIVIL DEFENSE: WIGNER ON PROJECT HARBOR. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Feb. 1966: 21-22. TK9145.A84, v. 22

The following is directed, firstly, to Howard Margolis' criticism of the National Academy of Sciences' Project Harbor Summary Report [both criticism and report noted elsewhere this issue] and the author's participation in it, and, secondly, to his interpretation of the author's views on civil defense and a blast shelter program. While the Summary Report contains some material personally contributed, it is by and large a product of the executive committee

of the project and reflects the views of the conference participants. The summary does not explicitly recommend the building of blast shelters. Rather it describes the range of programs that could be accomplished from "the present, fallout-shelter-only posture . . . at the present rather modest level of expenditure," to the "opposite end of the spectrum . . . a system which could accommodate the inhabitants of all cities with a population in excess 250,000." In other words, 75 million people could be protected at a cost of $20 billion. In regard to the advisability of a civil defense program and "the desirability of an immediate and moderately vigorous commitment to a blast shelter program," several positive points can be made. First, the existing disparity between defensive and offensive strength can be diminished with an expanded civil defense program. Second, the Soviet Union may react to a U.S. defense buildup with increased defensive, rather than offensive, preparations of its own, which would "increase our national security vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R." Third, a U.S. civil defense program would be effective against less formidable nuclear powers, such as Communist China. Fourth, "disarmament becomes more nearly a possible policy if the concealment of a few nuclear weapons does not provide the concealer with a decisive advantage and if there is at least some protection against lesser powers which may not adhere to a disarmament agreement." Fifth, existing feeble defenses make the United States susceptible to threat, coercion, and nuclear blackmail. Sixth, "if all else should fail, shelters would save untold millions of lives."

D. CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

1. General Analyses

1264
Clubb, O. Edmund. THE COST OF VIETNAM. Progressive, v. 30, Apr. 1966: 21-24.
AP2. P8655 v. 30

The United States' self-centered unilateral approach to the problems engendered by the Vietnamese War costs the Nation more than men, money, and materiel. It is not viewed with sympathy in Asia and many parts of the world. The United States has sacrificed an enduring principle that is welded to its national purpose. Espoused in foreign policy declarations in the 1930's and later, the principle is that aggression should be dealt with through the medium of an international organization. The Vietnam War has, in short, "distorted words, political meanings, and our political purposes." In attempting to justify good intentions as dintinguished from actions taken by other colonial powers in the past, the United States has assumed as its disguise a doctrine of containment of communism. In taking this role as unilateral arbiter of disputes America has allowed peace to be a secondary consideration. The United States has also negated its professed intention to operate within the framework of the United Nations and is doing to this organization what Germany, Japan, and Italy did to the League of Nations. The U.S. conflict between active support of a nonelected military regime, which has not abided by its promise to introduce social and economic reform, and grandiose phraseology to justify American bombing of hamlets has caused among the peoples of Asia and the world a crisis of confidence in American intentions. No victory can be achieved at the expense of broken moral commitments and corruption of broader foreign policy ideals. Even U.S. NATO allies are beginning to wonder about the ultimate U.S. commitment to defend Asia against communism. The sole salvation for the 20th century world is to agree to create and adhere to an effective international organization that will base its actions on principles of international law. This is the only way to resolve international conflict. If the United States fails to support this goal a nuclear holocaust could be the only alternative.

1265
Delaye, Th.-J. [AVIATION AND OUR NUCLEAR CENTER IN THE PACIFIC] L'aviation et notre Centre Nucléaire du Pacifique. Forces aériennes françaises, v. 20, Feb. 1966: 170-184.
UG635. F8F66, v. 20

After being obliged to abandon nuclear testing in the Sahara, France made a fortunate choice for a new test center in Polynesia--despite the high costs and difficult problems of transportation. The backwardness of the Polynesian islands can be explained by their distance from the metropole, a distance only now being conquered by French efforts to build and improve port, runway, and airport facilities. Tahiti has changed in these past few years; it has lost some of its beauty but gained in economic development prospects. From its Pacific nuclear test center France will draw many benefits besides a stronger nuclear force. The armed forces have had to solve unusual problems in the far-off land and have thus grown in imagination and initiative. French science and industry will be able to borrow from new processes, techniques, and tools, which the center's personnel have had to develop for dealing with the novel conditions imposed by the distance and setting of the islands.

1266
[EVOLUTION OF THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA] Évolution de la guerre dans le sud-est asiatique. Perspectives, v. 22, Feb. 12, 1966: 1-8.
HC10. P4, v. 22

Each article is separately paged.

The Vietcong's struggle against the Americans is aided by poor lines of communication, a terrain that favors ambush tactics, the support they have in the countryside, and available refuges in Cambodia and Laos. The best chance the United States has of neutralizing these advantages is in more extensive use of helicopters and small tactical support planes. The chief American weakness in the Vietnamese War is due to post-World War II underestimation of the need to develop means for fighting small non-European wars. Thus the supply of weapons, planes, helicopters, and munitions for counterguerrilla warfare is inadequate. Moreover an underdeveloped South Vietnamese infrastructure has created serious logistics bottlenecks. To develop and produce a quantity of weapons sufficient to defeat the Vietcong before the Soviet Union and China can provide them with counter-attack devices would be extremely expensive. And should more effective U.S. and Vietcong weapons be introduced simultaneously the result might be to eternalize an ever-more-destructive war, and perhaps to provoke the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Both sides are devoting considerable effort to new armament and are preparing to extend the field of action into neighboring territories, so that the war threatens to become one between the United States and East Asia. In order to defeat the Vietcong the United States must spend much more than envisaged in the 1966-67 budget, and must, moreover, increase imports at a time when its balance of payments is in serious trouble. Current rates of expenditure on the Great Society and on the

space program will have to be decreased. Secretary McNamara estimates that the United States will also soon need to spend at least $10 billion on an antimissile missile system to counter the new Chinese nuclear threat. Despite high U.S. prosperity, these economic prospects leave the American Government no alternative but to capitulate in the guise of a negotiated settlement.

1267
Hammes, John A., and R. Travis Osborne. SURVIVAL RESEARCH IN GROUP ISOLATION STUDIES. Journal of applied psychology, v. 49, Dec. 1965: 418-421.
BF1.J55, v. 49

The development of a nationwide fallout shelter system has initiated research on the physiological, psychological, and sociological aspects of group isolation. The most austere occupancy tests have been conducted at the University of Georgia. Results indicate that healthy men, women, and children can endure 2 wks.' isolated confinement under conditions of severe austerity without suffering deleterious physiological or psychological effects. (Authors' abstract)

1268
IS IT A PENNY WISE POUND FOOLISH POLICY? NATO's fifteen nations, v. 10, Oct./Nov. 1965: 8-10, 12. UA646.F5, v. 10

The British Labour Party's pre-election promise to cut defense expenditures may prove more expensive than originally anticipated. Cancelled contract commitments will have to be paid for, and purchase orders for the American F-111 (TFX) may be reduced. The cost of purely British modifications for the American Phantom fighter is increasing, while the British aircraft industry is still despondent over cancellation of the TSR-2. A comprehensive survey has convinced the Labour Government to reduce expenditures allotted to other armed services as well. Resistance to this frantic cut in defense spending is rising, and the Conservative Party is declaring itself a "watchdog of a satisfactory defence of Britain and its commitments to NATO." The Territorial Army believes the new defense plan to be contrary to the national interest. In spite of the planned cuts, official policy still intends to honor Britain's NATO, CENTO, and SEATO commitments. Prime Minister Wilson's decision to make NATO the cornerstone of British foreign policy has elicited the nation's offer to give sovereignty over much of its nuclear force to NATO and to collaborate closely with the European allies on weapons development, strategy, and policy planning, while still maintaining current commitments in Asia and the Middle East. Britain does not intend to let curtailment of defense expenditures reduce its ability to meet overseas commitments. A danger might arise under this policy if Britain yielded to extreme pressure and thereby allowed money-saving schemes to affect its ability to abide by present national and international commitments.

1269
Lehmann, Hans. [NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR EAST EUROPE] Neue Möglichkeiten für Osteuropa. Der europäische Osten, v. 12, Jan. 1966: 6-12.
DR1.E83, v. 12

Speculates on the Soviet Union's reaction to a possible American-Chinese confrontation, which on one hand may give rise to an anti-Communist revolution in Red China, and on the other may speed up the reunification of Europe.

1270
Maurel, Christian. [THE "BOMBA PERDIDA"] La "bomba perdida." Nouvel observateur, no. 67, Feb. 23, 1966: 11-12. AP20.02, 1966

The drama has five acts, although the last is still unfinished. Act 1: On January 17, 1966, four 10-megaton H-bombs fall on and around Palomares, Spain--an accident. The inhabitants are not ashamed to admit they wept that night for fear of death. Act 2: Two days later the U.S. Army and Navy descend on the countryside to find the missing bomb ("operation broken arrow"). Act 3: When the journalists arrive they are greeted by an unprecedented wall of silence. "If the authorities say nothing it is because the news is not good." Act 4: Public opinion enters the stage. Even the right-wing government of Spain is humiliated, but the exigencies of politics know no pride and it ends by singing the praises of the American protector. U.S. officials assure the world that safety devices were in perfect order, but McNamara has won a round in the fight to replace bombers with missiles. Act 5: The search continues. Soldiers still water down the fields and a medical laboratory checks for signs of radioactivity. The inhabitants sing a new song, "La Bomba Perdida," which tells of a slow and future sickness. An 8-year-old boy believes he will die, but can't tell when. Certainly the incidence of radioactivity in Palomares is relatively slight, but some villagers have been affected. Many years will have passed before a complete judgement of the effects can be made.

1271
Maurèle, Commandant. [THE INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICT] Le conflit indo-pakistanais. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Jan. 1966: 104-120.
D410.R45, v. 22

Recounts the military events of the war between Pakistan and India (Aug.-Sept. 1965) and discusses probable long-range diplomatic and economic effects of this conflict. Among other consequences a euphoric vision of victory in both nations threatens a return to war; the arms race has been stepped up and there is talk of nuclear weapons in the two capitals; economic development has been jeopardized; China has dramatically proved it will not be excluded from Asian events; and Soviet influence in the area has become greater.

1272
Mikhailov, M. DOES THIS NOT CONCERN THE U.N.? Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 18, Mar. 30, 1966: 18. D839.C87, v. 18
Reprinted from Izvestiia, Mar. 6, 1966.
Slav Rm

Representatives of the U.S. State Department, the Pentagon, and the Atomic Energy Commission have finally been forced to admit the danger posed to the residents of the Mediterranean area by the nuclear bomb lost near Palomares, Spain. Individual nations might take measures to protect themselves against the continuous, piratical flights of nuclear bombers over their territory, but the international aspects of the Palomares incident demand more universal action. One goal of the United Nations is "the necessary creation of conditions favorable to the observance of justice and respect for obligations stemming from treaties and other sources of international law, with a view to the triumph of law and order in international relations." Nuclear flights over sovereign territory can hardly conform to this standard. The U.N. Charter also

commits the world body to discussing "situations fraught with a threat to world peace and international security." Does not the Palomares accident constitute such a situation? The Secretary General of the United Nations must seize the initiative and propose international discussion of the Spanish accident and its implications for the future.

1273
Nevstrueva, M. A. [ON CERTAIN PROBLEMS OF RADIATION HYGIENE] O nekotorykh problemakh radiatsionnoi gigieny. Gigiena i sanitariia, v. 30, no. 12, 1965: 3-6. RA421.G5, v. 30

This paper deals with certain pressing problems of present-day radiation hygiene. The author considers problems of determining standards for various types of ionizing radiation, either in instances of individual action or in combination with environmental factors of a nonradiational nature. Determination of standards for soft X-rays is presented as one of the most urgent problems. The author discusses various aspects of the problem of radioactive waste burial and deactivation. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1274
Pentts, M. ACTIVITIES AT EUROPEAN NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER IN SWITZERLAND. Washington, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1966. 11 p. illus. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 33,798) P&GP RR
"CSO: 11925-D."
"Translation of an article . . . in the Russian-language publication Nauka i Zhizn' (Science and Life), No. 12, Moscow, December 1962, pages 28-33."
Q4.N43, 1962

Describes the staff, facilities, equipment, and activities of the European Nuclear Research Center at Geneva, Switzerland.

1275
Russell, Bertrand Russell, 3d earl. THE "YELLOW PERIL." Minority of one, v. 8, May 1966: 9.
AP2.M55985, v. 8

The American desire to maintain a foothold in Southeast Asia and the belief that opposition to communism is a public duty will probably produce a Sino-American war in a year or two. Unable to dominate even a small Asian nation such as Vietnam, the United States will find domination of China still more difficult. "Since the outcome is obvious to everyone so long as nuclear weapons are not employed, it is virtually certain that sooner or later America will take to using H-bombs." If China then develops a nuclear delivery system, all human and animal life will vanish from the earth. To prevent this outcome China should be admitted to the United Nations and plebiscites should be held in all countries suffering from a Chinese-American clash of interests. The United States, perhaps unconsciously, is manifesting a lust for power, a desire for domination that may prove fatal to the entire human race. Were the United States inclined to inject a bit of rationality into its dealings with China and at least listen to some of the Chinese proposals for nuclear disarmament and other issues, Chinese belligerence might be overcome. "The best hope for the world seems to be that the already strong opposition in the United States to the Government's policy will continue to grow until, before it is too late, the policy of that country and its satellites (such as Britain) is reversed."

1276
THE SPANISH BOMB. New republic, v. 154, Mar. 19, 1966: 9. AP2.N624, v. 154

The four nuclear weapons that fell upon the Spanish coast near Palomares are part of a nuclear stockpile that now includes perhaps 150,000 devices of mass destruction. "The wonder is that more of them are not similarly misplaced more often." The "fail-safe" control system maintained by the U.S. Defense Department is predicated upon probabilities--given effective control, accidents "probably" will not happen. But as the number of nuclear weapons and their handlers increases, the probability of accident also increases. The Palomares incident will probably not lead to more stringent control measures, even though the U.S. Government finds it "almost impossible to know where every device is, and to what use it is being put at any given moment." So far the fail-safe method has merely resulted in reducing the probability of nuclear mishap to what seems--to the Pentagon, that is--an "acceptable risk."

1277
[WARDING OFF PRESSURE ON GERMANY] Abwehr des Drucks auf Deutschland. Der Europäische Osten, v. 12, Jan. 1966: 1-2.
DRI.E83, v. 12

With the American involvement in Vietnam growing rapidly after the recent unsuccessful peace effort there is a considerable danger that the psychological warfare being waged on other fronts of the East-West confrontation, notably in Europe, will be given a lower priority by the United States. The realization that the Vietnamese War is of crucial importance to the overall situation in Southeast Asia, and consequently to the world balance of power, combined with the fact that the United States almost alone has been carrying most of that war's burden, may cause the Americans to seek repose in the European sector of their struggle with communism. One may then reasonably expect increased Soviet pressure on the West with regard to the German problem. The German Federal Republic should carefully prepare in advance its countermeasures against such Soviet pressure, especially its own demands for Soviet concessions. In fact, Germany should support those demands by methods typical of psychological warfare--methods used often by Moscow with great success.

1278
Yu, Hsueh-chih. PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY IN CHINA. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations on Communist China's science and technology, no. 281, Jan. 24, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 33,854) p. 3-5. P&GP RR
"CSO: 3575-D."
"Translation of an article . . . in the Chinese-language newspaper Chung-kuo Hsin-wen, Canton, 27 November 1965, page 10."
Chi Kor

Reports the application of radiation and isotopes to the fields of industry, agriculture, medicine, education, and scientific research in Communist China.

2. Political

3. Military

1279
Marey, Georges. [FRENCH ARMED FORCES IN 1966] Les forces armées françaises en 1966. Revue militaire générale, no. 1, Jan. 1966: 7-26.
U2.R48, 1966
Includes summaries in English and German.

Notes on the budgets, manpower, equipment, and prospects of France's military services and strategic nuclear force. Because the nuclear weapons program has received financial priority, armed forces modernization, especially in the army, has been retarded.

4. Economic

1280
Aboltin, V. [MONOPOLIES AND WARS] Monopolii i voiny. Kommunist, v. 42, no. 2, Jan. 1966: 110-119.
HX8. K56, v. 42

Since World War II the U.S. economy has become the most militarized in the world. A number of giant corporations, many of which could not survive without government military contracts, have been created. The profits realized by the executives of these corporations and their military collaborators are enormous. But militarization has led to a corresponding decline in true economic growth in the United States. Temporary increases in market capacity occasioned by military spending merely aggravate the contradictions inherent in capitalism and weaken the entire economic structure. Inflation and gold outflow are the real fruits of militarization. Yet U.S. militarists lose no opportunity to warn the public against the economic chaos and unemployment sure to result from "a sudden peace offensive" or the implementation of disarmament and arms control measures, for as long as an aggressive national spirit can be maintained the profits will continue. The United States is intervening in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic today because during the past year the scales have shifted in the struggle between more conservative members of American society and the spokesmen of the military-industrial complex. The U.S. officer corps, together with the military-industrial monopolists, exerts ever-greater influence upon U.S. political affairs. More responsible members of U.S. society have been mollified by the monopolists' assurance that "local aggression," such as that in Vietnam, is not dangerous for the United States or other nations, that more men are killed on U.S. highways each day than are killed in Southeast Asia. But broad segments of the American people are becoming aware of their duty to thwart the plans of the Pentagon and its weapons manufacturers. The louder the protests against U.S. aggression in Vietnam that are raised in all nations, the greater will be the chances for dispelling the clouds of war now gathering over all peoples.

1281
AEROSPACE: "NO END IN SIGHT." Time, v. 87, Feb. 11, 1966: 72-76, 79.
AP2. T37, v. 87

Chronicles the growth of America's "airframe industry" into the behemoth aerospace industrial complex. Emphasis is placed on Lockheed's advance over its competitors. All aerospace companies are now diversifying into other fields. This diversification has made the industry the largest single employer in the nation today. The recent rise in military and space budgets, while welcomed by the aerospace industry, has not prevented management from planning new projects that underscore the industry's determination not to become too dependent upon government spending, either for national defense, or for space exploration.

1282
Chalandon, Gabriel. [TECHNICAL AND INDUSTRIAL PROSPECTS IN THE THIRD DIMENSION] Perspectives techniques et industrielles dans la troisième dimension. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Feb.-Mar. 1966: 258-267, 491-505.
D410. R45, v. 22

Traces the history of man's achievements in air and space, with particular emphasis on the rapid technological progress in the postwar period; indicates the course research and its military and civilian applications are now taking; and relates current aerospace developments to the French aeronautic and space industry (the fourth largest in the world). For diverse reasons, including a relative reduction in appropriations for air weapons research and development, the industry seems somewhat threatened. This, in turn, could have widespread economic repercussions in France. The solution must be sought in maximum utilization of available research funds and in a policy of international cooperation. Research should direct itself toward original projects that are applicable to the military in a nuclear age (vertical takeoff or variable geometry planes) and to new civilian projects that will enable the country to compete internationally.

1283
Coulbois, Paul. [THE SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES] La situation aux États-Unis. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Mar. 1966: 529-535.
D410. R45, v. 22

Sketches the present status of the U.S. economy. The effects of the Vietnamese War on the economy should not be overestimated, as expenditures on it total only about 1.5 percent of the expected Gross National Product for 1966. The war may, however, aggravate the present inflationary trend and worsen bottlenecks in the labor market.

1284
DEFENSE. Forbes, v. 97, Jan. 1966: 96, 99-100, 103.
HF5001. F6, v. 97

The defense industry is affected by more than the level of the defense budget. Its uncertainty--TRW, Inc. Vice Chairman Dr. Simon Ramo called it "a bit of Russian roulette"--makes most firms anxious to diversify, to reduce reliance on Government contracts. The game is unpredictable. The gloom of a year ago has dissipated as earnings have risen because of the Vietnam War. Yet "the new arms boom is a spotty affair." Orders are geared to limited warfare, and contracts for strategic weapons systems and research and development have lagged. Most firms are seeking to expand their civilian sales. They agree with Ling-Temco-Vought's chairman: "We intend to build up our nonmilitary business over the next five years. We don't want to wait until defense business declines." Diversification does not mean abandoning Government defense business. Boeing's president deems defense work vital: "It keeps us working on the outer fringes of technology and feeds back into everything we do." Some firms failed to profit from the new defense spending boom because they were not working in the right areas (e.g., North American Aviation). Others can credit their recent resurgence to commercial diversification (e.g., Boeing, Douglas Aircraft) while others have been growing despite almost total dependence on Government contracts (e.g., Northrop Corp.). "There are no inflexible rules in the defense business."

1285
Ermath, Fritz. ECONOMIC FACTORS AND SOVIET ARMS CONTROL POLICY: THE ECONOMIC BURDEN OF THE SOVIET DEFENSE EFFORT. Cambridge, Arms Control Project, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1964. 1 v. (various pagings) UA770. E45

Provides an analysis of "the effect of defense spending on Soviet economic performance." Chapter 1 gives a quantitative measure of Soviet defense effort during the period 1950-1965. In Chapter 2 the effect of defense expenditures on the Soviet economy is determined "by examining the share of gross national product (GNP) allocated to military expenditures as well as the coincidence in time of changes in defense spending with changes in the rate of industrial growth, the rate of increase of industrial investment, and the allocation of resources to consumption and to agriculture." The conclusion, Chapter 3, indicates that the conflict between civilian and military sectors of the Soviet economy provides an "objective inducement to consider arms limitation only in inverse proportion to the promise of the arms effort to materially augment the power position of the Soviet Union."

1286
[FEDERAL BUDGET ESTIMATE FOR 1966] Entwurf zum Bundesetat 1966. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Feb. 10, 1966: 90. U3.W38, v. 10

Outlines briefly the German Federal Republic's draft defense budget for 1966. Estimated total expenditures for defense, including the civil defense, amount to DM18.6 billion, of which DM17.5 billion is earmarked for the Bundeswehr and DM0.5 billion "for the defense burdens related to the stay of the allied armed forces" in West Germany. All these expenses will represent, according to the draft, 26.8 percent of the government's total expenditures.

1287
Gazier, Philipe. [FRENCH INDUSTRY AND SPACE] L'industrie française et l'espace. Entreprise, no. 548, Mar. 10, 1966: 75, 77, 79, 81.
HC271.E5, 1966

French industry has proven it can produce and orbit a satellite. Joining the space race has stimulated French industry and, most directly, the aeronautics and electronics industries, which receive two-thirds of all space appropriations. Space programs provide more than new industrial contracts. They have shown industries the need to simplify production processes and demonstrated the prime importance of equipment reliability. Space is a "school of truth"; it creates a new engineering mentality which is essential for industry's future. Some of the repercussions from the space program have been stimulation of basic and applied research, improvement of existing processes, creation of new materials, quality controls, and, above all, an improved technology. The future of the French space program is uncertain. Scientific, technological, or industrial deficiencies will not be what limit the program--but rather the funds allotted it.

1288
James, Victor. THE PROFITS OF DEATH. Word, no. 1, winter 1965/66: 12-14, 24.
HX3.W52, 1965/66
Abridged from Sermon of the Month, Sept. 1965.

Inquiries into the arms traffic that were conducted in Great Britain and the United States between the wars revealed the dirty work of the "merchants of death," but did nothing to stop it. It is easy to buy arms in the cause of the "free world"--simply write to INTERARMCO in Virginia. Aerospace reported the following statistics on the value of U.S. military exports as supplied by Henry Kuss, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Logistics Negotiations: $0.5 billion in 1960, $3.0 billion in 1964, and an expected $5.4 billion in 1967. In its campaign to make profits out of possible wars the United States is encountering British and French competition. These sales, we are informed, help meet the deficit in the balance of payments. Defense Secretary McNamara has given arms salesmanship a priority status and Mr. Kuss has been awarded a medal of merit for assisting "in a unique fashion to develop the military-sales programme and other significant logistics efforts." The single flaw in the thriving munitions business is that it may blow up when most prosperous. "No wonder the conventions on armaments do not seem to make any headway. No wonder the Geneva Conference on disarmament has taken so long." The world endangered by the military-industrial-government complex must be changed--in the short term by active public protest and in the long term by abolishing the system that enables profits to be made out of others' uncertainty. We must drive out the "Unashamed" of G. B. Shaw's Major Barbara, who says, "You will do what pays us. You will make war when it suits us, and keep peace when it does not. When I want anything to keep my dividends up, you will discover that my want is a national need. When other people want something to keep my dividends down, you will call out the police and the military."

1289
Knoll, Erwin. MORE GUNS, LESS BUTTER. Progressive, v. 30, Apr. 1966: 13-15.
AP2.P8655, v. 30

The "Great Society" has succumbed to the needs imposed upon the budget by the war in Vietnam. While rhetoric covers up some of the obvious retrenchments in planned commitments, the hard fact is that U.S. participation will impede progress toward the goals originally envisaged by the antipoverty program. Sargent Shriver has admitted that his Office of Economic Opportunity had to cut back some of its projects and accept a reduced appropriation. The Department of Housing and Urban Development budget for urban renewal and public housing is less than that to be spent for military family housing. Such is the case with every major domestic program for which Congress has authorized expenditures, with the President's budget falling short in every category. Programs for school lunches and milk subsidies, aid to the poor, federal education, and annual payment to land-grant colleges have all suffered from lack of funds. The words of the Great Society have been heard and acknowledged by the underprivileged, but the money to translate these ideas into reality has been hard to come by. Precious little can be done without money, and unrest on the part of the poor is growing. Responsibility for failing to meet these needs fall upon the President and his advisers.

1290
Koriakin, Iu. I., and others. THE USE OF REACTORS OF THE BELOIARSK ATOMIC POWER PLANT TYPE FOR DUAL-PURPOSE DESALINIZATION SYSTEMS. Washington, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1965. 14 p. diagr., tables. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 33,406)
P&GP RR

"CSO: 13059-N."

"Translation of a report . . . delivered at the First International Symposium on the Desalinization of Salt Water held in Washington, D. C. 3-9 October 1965."

Assesses the advantages of the Beloiarsk type of nuclear reactor in dual-purpose plants yielding both desalted water and electric power. Thermal systems, reactors, turbines, and desalinization sections of the Beloiarsk nuclear power plant are described. Power potentialities and economic indices of the Beloiarsk reactor are supplied.

1291
THE 1967 BUDGET: A BLOCKBUSTER. Electronics, v. 39, Feb. 7, 1966: 133-141, 143-145.
TK7800.E4384, v. 39

Reports on the U.S. 1967 budget and evaluates its implications for the defense and civilian electronics industries, space research and development, and aviation. Expenditures on defense procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation are tabulated. The budgets for the National Aeronautics and Space and the Federal Aviation Agencies are compared to their fiscal 1965 and 1966 versions.

1292
Pennell, Maynard L. THE IMPACT OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN CONFLICT ON THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY. University of Washington business review, v. 25, Dec. 1965: 76-78.
HC107.A19A25, v. 25

The conflict in Southeast Asia has begun to be felt by the American aerospace industry, which expects increased demands for aircraft and missiles used in limited warfare. The demand created by a need for replacement of aircraft will most probably be augmented by a contemplated sizable increase in United States air cavalry forces in Southeast Asia. "Because of their pecular involvement in the conflict" rotary-wing aircraft will most probably be heavily in demand. In the next several months production of some other new military aircraft may be started. The aerospace industry as a whole will face a major problem of providing sufficient production capacity to cope with the increased demand. Current expenditures in the entire national aerospace effort (approximately $18 billion annually) may be increased by $3 or $4 billion next year.

1293
PENTAGON ESCALATES DOLLARS FOR VIETNAM. Business week, no. 1906, Mar. 12, 1966: 38-39.
HC431.B87, 1966

U.S. military spending is "racing now to meet needs created by the war in Vietnam." Expenditures upon strategic and defensive weapons and research and development have been little affected; defense dollars are being allocated primarily to meet the needs of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia. The two-year decline in defense contracts has been reversed; defense outlays for fiscal 1966 have increased by 32 percent. Defense employment is increasing and exerting pressure upon civilian markets. The heaviest volume of new contracts will go to manufacturers of hardgoods needed for guerrilla warfare. New programs include a second nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, additional helicopter-borne units, new long-range bombers, and new types of strategic and anti-aircraft missiles. To date the Pentagon has successfully maintained quality and reliability standards, together with continued reductions in cost.

1294
Powers, Patrick W. BUTTER FOR THE GUNS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 45, Dec. 1965: 79-86.
Z6723.U35, v. 45

The question "guns or butter" is of paramount importance today. While the advanced nations continue to share in the glories of technology, the poorer nations are in dire need of economic and technical assistance to offset severe shortages of food and meet the challenges of this age. The United States--the most technologically advanced of nations--depends upon imports for most of the minerals required to feed its industrial complex. A search for new sources of supply, or substitutes for present materials, must be instituted, and plans for future needs developed. The real question for the future is: How can the United States allocate its resources to meet future national requirements and at the same time produce enough to aid nations unable to meet their own needs? One thing is certain: America's agricultural produce will always be in demand and, given proper long-range planning, can be used as an international bargaining weapon. "The most formalized long-range planning in the Government is presently being conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It would appear that this national security planning could be conveniently extended to include all areas of national responsibility." This could be accomplished through a "National Capabilities Plan," which would make relevant information available to all branches of the Government. Clearly the Nation will continue to need both "guns and butter" to assure its national survival and meet economic needs and must start now to plan for future contingencies.

1295
Stonier, Tom. THE BIG BLACKOUT: UNWITTING REHEARSAL FOR NUCLEAR WAR? War/peace report, v. 6, Jan. 1966: 12-14.
P&GP RR

When the recent power failure plunged the northeastern United States into darkness and helplessness many citizens feared sabotage or nuclear attack. At the time no one seems to have considered nuclear accident as the prime suspect, although "this is precisely the possibility on which a concerned citizenry should focus its sober attention." In 1964 the Federal Power Commission minimized the effect of a nuclear attack on the U.S. power system; the big blackout shows what might be expected if a nuclear bomb explodes accidentally (an incident perhaps more likely to befall some day than not) near an electrical power source. Were such an accident to take place during a time of international crisis, it might trigger a nuclear war during which power stations, substations, and transmitters would be destroyed by nuclear riposte. Large bursts of electromagnetic radiation from nuclear explosions could disrupt facilities tied into the giant power gridwork. Just as the German economy collapsed toward the end of World War II because of the failure of the national transportation system, so the entire U.S. economy could be thrown into a downward spiral toward total collapse by failure of the power system, truly the lifeblood of the U.S. economy. "Of course, the very idea of an accidental nuclear explosion and its consequences looks like such a remote possibility that it hardly seems worthy of serious consideration. But then, so did the blackout."

1296
Weidenbaum, Murray L. MEASURES OF THE IMPACT OF DEFENSE AND SPACE PROGRAMS. [St. Louis, Dept. of Economics, Washington University] 1965. 33 ℓ. (Washington University. Dept. of Economics. Working papers) HC110.D4W4

Analyzes three aspects of measuring the impact of defense and space expenditures: "the current stock of information, the increment that will soon become available, and the relatively high-priority gaps that need to be filled."

1297
Weise, Kurt. [VIETNAM--BOOM FOR RAW MATERIALS?] Vietnam--Boom für Rohstoffe? Der Volkswirt; Wirtschafts- und Finanz-Zeitung, v. 20, Jan. 21, 1966: 71. HC281.V74, v. 20

The Vietnamese War has apparently diminished the supply of certain raw materials on the American market, especially copper, aluminum, zinc, platinum, molybdenum, and vanadium. Industries are much concerned about the possible impact of the war on raw material prices, especially as the increased military demand coincides with an increased civilian demand for the same materials. Should a real shortage arise, to draw from the American stockpiles of strategic raw materials could hardly improve the situation. The question being asked is whether the Korean War years, 1950-53, will prove analogous to the present situation. Then strategic raw materials rose in price to an unprecedented level. Today many factors speak against repetition of that trend. Firstly the American gross national product is now far greater, and the annual costs of the Vietnamese War amount only to 50 percent of the Korean War costs. Secondly a vastly increased market competition between natural raw materials and their synthetic equivalents makes shortages and radical price increases unlikely. Finally prices on the raw material market have been modified in intervening years by manipulations on the national, bilateral, and international level.

1298
WHAT THE WAR IN VIETNAM WILL DO TO BUSINESS NOW. U.S. news & world report, v. 60, Feb. 14, 1966: 42-43. JK1.U65, v. 60

The accompanying graph indicates that the real impact of defense spending for the Vietnam War is just being felt. Demands arising from present defense plans will press production capabilities; signs of inflation are evident. A rise in taxes and the imposition of economic controls are being considered. Though the Administration's estimates of the situation do not call for such measures, in the belief that the added strain of the war will not disturb the economy, officials are keeping a wary eye on economic indicators.

1299
Wilson, George C. JOINT CHIEFS FEAR SOVIET TECHNICAL COUP. Aviation week & space technology, v. 84, Feb. 28, 1966: 16-17. TL501.A8, v. 84

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff will soon inform Congress of an impending Soviet technological coup in advanced weaponry (antimissile missiles, advanced space systems and aircraft, etc.) that threatens to destroy the American strategic lead. Particularly worrisome to U.S. military leaders is recent Soviet concentration on antisubmarine warfare, a preoccupation that may "lead to a breakthrough soon which could decrease the invulnerability of the Polaris submarine force." Secretary McNamara's projection of the military budget includes no immediate development of new weapons systems. But the fear expressed by Gen. John P. McConnell and other military chiefs that lowered U.S. expenditures could pave the way for a Soviet technological surprise forecasts a "conflict between the chiefs and McNamara on Russia's military capabilities and intentions" that will challenge the Administration's contention of increasing Soviet-U.S. accommodation. Military witnesses before Congress will cite copious Soviet assistance to the North Vietnamese as evidence of continued Soviet belligerency. The case for rapid development of the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) will also be argued. Secretary McNamara's "go slow" approach to the AMSA project and other military programs may be challenged by many Congressmen who are alarmed by the strong warnings voiced by the military services. Such criticism promises revision of the 1967-71 defense budget projections.

1300
Wilson, George C. VIET SUPPLEMENTAL TO BUY 2,900 AIRCRAFT. Aviation week & space technology, v. 84, Jan. 24, 1966: 32-33. TL501.A8, v. 84

Reports the allocation of the supplemental defense expenditures upon the Vietnamese War which total $12.3 billion. A detailed breakdown of aircraft procurement resulting from the new appropriation is given. Information on U.S. aircraft losses and consumption of ammunition is included.

5. Ethical and Social

1301
Du Tiret, G. [THE MILITARY CAREER] La vocation militaire. Revue militaire générale, no. 10, Dec. 1965: 642-653. U2.R48, 1965
Includes summaries in English and German.

A pessimistic judgment of the consequences of the trend toward technical, depersonalized, and dehumanized officers' cadres--a natural outcome of nuclear weapons whose principal goal is deterrence of war and because of which war is so destructive that the conduct of it requires no art. In this materialistic age we need a school that teaches the primacy of human and moral values. What could this school be, unless the armed forces? Instead we are now threatened with the development of a soulless military establishment. The editor has appended a note to this article, in which he argues the contrary--that nuclear weapons have made the task of officers and soldiers more vital than ever before.

1302
Ibarrola, Jésus. [THE EFFECTS OF THE TWO WORLD WARS ON FRENCH DEMOGRAPHIC EVOLUTION]. Les incidences des deux conflits mondiaux sur l'évolution démographique française. Paris, Librairie Dalloz, 1964. 284 p. (Essais et travaux, 20) HB3593.I2

A detailed statistical study of marriage, birth, death, and population rates in France during the first half of the 20th century and how they were affected by the two world wars.

1303
Isbell, Allen C. WAR AND CONSCIENCE. Abilene, Tex., Biblical Research Press [1966] 221 p. BT736.2.I8

Contents. --The case for absolute pacifism. --The case for non-pacifism. --The justifiable war doctrine. --Nuclear pacifism. --Morality and defense strategy in the nuclear age. --A personal conclusion. --Appendixes. --Indexes. --Bibliography.

Sets forth the positions of the "consistent nonresistant Christian" and the "non-pacifist" in regard to war and violence. The author analyzes the impact of nuclear weapons on the doctrine of just war and on what defense strategies are morally acceptable to nonpacifists. Absolute pacifism is a New Testament ideal, and to be a conscientious objector is to follow or "emulate the example of Christ." The arguments for nonpacifism (the author's position, with some reservations) demonstrate that while war is not always wrong--hence just and necessary on certain occasions--there is disagreement among nonpacifists

as to the "moral character of war." War is in some instances justified when certain conditions are fulfilled; if it is, for example, the last resort. The atomic age has introduced the phenomenon of "nuclear pacifism," whose basis is a "rule of proportion which says that one does not have the right to create more injury than he seeks to mend, regardless of the provocation." Nuclear weapons have placed the concept of just war in a new moral perspective. Of the many strategies and defense policies of the nuclear age, second-strike capability is "strategically and morally preferable." But, finally, one can ask this question: "If it is immoral to use multi-megaton weapons in retaliation, is it moral to develop such a capability?"

1304
Rauhut, Franz. [CARDINAL OTTAVIANI AND WAR] Kardinal Ottaviani und der Krieg. Die Friedensrundschau, v. 20, Feb. 1966: 12-15.
JX903. F74, v. 20

Comments on Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani's moral teachings against war as set forth in the 1947 revision of his book Institutiones iuris publici eclesiastici. Dr. Rauhut compares Ottaviani's position with those taken by other authors, ancient and modern, and to the traditional Roman Catholic doctrine on the subject. He shows how Ottaviani's thought was shaped by the two world wars.

6. Biological

1305
Bowen, Vaughan T., and Thomas T. Sugihara. OCEANOGRAPHIC IMPLICATIONS OF RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT DISTRIBUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN: FROM 20°N TO 25°S, FROM 1957 TO 1961. Journal of marine research, v. 23, May 15, 1965: 123-146.
GC1. J6, v. 23

The patterns of Sr^{90} distribution in the equatorial Atlantic are described for the years 1957, 1958, 1960, and 1961. Evidence is drawn from analysis of surface samples and of vertical profiles. The concentration distributions bear no resemblance to patterns of fallout delivery on land; it is concluded that hydrographic processes are responsible for seawater concentration patterns. The data provide evidence for two otherwise unobserved, high fall-out incidents over the Atlantic Ocean. The rapid vertical penetration of Sr^{90} in the ocean, and the relatively rapid attainment of horizontal and vertical uniformity of concentration in the equatorial Atlantic are consistent with patterns of current flow derived from hydrographic considerations, only if these are complicated by very active unoriented mixing processes within water masses. Integration of vertical profiles yields estimates of fall-out delivery to the equatorial ocean surface that are much higher than estimates of delivery to land surfaces at comparable latitudes. Vertical profiles of Ce^{144} and Pm^{147} show secondary concentration maxima at various depths; some of these maxima are interpreted as being local concentrations of sinking particles whereas others appear to represent retention in the bodies of plankton swarms. In most cases these secondary maxima are enriched in Pm^{147} vs. Ce^{144}. (Abstract supplied)

1306
Broecker, Wallace S., Gregory G. Rocco, and H. L. Volchok. STRONTIUM-90 FALLOUT: COMPARISON OF RATES OVER OCEAN AND LAND. Science, v. 152, Apr. 29, 1966: 639-640. illus.
Q1. S35, v. 152

Measurements of strontium-90 in waters residing on the Bahama Banks for periods between 12 and 180 days suggest that fallout rates onto these waters are substantially the same as the average rates at all fallout collection stations between 20° and 30° north latitude. If the amount of precipitation on the Bahama Banks is reasonably representative of the oceanic areas in this latitude band, our results support the conclusion that the amount of strontium-90 deposited per unit area of ocean surface is within a factor of 2 of that on land. (Abstract supplied.)

1307
Fleischmann, A. W. RADIATION INCIDENTS IN NEW SOUTH WALES. British journal of industrial safety, v. 6, summer 1965: 270-277.
P&GP RR

Reports 12 incidents of accidental radiation dosage in New South Wales during the past 8 years. Preventive measures applicable to each case are discussed. Inadequate training and supervision of those who work with radioactive materials are cited as the leading causes of the incidents. The regulations of the New South Wales Radioactive Substances Act (with maximum permissible doses) are held to be the best way to prevent happenings of this type.

1308
Grosch, Daniel S. BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF RADIATIONS. New York, Blaisdell Pub. Co. [1965] 293 p. illus. (A Blaisdell book in the pure and applied sciences)
QH652. C76

Includes bibliographies.

For the student of biology, attempts to "present an organized picture of the diverse experiments in which living material is exposed to radiation." A brief explanation of the radiations and their actions on living matter is followed by discussions of their effects at the cellular level, on tissues and organs, and on the organism as a whole (radiation sickness and protection against harmful radiations are treated in this part).

1309
Korolev, G. K. DISTRIBUTION OF CERTAIN RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES UPON THEIR INHALATION. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Recent developments in studies of radioactive substances, USSR, Jan. 31, 1966. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 33,958) p. 8-19. tables, graph.
P&GP RR

"CSO: 13081-N."

"Translation of an article . . . in the Russian-language periodical Meditsinskaya Radiologiya (Medical Radiology), Vol X, No 10, Moscow, October 1965, pp 75-80."
Slav Rm

Examines the penetration of radioactive substances through organs of respiration. "The study of penetration of radioactive isotopes through the organs of respiration represents an extremely important problem, because their resorption through the lungs is much more significant, and in the case of the majority of isotopes--also much higher than through the gastrointenstinal tract." The content of certain isotopes in the lungs and the elimination of certain isotopes from the lungs are studied.

1310
Savitz, David. GAS AND GUERRILLAS--A WORD OF CAUTION. New republic, v. 154, Mar. 19, 1966: 13-14.
AP2. N624, v. 154

Although the United States did not ratify the 1925 Geneva protocols that prohibit bacteriological warfare,

it was generally assumed that the U.S. Government felt bound by President Roosevelt's pledge concerning the no-first-use of chemical and biological weapons. Recent use of nonlethal gases in Vietnam, however, indicates that the United States has consciously violated the traditional threshold of chemical and biological warfare. That these gases are more humane than, say, explosives is debatable once the impossibility of maintaining uniform dosage under battlefield conditions is recognized. What is more important, the United States has embarked upon a course of action very susceptible to unacceptable escalation. As the 14th Pugwash Conference has noted: "If the restraints on the practice of any kind of biological and chemical warfare are broken down, the entire spectrum of these weapons may come into use." Proliferation of chemical and biological weapons may occur more rapidly than nuclear proliferation, yet be just as dangerous. Arms control measures against such proliferation would be virtually impossible. A single vial might kill as many people as a nuclear bomb. Mutual example by nations can achieve the only real control of such agents. Thus the United States should prohibit the use of antipersonnel and anticrop chemicals in Vietnam, ratify the Geneva protocols or adopt an equivalent policy, and declassify chemical and biological warfare research.

1311
Symposium on the Assessment of Radioactive Body Burdens in Man, Heidelberg, 1964. ASSESSMENT OF RADIOACTIVITY IN MAN: PROCEEDINGS. Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency, 1964. 2 v. illus. (International Atomic Energy Agency. Proceedings series) RC78.7.R4S93, 1964

"Held by the International Atomic Energy Agency, International Labour Organisation, and World Health Organization."

"STI/PUB/84."

Surveys the experience of experts in various disciplines in the assessment of human radioactive body burden and resultant radiation doses. Volume I comprises papers dealing with problems common to many kinds of isotopes: "in-vivo counting, bioassay techniques, sample counting and analysis of data." The second volume covers "radioisotopes of specific elements: caesium, radium, radon, strontium, tritium, thorium, uranium, plutonium and rare earth elements."

1312
Weik, Mary H. RADIOACTIVE WASTES--AN UNSOLVED PROBLEM. Socialist leader, v. 58, Mar. 12, 1966: 5. HD4805.N35, v. 58

Nuclear energy plants need vast quantities of water for cooling and carrying away radioactive wastes. Although these wastes are said to be of such low radiation levels as to be harmless, investigations of the natural environments of nuclear plants have uncovered heavy concentrations of isotopes in plant and animal life and mutations in frogs and other forms of life. U.S. health statistics show that humans living near such plants experience higher mortality rates. The atomic industries may be contaminating the waters of the world to the extent that future generations will suffer an increase in birth defects, leukemia, miscarriages, and other injuries from radiation. The world public knows little of these matters. In the West, the trustees of the atomic industry, who also control many influential businesses, are determined to protect the profits realized from nuclear projects; yet even in the socialist countries, where the profit motive is not operative, "the same disregard is shown for their citizens' health and lives." Mankind has been too apathetic in the face of progress to question the safety of nuclear development. "For the sake of all the world's children, let us end this nightmare now."

III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

A. INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. Pacific Settlement

1313
Carpenter, Norman R. AMERICAN INITIATIVES: THE MYTH OF NEW REALITIES. In American Bar Association. Journal, v. 52, Jan. 1966: 42-44.
LL

In reply to Leonard M. Salter's article, "American Initiatives Toward a Disarmed World Under Law" (American Bar Association Journal, July 1965), it seems important to question the premises on which the article was based. True, the world may stand on the brink of a nuclear holocaust, but we cannot allow this specter to deter us from an assessment of the realities of the international situation. And, although the legalistic-moralistic approach espoused by Mr. Salter has merit, it pays no heed to the tactics used by America's adversaries, the Soviet Union and Red China, who ignore or debase all attempts at reaching a solution through legal precepts. World peace through law is an honorable objective; attempts to establish it as a valid approach to world order should not be abandoned. The difficulty arises when this approach is compared with the record of broken treaties and lies that characterize Soviet foreign policy since 1917, along with the Soviet emphasis on power as the chief determinant in achieving an objective. This difficulty is even more obvious in the case of Red China. To offer the Chinese territorial concessions under the guise of "initiative" would destroy confidence in the United States among the smaller countries and encourage attempts to bend the United Nations and other honorable organizations to purely nationalistic ends. With no evidence of Soviet or Chinese support for the principle of world peace through law, America must not make unilateral initiatives, honorable as they are, that can lessen its ability to fight subversion of "duly constituted governments." Nor can it offer concessions with territory not its own. The record indicates that a firm response to danger has been more a deterrent to a nuclear holocaust, as in the Cuban missile crisis, than has the moralistic-legalistic approach. The latter is valid, but not in times of great stress and duplicity by aggressive antagonists, who refuse to accept the basic premises that would allow creation of a system of world law.

1314
Tomšič, Ivan, lawyer. [PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES] Règlement pacifique des différends intenrationaux [sic] Beograd, Naučno Delo, 1964. 6 p. (Rapports préliminaires pour le Symposium sur les relations entre les États dans les conditions actuelles de la communauté internationale)
JX4475.T6

Progress in the peaceful settlement of international disputes has not kept pace with developments in the international community. Were peaceful settlement more prevalent, world security would increase and the risk of war decrease. Ways of enforcing nonviolent settlement, provided for in international law (and especially in the U.N. Charter), are stronger than in any other era, but they still must be reinforced to be made really effective. Despite certain facts about the state of the international community today--that international disputes are inevitable, that no supranational world authority exists, and that state sovereignty is carefully guarded--more adequate mechanisms for peaceful settlement can be found. "Is there truly a contested or unsolved issue extant that can't be settled in a peaceful way, by some mode of action agreeable to the litigants?" Among present weaknesses are the facts that finding a solution is not obligatory under international law, even when the dispute threatens international peace; execution of decisions is not guaranteed; and the International Court of Justice can exercise only an optional jurisdiction. States should be allowed to determine by what peaceful means they wish to settle their disputes, but settlement must be made obligatory. If the dispute remains unsolved for a certain period of time either the Security Council or General Assembly must step in with a power of compulsory decision. To strengthen the U.N.'s authority in this way, would require a corresponding decrease in state sovereignty. However, one may reasonably wonder whether such a move is feasible under present international conditions.

2. Adjudication

1315
Bane, Charles A. THE WASHINGTON WORLD CONFERENCE ON WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW. Illinois bar journal, v. 54, Feb. 1966: 498-505.
LL

The capacity for compromise of jurists, lawyers, and law teachers from 121 countries was tested at the World Conference on World Peace Through Law, held in Washington, D. C., September 12-18, 1965. The Conference approached broad concepts from their more limited, local applications. The theory of a World Judicial System was approved, but a treaty to set up a system of "neighborhood" courts, responsible for regulating minor disputes, was concretely approved as the first step. The idea of a World Law Code was also approved, although the action concerned only endorsement of the first volume, which would contain treaties already enjoying worldwide acceptance. Chief Justice Earl Warren lauded the advances made in the application and development of international law in recent times, while President Johnson reaffirmed U.S. commitment to the rule of law. World Law Day, proclaimed by the President, focused worldwide attention on the Conference. Panel sessions dealt with the resolution of international disputes, improvement and expansion of the rule of international law and legal institutions, and related problems. "That so large and diverse a group of outstanding jurists from the four corners of the earth could meet and agree on a program to advance world law is in and of itself a tremendous accomplishment." Their agreement on so many aspects of international law should facilitate expansion

of the rule of law, and make the program "a tremendous factor for world peace." Chief Justice Warren's dream of a world rule of law has been brought closer to realization.

1316
Chiu, Hung-ta. COMMUNIST CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW. American journal of international law, v. 60, Apr. 1966: 245-267.
LL

Communist China's conduct of foreign relations, its governmental and academic references, and its appeals to an international legal code to justify or condemn international enterprises testify to Chinese recognition of the existence of international law. But, like the Soviet Union, Communist China regards law as an instrument of the state, not as an objective body of rules. Within such a framework international law emerges as an expression of the collective will of a number of states. Because Communist ideology ascribes a class character to all laws, Chinese jurists, like their Soviet counterparts, are divided on the question of whether a system of international law can be applicable to both Communist and non-Communist states. Official Chinese policy seems to recognize at least two systems of international law (Socialist and general) and possibly three (Socialist, general, and bourgeois). In practice China seems to regard treaties and customs as genuine sources of international law. Judicial decisions and writings by publicists receive scant attention in Chinese legal circles, and decisions by international organizations are regarded only as recommendations, without binding power. Bourgeois students of the law, it is said, are unable to achieve scientific objectivity because of their limited ideology and methodology and their obligation to justify the illegal activities of their imperialist masters. Western measures toward formulation of a transnational or supranational legal code are cited as naked endeavors to destroy national sovereignty and thereby prepare the way for extension of U.S. hegemony throughout the world. The following conclusions can be drawn: (1) Communist China is more dogmatic in its application of Marxism-Leninism to international law and "less responsive to the recent development of international law in the Western world" than is the Soviet Union. (2) China's bitter experiences with Western imperialist nations exert great influence upon its opinion of international law. (3) Chinese work in international law has been and remains quite primitive, with the compiling and editing of documents remaining its greatest contribution. Chinese interest in original works on international law is slight.

1317
Corbett, P. E. LAWYERS AND THE LAW OF NATIONS. International studies, v. 7, Jan. 1966: 419-428.
JX18.I55, v. 7

Commends the increased concern for international law among lawyers and lawyers' associations and selects areas where particular efforts should be made to develop international legal norms. The rule of law requires far-reaching world federation which requires that states renounce much of their claimed sovereignty. (Whether nuclear weapons will destroy the world before states are finally viewed as instruments of human welfare rather than as ends in themselves is an open question.) Especially important now are legal definitions of the following: the composition of the international community, intervention and aggression, the relationship of international law to civil strife, and human rights.

1318
Evans, F. T., and H. D. Howard. THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE. In their Outlook on space, London, G. Allen & Unwin [1965] p. 119-160.
TL788.5.E9

Contents. --Law in a new dimension. --The national past. --The international future.

Extrapolates from related cases the application of national and international law and institutions to space. Nationalism is decried, and international cooperation in space as well as the formulation of an international space law are urged.

1319
McWhinney, Edward. THE "NEW" COUNTRIES AND THE "NEW" INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE UNITED NATIONS' SPECIAL CONFERENCE ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION AMONG STATES. American journal of international law, v. 60, Jan. 1966: 1-33.
LL

Recounts a 2-year-old scientific-legal disagreement within the U.N. Special Committee on Friendly Relations over the principles of peaceful coexistence. The author stresses the differences between the Western and the Soviet stands on the principle of a state refraining from the threat or use of force against any other state, as well as on the principles of peaceful settlement of international disputes and nonintervention. The only principle on which "it was at least possible to obtain some agreement" was sovereign equality of states. This was so because of "the very self-evidence" of that principle and "the absence of too much limiting positive law doctrine from earlier eras." Mr. McWhinney suggests some changes in basic Western tactics at international debates of this kind. He feels, for instance, that Western representatives should not neglect deductive methods of reasoning, because "the larger part of the world, including a majority of the 'new' countries, is civil law in legal background, and does not have the same distrust of abstract general formulations or codes that Western common lawyers have."

1320
Moscow. Institut mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii. [INTERNATIONAL LAW] Mezhdunarodnoe pravo [Otvetstvennyi redaktor F. I. Kozhevnikov] Moskva, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1964. 678 p. (Its Uchebnyi kurs mezhdunarodnogo prava)
JX3695.R9M6

Contents. --A brief outline of the history of international law. --Concepts and basic features of modern international law. --Peaceful coexistence of states of two systems: the basis of modern international law. --The new pattern of international relations and international law. --The national liberation movement of peoples and international law. --Subjects of international law. --Territory in international law. --The populace in international law. --International agreement. --State organs of foreign relations. --International organizations. --Forms of international law in the economic relations of states. --Peaceful means of resolving international disputes. --Problems of international law in preventing war. --International law and war.

A comprehensive text for students of international law. Each chapter is written by a Soviet specialist in international law or one of its phases.

1321
Moscow. Vsesoiuznyi iuridicheskii zaochnyi institut. [INTERNATIONAL LAW] Mezhdunarodnoe pravo [Otvetstvennye redaktory: D. B. Levin, G. P. Kaliuzhnaia] Moskva, Iurid. lit-ra, 1964. 429 p.
JX3695. R9M65

Contents. --Concepts and essence of modern international law. --History of international law and its sciences. --Peaceful coexistence and modern international law. --Principles of international law in the cooperation of Socialist States. --Sources of international law: international agreement. --Subjects of modern international law. --The downfall of the imperialist colonial system and international law. --Problems of populace in international law. --Territory in international law. --State organs of foreign relations. --International organizations. --International organizations for special problems of international relations. --International agreements and covenants on problems of economics, science, and culture. --Peaceful means for resolving international disputes. --The role of international law in the struggle against aggression and other international crimes: problems of the struggle for peace.

A comprehensive text for students of international law. Each chapter is written by a Soviet specialist in international law or one of its phases.

1322
National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation. Committee on Development of International Law. REPORT. Washington, 1965. 15 p.
P&GP RR

Prepared for presentation at the White House Conference on International Cooperation, Nov. 28-Dec. 1, 1965, Washington, D. C.

Stresses the importance of international law in world affairs and recommends (with supporting arguments) seven ways to aid the spread of international legal precepts among the old and new nations of the world community. These are: (1) "That the United States delete the Connally Amendment to its reservation to the declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and the reservation regarding disputes involving multilateral treaties." (2) "That the United States develop a program for legal assistance to new nations." (3) "That the United States develop a program with other countries for exchange of government lawyers." (4) "That the United States propose to the United Nations the establishment under U.N. auspices of an international law reporter system." (5) "That the United States ratify the United Nations and the World Bank arbitration conventions." (6) "That the United States ratify the consular convention with the Soviet Union." (7) "That the United States endorse the establishment of a court for the adjudication of lower level international disputes."

1323
Verdross, Alfred. JUS DISPOSITIVUM AND JUS COGENS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. American journal of international law, v. 60, Jan. 1966: 55-63.
LL

This article was written in response to criticism directed against the International Law Commission's draft Convention on the Law of Treaties (Art. 37) by "the eminent English lawyer, Professor Georg Schwarzenberger."

Among jurists of international law opinion is divided as to whether general international law embodies exclusively the character of jus dispositivum--norms that must be applied only if the individual states have not agreed otherwise between themselves--or whether it contains also norms of jus cogens--rules that cannot be repealed by any treaty inter partes, that is a treaty whose legal effect is limited to the contracting parties. The question involves on one hand the principle of the state's unlimited power to conclude treaties, and on the other existence of public order in the international community. The latter, according to proponents of a dual character of general international law (jus dispositivum and jus cogens), renders all treaties contra bonos mores (treaties violating that order) null and void. Those who advocate an exclusively jus dispositivum system argue that states are always free to conclude treaties that may deviate inter partes from general international law, and that the individualistic structure of that law makes the principle of international public order inconsequential. Holders of the dual view contend that in general international law the rules serving the interest of the international community as a whole are by definition jus cogens, because without them the maintenance of orderly international relations would be impossible. The principle of jus cogens has been unanimously recognized by the International Law Commission in its draft Convention on the Law of Treaties (1963). Furthermore, the precedence of norms serving the international community as a whole over norms established by treaties inter partes was emphasized by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion Concerning Reservations to the Genocide Convention. In fact, the practice of international arbitration so far has rested on the assumption that all international agreements contra bonos mores are void. The lack of compulsory international jurisdiction, although of great practical consequence, has not affected the validity of that principle. Therefore bilateral and multilateral treaties contra bonos mores are void. The International Court or an arbitral tribunal could never uphold them.

1324
Wilson, Larman C. LAW AND INTERVENTION IN THE CUBAN "INVASION" OF 1961. Revue de droit international, de sciences diplomatiques et politiques, v. 43, Oct./Dec. 1965: 347-355.
JX3. R37, v. 43

Discusses the background and political repercussions of the April 1961 Cuban "invasion" and concludes that legal approaches (consonant with international, inter-American, and U.S. law) to Latin American problems stand a much better chance of long-range success. The author agrees with Richard A. Falk's observation that "we must come to understand that the restraints of law often serve our national interests." If Latin American nations are expected "to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration" (Kennedy Doctrine) then the United States must honor the obligations of nonintervention found in the Organization of American States Charter.

B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

1325
[ADAPTATION OF THE U.N. TO TODAY'S WORLD] L'Adaptation de l'O.N.U. au monde d'aujourd'hui. Paris, A. Pedone, 1965. 230 p.
JX1977. A646

At head of title: Colloque international de Nice, 27-29 mai 1965.

Sponsored by l'Association pour le Développement du Droit Mondial.

Speeches delivered at the May 1965 colloquium of the Association for the Development of World Law. The first day heard short messages from several participants and three papers--Henri Laugier on the past, present, and future of the United Nations; Mrs. Paul Bastid on the legal obligations of member states and international cooperation; and Charles Chaumont on the roles of the General Assembly and Security Council. On the second day René-Jean Depuy spoke on the International Court of Justice, André Philip on the association between the United Nations and developing countries, Jules Moch on the related problems of disarmament and economic development, and Francis Gerard on a permanent U.N. force. On the last day regionalism and decentralization were discussed by Paul de la Pradelle, literacy and development by Mrs. Germaine Tillion, and the choice between practical reform or Charter revision by Michel Virally.

1326
Bennett, Roy. THE WEST LOSES ITS U.N. MAJORITY. War/peace report, v. 6, Feb. 1966: 3-4.
P&GP RR

Analyzes the change in voting patterns and alinements that have taken place over the past 20 years in the United Nations. U.S. predominance in the initial period of U.N. activity has been lost as the world has changed its character. The Afro-Asian-Socialist bloc commands majority votes now. "The significance of the changing tide in the U.N. is symptomatic of a more fundamental problem: U.S. foreign policy has outlived the basic premises and assumptions it set 20 years ago. American responses to a world in change, wittingly or not, have convinced most of the world that U.S. policy means no change at all." The United States will have to revise its world policies in order to avoid isolation from the world community of which it should constitute a very vital part.

1327
Buzuev, Vladimir M., and Vladimir P. Pavlichenko. [SCIENTISTS GIVE WARNING] Uchenye predostereguiut. Moskva, Nauka, 1964. 179 p.
JX1974.7.B87

Contents. --Science and society. --Scientists and their international organizations in the fight for peace. --From Pugwash to Moscow. --Reason triumphs: peace will be preserved.

A history and analysis of the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. Resolutions and proposals adopted by the Conference since its inception are reported in detail. The efforts of scientists throughout the past century to caution and protect mankind against possible harmful effects of scientific discoveries are related. The authors see real hope for a world without war and predict great social and cultural improvements for mankind when science is freed from service to military research and development.

1328
Dougherty, James E. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, WAR AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Orbis, v. 9, winter 1966: 845-897.
D839.O68, v. 9

Reviews the attitude of the Catholic Church toward war, military service, and pacifism from the early centuries of its history to the conclusion of the second Vatican Council. The views of Pope Pius XII and Pope John XXIII concerning the morality of nuclear deterrence, stockpiling of nuclear weapons, and threats of nuclear retaliation against an aggressor are studied in detail. The attitude of the Church and its leaders toward disarmament throughout recent times is presented and analyzed. The author finds that the second Vatican Ecumenical Council (which debated the posture of the Church in the nuclear age at its third and fourth sessions) refused to condemn nuclear stockpiles or to condemn "governments and military establishments in an effort to achieve an inner sense of moral purity and freedom from guilt, irrespective of the political consequences." The Church seems to be cautiously optimistic that mankind will take advantage of the interlude granted by the balance of terror to achieve "a more rational political organization of the planet earth."

1329
Douglas, James W. PEACE: ISSUE FOR THE COUNCIL. Peace, v. 2, summer 1965: 3-11.
P&GP RR

Reviews the Catholic Church's views of nuclear war, deterrence and strategy, and the achievement of world peace. The author points out the divergent, though not necessarily conflicting, positions within the Church on the problem of nuclear deterrence. The writings of Pope Paul and the late Pope John are cited as significant contributions to the growing body of Christian literature on the problems of war and peace. A Christian commitment against nuclear weapons is a moral force in the world that seeks political expression wherever possible. Total unilateral disarmament appears to be the most logical political position for such a commitment, although an unrealistic one. And yet "a Christian effort to transpose its moral commitment into the political order could not compromise itself by supporting the deterrent in any way as a temporary expedient." Regarding total unilateral disarmament, the effort required to obtain it might better "take the direction of the national sacrifice necessary for a preferable multilateral agreement and effective world government."

1330
Fehrenbach, T. R. THIS KIND OF PEACE. New York, D. McKay Co. [1966] 402 p.
JX1977.F36

Contents. --The faith. --The failure. --The future.

"Illustrates how and why the U.N. came about, who made it, what it was meant to be, and, finally, what it ultimately became." The author endeavors to give a realistic picture of the United Nations rather than what it might have done or can do. Most works on the United Nations treat it "as if it had, or could have, a life of its own, outside the world we live in." A better approach, the author feels, is to study the world of the United States, Communist China, and the Soviet Union along with the United Nations. During its first 20 years the Organization led three lives. The first was "the order-keeping apparatus designed at Dunbarton Oaks" to assure collective security and to serve as a forum against injustice. The cold war intervened, for the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States was not the bailiwick of the United Nations. The second United Nations "was the diffuse apparatus of the Economic and Social Council." This council is important to the non-European nations and has great humanitarian value, but cannot initiate decisive change in a world requiring such change. The third United Nations, which "provided a mechanism for settling disputes in the non-Communist world," has turned out to be the most valuable role for the Organization in today's changing colonial order. Peaceful change in the postwar world has come about more easily because of this third function.

1331
Goldberg, Arthur J. THE UNITED NATIONS: WHY IT SHOULDN'T ADMIT RED CHINA. General federation clubwoman, v. 44, Feb. 1966: 8-9, 22, 28.
HQ1903.G35, v. 44

Text of the statement made by American Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur J. Goldberg to the Plenary Session, Nov. 8, 1965, opposing the proposal to seat Communist China.

1332
Leng, Russell J. VIETNAM: WHAT ROLE FOR THE UN? Nation, v. 202, Feb. 28, 1966: 227-229.
AP2.N2, v. 202

Like it or not, the U.N. Security Council has become "directly and formally involved" in the Vietnam conflict. Any effective U.N. action will require Soviet approval and cooperation. Yet achievement of a truce in the war-torn Southeast Asian country could still be accomplished through the Security Council. Moscow could help arrange peace negotiations and save face if the plea for help came not from the United States but from the nonalined nations. Through this means Washington might even find it easier to swallow talks with the National Liberation Front. Perhaps even the cooperation of Red China, the Vietcong, and the two Vietnams could be enlisted if the neutrals took a strong initiative. If some kind of truce is attained, the United Nations will probably have the responsibility of supervising it. Financing such an operation is an obvious but not insoluble problem. The United States could bear the entire cost of a U.N. force and still spend less than it now does in Vietnam. This is not to suggest that Washington "can simply spray blue paint on the helmets of the 101st Airborne Division and magically turn them into a Korea-style United Nations force effectively controlled by the United States." The force that mans a Vietnam truce must be small with a balance between "Socialist" and "non-Socialist" lesser powers. In any case the United Nations is not likely to police such a ceasefire without a fair chance of success. Without the cooperation of all sides any such attempt is doomed.

1333
McVitty, Marion M. IN THE EYE OF THE HURRICANE. World federalist, v. 11, Feb. 1966: 8-9.
JX1901.W825, v. 11

Reviews the U.N. General Assembly's 20th session and looks ahead to future work on the matters dealt with by the Session.

1334
Martin, Paul. PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 17, Aug. 1965: 355-360.
JX351.A3, v. 17

"Statement made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs . . . on June 22, 1965, to the Standing Committee on External Affairs of the House of Commons."

Delineates the relationship between U.N. peacekeeping functions and those of regional bodies such as the Organization of American States.

1335
Sobakin, Vadim K. [GOALS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE U.N. IN A DISARMED WORLD] Tseli i printsipy OON v usloviiakh razoruzhennom mire. In his OON i aktual'nye mezhdunarodnye problemy. Edited by Valerian A. Zorin and G. I. Morozov. Moskva, IMO, 1965. p. 342-354. LL

The U.N. Charter does not indicate the form or scope of the disarmament it hopes to achieve, but faithfulness to the principles and ideals incorporated in the Charter unmistakably binds members to work for the achievement of general and complete disarmament. Under conditions of general and complete disarmament the principles of the United Nations will become highly relevant. Deprived of the "argument of force," even capitalist states will have to rely upon peaceful discussion for the resolution of international problems, although the United Nations will still have to create safeguards against the use of economic pressure by powerful states in their disputes with weaker nations. Complete disarmament will create conditions more favorable to international cooperation. Equal rights for all peoples, self-determination for all nations, and human rights and freedom for all men will be easier to achieve. The principles of national sovereignty and noninterference in the domestic affairs of nations will be better supported. The United Nations must not offer any guarantee, however, that the influence of Communist ideas will not increase under conditions of disarmament. By causing radical changes in international relations, general and complete disarmament will necessitate changes in those sections of the U.N. Charter devoted to the regulation of peaceful coexistence. The authority of the various U.N. organs and their relationship must not be altered, although changes will be necessary in the definition of permanent and nonpermanent status of Security Council members. For now the United Nations must begin to establish closer contact with nongovernmental, democratic organizations that are striving for peace and invite these groups to participate in U.N. work. The failure of the United Nations to establish organizational relations with what is perhaps the most powerful force working for peaceful coexistence in the world today--the international peace movement, in all its forms--cannot help but exert a negative influence on U.N. goals.

1336
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Social Science Clearing House. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES; A SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF THE STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SPECIALIZED IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND IN CONSULTATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH UNESCO, CATEGORIES A AND B. LES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES DE SCIENCES SOCIALES; APERÇU DE LA STRUCTURE ET DES ACTIVITÉS DES ORGANISATIONS NON GOUVERNEMENTALES SPÉCIALISÉES DANS LE DOMAINE DES SCIENCES SOCIALES ET BÉNÉFICIANT D'ARRANGEMENTS CONSULTATIFS, CATÉGORIES A ET B, AUPRÈS DE L'UNESCO. Rev. ed. with an introd. by T. H. Marshall. [Paris] Unesco [1964] 147 p. (Its Reports and papers in the social sciences, no. 21)
H62.U475, no. 21

Includes bibliographies.

Information on the aims, organization, activities, meetings, and publications of 14 international nongovernmental social science organizations that have consultative arrangements with UNESCO. The organizations described are: the International Association of Legal Science, International Committee for Social Sciences Documentation, International Economic Association, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, International Law Association, International Political Science Association, International Social Science Council, International Society for Criminology, International Sociological Association, International

Statistical Institute, International Union of Scientific Psychology, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, World Association of Public Opinion Research, and World Federation for Mental Health.

1337
Vernant, Jacques. [VIETNAM AND THE U.N.] Le Vietnam et l'O.N.U. Revue de défense nationale. v. 22, Mar. 1966: 524-528.
D410.R45, v. 22

"In spite of nuclear equilibrium the world in which we live remains dangerous." With the war in Vietnam threatening to engulf all of Indochina and with the possibility of many other types of war, the United Nations continues to be a necessary and effective instrument for resolving conflicts. In the Vietnam case, though, it will not suffice. Here U.N. members confront nonmembers; it is difficult to imagine what possible contribution Security Council debates could make to a solution. U.N. limitations are also obvious in the Geneva disarmament negotiations, where a necessary participant, China, is not a member. Moreover not even an agreement between the five powers would solve all arms problems. A nonproliferation agreement requires a positive relationship between these powers and "the others."

1338
Zorin, Valerian A., and G. I. Morozov. [THE U.N. AND THE PRESSING INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS OF TODAY] OON i aktual'nye mezhdunarodnye problemy. Moskva, Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenila, 1965. 363 p. LL

Contents.--The United Nations Organization in a changing world, by E. S. Pchelintsev.--The U.N. and peaceful coexistence, by G. I. Morozov.--The U.N. and the problem of disarmament, by O.V. Bogdanov.--The U.N. and the national liberation movement, by S. A. Krasil'shchikova.--Problems of international trade in the U.N., by G. P. Arkad'ev.--Technological and financial aid to developing countries and the United Nations, by V. Ia. Aboltin.--The U.N. and international cooperation in the social realm, by V. G. Shkunaev.--The U.N. and problems of the peaceful use of outer space, by G. P. Zhukov.--The U.N. and problems of securing peace and security in a disarmed world, by V. K. Sobakin [abstracted elsewhere this issue].

A collection of articles commemorating the 20th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations.

C. INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

1339
National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation. Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. REPORT. Washington, 1965. 24 p.
P&GP RR

Prepared for presentation at the White House Conference on International Cooperation, Nov. 28-Dec. 1, 1965, Washington, D. C.

Outlines the difficulties confronting the United Nations in its attempts to mediate disputes and restrain acts of violence on the international scene. A review of the establishment of peacekeeping operations from 1945 through the present, and the political and financial difficulties this posed for the United Nations, indicates a pressing need for agreement on the procedures to be followed. The Committee recommends points of departure for investigation of how to make the peacekeeping operations easier for the United Nations. It cites instances where the United States might use its influence to bring this improvement about.

D. OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS

1340
Abdullah, Mohammad. Sheikh. KASHMIR: A HUMAN PROBLEM: SPEECH. [Delhi, Plebiscite Front, Jammu and Kashmir State, 1965] 18 p. DS485.K2A59

A plea for a cautious and rational approach to solution of the Kashmir problem--one that will strengthen the Indian subcontinent, preserve peace, and conform with the moral right of self-determination.

1341
Antoine, Pierre. [POLITICS AND VIOLENCE] Politique et violence. In Centre catholique des intellectuels français. Recherches et débats, no. 53, Dec. 1965: 95-114. AS162.P44, 1965

Men resort to violence in order to defend liberties that they hold more important than life itself. Peace must be constructed. It will not simply be found--especially not by philosophers of utopian "economism" who misunderstand the essence of violence, reducing its causes to material needs. Among others four utopians--Phaleas of Chalcedon, Locke, Saint-Simon, and Comte--have one theme in common in their diverse schemes for abolishing violence: the transition of human society from one resembling the society of wolves to one resembling a functionally but not individually differentiated, economically-oriented insect community. There is something inexplicable in human violence. It may stem from a will to power or may be a simple affirmation of self. At any rate it must be recognized rather than explained. Saint-Simon and Comte foresaw that in a highly productive industrial society the material gains of war would become less profitable than the gains of work. Reason, therefore, would dictate the disappearance of war; the political problem would become one of administering production, not of governing men. To make such an abstraction of violence is to renounce the possibility of controlling it. Reason itself uses violence to force others to be "reasonable." For reason (derived from concrete values) does not accept compromise. If, in employing violence for the edification of the world, it refuses to call itself violent, then it exacerbates conflict and does so in refusing to engage the "unreasonable" in a real dialogue. But if reason recognizes its own violence it is capable of self-doubt and self-criticism. It is dialogue and confrontation, rather than calculation, that permits men to construct common values mutually and thus to solve the political problem of coexistence of liberties. The political function is to make this violence (confrontation) a constructive force. "Peace--peace that is neither resignation, nor compromise, nor even only a precarious truce, but peace whose substance derives from an agreement on what is reasonable--must be constructed." The political function is all the more significant as it becomes clear that agreement on values (the basis of a political community) must be universal in a global age.

1342
Brossier, Raymonde. [PEACE FORCES IN ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES] Forces de paix en action aux États-Unis. Cahiers du communisme, v. 42, Feb. 1966: 77-81. HX5.C26, v. 42

Pressures on the Johnson administration to stop the war in Vietnam are growing. Up to now the opposition

has consisted chiefly of students, intellectuals, and religious groups. But, with an increasing possibility of heavy economic and human sacrifices, labor and the poor (particularly Negro-rights organizations) are joining its ranks. Sacrifices would no doubt be accepted were the national interest at stake. The present preoccupation of U.S. peace forces is coordination of their efforts. Their task is made more difficult because the masses do not recognize the aggressive and exploitive nature of American imperialism. Thus the Vietnam opposition must word its arguments in terms of threats to world peace and national interest. The debate is raging among the public and even in the Congress. In this way American pacifist groups are contributing to a just and peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

1343
Clark, Joseph S. SENATOR CLARK ON THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Mar. 1966: 30-33.
TK9145.A84, v. 22

The report of the White House Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, though very able, hardly mentions disarmament itself. Concentration on urgent problems immediately threatening world peace and neglect of general and complete disarmament seemingly make the report too timid for the times. The Committee renders valuable service by denouncing the follies of the proposed multilateral force, by advocating a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, and by arguing that agreement on a nonproliferation treaty need not be made dependent upon progress in other areas of arms control. Implementation of its proposals, however, would still leave the nuclear superpowers in a position to annihilate each other and the rest of the world. "Whatever its limitations, the conference struck a strong blow for peace and international cooperation at a time when both are the crying need of the day." Those segments of the American public that desire peace through international cooperation should ascertain from their Congressmen whether they are aware of the Committee report, whether they support its recommendations, and what they intend to do "about prodding the executive and enacting the legislation necessary to carry the recommendations into effect."

1344
Conference to Plan a Strategy for Peace. REPORT. 5TH. 1964. [Muscatine, Iowa, Stanley Foundation] 43 p.
JX1932.C6, 5th

Contains reports of Conference discussion groups on Asia, Europe, arms control and disarmament, the United Nations and peacekeeping, space, and the economic aspects of a strategy for peace. The arms control discussion group concluded that the main threat is the aggressive tendency in man, not the presence of nuclear or conventional weapons and that the future is optimistic despite the continued presence of the nuclear threat.

1345
Conference to Plan a Strategy for Peace. REPORT. 6TH. 1964. [Muscatine, Iowa, Stanley Foundation] 43 p.
JX1932.C6, 6th

Contains reports of discussion groups on Europe, disarmament and arms control, the United Nations, the Far East, and the impact of science and technology, with the main theme being "A Ten-Year Look Ahead at a Strategy for Peace." The arms control discussion group concentrated on nonproliferation and assigned it high priority as a national policy objective.

1346
Hocke, Gustav R. [THE COUNCIL AND WORLD POLICY] Das Konzil und die Weltpolitik. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, Mar. 1966: 133-141.
D839.A885, v. 17

The most important achievement of the second Vatican Council was its resolutions on the Church's universality. The same principle was later expressed in the "Pastoral Constitution on the Church's Relations to the Contemporary World." The idea elaborated therein--that the Church's mission is to influence people of all persuasions and act to that end in complete political autonomy and independence from any earthly power--was clearly inspired by the late Pope John's encyclical "Pacem in Terris." Politically the Church can no longer be identified with the West as it was 10 years ago. The new, Christian-existential relation of the Church to all power blocs and forms is based partially on tolerance stemming from Christian charity rather than from liberal, humanist ideas. In that light the Vatican's new policy towards the East should be appraised. The conciliatory initiatives of Pope Paul VI towards the Communist bloc and toward atheists (for example, the establishment of a Vatican secretariat for atheists) have been and are being made in the hope of reasserting the Church's universal role among nations to promote Christian love and establish lasting peace in the world.

1347
International Conference for Solidarity with the People of Vietnam Against U.S. Imperialist Aggression and for the Defence of Peace. [DOCUMENTS] Hanoi [Bureau of the International Conference, etc.] 1964. 459 p. illus.
DS557.A5A27, 1964

Reports and speeches delivered at the International Conference for Solidarity with the People of Vietnam against U.S. Imperialist Aggression and for the Defence of Peace, held in Hanoi, Nov. 25-29, 1964. Resolutions adopted by the Conference are included. Messages and speeches by Chou En-lai, Bertrand Russell, Ho Chi Minh, and others are reproduced in full.

1348
Jack, Homer A. TOWARD A U.S. PEACE MOVEMENT. War/peace report, v. 6, Jan. 1966: 14-16.
P&GP RR

Compares public efforts on behalf of civil rights and peace and attempts to explain why a U.S. "peace" movement has not materialized. Lack of agreement on limited goals, lack of a medium of communication, neglect of specialization by the various peace organizations, absence of a specific constituency, and competition among various peace groups are some of the major reasons for the failure of U.S. pacifists to make their efforts more universal.

1349
Lall, Betty (Goetz). INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AT THE WHITE HOUSE. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Feb. 1966: 41-43.
TK9145.A84, v. 22

Several good ideas, relating to "the unfinished business of the government, its citizens, and international institutions on international cooperation and U.S. foreign policy," can be found among the 30 reports given at the White House Conference on International Cooperation. While most of the recommendations were not revolutionary, they were positive, generating a feeling of good will "of the moderate and evolutionary type." The panel on communications came up with the best individual idea: a Voice of Peace, a new U.N.

agency to function as an information and communications center with broadcasting facilities. The committee on culture and intellectual exchange, in the same vein, suggested an "ear of America" to bring into the United States the cultural and artistic contributions of the rest of the world. A great variety of international organizations and conferences were suggested, ranging from an international river basin commission to a presidential commission on international youth affairs. Conventions in the fields of human rights, industry and trade, and space were recommended for ratification. Only the recommendations from the panels on arms control and disarmament and trade relate directly to U.S.-Soviet or Communist relations, while most of the other panels were concerned with the United States and the developing countries.

1350
Lambilliotte, Maurice. [FORCE AND ANXIETY] La force et l'angoisse. Synthèses, v. 20, Jan./Feb. 1966: 5-12. AP22.S9, v. 20

Can the present state of increasing world tensions, a growing force of destructive means, and inhumanity be viewed with a certain optimism? Yes, because "anxiety engendered by the dangers of force is revealing the advent of a new stage of civilization." Since the opening of the cold war, anxiety has played the role of a warning system and offered resistance to those who think only in terms of force and violence. Anxiety is an antitoxin to the forces of evil such as unlimited acceptance of the principle of violence. Geopolitical equilibria are important for peace but it is the psychological-psychic domain which is most relevant. The Americans (and other people as well) have become prisoners of a recourse-to-brutal-force psychosis. Very conscious of the effects of a nuclear war, the Russians are functioning as "the bastion of peace in a world which, in any other circumstance, would have already succumbed to a general war." Anxiety is not yet an effective brake to force ("man has not grown better"), but it is, at least, a power greater than simple fear, and one that may perhaps protect the "human" element in us. It is on men of great character that the "human" element must rely for survival. These will comprise a new aristocracy (not to include the politicians or technicians of today) that is disinterested, lacks pride, and instinctively uses an "intelligence of the heart" in place of a cold dialectic. These men exist or are evolving; widespread anxiety will compel the false leaders to make way for them.

1351
National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation. Committee for Research on the Development of International Institutions. REPORT. Washington, 1965. 26 p. P&GP RR

Prepared for presentation at the White House Conference on International Cooperation, Nov. 28-Dec. 1, 1965, Washington, D. C.

Reports results of commentary found and solicited from private and public sources on the research facilities of the United States Government for studying questions of war and peace. The consensus indicates "that our search for peace primarily consists of military preparation for ourselves and our allies." The exclusively military approach is not desirable. The correspondence indicates that the State Department and related agencies (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Agency for International Development, United States Information Service) receive some of the smallest allocations of research funds within the Government. These inadequate resources are not commensurate with the vast world responsibilities of the United States. The Committee recommends that the President establish a new commission comprised of representatives from all sectors to ascertain how to implement "the 'assignment of the century' through independent investigation, the marshaling of existing and the acquisition of new knowledge, and its application to national policy and the resolution of conflict." The report includes charts of research facilities and comparisons of the military and non-military allocation of research funds.

1352
National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation. Committee on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. REPORT. Washington, 1965. 28 p. P&GP RR

Prepared for presentation at the White House Conference on International Cooperation, Nov. 28-Dec. 1, 1965, Washington, D. C.

Emphasizes both the importance and difficulty of settling international disputes by peaceful means. The Committee suggests two lines of approach. The first would involve further development and refinement of United Nations procedures under the auspices of the General Assembly, a review of the Charter obligations and the use of the judicial method, and wider use of the International Court of Justice. The second approach would be to strive for conceptualization of the nature of disputes. This would be attempted through a dialogue between scholars, researcher-scientists, and government officials on the nature of conflict. The social science approach will enable man to classify the various types of conflict, and, coupled with the historical approach, will bring about a greater understanding of this area of international behavior. The Committee also recommends other research and lines of policy for the United States in this area.

1353
National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation. Committee on Science and Technology. REPORT. Washington, 1965. 39p. P&GP RR

Prepared for presentation at the White House Conference on International Cooperation, Nov. 28-Dec. 1, 1965, Washington, D. C.

Reviews some of the areas in which cooperation between scientists the world over is apparent, and cites another area--technology--where it is not apparent. Scientists have learned to exchange information and ideas, and to some extent this has cut across lines set by ideological and cultural differences. This has not been apparent in the field of technology, where there remains much to be done to match the freedom of exchange in the purely scientific fields of investigation. Through technological cooperation vast advantages could accrue, not only to the developed but the underdeveloped countries of the world, and a suitable basis would be established for achieving world peace.

1354
Noel-Baker, Philip. SCIENCE AND DISARMAMENT. Impact of science on society, v. 15, no. 4, 1965: 211-246. Q1.I4, v. 15

From the start of World War II, the application of scientific principles to the art of killing people has been a constantly accelerating process. Today more than half of America's scientists are engaged in military research; Great Britain employs fully 20 percent of its scientists on weaponry; and undoubtedly many

other nations allocate their scientific resources similarly. Technological innovation appears to bring about a new revolution in weaponry every 5 years; yet a substantial number of scientists believe that disarmament is only a chimera, that peace can best be preserved by weaponry. As one of their justifications they cite the alleged civil benefits of the arms race. But it is also clear that nuclear weapons add little to human progress. If a scientist responds to his government's invitation to participate in military research it is his duty to perform the best work he can. Like other civil servants, he is under the orders of those who make political decisions. Yet the scientist in military research has at his command so much knowledge of modern weapons that he is actually a part of the decisionmaking process. He is therefore obliged to warn the world of the dangers inherent in his weapons, to help end the arms race through devising the technical means of disarmament, and to help form a body of opinion favorable to disarmament. Even scientists not directly engaged in military research must use their expertise to promote peace. Scientists also share in the blame for "the use--or misuse--of language to obscure the realities of the present arms race and of nuclear war." Firstly they have caused confusion by using old strategic terms to describe nuclear concepts. Secondly they have invented a chilling new jargon. The terms "kiloton" and "megaton" obscure the actual destructive power of nuclear weapons. Even professionals tend to "think of kilotons as tons." Speaking of a bomb with the force of the Hiroshima weapon as a "nominal" bomb disguises its true nature; likewise, calling a 2-megaton bomb a "low-yield thermonuclear device" hides the reality that 2 megatons is "nearly double the explosive power of all the bombs dropped on Germany in six years of war." The concept of "tactical" nuclear weapons is equally horrendous. There are no "tactical" weapons when their average yield is 100 kilotons. The international scientific community has not totally ignored its responsibility. In America scientists from all over the world helped develop the atomic bomb, then proceeded to lobby firmly against its use. After the war's end they continued to advocate international control of atomic energy. However, they must do more. "Operation Vox Populi: The Challenge of the Peoples to Militarism and Death" must be launched. Eleven issues, including future weapons development, the danger of unintended war, the short-term effects of disarmament, and the like, should be studied by an international committee of scientists. A manifesto summarizing their opinions should be prepared, first to be endorsed en masse by scientists, and then to form the basis for a world petition in favor of general disarmament.

1355
Pax Christi. France. [TALKING TOGETHER FOR PEACE] En dialogue pour la paix. Paris, Éditions Pax Christi [1964] 180 p.
BT736.4.P38

Contents.--Principles and conditions for a "universalist dialogue," by Louis Lochet.--Psychological aspects of the dialogue, by A. de Peretti.--The scientific dialogue, by Father Dubarle.--The ecumenical dialogue, by Father Michalon.--The international dialogue, by Marcel Merle.--The European dialogue, by Philippe Farine.--The dialogue in international institutions, by J. Larnaud.

Seven papers treating the question of how to open a dialogue (among men and groups) that can contribute to a peaceful society. The first two discuss spiritual, moral, psychological, and sociological aspects of this proposed dialogue, while the remaining essays try to show where and how the dialogue can come about--between churches, between scientists, between the blocs and nations, and within international organizations.

1356
Pritchard-Jones, Hugh. END (EARTH'S NUCLEAR DETERRENT). Llandybïe [Wales] C. Davies [1965] 102 p.
JX1395.P67

Criticizes Britain's party system as leading to war. Pritchard-Jones feels that his country is being drawn by American "Usurpers"--the military-industrial complex--into policies not of Great Britain's own making. His mistrust of the present system extends to the concept of sovereignty, and it is his hope that all nuclear weapons will be turned over to a strengthened United Nations. These weapons, along with a well-trained international military body ("Life Guards"), will represent Earth's Nuclear Deterrent (END). Cambria (Wales) can provide the impetus for such a movement, since the "Cambrian Ethos" qualifies it "as a national standard-bearer of Goodwill and Truth in the family of Nations."

1357
Rabinowitch, Eugene. THE SCIENTIST IN POLITICS--THE PUGWASH CONFERENCES. In U.S. Foreign Service Institute. Science, technology and foreign affairs: report on the seminar held at the Foreign Service Institute, January 11 to February 5, 1965. Prepared by L. F. Andrieth [and] H. I. Chinn [Washington, 1965] p. 69-74.
Q127.U6A5334

Rapporteur: W. A. McFadden.

Gradual recognition is being given to the scientist's point of view in conducting foreign policy, in shaping disarmament positions, and in solving, among others, problems of automation, nuclear war, the population explosion, and genetics. While there will probably always be room for disagreement between diplomats and scientists on emphasis given political or scientific data, there is also wide latitude for cooperation and a need for scientists to assist in policymaking. The Pugwash Conferences have furthered the idea of cooperation among scientists and diplomats for the past decade. Pugwash was organized mainly to provide a forum in which Soviet and U.S. scientists could discuss disarmament. It is reasonable to assume that some of the changes in Soviet and U.S. attitudes on problems of arms control and disarmament have resulted from these open discussions. The participants in the conferences should be as independent of their governments as possible. The American scientists are more so than the Soviets, but even the latter have some freedom of thought. "Pugwash meetings are an attempt to establish communication between the intellectual elite of the participating countries on the scientific revolution." The Soviet representatives can act "as a conveyer belt" that introduces new ideas into the Soviet Union.

1358
Ricoeur, Paul. [FROM THE NATION TO HUMANITY: TASK OF CHRISTIANS] De la nation à l'humanité: tâche des chrétiens. Christianisme social, v. 73, Sept./Dec. 1965: 493-512.
HN30.C53, v. 73

We are living in an age of global consciousness that has its foundations in the universal applicability of technical-scientific achievements. Statesmen have a

common goal in the prevention of war. Decolonization and international organizations have introduced the political and psychological fiction of equality between nations. At last the world is capable of giving substance to the philosophic idea that mankind is one. "The foreign policy of all nations has become the domestic policy of humanity." But two types of obstacles block the translation of global awareness into global policies. The first are structural, deriving from centuries of evolution and practice. The principle of state sovereignty as developed in history, even though made less meaningful by discrepancies of power and interdependence, remains the dominant note in a complex world. A state is very often also a nation, the community to which men feel they belong. Nationalism seems to be growing stronger; Gaullism as an alternative to ideological identification is popular; national feeling protects the individual against the levelling anonymity of modern industrial society. The trend toward globalization encounters, secondly, obstacles depending on the circumstances of recent world politics. Economic and social disparities, the competition of revolutionary ideologies, the dissolution of bipolarity, the spread of nuclear weapons, and racism create disorder and divide humanity. Obstacles can be banished in time and it is the task of Christianity to speed this evolution. The Church must preach justice and equality to the world--defend humanity, denounce the obstacles that stand in its way, spur the conscience of the rich to aid the poor. A universalist theology must be clarified, showing that the Church too can overcome differences of nation, economic and social level, and ideology. And Christians must engage in this action through protest against divisive forces, the organization of meetings between the developed and underdeveloped, and via work with international organizations.

1359
Riedmatten, Henri de. [THE COUNCIL'S TEACHING ON WAR AND PEACE] L'enseignement du Concile sur la guerre et la paix. Études, Feb. 1966: 247-256.
AP20. E8, 1966

The last chapter of the Ecumenical Council's On the Church in the Contemporary World, devoted to the promotion of peace and an international society, is of great significance. Conflicting ideas were offered but the decisions reached were based on objective moral truths; they were not the result of tactical compromise. Central to the Council's thinking is a belief that the nature of contemporary war (new weapons, the danger of escalation, the uncertainty of the balance of terror) requires a new approach. Legitimate defense is still a right and a duty, but the unbridled use of armed power is another matter. The Council found it necessary to condemn indiscriminate and widespread destruction in war, but stopped short of proscribing the preparation of means that would permit such destruction. While the arms race was not denounced as "criminal" or "irresponsible," it was characterized as "one of the worst catastrophes of the epoch." The Fathers recognized the urgency of establishing a durable peace, yet they avoided facile exhortations (e.g., for unilateral disarmament). The chapter orders that everything be done to "attain a condition of disarmament that, upon the conclusion of concerted, progressive, and controlled steps, can become general." The responsibility for establishing peace bears on every individual as well as on every government. The document indicates that only the establishment of an international community can erase the deep causes of instability and war.

Christians cannot ignore the unjust economic gap between peoples. Other aspects of cooperation are treated, but the economic receives the most attention. Three facts about peace must be learned. Peace is not simply the absence of war; it is achieved by building a just world instead of preventing or minimizing conflicts. Peace is a dynamic concept and cannot be guaranteed by a static arrangement, such as a police force. Peace is the product of love and charity. In all, it is a work of justice.

1360
Ross, Sherwood. A WORLD MARSHALL PLAN. Progressive, v. 30, Apr. 1966: 26-30.
AP2. P8655, v. 30

Stresses that the survival of the world, rich and poor alike, hinges on the defeat of hunger and disease in the less fortunate areas of the world. Too much of the aid dispensed by the rich nations has political strings attached, and cannot meet the needs of the suffering millions. An international aid program, utilizing the facilities of already-established United Nations agencies is a possible solution. The recipient and giving nations can plan priorities together in an atmosphere bereft of political overtones. The money required for these programs is not as much as the $120 billion nations now spend on armaments in a given year. With the limited funds now available, the responsible United Nations agencies have brought relief to millions. Mankind can only stand to benefit from a Marshall Plan launched under United Nations auspices, and the time to start is now.

1361
Santa Ana, Julio de. [SOLIDARITY AND COOPERATION FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE: THE LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE] Solidarité et coopération pour la justice et la paix: perspective latino-américaine. Christianisme social, v. 73, Sept./Dec. 1965: 477-491.
HN30. C53, v. 73

Report presented to the advisory committee of the Christian Peace Conference, Budapest, 1965.

The absence of peace today is rooted in the conflict between economies in different stages of development. Peace is inseparable from justice, and the injustice of poverty creates a condition of ever-present, albeit stifled, violence in Latin America. The problem can be depicted in structural terms (rates of infant mortality, literacy, population growth, caloric consumption; raw materials prices; single export economies) and in terms of human misery. It is dramatized by the contrast between the huge sums spent on armaments and the infinitessimal effort devoted to easing the hunger and sickness of two-thirds of the world's population. Solidarity and cooperation for the goals of peace and justice can be sought between the underdeveloped countries, between rich and dependent economies, and between all men. Overcoming the many obstacles blocking regional integration of the developing economies is vital; i.e., the divisive forces of imperialist economic policies; the single-country-development policies of international organizations; domestic resistance to reform; paternalistic intervention in the development plans of dependent economies. Christians must try to understand, through international dialogue, the causes of international tensions and then must seek paths of reconciliation. Their task is to press for better commercial and aid relations between the rich and the poor, to stimulate worldwide anti-misery efforts, and to refrain from a priori opposition to third world revolutions. There are no easy or abstract solutions. Peace at any cost may block development; reforms to abolish unjust inequalities may unloose

terrible violence. Only if policies are founded on historical realities will the world be permitted to move in the direction of peace and greater justice.

1362
THE SECOND DUBLIN DECLARATION. World federalist, v. 11, Feb. 1966: 4-5.
JX1901.W825, v. 11

Gives a brief background note and the text of the "Declaration of the Second Dublin Conference," held in Dublin, N. H., October 1965. The first Dublin Conference was organized by Grenville Clark and Owen J. Roberts in 1945 to discuss the implications of the atomic bomb. The declaration of the first conference "anticipated . . . the main course of events during the next two decades." The second declaration calls for maintaining peace through an effective world organization. Universal disarmament and a world police force are also urged, as being requisite for world government.

1363
Sokolovskii, Pavel. [SOLIDARITY AND COOPERATION FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE] Solidarnost' i sotrudnichestvo dlia spravedlivosti i mira. In Orthodox Eastern Church, Russian. Patriarch. Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, no. 12, 1965: 42-48.
BX460.O7, 1965

Recounts the activities of the Consultative Committee of the Christian Peace Conference at a session held in Budapest, Oct. 13-17, 1965. As part of the general theme, "solidarity and cooperation for justice and peace," more than 200 representatives of 42 countries discussed broad problems of international peace and cooperation as well as specific security proposals, such as the Gomulka and Rapacki plans and the suggested nonaggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations.

1364
Symposium on Pacem in Terris by Pope John XXIII, University of Notre Dame, 1965. PROCEEDINGS. Edited by Mark J. Fitzgerald. [Notre Dame, Ind.] Dept. of Economics, University of Notre Dame [1965] 78 p. BX1793.A26S9, 1965

The proceedings of the symposium's panels on the general themes, "Building a Christian Civilization," and "Meeting Responsibilities in the Modern World." Specific topics discussed included the international common good, government and the economy, and cooperation among nations. The volume has a brief index.

1365
Thompson, Kenneth W. CHRISTIAN REALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY. Christianity and crisis, v. 26, Feb. 21, 1966: 25-26, 27-29.
BR1.C6417, v. 26

Advances a belief in the need for "judgement and restraint and a passionate devotion to peace even in the midst of conflict and war." The potential destructiveness of nuclear war and the present détente in U.S.-Soviet relations contribute toward a relaxation of cold war tensions. In the nuclear era leaders of powerful nations choose "realistic accommodation" when confronted with a conflict situation that might escalate into general war. Peaceful change and accommodation are instrumental in averting conflict. "Two factors have historically restrained men from imposing their imperfect versions of justice on others: the limits of influence and power, and the restraints of a higher order of justice." Such Christian realism in the conduct of foreign policy is the means to a peaceful world.

1366
Tillich, Paul. THE BASIS OF GENUINE HOPE FOR PEACE ON EARTH. Social progress, v. 55, May/June 1965: 16-20. BX8901.S6, v. 55
Address before the Pacem in Terris Convocation, Feb. 18, 1965, in New York City.

Views about the problem of peace are rooted in views of human nature. Man is essentially good, but under the conditions of his existence he is estranged from this goodness. What he actually does then is ambiguous--good and bad. "A realistic view of man and history needs not to lead to cynicism. But it may often ask for hope against hope, and certainly it demands the courage to risk, even if failure is more probable than success." Utopian hopes for peace founded on a universal law of progress and on man's increasing reasonableness have engendered skepticism. Every instance of historical and scientific progress has witnessed a corresponding evil, "which uses the good and distorts it," and the dark elements in man struggle against his reason--thus the "well-reasoned outbreak of destructive antirationality in Hitlerism and Stalinism." Yet bases for genuine hope exist where there is something present of that which is hoped for "as in the seed something of the coming plant is present." Today the world enjoys a limited peace, based on a community of fear (although this fear is still weaker than nationalism or ideology). Technically man is bringing himself closer to his fellow men, and although nearness can induce conflict, it can also have the opposite effect. Cooperation across national and ideological lines is increasing, and there is a legal cover for this cooperation. More than legality, however, peace requires a communal eros (love directed to a group) that transcends interest and law. We cannot hope for a final historical stage in which peace and justice reign but "we can hope for partial victories over the forces of evil in a particular moment of time."

1367
Tung, S. T. UNLEASH CHIANG KAI-SHEK NOW TO PREVENT WORLD WAR III. West & East, v. 10, Feb. 1965: cover verso-1.
P&GP RR

"A radio address from the Commonwealth Club of California."

Unless the United States unleashes Chiang Kai-shek upon Communist China, Asian Communists will win U.N. recognition for the Red Chinese regime, thereby acquiring a legal claim to Taiwan. When Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, and the other British and Portuguese colonies that were once Chinese territory have been taken, Chinese Communist prestige and morale will soar, encouraging Peking to initiate the conquest and communization of Asia and Africa. Then the United States will have to fight China in a full-scale war or face "a general and even more terrible holocaust later." If Chiang were allowed to invade the mainland, U.S. arms and equipment, not troops, would be needed. History demonstrates that in recent internal wars in China the victory has always gone to the smaller and weaker faction. The persecuted mainland masses will rise and help destroy their Communist enslavers. Russia will understand that Chiang's regime could hardly be a worse neighbor than Mao's and will refrain from intervention. The war in Vietnam is being waged in the wrong place and against the wrong people; were this war transferred to mainland China the Communists would find themselves fighting guerrillas, saboteurs, and revolutionaries, and expending their resources upon counterinsurgency and anti-inflation measures, as the South Vietnamese are

now doing. "We can accomplish this by unleashing Chiang Kai-shek. Let us unleash him without delay."

1368
V., V. EIGHT YEARS OF CND. Socialist standard, v. 62, Apr. 1966: 52-53.
HX3.S76, v. 62

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) is a lost cause based on the false assumption that banning the bomb would solve the problem of nuclear war. It began (February 1958) in a time of growing fear; its ranks were swelled with disparate groups, including anti-Soviet East Europeans, disgruntled "left-wingers," religious groups, anarchists, and middle class people who accepted the world as it was except for nuclear weapons. CND's platform was simply "Ban the Bomb." Many of its adherents did not even oppose conventional weapons. CND once claimed the allegiance of one-third of the British electorate. Today it is without a policy. "The initial idea of unilateralism has been replaced by policies which are extremely vague; its one-time adherents are hiving-off to the futility of reformist politics or to frustrated inactivity." Did CND accomplish anything in its 8 active years? The nuclear test cessation was not its doing, nor can it be credited with a special role in drawing attention to the horrors of the bomb; the bomb attracts its own attention. Were nuclear weapons abolished, nations would still possess the capacity to manufacture them, and, in a war situation, they would do so. "Always, there are groups in protest against some aspect or other of this social system. CND'ers come into this category. They leave intact the very thing which spawned nuclear weapons--the private property basis of Capitalism--so their cause is hopeless."

IV. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. GENERAL STUDIES

1369
Cosyns-Verhaegen, Roger. [GUERRILLA WARS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY; A STUDY] Guérillas du vingtième siècle; étude. Brussels, Les Ours, 1964. 74 ℰ. D431. C6

Case studies of the "principal actions of irregular armies in this century." Included are the Arab uprising under Feisal, the Irish Sinn Fein, the Red Guard in Petersburg (March 1917), the Spartacists in Berlin (1918-19), Mussolini's Black Shirts, Hitler's Sturm-Abteilung, the Spanish popular front, the French resistance (1940-44), Zionist guerrilla activities, the Chinese revolution, the Mau-Mau in Kenya, the 1956 Hungarian uprising, the Algerian war, and others. The political and historical context of these conflicts is emphasized.

1370
Laffin, John. JACKBOOT: THE STORY OF THE GERMAN SOLDIER. London, Cassell [1965] 237 p. illus., ports. DD101. L3
Bibliography: p. 223-226.

Traces the development of the German soldier and military philosophy from the time of Frederick the Great to the last great battles of the Second World War. Laffin asserts that the German is imbued with and glorifies war. The true German is a born soldier, and to him "peace is a suspension of the state of war. . . . One day the Germans will march again."

1371
Moscow. Institut mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii. Kafedra istorii mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii i vneshnei politiki SSSR. [HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE U.S.S.R., vol. 3, 1945-1963] Istoriia mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii i vneshnei politiki SSSR. Tom III. 1945-1963gg. Pod. red. V. G. Trukhanovskogo. Moskva, Izd-vo IMO, 1964. 902 p. DK66. M6, v. 3
Third volume of a trilogy on international relations and Soviet foreign policy, 1917-1963.

In the third volume the results of the Great Fatherland War of the Soviet Union and the Second World War are examined in full, as well as the great historical changes that took place on earth during the postwar period. This book elucidates in detail the struggle of the Soviet Union and the other Socialist states to exclude war from the life of society, for the peaceful coexistence of states with divergent social systems, and for general and complete disarmament under strict international control. Particular attention is given to international relations in the third stage of the general crisis of capitalism and also to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the period after the 20th Communist Party Congress. (Translation of supplied summary)

1372
Toscano, Mario. THE HISTORY OF TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. 685 p. D217. T613

Partial contents. --pt. 1. The documentary sources. --Memoirs as sources. --pt. 2. Publication of the sources. --Collections of treaties. --The colored books. --The collections of diplomatic documents relative to the origins of World War I. --The collections of diplomatic documents relative to World War II and its origins. --Memoir sources for World War I and its origins. --Memoir sources for World War II and its origins.

A bibliographical guide in essay form to the principal source materials available in the area of international relations. Each chapter deals with the origin and background of the documents as they relate to a period as well as with their content.

1373
Waterkamp, Rainer. [SOVIET CONCEPTS OF DISARMAMENT] Die Abrüstungskonzeptionen der Sowjets. Osteuropa, v. 16, Feb./Mar. 1966: 153-159. DR1. O8, v. 16

Reviews changes in Soviet disarmament strategy from the early thirties to the present. The author points out the diminishing trend in ideological dogmatism in the later Soviet positions on disarmament as compared to the earlier ones. However Communist doctrine, in defiance of political realities, still plays a major part in distracting the Soviet leadership from a more pragmatic attitude toward disarmament. On the basis of recent history Waterkamp concludes that each time the risk of a direct nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union increases (as now in Vietnam), both sides intensify their efforts toward preventing a world war and "shutting up the nuclear club."

B. THE BACKGROUND UP TO WORLD WAR I

C. THE INTERWAR PERIOD AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

D. THE POST-WORLD WAR II PERIOD AND THE UNITED NATIONS

1374
Akademiia Nauk SSSR. Institut istorii. [THE SOVIET UNION IN THE UNITED NATIONS] Sovetskii Soiuz v Organizatsii ob"edinennykh Natsii. Edited by I. G. Usachev. Moskva, Nauka, 1965. 2 v. JX1977. 2. R8A85

A history of Soviet participation in the United Nations since 1945. Soviet proposals concerning "peace, security, and the rights of peoples" receive particular attention. An extensive bibliography is given of Slavic and Western sources on the United Nations and major international problems.

1375
Australia. Dept. of External Affairs. VIET NAM SINCE THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENTS. Canberra, 1964. 93 p. (Its Select documents on international affairs, no. 1 of 1964) P&GP RR

Documents recording the progress of the Vietnam conflict since the conclusion of the Geneva Agreements of 1954.

1376
Bingham, June. U THANT: THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. New York, Knopf, 1966. 300 p.
D839.7.T5B5

A biography of the U.N. Secretary General that includes a good deal of Burmese as well as personal history.

1377
Eggleston, Wilfrid. CANADA'S NUCLEAR STORY. Toronto, Clarke, Irwin, 1965. 368 p. illus.
TK9026.E35

A history of nuclear research in Canada beginning with the first experimental work in nuclear fission, which was initiated in Ottawa in 1940. The scientific and engineering projects of the Chalk River nuclear laboratories are described in popular language. The development, activities, and operation of various Canadian nuclear power plants are discussed.

1378
Fontaine, André. [PANDORA'S BOX] La boîte de Pandore. Preuves, v. 16, Mar. 1966: 11-20.
AP20.P74, v. 16

Extracts from the first volume of André Fontaine's History of the Cold War (Histoire de la Guerre Froide, Fayard, 1966) on the effects of the atomic revolution. Fontaine traces U.S. scientific, military, and political opinion on the first use of atomic weapons, on global-control attempts (the Baruch Plan, the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, years of disarmament negotiation without result), and on national military programs and the McMahon Act. Also examined are the British decision to undertake an independent nuclear weapons program and the beginnings of the cold war. Regardless of whether the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings were criminal (many conventional air raids took more lives), Fontaine feels it was "a serious error to open Pandora's box without being sure it could be closed again." President Truman admitted that to introduce atomic weapons into a world without law would be too dangerous. And who knew better than he that the world was lawless? Even if atomic weapons had never been used, however, they would probably not have stayed undeveloped. Of all the startling technological and social changes in the postwar world none has had the significance of "the discovery which conferred upon man . . . the key to almost unlimited destruction and creativity."

1379
Kelen, Emery. HAMMARSKJÖLD. New York, Putnam's [1966] 316 p.
D839.7.H3K4

A biography of the former U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. Hammarskjöld's attitudes toward and activities in behalf of peacekeeping, disarmament, and the rule of international law receive some elucidation.

1380
Palfrey, John G. LAW AND SCIENCE IN NUCLEAR ENERGY. Nuclear energy, Feb. 1966: 46-50.
TK9001.N73, 1966

Presented at the Third Annual Meeting of the International Academy of Law and Science, London, July 19-20, 1965.

A capsule picture of the evolution of law and science in the field of atomic energy over the past 20 years. The author covers the following three points: "Certain characteristics of the law of atomic energy in the United States; Representative problems of law and science in the atomic field; Collaboration of lawyers and scientists in the atomic field." Civil or peaceful uses of nuclear energy are emphasized except for brief references to the nuclear test ban treaty and the weapons production responsibilities of the Atomic Energy Commission.

V. GENERAL ANALYSES AND BASIC APPROACHES

A. GENERAL ANALYSES

1381
Chalfont, Lord. DIMENSIONS OF VIOLENCE. Listener, v. 75, Jan. 20, 1966: 83-85.
AP4. L4165, v. 75

First of two articles on "Nuclear Weapons and World Power."

Possession by the two principal powers of the means to destroy each other has led to a tacitly accepted balance in which economic, psychological, and political pressures have become more significant extensions of national policy than armed force. A basic element in this new relationship is that each step in the progressive application of military might must be taken at the highest political level. Nothing has really changed, however, except the techniques of applying military strength. Governments have made no radically new approach to the underlying problems of power. The churches have been no more effective than the strategists and the protest movements in altering basic attitudes toward armed force. To be sure the strategists have devised doctrines, methods of control, and force structures that have reduced the danger of war starting by mechanical accident or political miscalculation. The protest movements have seen some of their ideas gain political and even governmental respectability. The awakening interest of the churches in political-military dilemmas of nuclear power still awaits full assessment. Even so, if the present balance of nuclear power is regarded as intolerable, and if, as seems clear, the abolition of nuclear weapons per se will achieve naught, what is to be done?

1382
Chalfont, Lord. THE EIGHTEEN NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE--MOST SUITABLE PLACE FOR TALKS. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Feb. 5, 1966: 4-5. D839. R4, v. 17

One of a series of articles by government officials on the U. N. resolution to convene a World Disarmament Conference.

The complexity of disarmament problems precludes any easy or rapid solution. In view of the significant advances already made at Geneva, however, the United Kingdom is confident that disarmament and a world ruled by international law will be achieved. Because of the political, military, and technical difficulties of disarmament negotiation, it is unlikely that the World Disarmament Conference, on account of its size, will have important results. But if it succeeds in introducing China to disarmament discussions, "then it could hardly fail to do good." Which measures must be adopted as soon as possible? Certainly a treaty that prohibits proliferation of nuclear weapons must be given top priority. Extension of the nuclear test ban treaty to underground testing "would be an important measure of disarmament in its own right and one which would also make a constructive contribution to the non-proliferation issue," although the problem of positive verification has yet to be resolved. President Johnson's proposal to freeze nuclear delivery vehicles "might be combined with the destruction of some of these weapons." Any proposals that the World Disarmament Conference may later be able to submit concerning these vital issues will be welcomed by the British Government.

1383
Chalfont, Lord. PROSPECTS OF PEACE. Listener, v. 75, Jan. 27, 1966: 119-120, 139.
AP4. L4165, v. 75

Second of two articles on "Nuclear Weapons and World Power."

The heart of the nuclear weapons problem is the fact that the balance of power between the Soviet Union, the United States, and their alliances will not be the decisive configuration in the pattern of world power 10 or 15 years from now. The potential Chinese threat to the precarious and delicate international balance that exists today is only one aspect of a short-term danger that must be dealt with at once: an uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons about the world accompanied by a geometrical increase in the danger of nuclear war and by the diversion of substantial economic and technical resources, in the developing countries, to nuclear weapons production. The nuclear states will have to offer powerful incentives to persuade nonnuclear nations to subscribe to self-denying ordinances. The present members of the atomic club must effectively assure nonmembers they will be safe even if they deny themselves the option of a national nuclear striking force. Concomitantly the status of nuclear weapons will have to be systematically reduced, and the nonnuclear countries will have to exercise the sort of voice in world politics that makes nuclear threats unnecessary and demonstrably false. Moreover the nuclear powers must give some sign that they are prepared to stop adding to their own stockpiles and developing bigger and better delivery systems. A critical prerequisite to these steps is that the Soviet Union and the West extricate themselves from their familiar cold war postures; this they must do soon enough to find common ground on which to approach to the power problems of the next 15 to 20 years. Possibly the logical first step in this process is to accept the realities of Chinese power and to draw Peking into the whole complex of international negotiations. In the long run general and complete disarmament "must be a fundamental article of policy" even if nuclear weapons are kept under control for a few decades. Before effective disarmament on any large scale becomes possible, however, a revolution in political thought must bring about not only a greater morality in international affairs but a reevaluation of the political philosophy that underlies the concept of the nation state.

1384
David, Vaclav. PARTIAL MEASURES--THE BASIS FOR ACTUAL DISARMAMENT. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Feb. 5, 1966: 5-6.
D839. R4, v. 17

One of a series of articles by government officials on the U. N. resolution to convene a World Disarmament Conference.

Czechoslovakia resolutely supports the convocation of a World Disarmament Conference and trusts that those who have initiated this proposal will, through their cooperation, hasten progress toward disarmament. Although general and complete disarmament remains the purpose of negotiation, Western attitudes militate against immediate implementation of that concept. Accordingly the adoption of partial disarmament measures becomes of great importance. Partial, limited measures should aim at an immediate improvement of the world situation and should, therefore, "not be connected with the settlement of other complicated questions, primarily of those related to providing secure and effective control." The most efficacious of partial measures would be prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, liquidating foreign bases (which "serve as a foot-hold for aggressive actions against sovereign states and national liberation movements, and represent a dangerous source of tension in the relations among peoples"), and agreeing not to use atomic weapons. The forthcoming World Disarmament Conference should find ways to achieve these realistic partial measures and "deliberate on the disarmament problem in its widest implications." By influencing the international atmosphere the Conference may breathe new life into the drive for general and complete disarmament and free disarmament negotiations from the impasse created by the intransigence of the Western powers.

1385
Dean, Arthur H. DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL. In his Test ban and disarmament: the path of negotiation. New York, Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Row [1966] (Policy book series of the Council on Foreign Relations) p. 63-80.
JX1974.7.D4

An adaptation of this chapter appeared under the title "The War on Weapons" in Saturday Review, Mar. 19, 1966: 23-25, 89. Z1219.S25

Although three limited arms control matters were agreed upon in 1963, and the following year saw some progress made through the mutual example of states, general and complete disarmament remains "a far-off will-o'-the-wisp." To understand the realities of disarmament negotiation, four basic points must be accepted: "1) The essential foundation for negotiation on arms control and disarmament is respectable military strength on both sides; 2) Disarmament is as much a function of national security as is armament; 3) Limited measures may open the way to general disarmament, while being of value in themselves; 4) There is no reason to assume that disarmament in and of itself will bring with it the disappearance of conflict any more than did the defeat of the Axis powers." There would be no discussions at Geneva were not both the United States and the Soviet Union (and their allies) concerned by the military threat posed by the other. Unilateral or inequitable disarmament measures would probably lead to the political defeat of the weakened member and perhaps greater danger to world peace. Points agreed upon by all negotiators must comprise the limited measures that may lead to a more comprehensive solution. When such diversely powerful states as Communist China, the Soviet Union, and the United States are compared, how can the differences among them be balanced upon the scales of disarmament? How can an international peacekeeping force be created strong enough to counter any combination of world powers, and yet be "kept from becoming the most powerful organization in the world?" Is disarmament then possible only under the sponsorship of a world government? Soviet disarmament proposals have emphasized state sovereignty and disregarded Western attempts to provide for new peacekeeping institutions. The Soviet draft treaty "shows an impatient drive for measures which would immediately put the West at a military disadvantage." It is founded upon tactics so obviously aimed at destroying the effectiveness of NATO that James J. Wadsworth could term Soviet arms control measures "part of a grand strategy aimed at the eventual total defeat of the other side." These and other differences demonstrate why the talks at Geneva have been tedious and unproductive. Still, some measure of agreement on disarmament may unexpectedly be reached. In the meantime, "something may be learned in the process of analysis and talking."

1386
Dean, Arthur H. TEST BAN AND DISARMAMENT: THE PATH OF NEGOTIATION. New York, Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Row [1966] 153 p. (Policy book series of the Council on Foreign Relations) JX1974.7.D4
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents. --Disarmament and diplomacy. --Verification and inspection. --Disarmament and arms control [abstracted elsewhere this issue]. --Nuclear test-ban treaty. --Points of emphasis. --The urgent future. --Note on earthquakes and underground explosions.

Aims at demonstrating that there can be no easy or quick way to achieve general and complete disarmament--that many problems of arms reduction, inspection and verification, and relations in a disarmed world must first be resolved through patient negotiation. Mr. Dean emphasizes the urgency of halting the arms race, preventing diffusion of nuclear weapons, and achieving a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty within an effective verification and identification system. He cites instances of international negotiation concerning the nuclear test ban and other disarmament measures to illustrate the complexities of disarmament diplomacy. On the problem of nonproliferation, more frequent and more accurate inspection of world nonmilitary nuclear production is urged, "with a prompt triggering of IAEA sanctions" in case nuclear material is diverted to military use. Proposals for the creation of a European nuclear-free zone will be infeasible until the western territories of the Soviet Union are included in the arrangement. The concept of a multilateral nuclear force or something similar must be reevaluated to determine whether the political advantage to be realized from such an arrangement is worth sacrificing accord with the Soviet Union on adoption of a nonproliferation treaty. "No matter how one puts it, it seems to me that there is a deep contradiction between our professions on the extreme importance of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and our proposals for further nuclear sharing in NATO." If the desire to stem proliferation is paramount in U.S. policy, "we should look for other effective ways to organize Western defense and still achieve the political purposes that lay behind the MLF proposals."

1387
DISARMAMENT AND THE TWENTIETH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 18, Jan. 1966: 21-24.
JX351.A3, v. 18

Summarizes General Assembly discussions and actions on the following aspects of disarmament: nonproliferation, the convening of a world disarmament conference, nuclear weapons testing, nuclear-free zones, and general and complete disarmament.

1388
DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS: DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAST TWELVEMONTH. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 17, Aug. 1965: 334-346. JX351.A3, v. 17

Reports the activities of the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference, the 19th session of the U.N. General Assembly, and the U.N. Disarmament Commission, and sets forth the Canadian position on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through excerpts from speeches by Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin.

1389
Gasteyger, Curt. THE PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 46, Jan. 1966: 23-29. Z6723.U35, v. 46

Arms and peace are not inextricably linked. Disarmament--the reduction or elimination of armaments, unilaterally or multilaterally, and with or without control agreements--has recently been supplemented by the concept of arms control--those measures that "regulate or limit armaments as to size, type, deployment, or use." Achieving disarmament as a long-term goal is likely to be quite difficult. Even as collateral a measure as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty appeared fraught with troublesome political implications. Informal arms control measures, such as the simultaneous unilateral announcement of fissionable-materials production on the part of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, can be achieved somewhat more readily, but they tend to mislead the public as to the extent of tension reduction in the cold war and to distract attention from the real difficulties of disarmament. Moscow tends to turn such high public expectation to its own advantage. Increasingly disarmament is the province of the two superpowers, with the interests of the other nations inadequately treated. The current Soviet-American nuclear balance, which is keeping the peace, is one that is very sensitive to "all disarmament measures which do not adequately consider the security interests of either side or are not comprehensive enough to make allowances for the political and military changes which must be expected." Mutual restraint in weapons development can alleviate this problem, but problems created by the spread of nuclear weapons will be more difficult to solve. National arms limitations, a type of self-control, are something of a stabilizing factor but serve to create conditions favorable for "subconventional wars." Regional arms control measures can generally check this trend. In Europe, however, the situation is still more complicated. Arms control based on disengagement has been the goal, but the presence of the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe may well be the only practical basis for European stability, whether it be approached through a flexible defense plan or nuclear guarantees alone. Solving the pressing political problems of the day is the prerequisite for disarmament and peace.

1390
Haekkerup, Per. AGREEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS--THE MOST URGENT ISSUE. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Jan. 20, 1966: 2-3. D839.R4, v. 17

One of a series of articles by government officials on the U.N. resolution to convene a World Disarmament Conference.

The Government of Denmark believes that a well-prepared World Disarmament Conference in which all nations participate can make an important contribution to progress toward disarmament. If measures are to be implemented, it is also essential that the five nuclear powers play an active role. "A world disarmament conference will not render the existing negotiating machinery superfluous and it may add new impulses to the international negotiations for disarmament." Unless the proliferation of nuclear arms is halted, numerical increase of nuclear powers may further narrow the possibility of achieving disarmament and lead to international anarchy. A comprehensive test ban treaty may serve as an indirect nonproliferation measure. "No matter how the problem is attacked, the decisive issue is to get the nuclear weapons under control."

1391
Hakim, George. FRANCE AND CHINA SHOULD BE REPRESENTED. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Mar. 5, 1966: 6. D839.R4, v. 17

One of a series of articles by government officials on the U.N. resolution to convene a World Disarmament Conference.

The Government of Lebanon supports the proposed World Disarmament Conference and will work to secure profitable agreements, "even if these agreements are limited to certain points only." All nations, and especially France and China, should participate in the Conference. Preliminary measures conducive to moral and spiritual disarmament should be adopted; among these making peace in troubled areas (Vietnam, Rhodesia, Kashmir, etc.) is particularly important. The pressing issues of disarmament are the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the gradual elimination of existing nuclear stockpiles. Nations opting for denuclearization should be supported. Important partial measures should include an underground test-ban treaty and an agreement by nonnuclear states to neither produce nor accept nuclear weapons and by the nuclear powers not to assist in other states' acquisition. "It seems to me also desirable for the nuclear powers to reach, as soon as possible, agreements which would put an end to the production of fissionable material for military use, and to set up a blocade, in numbers and in characteristics, of the vectors of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons."

1392
Jack, Homer A. TOWARD A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Feb. 20, 1966: 6-7. D839.R4, v. 17

Reviews the background, formulation, and intention of the proposal to convene a World Disarmament Conference adopted at the 20th General Assembly of the United Nations. The debate on participation in the Conference, its agenda, timing, and relationship to the United Nations and the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee is summarized. The author thinks Communist China may be seated in the United Nations before the Conference convenes. "Then perhaps a world conference could be held under the auspices of the UN Disarmament Commission, with special provisions for the attendance of divided countries, and at a special site to give disarmament the impetus it surely deserves."

1393
Kaine, Henri. SIGNIFICANT ROLE OF THE SMALL COUNTRIES. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Feb. 20, 1966: 5. D839.R4, v. 17

One of a series of articles by government officials on the U.N. resolution to convene a World Disarmament Conference.

Convocation of a World Disarmament Conference indicates the concern felt by all nations concerning the threat to human existence. The Government of Uganda

hopes that the summoning of a conference will impress upon the great powers the magnitude of that threat. Whenever sensitive issues are at stake, East-West communication is disrupted by ideological differences. "In these circumstances, the presence of the smaller powers is beneficial for such Conferences because it tends to inject some sanity in the otherwise ideologically-ridden proceedings." The Conference should adopt preventive measures (nonproliferation, denuclearization, prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons) before seeking curative measures (general and complete disarmament, withdrawal from foreign bases). Uganda cannot accept the American argument that elimination of foreign bases would upset the balance of power; in the nuclear age such an argument is meaningless. "We believe that withdrawal of military bases from foreign bases would greatly reduce the tension between the Big Powers which would in turn make for more meaningful negotiations."

1394
Kantol, Norodom. POOR PROSPECTS. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Feb. 20, 1966: 4-5.
D839.R4, v. 17

One of a series of articles by government officials on the U.N. resolution to convene a World Disarmament Conference.

The Government of Cambodia considers the proposed World Disarmament Conference "a worthy framework for finding a satisfactory solution to the problem of disarmament." Still, political considerations and international rivalries greatly reduce the likelihood of achieving success through such a conference. The probable absence of China and France from the proceedings also forebodes an unfavorable outcome. As Prince Sihanouk has stated, disarmament must be total and controlled by a neutral commission formed from among the nonalined nations. Events in Southeast Asia demonstrate how essential to disarmament is the elimination of conventional armaments. "The world conference on disarmament should primarily devote itself to the abolition of every kind of military aid, to the destruction of the existing war machines, to the reduction of military forces and finally to the elimination of all military bases."

1395
Kreisky, Bruno. NOT TO YIELD TO RESIGNATION. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Jan. 20, 1966: 3.
D839.R4, v. 17

One of a series of articles by government officials on the U.N. resolution to convene a World Disarmament Conference.

Mankind must not, the Austrian Government feels, yield to resignation because of the failure of disarmament discussions to date. "Although disarmament requires understanding on a global basis, I think that at the present moment we should try to achieve progress by applying the method of partial solutions." The most important partial disarmament measures are an agreement prohibiting underground nuclear tests and an arrangement concerning the nonproliferation of nuclear arms.

1396
Kyprianou, Spyros. APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR FRUITFUL NEGOTIATIONS. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Mar. 20, 1966: 5-6.
D839.R4, v. 17

One of a series of articles by government officials on the U.N. resolution to convene a World Disarmament Conference.

Cyprus agrees that the proposed World Disarmament Conference will provide "the appropriate forum" for negotiation by all nuclear powers toward ending the arms race. The agenda should encourage efforts toward general and complete disarmament under strict international control but should not neglect collateral disarmament measures. Measures such as a ban on nuclear proliferation, application of the Moscow test-ban treaty to all states, and extension of that treaty to underground nuclear testing "could be implemented even in the absence of a breakthrough in regard to the wider issues of general and complete disarmament." Denuclearization of certain regions also "appears to offer promising possibilities."

1397
Luns, J. M. A. H. TO HELP THE 18 NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Mar. 20, 1966: 5.
D839.R4, v. 17

One of a series of articles by government officials on the U.N. resolution to convene a World Disarmament Conference.

The Government of the Netherlands regards the envisaged World Disarmament Conference as an expedient way to bring all nuclear powers to the conference table, to acquaint a greater number of governments with the intricacies of promoting general and complete disarmament, and to breathe new life into the negotiations of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). The Conference should accord top priority to the problem of nuclear proliferation, although the ENDC remains the "most appropriate forum" for debating general disarmament and partial measures. "The proposed World Disarmament Conference could best help the work of the ENDC by expressing its opinion concerning the order of urgency in which solutions for the problems of disarmament should be sought and concerning the main principles on which such solutions should be based."

1398
Martin, Paul. CAREFUL AND THOROUGH PREPARATIONS. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Feb. 20, 1966: 3-4. D839.R4, v. 17

One of a series of articles by government officials on the U.N. resolution to convene a World Disarmament Conference.

The Canadian Government agrees with the Secretary General of the United Nations that proliferation of nuclear weapons is the most urgent question of the day. Canada regrets the Soviet refusal to discuss the U.S. draft treaty on nonproliferation and finds Soviet objection to European participation in nuclear deterrence unreasonable. "While the European members of the North Atlantic Alliance are under the threat of potential nuclear attack themselves, it cannot be argued that they should have no right to participate in decisions on how such an attack is to be deterred." Also unreasonable is the expectation that nonnuclear states will renounce acquisition of the weapons as long as the existing nuclear powers continue the unrestrained production and stockpiling of nuclear devices. Perhaps the geographical position and seismic detection facilities of Canada will allow its scientists to develop more reliable detection methods, thereby making a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty more feasible. Finally, careful and thorough preparations must precede the World Disarmament Conference. "It is the view of the Canadian Government that the agreed principles adopted by the Assembly in 1962 should continue to govern discussions at the World Disarmament Conference."

1399
Nikezić, Marko. DISARMAMENT--GUARANTEE OF PEACE AND SECURITY. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Jan. 20, 1966: 1-2.
D839.R4, v. 17

One of a series of articles by government officials on the U.N. resolution to convene a World Disarmament Conference.

The U.N. resolution to convene a World Disarmament Conference inspires hope that mankind is beginning to realize that armaments threaten its very existence and provide, even for the most highly armed nations, no real security. All nations must approach the Conference with the awareness that disarmament offers the sole guarantee of security. The Yugoslav Government encourages existing disarmament bodies to continue their work, for "it is difficult to expect results from the conference if the wish to prepare its success does not prevail at the negotiations" already in progress. The Conference should strive toward general and complete disarmament by adopting those partial measures that can initiate the disarmament process. Partial measures on which agreement is already possible should not be postponed until the Conference convenes. "Among all these measures, the agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear arms and the ban of underground tests would certainly contribute most to create conditions for the World Conference to attain crucial successes."

1400
Nilsson, Torsten. AN ATTEMPT WHICH MERITS SINCERE EFFORTS. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Mar. 5, 1966: 6. D839.R4, v. 17

One of a series of articles by government officials on the U.N. resolution to convene a World Disarmament Conference.

The Government of Sweden finds the significance of the forthcoming World Disarmament Conference in the opportunity it provides for states hitherto absent to participate in disarmament negotiations and the work of the United Nations. "In view of the difficult and delicate negotiations which are doubtless required before a world disarmament conference could be realized it seems premature to point to any special problem which before others should be given priority at such a conference. It would also seem to be mainly a task for the main powers especially those with nuclear capacity to seek agreement on the agenda for the conference."

1401
[PEACE CAMPAIGNS AND INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIZATION] Campagnes de paix et démocratisation internationale. Projet, n.s. no. 2, Feb. 1966: 129-132.
HN37.C3A46, 1966

Whatever comes of peace efforts, the war in Vietnam will have signaled the end of the postwar era and the beginning of a new system of international relations that is characterized by a dispersion of power. China was the moving force; the West is now divided; and everywhere a drive for disengagement, nonalinement, and independence is manifesting itself. Regional and continental alliances will be founded less on collective security and military coercion and more on peaceful coexistence and economic development. Democratization of international society is destroying "sacred ideological alliances." Vietnam, where the strong will not leave the weak in peace, demonstrates the still-fragile hold of international democracy. But the furor this war has raised is an indication of progress. A foreign policy that "aims at undoing monolithism in blocs and increasing relations with each and every state" is a step toward peace.

1402
Schelling, Thomas C. PERSPECTIVE ON DISARMAMENT. Disarmament, no. 9, Mar. 1966: 11-13.
JX1918.P7D5, 1966

It is not surprising that conclusion of the 1963 nuclear test ban treaty "seems not so much to have opened an era of arms negotiation as to have brought one to a close." Conclusion of the treaty reversed the momentum toward disarmament by removing "a provocative symbol of the arms race." Relaxation of the momentum toward disarmament is probably beneficial in that it compels the Soviets to acknowledge the U.S. position that preoccupation with the ultimate goal--general and complete disarmament--need not preclude the adoption of immediate, practical steps. The U.S. proposal for an armaments "freeze" is an important disarmament measure in itself, for curtailment of the arms build-up may lead to a plateau of great value for negotiations. The present lull in weapons acquisition may be due to the unevenness of technological progress. If this de facto freeze can be combined with a desire to avoid future aggravation of the arms competition, an opportunity for a negotiated freeze on weapons development may be created. When relaxation of the arms race happens of its own accord, negotiated understandings, although less urgent, become more feasible. Perhaps now "may be an opportune time to negotiate an agreement that can outlast the momentary lull." Although the arms control measures adopted to date are modest, it does not seem that the arms race has outstripped arms control, making the earth more dangerous each new year. But professional interest in arms control has lessened since reaching its peak in 1960-61. This diminution has been occasioned by the absence of urgency, excitement, and real progress at disarmament negotiations; and by the fact that the more obvious solutions have now been uncovered. Also, many who were first attracted to arms control activities by the excitement of the 1958 surprise-attack negotiations at Geneva have found security policy in general a more promising area for pursuing stability and peace. In the meantime, however, interest in arms control may have penetrated to the military establishments of both the United States and the Soviet Union and altered the military approach to strategy to the extent that a real dialogue between the superpowers has become possible. "I believe that there has been intellectual progress, of a kind that is unlikely to be reversed."

1403
Slim, Mongi. DISCONTINUING ALL NUCLEAR TESTS. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Feb. 5, 1966: 7-8. D839.R4, v. 17

One of a series of articles by government officials on the U.N. resolution to convene a World Disarmament Conference.

The Government of Tunisia considers the forthcoming World Disarmament Conference an attempt by the small and developing nations to present their views on international security, aggression, the drive for hegemony, and peace before the nuclear powers. The Conference must first secure agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear testing. "This would be the best proof the great powers could offer the public opinion of their genuine desire to overcome the differences springing from their economic systems and political perspectives." Military research on nuclear energy should be directed toward peaceful purposes. A treaty providing

for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the creation of denuclearized zones would greatly advance the cause of disarmament. "The increase in the number of the de-nuclearized zones would enable us to reach complete de-nuclearization in the world, if in addition to it a first step was made in spite of hesitations and delays, towards general and complete disarmament--the destruction of the existing nuclear arms." Total disarmament can only be reached when the nuclear powers agree to demonstrate their desire for peace by ridding the world of the instruments of mass destruction.

1404
Timberlake, Clare H. SOME FIRST STEPS TO CONTAIN THE NUCLEAR THREAT. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Mar. 5, 1966: 3-5.
D839.R4, v. 17

One of a series of articles by government officials on the U.N. resolution to convene a World Disarmament Conference.

The vast good that nuclear energy promises for mankind will be realized only if man can check the enormous destructive power of the atom. In the first 20 years of the atomic age the disease of nuclear threat has become acute, with the dangers of proliferation bringing its progress to a crisis. As the number of nations with a nuclear capability increases, the probability of "triggering a nuclear conflict will be multiplied many times more than the number of nations possessing such arms." By 1970 nuclear reactors throughout the world will yield enough plutonium to produce 1,700 nuclear weapons. In an attempt to regulate this situation the United States has proposed a treaty against the proliferation of nuclear devices, an international safeguards system for peaceful nuclear development, and a comprehensive test ban treaty that would inhibit development of atomic weapons by non-nuclear states. Along with these measures other steps must be taken, including reduction of nuclear stockpiles, a freeze upon delivery vehicles, and the like. The United States hopes that the Soviet Union and all responsible nations will promptly act to establish effective controls over nuclear weapons.

B. APPROACHES AND PROPOSALS

1. Comprehensive Measures and Proposals

1405
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT. UN monthly chronicle, v. 3, Jan. 1966: 17-21.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 3

A report on the U.N. General Assembly's consideration of the resolution on general and complete disarmament (GCD), adopted Dec. 3, 1965. The resolution asks the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue efforts toward GCD and collateral measures, to accept all disarmament documents and records of the First Committee, and to "resume its work as early as possible and to report to the General Assembly, as appropriate, on the progress achieved." The text of the resolution is included.

1406
Mikhailov, Y. FIFTH YEAR AT GENEVA (18-NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE RESUMES WORK) International affairs (Moscow) no. 3, Mar. 1966: 43-45.
D839.I465, 1966

As the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee begins its fifth year of negotiation at Geneva, mankind enters the 21st year of nuclear terror. The threat of nuclear destruction has become so much a part of modern life that politicians can enjoy new success in persuading mankind that life under impending universal annihilation is normal, that the fate of mankind is preordained and cannot be altered by human efforts. This attitude is obvious in the resistance of imperialist circles to the implementation of concrete disarmament measures. The imperialist forces, notably the U.S. Government, are thrown into confusion whenever the Soviet Union presents its proposals for general and complete disarmament (as it has done since the days of Lenin). Total disarmament, the capitalists argue, "is not such an urgent problem but merely a theoretical issue of the distant future not worth wasting any time on." The Soviet delegation at Geneva has in recent months called for a ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and a ban on underground nuclear testing. Be it noted, however, that the Soviet Union "has proposed this step by step approach only because the United States and the NATO Powers supporting it are still unwilling to accept a radical and immediate solution of this issue." This year the NATO countries bring no new proposals to Geneva. President Johnson's address to the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee on January 27 expresses no willingness to agree to general and complete disarmament and no readiness to accept any of the more limited Soviet proposals. It is significant that the neutralist members of the Committee have shown great interest in all of the Soviet suggestions. More and more peoples throughout the world will join the struggle for disarmament, a movement "indissolubly bound up with the struggle against imperialism, against aggression and for peace and progress."

1407
Walch, John W. SUPPLEMENT ON WEAPONS CONTROL. Portland, Me. [1965] 101 p.
JX1974.7.W3

Abstracts of affirmative and negative evidence on the national debate proposition for the 1964-65 school year: "Resolved: That Nuclear Weapons Should be Controlled by an International Organization." A "Who's Who of Authorities" and a bibliography of recent materials on nuclear weapons control are provided.

2. Noncomprehensive Measures and Proposals

a. REGIONAL

1408
Germany (Democratic Republic, 1949-) Staatsrat. SIX-POINT PLAN FOR GERMAN AGREEMENT. Democratic German report, v. 15, Jan. 21, 1966: 1.
DD261.D3, v. 15

Text of the East German State Council's plan for tension relaxation in Central Europe as "announced by Walter Ulbricht in a New Year Speech on GDR radio and television on December 31st."

"The State Council of the German Democratic Republic makes the following suggestions to the newly-elected Bundestag of the West German Federal Republic": (1) renunciation by both German states of nuclear arms and nuclear-arms sharing; (2) recognition by both states of the existing frontiers in Europe; (3) establishment, by the German Federal Republic, of diplomatic relations with all Warsaw Pact nations, and by the German Democratic Republic with all NATO nations; (4) declaration by

both states of their readiness to negotiate German disarmament; (5) renunciation by both states of "all measures, laws and decrees" impeding the realization of German reunification; (6) negotiation by both German states aimed at normalization of their mutual relations.

1409
POLICY BY ARMS. New outlook, v. 9, Feb. 1966: 5-7. P&GP RR

Reprinted from Al Amishmar (Tel Aviv), Jan. 7, 1966. AP58.B8A5

The great powers are heightening tension in the Middle East with their continued arms shipments to these countries. Not only does the arms race increase the danger of a military clash, it obviates any hope of relaxation and a mutually conciliatory attitude. "The removal of the Middle East, and especially the Israeli-Arab parts, from the sphere of arms competition is a pre-condition to any peaceful solution to the present conflict." Peace moves are being explored elsewhere in the world, for example in Tashkent and Vietnam. In this spirit an initiative by Israel to keep nuclear weapons out of the area would offer a chance for Middle Eastern peace negotiations.

1410
Rapacki, Adam. SOME PROBLEMS OF SECURITY IN EUROPE. In International Institute for Peace, Vienna. Active co-existence, no. 6, Dec. 1965: 1-8. P&GP RR

"Lecture delivered at the University in Brussels on February 15th, 1965." Reprinted from Polish Reports, no. 2, 1965. P&GP RR

The most important international development of the last decade is the serious crisis of "the policy from the position of strength," a crisis caused by, among other factors, the United States loss of nuclear dominance. That loss, along with the world's growing realization of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war, has prompted many a Western statesman to sincerely favor a more sensible course. Thus "a new policy seems to be paving the way for itself," a policy attuned to historical processes (as evaluated by scientific analysis) and realistic goals rather than one given to spontaneity, "poker play" with mankind's fate, and illusionary goals. The most reasonable course this policy can take is peaceful coexistence, viz "peaceful competition linked with peaceful cooperation." Some powerful circles keep sticking, however, to the ineffective methods of "policy from the position of strength" in the futile hope that it will once again be a viable policy. This is most sharply reflected in Europe, where the arms race "creates eo ipso" the danger of a world war and complicates all European problems, "making each of them assume the dimensions of a problem of total strategy." With regard to the crucial German problem the policy of force manifests itself in "1) support and arming of the German Federal Republic; 2) non-recognition of the fact of the existence of the German Democratic Republic; 3) evasion of recognition of the final and irreversible character of the eastern frontiers of Germany." Another manifestation of this policy is the projected collective nuclear force within NATO, which amounts to nuclear proliferation. The only realistic solution lies in using collective security and guarantees as "a point of departure" for gradual solution of all the most important European problems, "including the very problem of division of Europe into two opposed military groupings." A convenient forum for discussion of the entire problem would be a conference, such as was proposed by Poland, of all European states and the United States. This initiative would, of course, by no means replace Poland's earlier proposals aimed at gradual solution of the problem of European security. To those early proposals belong the idea of an atom-free zone in Central Europe (still regarded by Poland as timely) and the Wladyslaw Gomulka plan, which meets halfway the objections raised against the former.

1411
Robles, Alphonso Garcia. THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA. Disarmament, no. 8, Dec. 1965: 17-20. JX1918.P7D5, 1965

Tells of the efforts of the Latin American nations to conclude a regional treaty ensuring the denuclearization of their territories. The author reports the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, of which he is chairman, during the past 2 years. Ratification of a Latin American denuclearization treaty will probably provide important impetus toward resolution of other nonproliferation and disarmament measures.

1412
Vladimirov, Semen A. ATOM-FREE ZONES, ZONES OF PEACE. Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Pub. House [1965?] 43 p. JX1974.7.V513

The Soviet Union supports the creation of denuclearized zones throughout the world and calls upon the imperialist powers to cooperate in reaching agreement on their establishment. Denuclearization of especially troubled areas (particularly Central Europe and the Mediterranean) might well prevent the outbreak of a world thermonuclear war. Polish plans to pacify Central Europe through formation of a nuclear-free zone have met with many objections: that the balance of power would shift to the Warsaw Pact nations, that Western security would be undermined, and that the reunification of Germany would become an impossibility. But these objections are groundless, for equal pledges would be made by all states, armed forces would be reduced according to an agreed schedule, and strategic and manpower parity would be preserved. German reunification really depends upon how quickly relations between the two German states become normal and permit negotiation. The removal of nuclear arms from that region would encourage prospects for German reunification. The Soviet plan for denuclearization of the Balkans guarantees that no nuclear device would be detonated there in case of conflict. But the Western states have spurned the suggestion, claiming that their security "would not be guaranteed sufficiently after implementation of the plan." The Soviet proposal, however, in no way precludes continued membership of Turkey, Greece, and Italy in NATO. Still more beneficial would be the extension of this atom-free zone to the entire Mediterranean. Here again the United States has accused the U.S.S.R. of seeking to alter the balance of power. Was it not Washington's intention to make such an alteration when it introduced Polaris missiles into that body of water? With the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Scandinavia and the Baltic relaxation of tensions throughout Europe might result. The 1961 U.N. resolution proclaiming Africa a denuclearized zone should be made an article of international law. Nuclear-free status for Latin America depends solely upon the United States--the only nuclear power in that hemisphere. Here again negative reaction and hesitation have forestalled a salutary measure. "The idea to form atom-free zones has stood the tests of time, proved its viability and won the right to existence." Western objections

to denuclearization demonstrate the stubborn persistence of old myths in contemporary foreign policy and the retention of outworn concepts of international relations. All states must suppress these myths and strive for the reliable security desired by all the world.

1413
Zorin, Valerian A. [THE PROBLEM OF EUROPEAN SECURITY] Le problème de la sécurité européenne. Revue militaire générale, no. 2, Feb. 1966: 236-250.
U2.R48, 1966
Includes summaries in English and German.

One precondition for world peace is European peace. Were the peace to be broken, it would mean the destruction of European civilization by modern weapons. The Soviet Union believes that to insure Europe's peace the efforts of all the states must be coordinated and alined with current realities. Already a process of normalization of relations is going on between the Socialist and non-Socialist countries, and nothing can reverse this trend. But Europe must not sit and watch developments. Rather every state should contribute to the construction of inter-European trust and should fight against any actions that would disturb this new atmosphere. One dangerous omen is current planning to give nuclear weapons to West Germany. A nuclear-West Germany and German reunification are two incompatible goals. Linked to the problem of peace and security is a German settlement, one which will "forever exclude German militarism from the opportunity to upset the peace." The NATO states and the Warsaw Pact states must improve their mutual relations--by a nonaggression pact, a reduction of foreign troops on their soil, and a ban on nuclear-weapons installations in both Germanies. The merits of many proposals for the denuclearization of various European regions are well worth considering. A European security system will of course be difficult to realize. The important task is to find a common approach to political problems (especially to the security problem). Franco-Soviet rapprochement and cooperation can contribute immensely to the search for a common European orientation.

b. OUTER SPACE

1414
Kol'man, E. [SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE CONQUEST OF OUTER SPACE] Sotsial'nye aspekty osvoeniia kosmosa. Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 4, 1966: 35-45.
HC10.M5357, 1966

The penetration into outer space broadens our knowledge of the universe, opens up new vistas for changing the face of the earth and its raw material and power potential, and stimulates many branches of knowledge. Those possibilities can be realized only if the knowledge of outer space is used in the interests of society and not for the military and prestige objectives which motivate the imperialist powers. The time is ripe even now, with the existence of two opposing systems, to introduce a control of outer space which would prohibit its utilisation for military purposes. The conquest of outer space is a necessary condition of social progress. The full development of the cosmic era will come only with the victory of socialism on earth, when mankind, socially united, will direct its efforts to the transformation of nature for the benefit of everyone. (Abstract supplied)

1415
Lachs, Manfred. LAW-MAKING FOR OUTER SPACE AND ITS PEACEFUL USE. Disarmament, no. 8, Dec. 1965: 1-4. JX1918.P7D5, 1965

Recent advances in meteorology, aviation, and communications have been realized in outer space and indicate some of the great gains man can attain through this type of research. The important legal issues involved in space exploration and development require "a constructive spirit of international co-operation and mutual agreement." The U.N. Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space prohibits space activities that are not peaceful. But peaceful use of space implies more than the mere absence of aggressive acts; "it would mean the exclusion of its military use." To forestall the introduction of weapons into space becomes increasingly difficult as the arms race continues. Thus the space age has made the need for general and complete disarmament even more urgent. "Man is faced with a decisive choice: either to become a victim of the gigantic forces he himself has released or to make them serve the good of humanity. The opening up of the gates to the universe has given it a sense of particular urgency."

1416
National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation. Committee on Space. REPORT. Washington, 1965. 32 p. P&GP RR
Prepared for presentation at the White House Conference on International Cooperation, Nov. 28-Dec. 1, 1965, Washington, D. C.

Reports on the various joint efforts on the part of Government and industry directed toward the exploration of outer space. Present achievements are summarized and future projects mentioned, along with suggestions for areas in which the various nations could pool their resources and knowledge. Concluding that prospects for international cooperation appear to be good, the Committee recommends that the United States cooperate in the exploration of outer space. This would not only benefit mankind technically but would bring about a reduction of distrust and fear on the international scene.

c. OTHER MEASURES AND PROPOSALS

1417
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AT THE WHITE HOUSE. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Feb. 1966: 43-45; Mar.: 33-37.
TK9145.A84, v. 22

Excerpts from the report of the National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation, Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament [abstracted elsewhere this issue], presented in two parts. The first gives the Committee's recommendations on nuclear proliferation and strategic weapons systems. The second presents the Committee's views on disarmament in Europe, arms races in the developing countries, China and the arms dialogue, and U.N. peacekeeping machinery. In addition the March issue includes the Committee's proposals for dealing with these problems.

1418
BREAK THE NUCLEAR MONOPOLY, ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1965. 28 p. JX1974.7.B673

Contents.--Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China (October 16, 1964).--Press communique on the explosion of the first atom bomb (October 16, 1964).--Press communique on the explosion of the second atom bomb (May 14, 1965).--Premier Chou En-Lai cables government heads of the world (October 17, 1964).--Break the nuclear monopoly, eliminate nuclear weapons (Renmin Ribao editorial, October 22, 1964).--New starting point for efforts to ban nuclear weapons completely (Renmin Ribao editorial, November 22, 1964).

Expresses Communist China's attitude toward nuclear weapons: a no-first-use promise; a statement of conviction "that man, who creates nuclear weapons, will certainly be able to eliminate them"; a claim that Chinese possession of atomic weapons has raised the morale of all revolutionary peoples; and a proposal that all nuclear nations agree not to use these weapons as "a first step" toward total elimination.

1419
Dougherty, James E. THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. Russian review, v. 25, Jan. 1966: 10-23.
DK1.R82, v. 25

Reviews recent specific proposals and discussions in the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee concerning the proposed treaty against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The author feels that the Soviet Union has perceived the nonproliferation discussions as an excellent opportunity to "carry on a bit of political warfare against NATO and to plant the seeds of distrust in the relations of West Germany with her allies" by attacking the proposed multilateral nuclear force as an attempt to "place nuclear weapons in the hands of the German revanchists." Even if the German question is solved, however, complex and overlapping problems of international relations argue against the implementation of a successful nonproliferation arrangement. "As the new year began, there seemed to be more questions than the wise men could answer."

1420
Gasteyger, Curt. THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE: REPORT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS. Disarmament, no. 8, Dec. 1965: 5-13.
JX1918.P7D5, 1965

Reviews negotiations of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament during 1965 concerning a proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty and a system of inspection and guarantees for its implementation, extension of the Moscow test-ban treaty to underground nuclear testing, and other arms control measures. In an annex the author reproduces the statements of Representatives Foster (United States), Trivedi (India), and Burns (Canada) on the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System, the U.S. and Soviet draft nonproliferation treaties, and the Italian draft unilateral nonacquisition declaration.

1421
IN SUMMARY: THE COMMITTEE'S PROPOSALS FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Mar. 1966: 34-35.
TK9145.A84, v. 22

Summarizes the report of the White House Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament [abstracted elsewhere this issue] presented to the White House Conference on International Cooperation, Nov. 28-Dec. 1, 1965. The major proposals made by the Committee dealt with nuclear nonproliferation; reduction of strategic delivery capabilities; limitation of the conventional arms races among developing nations; settlement of major East-West differences; the possibility of introducing Communist China into both the United Nations and the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament; and strengthening U.N. peacekeeping machinery.

1422
Kosygin, Aleksei N. MESSAGE FROM CHAIRMAN OF U.S.S.R. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO PARTICIPANTS IN 18-NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE, GENEVA. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 18, Feb. 23, 1966: 18-19. D839.C87, v. 18
Reprinted from Pravda, Feb. 3, 1966, p. 1-2.

For more than 40 years the Soviet Union has been guided by Lenin's behest that the achievement of general disarmament remain central in its policy. Although the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee has achieved no tangible results, and the flames of war, fanned by the NATO military and political bloc, still rage in Vietnam and threaten all peoples, the Soviet Government remains firm in its determination "to place the use of nuclear weapons outside the law." The recent Soviet draft treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is designed to eradicate the grave dangers to peace certain to arise if no limits are set to the diffusion of nuclear armaments. To facilitate acceptance of this treaty, the Soviet Union "declares its willingness to include in the draft treaty an article banning the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear signatories to the treaty that do not have nuclear weapons on their territory." The Soviet Government also repeats its call for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, prohibition of underground nuclear tests, ratification of a "no-first-use" treaty, liquidation of military bases on foreign soil, destruction of nuclear stockpiles, prohibition of the production of nuclear weapons, and reduction of military budgets of states. "In submitting to the committee constructive and thoroughly weighed proposals, the Soviet Government assumes that they can form a basis for further progress toward disarmament." Soviet delegates to Geneva have been charged with the examination and consideration of proposals submitted by other delegations, "if these proposals actually aim at advancing the cause of disarmament."

1423
Margolis, Howard. FROM NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON: TALKING ABOUT DISARMAMENT. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Feb. 1966: 38-40.
TK9145.A84, v. 22

Achievement of a nonproliferation treaty is the main topic for consideration at the spring session of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The problem, though, is not whether the Soviet Union and the United States can reach agreement, but rather how such a treaty would prevent nuclear weapons production by the present nonnuclear nations. The consensus is that a Soviet-U.S. nonproliferation agreement would not deter the nonnuclear nations from joining the nuclear club unless they could be persuaded "to accept the idea that taking--and taking seriously--a nonnuclear pledge is consistent with their interests." India's nuclear production is probably the most urgent consideration, for its present position is qualified on several points, the main one being that the United States and the Soviet Union must do something about the Chinese nuclear capability. At the 20th U.N. General Assembly session several arms control measures received attention but no real progress was made. Resolutions were passed calling for a nonproliferation treaty "with no loopholes," a suspension of all nuclear testing along with technical

discussions to achieve some Soviet-U.S. agreement on the problem of inspection, and a world conference on disarmament. The highlights included the Nigerian delegate's speech on the test ban and inspection and China's refusal to participate in the World Disarmament Conference, which was proposed for the purpose of getting China into disarmament negotiations. The 20th General Assembly also debated peacekeeping, during which time the Soviet Union maintained its previous position that the Assembly has no authority to conduct such operations. The vote on the admission of Red China was the narrowest to date, the impression being that most countries would like to bring Peking into the United Nations. "In Washington, meanwhile, another sort of disarmament debate took place, quite as arid as those at the U.N., but this time between administration officials and a disarmament panel reporting to the White House Conference on International Cooperation." A 3-year antiballistic missile (ABM) defense system moratorium was the "most striking recommendation" of the panel. The proposal specified that the systems involved be "new," presumably on the assumption that the Soviets have already deployed part of an ABM system. Other recommendations were made regarding the proliferation problem.

1424
Morton, Louis. THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE: SOME POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS. Virginia quarterly review, v. 42, winter 1966: 28-42.
AP2.V76, v. 42

The U.S. assumption that the Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM) is designed solely to protect the U.S.S.R. from an American attack may be erroneous. The Soviets feel that only if general and complete disarmament eliminated nuclear weapons would it be feasible to stop the deployment of an ABM system. They know the United States could penetrate such a system, but this does not mean they could not blunt or deter a similar attack from the rudimentary delivery systems available to China, France, and other nations. The United States should reach an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on limiting ABM programs, possibly through controlled deployment. Such an agreement could prevent rapid escalation of strategic weapons systems and yet not present any problems of verification. It might reduce nuclear proliferation. On the other hand, realinement of the European Security System could be brought about with a closer U.S.-Soviet détente and stabilization of the international situation. A nuclear freeze might persuade the Soviets to drop ABM development. In the absence of a perfect defense system the dangers inherent in deployment of ABM's could be mitigated and the possibilities of war reduced by limiting the number of offensive missiles required to overcome the defense. "If the objective over the next decade is to reduce the possibility of nuclear war, to discourage proliferation, and to achieve a more stable world order, then an agreement based upon a U.S.-U.S.S.R. capability for even a limited defense against nuclear weapons may represent a feasible approach."

1425
National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation. Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. REPORT. Washington, 1965. 40 p.
P&GP RR

Prepared for presentation at the White House Conference on International Cooperation, Nov. 28-Dec. 1, 1965, Washington, D.C.

The two major challenges to arms control and disarmament are halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and containing the armaments buildup taking place among the five nuclear powers. It is imperative that both challenges be met if the benefits of reduced world tensions that resulted from the arms limitation agreements of 1963-64 are to be maintained. Other pressing problems include conventional arms buildups in the developing countries, maintenance of security between East and West Europe, the absence of Chinese Communist participation in disarmament negotiations, and the U.N.'s inadequate organization for handling internal peacekeeping missions and supervising arms control agreements. The United States can do much to build mutual security and to "halt the drift toward international anarchy." It "can take the lead in seeking agreements on measures of collective security and of arms limitation and reduction and should do whatever can usefully and safely be done unilaterally as well as jointly." The trends of arms competition in the development and deployment of new weapons systems must be reversed. A 3-year moratorium on the deployment of antiballistic missile defenses "explicitly or tacitly" agreed upon by both the Soviet Union and the United States is an appropriate first step. But more important than any specific arms control recommendation is a reversal of the trend toward armament. "Immediate steps are needed in the next year to put a brake on developments that can only hinder progress toward comprehensive disarmament measures under law which stand as our ultimate goal."

VI. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND RELATED MEASURES

A. NEGOTIATION OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

1426
Carter, Luther J. NUCLEAR WEAPONS: NONPROLIFERATION AND TEST-BAN TALKS TO BE RESUMED. Science, v. 151, Jan. 7, 1966: 57-60.
Q1. S35, v. 151

U.S.-Soviet accord on ratification of some sort of nonproliferation treaty has never been easy to achieve; more difficult still will the matter become in light of the effects of the Vietnamese war upon East-West relations. It is possible that Moscow may close its ears to the Chinese denunciations and negotiate with the imperialist foe. "Nevertheless, negotiating agreements with a capitalist adversary against whom one's friends are struggling in Southeast Asia would demand of the Soviets a sang froid and sophistication in diplomacy perhaps greater than any they have shown to date." Certainly Soviet and U.S. awareness of the dangers of nuclear proliferation will cause the Geneva talks to continue, although Moscow can hardly be expected to agree to any treaty allowing Germany nuclear responsibility. India, with the capability and motivation to "go nuclear," well illustrates the problems faced by a nonnuclear state in the face of a nonproliferation treaty. India's experiences with colonialism prevent reliance upon a nuclear guarantee (such as the one offered by President Johnson) from a single great power. Indian spokesmen have expressed their opinion that assurances of security must be granted by all the nuclear powers--and it is these nations' problem to conceive how this might be done. A treaty that prohibits underground nuclear testing "could serve as a useful supplement to a nonproliferation treaty or as a partial substitute for one." An untested nuclear weapon may prove to have little efficacy for threats and deterrence. "If for no other reason, the coming round of Geneva talks should be useful in keeping alive an awareness of the problem of nuclear proliferation and discouraging complacency in those governments whose decisions will determine whether or not the spread of weapons continues unchecked."

B. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

1. Escalation

1427
Baldwin, Hanson W. THE CASE FOR ESCALATION. New York times magazine, Feb. 27, 1966: 22, 79-82.
AP2. N6575, 1966

Apart from the arguments concerning American "brutality" in the Vietnamese War (and Asian wars have always been noted for their ferocity) the simple fact is this: President Johnson "has no choice except to escalate." At the present time the war is stalemated. The United States could choose to hold the line at this point, but it would only postpone eventual defeat. A second possible option is to pull out, but, all things considered, this course would be completely out of the question. Thus American and South Vietnamese forces must be strengthened and bombing intensified in the North and in Laos. Such a military buildup would not be cheap, but the costs of losing Vietnam--and then Laos or Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand--justify the expenditure. Communist China has probably already intervened as much as it will; while Chinese aid may escalate, the United States will be firmly in control of just how fast the war grows. Certain provocations, such as a massive American invasion of the North or an attack on China itself, could bring actual Chinese military intervention, but even so Southeast Asia offers a far more favorable battlefield for fighting against Chinese ground troops than did Korea. If overt provocation of China could be avoided, escalation of the war would probably exacerbate the Sino-Soviet split. Nuclear war is naturally a danger, as in all such situations. However the thought that the Soviet Union--the only Communist power with a true nuclear capability--would endanger its territorial integrity with a nuclear war just to defend Ho Chi Minh is preposterous. The risk of nuclear war, very slight in this instance, must not forever frighten the United States into a no-win policy.

1428
Bobrow, Davis B. CHINESE VIEWS ON ESCALATION. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 46, Jan. 1966: 60-67.
Z6723.U35, v. 46

Chinese Communist leaders believe they can endure escalation and its consequences despite their painful awareness of China's limited capabilities for nuclear and conventional war. They plan to meet U.S. conflict escalation not with reciprocal escalation but with "the military guile expounded in Mao Tse-tung's writings." Peking, confident that it can win a "national liberation war," attempts to escalate conflicts to that level. Chinese leaders assume that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against them and that they can even turn American nuclear threats to their advantage. They recognize the overwhelming U.S. superiority in conventional war capabilities, but they consider America too soft to sustain a conventional war effort. In short they consider Chinese and American capabilities the reverse of one another. To Peking, the very broad American conflict spectrum will allow time to build up Chinese forces while U.S. escalation gradually mounts. The Chinese, on the other hand, will escalate geographically, psychologically, and politically. The United States must therefore demonstrate both that it can sustain a war effort and that "the Chinese Communists and their proxies cannot credibly present our accomplishment as a de facto Communist victory--for example, the industrialized United States stalemated by the military establishment of a small and underdeveloped country."

1429
Fishel, Wesley R. VIETNAM: THE BROADENING WAR. Asian survey, v. 6, Jan. 1966: 49-58.
DS1. A492, v. 6

Reviews the course of the Vietnamese War during the Year of the Snake (1965), the impacts that the war and Vietnam's political and economic situation

have on one another, and finally the seemingly nonexistent possibility that the adversaries might soon be able to meet "on middle ground."

2. Miscalculation and Accidental War

3. Surprise Attack

4. Proliferation

1430
Amlund, Curtis A. TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF WORLD LAW: FROM POSSIBILITY TO PROBABILITY. Southwestern social science quarterly, v. 49, Dec. 1965: 281-288. Hl. S65, v. 49

To maintain a policy based on a monolithic system in an increasingly pluralistic world is simply not feasible. If the United States can accept the "proliferation of power centers" its position will be not weakened but strengthened. The Soviet Union on the other hand will find itself increasingly disadvantaged by depolarizing tendencies. Even the proliferation of nuclear weapons is not necessarily undesirable. Accepting the Western allies as members in the nuclear club will quell the fear of such countries as France, Belgium, Sweden, and Italy that they are seen as irresponsible by the United States. Proliferation in the West might well have a stabilizing effect upon NATO. At any rate the danger will be marginal, since each Western country "shares in one degree or another certain basic democratic values." The spread of nuclear weapons among the Soviet satellites might be equally advantageous to the West, since tensions among the Communist bloc will be heightened, and these nations will have power to assert national interests having no particular relationship with the struggle against the West. The satellite nations might conceivably turn to the United Nations for mutual protection in their new fears. The Warsaw Pact would no longer meet their needs. Possession of nuclear weapons by the neutral nations as well would magnify the problem of restraint to a point where it could no longer be ignored. Thus all nations would give priority to international control. Within "this auspicious milieu" world law may at last become practicable. One of the most serious factors militating against world law is the military-industrial complex generated within nations by the profits to be gained from world tensions. Fear of an untried system will also slow the acceptance of world law. But if each nation can believe that adherence to such a system will genuinely be in its national interest (as it will, for example by easing the financial burdens of the arms race), a world law system may be brought into existence. The interrelatedness of nations becomes increasingly evident. A logical first step in the direction of world law would be a greatly enhanced use of the International Court of Justice. The United States can make a strong contribution here through repeal of the Connally Reservation.

1431
[Bhutto, Zulfikar A.] SPEECH BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF PAKISTAN TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. Pakistan horizon, v. 18, 1st quarter, 1965: 64-84.
DS376.P32, v. 18

The world situation is momentarily in a state of flux. In the struggle to secure peace the role of the great powers; the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; and international organizations such as the United Nations depends on both their willingness and ability to find solutions to the disputes that will arise. Each must be willing to sacrifice his own particular interests for the sake of a more peaceful world. The presence of nuclear weapons makes the achievement of abiding peace difficult. Four years have passed since the inception of the Geneva disarmament talks, and general and complete disarmament is still a distant dream. The partial nuclear test ban treaty has merit, even though its attainment was marred by the absence of two nuclear powers from the negotiations. Proliferation remains a major arms control problem. Pakistan has urged the United Nations to realize that measures must be taken to halt the spread of nuclear weapons before a sixth country joins the nuclear club. At present the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides some security against diversion of nuclear materials to military use, although even with improvement and more general use IAEA's safeguards system will still not be satisfactory. Pakistan proposes the convening of an international conference to "devise strict arrangements which would make it impossible for non-nuclear Powers to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons." Other dimensions of the international scene that are of concern to Pakistan include the economic growth of the developing countries as they take their proper place in the international community; security in Europe; eradication of colonialism in Africa; and utilization of the newly formed Organization of African Unity to seek peaceful solutions to inter-African disputes. In Asia both the Chinese nuclear bomb (and China's absence from the United Nations) and India's insistence on guarantees from the nuclear powers as part of a nonproliferation agreement (along with its rearmament program) complicate attempts to rid the continent of conflict and to secure peace. Would a nuclear guarantee retard proliferation? "It would extend a nuclear hegemony into a non-nuclear area and thereby further complicate the already complex problem of disarmament." India must be prevented from involving the nuclear powers in an arms race that will only encourage instability in the Indian Ocean.

1432
Brunner, D. [NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND THE SECURITY OF NATIONS] La non-prolifération nucléaire et la sécurité des nations. Revue militaire suisse, v. 110, Nov. 1965: 526-530.
U2.R5, v. 110

Both the Soviet Union and the United States have manifested great interest in limiting membership in the nuclear club. That such a move is urgent cannot be denied, given the axiom that the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries can but increase the danger that the weapons will be used. A nonproliferation treaty would be effective only if the security of nonnuclear nations were guaranteed. Because of almost absolute nuclear stability between the United States and the Soviet Union a unilateral U.S. guarantee would not suffice. The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons on other conflict levels is slight. Only if the stakes were deemed vital would a U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons be credible. Thus many theoreticians believe the single way for the United States to gain the adherence of threatened countries to a nonproliferation treaty would be "to undertake to give them conventional military support and, in addition, to let them participate in the elaboration of American policy where it affects them." The problem is even more difficult. If the objective is to achieve peace--not just the elimination of nuclear war--a means for deterring the great powers from limited conflict must be found. The French in particular believe that such a deterrent is the existence of multiple nuclear forces in the hands of

peaceful, democratic nations, which can "re-establish that degree of uncertainty about the possibility of recourse to the supreme weapon."

1433
Burlatskii, Fedor. THE ATOM BOMB AND NATIONAL SECURITY. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 18, Feb. 2, 1966: 23. D839.C87, v. 18
Condensed from Pravda, Jan. 10, 1966, p. 5. Slav Rm

Despite the determination of the United States to secure nuclear weapons for its West German partners (a resolution that certainly will preclude conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear arms), there is now a real possibility of achieving a nuclear nonproliferation pact. Those nations still opposing the formulation of such a treaty generally explain their desire to acquire a nuclear capability in terms of strengthening national security and prestige. Both arguments are untenable. One need merely consider the case of postwar England: an independent nuclear capability did nothing to reverse the degeneration of its international prestige. Nuclear weapons can hardly be expected to enhance national security. The Federal Republic of Germany, surely the nation most anxious to gain access to nuclear arms, would be indefensible in a thermonuclear war by virtue of its geographical position. "Why then should he who lives in a glass house throw stones?" A nonproliferation treaty cannot solve all contemporary problems. It will, however, open the door to "the gradual solution of other important questions disturbing mankind: the limitation of the nuclear arms race, the creation of nuclear-free zones in different regions of the world, and eventually a complete ban on nuclear weapons and the destruction of all reserves of them on earth."

1434
Burns, E. L. M. CAN THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BE STOPPED? International organization, v. 19, autumn 1965: 851-869.
JX1901.I55, v. 19

Since 1946 the Soviet Union has carried on a "ban the bomb" campaign that depends upon nothing more than a "declaration of virtuous intentions" to guarantee the nonuse of nuclear weapons. The haste with which Moscow has developed its own nuclear weapons demonstrates "how little faith it had in the possibility of obtaining real security from simple promises not to use nuclear weapons, even if enshrined in a treaty with all the solemn ceremonial of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of unhappy memory." Driven by similar considerations of security the United Kingdom, France, and Communist China have developed nuclear capabilities--and China's actions may well inspire nuclear proliferation in earnest. For the next 5 or 10 years the risk that nuclear proliferation will lead to nuclear war will not be great. During this period, however, the nuclear powers will not be able to initiate any form of disarmament. Tactical nuclear weapons will multiply. Nuclear arms will be accepted as the proper instruments of warfare. Eventually these weapons will be used. Realization of an effective antiproliferation agreement has floundered upon the question of nuclear sharing within NATO and the reluctance of the nuclear powers to adopt disarmament measures. As General de Gaulle has asserted, it is unreasonable to expect nonnuclear states to renounce acquisition of that which the great powers have and intend to retain. The establishment of nuclear-free zones is another possible means of checking the spread of nuclear arms. An acceptable nondiffusion arrangement seems dependent upon two conditions: (1) Can control of the NATO nuclear forces be so arranged that each member will enjoy its legitimate right to have a voice in strategies important to its own security, while the deterrent power of the organization is not weakened and Soviet fears are assuaged? (2) Will the nuclear powers undertake to reduce their own armaments? If not, each nation will recognize the validity of the French claim that any state that "wants its voice to be heard in international councils must acquire independent nuclear armaments."

1435
Chalfont, Lord. PROSPECTS FOR NON-PROLIFERATION AGREEMENT. Disarmament, no. 9, Mar. 1966: 1-5. JX1918.P7D5, 1966

If a nuclear nonproliferation treaty is not achieved, the number of nuclear powers will increase, their need to test newly developed nuclear devices will probably nullify the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and the prospects for a disarmed and peaceful world will generally diminish. As new governments secure nuclear arsenals the probability that the bomb will eventually be used will sharply increase; when "once the bomb has been used the built-in restraints will automatically disappear and thereafter the decision to use it will be easier and easier to take." The U.S. and Soviet draft nonproliferation treaties differ substantially not in their nonacquisition clauses but in their nondissemination clauses. The Soviet argument that West Germany must be denied all access to nuclear arms strikes Western diplomats as an intentional nuisance, for no Western power intends to relinquish control of nuclear weapons to the Germans. But the Soviet attitude toward this question may be changing. Were the perplexing security arrangements for NATO resolved quickly, Moscow might accept a fait accompli and "reckon that nothing further can be gained by blocking a nonproliferation treaty on these grounds." The desire of the nonalined nations to secure some guarantee of the major powers' intention to initiate disarmament before they agree to nuclear nonacquisition hinders the work toward nonproliferation by making agreement dependent upon too many other problems. A comprehensive nuclear test ban, in contrast, might deter proliferation and would "have the advantage of involving sacrifices by nuclear and non-nuclear powers alike." The omens for a successful outcome at Geneva are not favorable. Certainly progress toward a settlement in Vietnam would have a marked effect. The common sense of mankind and the universal appreciation of the ultimate consequences of nuclear proliferation offer the best hope that differences can be resolved and a solution reached before it is too late.

1436
Germany (Democratic Republic, 1949-) Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten. THE ATOMIC ARMING OF THE WEST GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC: AN IMMINENT DANGER TO WORLD PEACE. [2d ed.] Berlin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic [1965] 70 p.
UA710.A554

Contents. --Why does the West German government want atomic weapons? --The way to the atomic arming of the West German Bundeswehr. --Attempts by the West German Government to disguise its revanchist aims and atomic armament plans. --The GDR shows the only alternative to the Bonn policy of atomic armament.

Takes the viewpoint that West Germany is trying to obtain nuclear weapons. In its desire to gain equal footing with its NATO allies in the defense of Europe, West Germany is determined to share in the control and use of nuclear weapons. The various means by which Bonn hopes to achieve this are the multilateral nuclear force, the Franco-West German alliance, and its own plans for national development and production of nuclear weapons. The German Democratic Republic "considers the renunciation of atomic weapons by the two German states to be the best way to reduce the danger of an atomic war in the heart of Europe under present conditions." It feels this step must be taken before there can be a reduction of tension in Europe and progress toward disarmament.

1437
Hinton, Harold C. IN CONCLUSION. In his Communist China in world politics. New York, Houghton Mifflin [1966] p. 469-498.
DS777.55.H55

The explosion of the Chinese Communist nuclear device in October 1964 is directly related to the demise of Khrushchev. Evidence indicates the Soviet leader was planning to eliminate the Chinese nuclear capability by military means--an example of "hair-brained scheming" that caused much alarm in the Kremlin. Relations between Khrushchev and the Chinese Peoples Republic (CPR) had become strained to the utmost in the months preceding the nuclear explosion. Khrushchev was anxious to eliminate China from the international Communist movement, and he was anxious too about China's nuclear progress. He had terminated aid to the Chinese nuclear weapons program in 1959-60. At the time of the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty China assured the world that its first nuclear test was a long way off. Several events that took place in 1964, however, alarmed Khrushchev: the establishment of diplomatic relations between France and Communist China in January; the possibility of Sino-French nuclear collaboration; the impact a successful Chinese nuclear test might have on West Germany's plans for nuclear status; and deterioration of relations between Outer Mongolia and Communist China. "The irony of Khrushchev's relationship to the CPR's nuclear weapons programs was this: he had given it valuable, probably indispensible, aid, but he had soon regretted having done so and had pushed his efforts to undo his own mistake, as he now considered it, to the brink of war." Sino-Soviet relations became superficially more friendly after the change in power in the Kremlin. While Communist China will not have a significant number of nuclear weapons and appropriate delivery vehicles for some time, the political benefits of its nuclear capability can be felt already, particularly in Asia. The future course for China can be seen in controlling its population and increasing its food supplies for the masses. After Mao Tse-tung's death China's policy, which will be handled by already-designated successors, will probably become more militant for a decade or so, after which there will be a "mellowing" trend. "An American policy of firmness and even toughness is more likely to accelerate such a mellowing process than is a policy of conciliation or appeasement."

1438
India (Republic) Dept. of Atomic Energy. 10 YEARS OF ATOMIC ENERGY IN INDIA 1954-1964. [Bombay, S. N. Gupta on behalf of the Department of Atomic Energy, 1965] 36 p. HD9698.I52A5

Commemorates, in text and pictures, the 10th anniversary of India's nuclear energy program.

1439
INDIA AND THE BOMB: A SYMPOSIUM. Gandhi marg, v. 10, Jan. 1966: 11-18. DS481.G3G22, v. 10

"Brings together four members of parliament with four different political backgrounds" to discuss the problems and prospects of an Indian nuclear capability. V. K. Krishna Menon, R. R. Diwakar, M. R. Masani, and Surendra Mohan Ghose examine the defense of India in the face of growing Chinese nuclear might, the morality of nuclear armament, the economic feasibility of an Indian bomb, and similar issues.

1440
Jack, Homer A. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE INDIAN BOMB. Gandhi marg, v. 10, Jan. 1966: 7-10. DS481.G3G22, v. 10

It is sad to see India in a brief 20 years foresake the philosophy of Gandhi for the advantages likely to be won through power politics. Although Prime Minister Shastri indicated that India would not embark upon a military nuclear program "for the present," India has surrendered its leadership of world opposition to nuclear armament and has qualified its position at disarmament conferences. The conditions under which India would refrain from producing nuclear weapons (as enunciated by Indian Ambassador Chakravarty at the 1965 U.N. Disarmament Commission Session and later by Ambassador Trivedi at the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee) appear too great for the nuclear powers to fulfill. Can India secure itself against China and win international prestige without a nuclear capability? A more feasible and effective Indian defense against China might well depend upon Asian-African pressure upon China, efforts toward détente with Peking, or effective steps toward general and complete disarmament. "Progress in any one may give India as much security, and probably more, than by her acquiring the atomic bomb." Perhaps India may be persuaded to renounce nuclear development in return for a permanent seat and a veto in the U.N. Security Council--a move that would certainly add immensely to Indian prestige. "Here is an option for action by those who, at the eleventh hour, both inside India and outside, would like to see India continue to reject atomic power while retaining at least the potential of Gandhi power."

1441
Krishna, Raj. INDIA AND THE BOMB. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 45, Dec. 1965: 74-78. Z6723.U35, v. 45

Three major policy alternatives have been proposed to aid India in meeting the aggressive thrusts of Red China. Nonalinement, alinement, and acquisition of a deterrent all offer advantages. The best course lies in persuading the West and the U.S.S.R. to provide a long-range strategic cover, while India develops a small but creditable independent nuclear capability. This capability will establish a regional diplomatic and strategic balance in Asia. Past Indian positions on nuclear proliferation can be renegotiated since Chinese aggressiveness has altered Indian defense requirements. Besides, "no objections or agreements are absolutely final in diplomacy." India must continue to press for disarmament, as this is still the most desirable course, but the responsibility for national survival must not be sacrificed to vague future contingencies such as disarmament and arms control.

1442
Lachs, Manfred. ON THE NON-DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Polish perspectives, v. 9, Feb. 1966: 11-18. DK401.P7947, v. 9

"A slightly abridged version of a speech delivered on October 26, 1965 during the session of the U.N. General Assembly."

Dissemination of nuclear weapons--whether through the growing capacity of states to manufacture them or the transfer by nuclear powers to states that do not presently have them--urgently requires prevention. If the arsenals of additional states become filled with atomic weapons, a new phase of the arms race will begin, the likelihood of war will increase enormously, and disarmament will become "even more remote." Nondissemination is not an end in itself, but represents a collateral measure that is important for achievement of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet draft treaty, submitted on September 24, 1965, provides an excellent basis for conclusion of a treaty. The difficulty presented by the American draft proposal, on the other hand, is that it does not preclude collective arrangements whereby nuclear armaments are, in effect, disseminated to nonnuclear states. This situation could create a new category of states that might be characterized as "status mixtus"--somewhere between nuclear and nonnuclear. The introduction into international law of a status mixtus category that would lie between war and peace has already been advocated. Such an introduction has been opposed because it "obviously would blur the line between peace and war, facilitate an easy passage from peace to war, and tend to legalize war under another label." A similar argument can be leveled against status mixtus relating to nuclear possession. A state in this category would gradually and inconspicuously make its way into the nuclear club. Sharing, integration, collective control, or any similar concept will kill the idea of nondissemination. This is not an abstract consideration. Right now, through the medium of NATO, the door is being opened to West German possession of nuclear weapons. And Germany, the Western half of which is clamoring for the fulfillment of its expansionist territorial demands, has shown little restraint in the past. The problem thus concerns all of Europe. Poland, which has a large stake in the security of Europe, has consistently fought the spread of nuclear weapons. Had the world heeded the Polish warning long ago, perhaps many present difficulties could have been avoided. Every hour counts; if a nondissemination treaty is not concluded soon, it will be useless.

1443
Mahadevan, T. K. BEYOND THE BOMB. Gandhi marg, v. 10, Jan. 1966: 19-24. DS481.G3G22, v. 10

India's decision whether to produce an atomic bomb or not should be made by the armed forces. The atomic bomb is but one item in the vast complex of modern weaponry. Once a nation decides to depend upon armed defense it must necessarily obtain the latest weapons. "What we should attack is not the nuclear bomb or the laser beam or the Nth weapon (whatever that may turn out to be) but rather this whole notion of dependence on armaments for survival." The nuclear attack on Hiroshima made no impression on Gandhi; violence is the same despite the size of the bomb that serves its purposes. If India decides not to take up nuclear arms mankind will not be pushed forward by that act; the world will merely have taken a step back toward where it was 25 years ago. The Gandhian ideal should impel mankind forward. "Gandhian brinkmanship" is based upon unilateral rejection of all armaments, the total renunciation of all violent action. "Disarmament cannot be achieved round the green-topped table or in carefully measured doses. It can only be achieved by an act of defiant courage and daring, by a heedless unilateral act which waits for no other either to precede or to follow." Gandhi understood that one nation's calculated, deliberate rejection of the folly of armaments could achieve the salvation of the world community. He had hoped that the native land of Asoka, Buddha, and Santiparva would provide the impetus to inspire mankind to go "beyond the bomb."

1444
Menshikov, V. GENEVA DISCUSSIONS. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 18, Mar. 23, 1966: 13. D839.C87, v. 18

Reprinted from Pravda, Mar. 2, 1966. Slav Rm

Despite the many substantive proposals set forth at Geneva, the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament has yet to resolve the principal problem on its agenda--ratification of a treaty banning the spread of nuclear weapons. A constructive step toward this end was made recently when the German Democratic Republic called upon the Federal Republic of Germany to renounce, "jointly with the G.D.R., the acquisition and stationing of nuclear weapons on their respective territories." But West German Defense Minister von Hassel quickly asserted that his country retains hope that the McNamara Committee will allow West German participation in nuclear planning. The West German newspaper Neues Deutschland recently stressed the importance to Bonn of gaining a say in nuclear targeting, asserting that West Germany should have a voice in the matter of "which should be attacked first--Soviet Russian targets or, for instance, East German, Polish or Czech targets." The work of the Disarmament Committee can go forward only when the nuclear importunities of the Bonn revanchists have been stifled.

1445
[NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST] Nukleare Konfrontation im Mittleren Osten. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Jan. 10, 1966: 29-31. U3.W38, v. 10

Analysis of recent exercises by the principal military forces in the Middle East proves that, all sensational reports to the contrary, neither side is seriously considering the utilization of atomic weapons or other methods of mass destruction at this stage. On the other hand, reports of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East have multiplied of late, and some of them emanate from such authoritative sources that they cannot be simply dismissed as hearsay. A sober assessment of present activities and future plans, insofar as these are accessible to the layman, reveals that both the major adversaries--Egypt and Israel--are firmly convinced that no serious conflict is possible as long as both have an adequate deterrent force, whether nuclear or conventional. It is clear from Nasser's own statements over the past year that Egypt will not be in a position to attack Israel for another five to seven years. Egypt's home-made rockets are unreliable, her much-publicized jet fighter apparently a fiasco. True, plans call for the erection of a powerful nuclear reactor in the Qattara Depression, capable of producing sufficient enriched uranium and plutonium for atom bombs; but without foreign scientists and knowhow it is very unlikely that Egypt could detonate her first nuclear device much before 1972, if then. Israel has two reactors

in operation (one of them purely experimental), but American experts have testified that they are not being used for military purposes. Israel admittedly has the scientific brainpower to develop atomic weapons, but is not interested in doing so, if only for economic reasons, unless forced to this step by her adversaries. The remaining Middle East countries in one way or another all lack the resources needed to make nuclear weapons or even to engage in an aggressive military policy. (Abstract supplied)

1446
SPRING MUSHROOMS. Economist, v. 218, Mar. 26, 1966: 1205-1206. HG11. E2, v. 218

Now that spring has arrived, "the statesman's fancy lightly turns to thoughts of bombs." Prominent men in Great Britain, Germany, and the Arab World, as well as those in charge of the supposedly peaceful "Operation Plowshare," all gleefully mentioned acquiring or blowing up nuclear bombs. British Prime Minister Wilson has expressed his fear that 1966 will turn out to be "International Proliferation Year," and his disarmament minister Lord Chalfont has been sent speeding to Moscow, presumably on behalf of a non-proliferation treaty. Alterations in the American draft treaty may bring its acceptance closer. Washington appears to have eliminated "all possibility of any nuclear arms being used by allied forces without an existing nuclear power's explicit consent at the time of firing," a possibility that proved highly disturbing to Britain in August 1965. The Soviets maintain an even stronger stand, however, contending that no nation currently nonnuclear should be allowed "even the slightest form of participation" in controlling nuclear weapons. Neither German nor Soviet assent is all that important, however, for the real threat to world peace comes not from the possibility of the present members of the nuclear club handing out weapons but from those nations that are dangerously close to developing them on their own. Since the problem is one of "genuine new budding," the temptations to acquire nuclear arms must be removed. Among other measures, those nations that are attracted by the economic gains of nuclear energy "should be persuaded to turn back to the use of fuels that are less potentially deadly."

1447
Teeple, John B. ON PROLIFERATION: THE DANGER ISN'T NUCLEAR. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Feb. 1966: 32-33.
TK9145. A84, v. 22

Letter to the editor in response to Jeremy Stone's "On Proliferation: Where's the Danger?" (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 21, Nov. 1965), which appeared as item 917 in Arms Control & Disarmament (v. 2, spring 1966).

Proliferation of nuclear weapons is feared because of its purported catalytic and/or escalative potential. Stepping over a nuclear threshold can be compared to being in a "vacuum"--an undesirable situation because "we don't know what would happen once we were in it." Escalation is not a "nuclear" problem, for any conflict can escalate into an all-out war; many have in the past. In addition the unconventional or guerrilla conflicts of the present era do not lend themselves to the use of nuclear weapons. The ability to use--i.e., to deliver --nuclear weapons is the real problem of proliferation, for what good is an arsenal of nuclear warheads if the necessary delivery vehicles are not available? Even though the United States recognizes that the developing countries are more conflict prone, it sends these countries obsolete armaments, particularly airplanes, for use in protecting themselves from their volatile neighbors. In its enthusiasm for international cooperation in space and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy the United States has set up development programs in the very countries most apt to become involved in boundary or territorial disputes. Each of these programs seems beneficial in itself, but the combination could provide a nation with a delivery system which it might use to launch a nuclear weapon against one of its warring neighbors. While an offensive capability may be the best defense--and hence deterrent--between the two major nuclear powers, this is not the case between potentially conflicting countries of the developing world. "Arms races so engendered are, if anything, less likely to stabilize the developing world than they have the bipolar world." Regardless of the types of weapons these nations may have or acquire, if their defensive systems appear "offensive" to their neighbors, these systems may increase tensions and encourage a preemptive attack. It would behoove the industrialized nations to worry more about the means by which the developing nations might acquire delivery vehicles than "how their warheads exploded."

1448
Wassermann, Ursula. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION KEY TO DISARMAMENT TALKS. National guardian, v. 18, Mar. 12, 1966: 7.
AP2. N244, v. 18

The critical question raised by the burgeoning problem of nuclear proliferation is: When does a nation become a nuclear power in the military sense--when it first explodes a nuclear device or when its technology is sufficiently advanced to operate power reactors that can be easily converted to military purposes? Outside the Socialist countries 6 power reactors are working today; by 1972 there will be 19 in 8 nations. About 270 smaller, research reactors are already operating in a score of countries. Thus the spread of nuclear energy, which can be separated only artificially from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, has reached frightening proportions. On this basis alone a nonproliferation treaty is vital, for (even if China and France refuse to sign) the smaller countries could thus be pressured to slow down, if not stop, the production of nuclear arms and delivery vehicles. States having the capacity to produce such weapons include Italy, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland, although none has yet decided to do so and none is likely to refuse to renounce nuclear ambitions if a nonproliferation treaty is drawn up. In practice if not in theory, India has renounced a nuclear armaments program; it is still regarded as one of the leaders of the third world. Israel's situation is less clear. Of most importance is the question of German acquisition, which has checkmated all Geneva negotiations so far. Moscow insists, and most Soviet allies concur, that West Germany be barred both from access to nuclear weapons and participation in a so-called integrated nuclear force. Italy and Britain take a basically similar stance; the Times has stated that the multilateral nuclear force (MLF) is dead. Washington has not cast aside the MLF as yet. The longer it procrastinates in officially abandoning the force--now hardly more than a debating point--the less likelihood there is of reaching any treaty and a consequent détente with the Soviet Union.

5. Communication

6. Command and Control of Weapons

1449
Emel'ianov, V. THE PALOMARES BOMB. New times, no. 8, Feb. 23, 1966: 24-25.
D839.N483, 1966

Reviews reports in the Western press concerning the loss of a nuclear weapon and contamination of the region about the village of Palomares, Spain. Professor Emel'ianov reasons that the extensive security and sanitation operations carried out near Palomares by U.S. forces prove that the nuclear primer of the H-bomb had exploded. "The reason there was no mushroom cloud was that the falling bomb (or missile) buried itself in the ground." If the United States persists in exposing Western Europe to similar dangers, the people of Europe may someday experience "a tragedy whose magnitude and consequences it is difficult even to imagine."

1450
Flambard, A. [NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS] Explosions nucléaires et télécommunications. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Feb. 1966: 329-348. D410.R45, v. 22

Summarizes the known immediate and longer term effects of nuclear explosions on telecommunications. These are important enough that they cannot be neglected in current studies.

1451
Getler, Michael. TACTICAL COMSAT NETWORK PLANNED. PART 3: MILITARY SYSTEMS. Missiles and rockets, v. 18, Jan. 31, 1966: 58-60, 63-69.
UG630.M54, v. 18

Describes in detail the three major military communications satellite programs now underway. Emphasis is given to the newest, the Tactical Satellite Communications project, whose development is motivated by the need for greater and better communications in tactical warfare situations such as Vietnam. This project is in the earliest formative stages. The tactical communications network will differ from the more advanced strategic systems in that it will reach thousands of users directly involved in combat while transmitting small amounts of data. The other two systems--The Initial Defense Satellite Communications Program (IDSCP) and The Advanced Defense Satellite Communications Program (ADSCP)--are in more advanced stages of development. IDSCP, a research and development project, "is viewed essentially as supporting a strategic communications requirement; this will mean (in a fully operational net) a few channels able to continuously carry a comparatively large amount of data to a few users--all at high command levels." ADSCP is "an advanced strategic comsat link intended to support operational requirements . . . and it is expected to go into operation roughly three years after the IDSCP begins to function."

1452
U.S. Dept. of the Army. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEY. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965. 193 p. map, table.
Z6724.A9U48

Surveys the problems and issues confronting NATO, "including those dealing with the control and employment of nuclear weapons," as well as broader aspects of the defense of Western Europe. Abstracts of "more than 750 books, documents, and periodical articles that were selected from several thousand items" are given, as well as a special bibliographic supplement on the Chinese atomic bomb.

C. VIOLATIONS OF AGREEMENTS AND RESPONSES

1. Violations, Inspection, and Verification

1453
[IDENTIFICATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS] Identifizierung unterirdischer Kernexplosionen. Kerntechnik, Isotopentechnik und -Chemie, v. 8, Feb. 1966: 52.
TK9001.K4, v. 8

The December 9, 1965 United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority report on the identification of subterranean explosions points to the necessity of on-the-spot inspection in cases where earthquakes are seismologically indistinguishable from underground atomic tests. The report contends, however, that since the time of the last Geneva conference of experts on underground test detection (1958-59) notable progress has been achieved in the technical and analytical methods by which the ratio of signals to the background noise can be greatly improved. The structure of seismic signals is also better understood than in the past. Consequently fewer stations are now needed for positive identification of the greatest possible number of earthquakes. According to the latest estimates there are 10,000 to 12,000 underground tremors per year.

1454
Iklé, Fred C. DETERRING VIOLATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. Disarmament, no. 8, Dec. 1965: 14-16. JX1918.P7D5, 1965

Detecting violations of arms control agreements is only one side of the verification problem. The other is establishing a system to deter violations. Enforcement of arms control agreements cannot depend on short-lived, "amorphous" adverse public reaction to violations. "If the world's reaction cannot be translated immediately into substantive political or military changes damaging to the violator, it will soon lose all force." The threat of sanctions to which the victim of a violation is committed in advance offers the most effective deterrent. Implementation of this plan raises several problems, however, especially in democracies, where a politician may find it easier to ignore violations than to alienate pacifist opinion, or to avoid an effective deterrent reaction than to intensify the arms race. Certain parallels may be drawn between problems of deterring arms control violations and those of strategic deterrence. If deterrence fails for either, execution of the threat may still be undesirable or irrational. In both cases deterrence policy must accept the possibility of unintended violation. Also, an advantage similar to that of a first strike may be gained by a quick violation of certain agreements--though if the possible advantage were decisive the agreement would probably have never been concluded. Military sanctions against violations may be either restorative or additional. The first, currently favored by governments, would simply require the injured party to match the violation, to "rearm to the same extent." Such a limited reprisal would pose no threat at all to a nation wishing to destroy certain parts of a negotiated agreement so as to make the residual one more advantageous to itself. Effective deterrence of arms control violations, therefore, must usually include additional sanctions. The injured nation might

substantially increase its defense efforts in a manner detrimental to the violator, which, to be sure, is costly. Finally, political sanctions could play a complementary role.

1455
Morgan, Joseph O., and Virginia L. Prentice. THIRD SYMPOSIUM ON REMOTE SENSING. Photogrammetric engineering, v. 32, Jan. 1966: 98-108.
TA593. A2P5, v. 32

Report "presented at the Annual Convention of the American Society of Photogrammetry, Washington, D. C., March 1965."

The Third Symposium on Remote Sensing of Environment was conducted at the University of Michigan on October 14, 15, 16, 1964. Some fifty papers were presented, discussing current and anticipated research programs, many of which will involve the use of orbiting platforms, in such fields as planetary studies, earth exploration, meteorology, and oceanography. Other papers dealt with new instrumentation and with interpretation of remote sensor data, including multiband photographic, infrared, and radar imagery. The talks included considerable material of direct or peripheral interest to the photo-interpreter and photogrammetrist. A resume of the conference is presented, with some discussion of the history of development of the remote sensing symposia, and with emphasis on material excerpted from some of the papers. (Abstract supplied)

1456
NUCLEAR FUELS AND SAFEGUARDS. Euronuclear, v. 3, Mar. 1966: 137-139. illus.
TK9001. E8, v. 3

Second of two articles on "Some Non-technical Aspects of Nuclear Power."

Large nuclear power reactors and some types of research reactors utilize fuels that can be used in the manufacture of nuclear armaments. Although to a certain extent the United States is to blame for the wide dissemination of plutonium (stemming in part from the 1953 "Atoms for Peace" program) the only relevant problem today is the placing of safeguards on such equipment. In many instances bilateral or multilateral safeguards have been instituted among the supplying and recipient nations. These, however, smack of neocolonialism. Even regional arrangements, such as those utilized by Euratom, are not wholly satisfactory, for the only truly acceptable system would be one recognized and adhered to by every nation in the world. The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to which the responsibility of the United Nations in this realm has been delegated, has many attractive aspects. Under its "Revised System" the various safeguards procedures--frequency and types of inspections, categories of reactors, exemptions from safeguards, and the like--are set forth. Along with principles and procedures, the technology of safeguards must continually advance. Research is currently being conducted on such topics as methods of determining the power output of a nuclear reactor, nondestructive analysis of irradiated fuel, the identification of fuel elements "by photographic and other means in order to reduce the possibility of clandestine use of fuel," and the monitoring of fuel handling equipment.

1457
SOVIET GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 18, Mar. 9, 1966: 19.
D839. C87, v. 18

Reprinted from Pravda, Feb. 18, and Izvestiia.
Slav Rm

On Feb. 16, 1966, A. A. Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, transmitted to the U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. a memorandum on the contamination of the Spanish coast and waters by nuclear weapons from a U.S. bomber. The Soviet Union regards the radioactivity generated by this accident as a violation of the 1963 Moscow Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits contamination of the atmosphere, oceans, and outer space of this planet. The incident also violates the 1958 convention on the high seas (to which the United States is a signatory), requiring every state to prevent pollution of the seas through radioactive or other means. The Soviet Union has repeatedly warned that the U.S. practice of flights of nuclear bombers would lead to disaster, perhaps to a disastrous nuclear war. The Soviet Government, reflecting the wishes of the peoples of the world, demands "an immediate halt to the flights of planes with nuclear weapons aboard beyond national borders" and the strict observance of "international agreements providing for a ban on the radioactive contamination of man's environment."

1458
Willrich, Mason. SAFEGUARDING ATOMS FOR PEACE. American journal of international law, v. 60, Jan. 1966: 34-54. LL

Analyzes "the salient legal aspects of the revised IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] system of safeguards." The author outlines the background of the system, discusses its constitutional basis, and reviews its main features. He concludes that "from the point of view of international law . . . IAEA safeguards have significance as a novel system of international inspection and control of certain activities of states." Their success depends, however, on prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation and on a measure of progress in settlement of "much broader issues of international security."

2. Enforcement

a. BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

1459
National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. REPORT. Washington, 1965. 26 p.
P&GP RR

Prepared for presentation at the White House Conference on International Cooperation, Nov. 28-Dec. 1, 1965, Washington, D. C.

Examines some of the areas in which the peaceful uses of atomic energy benefit mankind and discusses the various organizations and programs now working in this field. The Committee strongly recommends that the United States press for universal adoption of the safeguards proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which include both the peaceful use of nuclear materials and the prevention of their diversion to military use. The public health and safety must be protected, and both national and international safeguards must be refined and cooperation increased, to see that this area of technology continues to benefit mankind. The IAEA, with assistance from other nations, must set the standards for this task.

1460
Pretsch, J. [THE IAEA IN TOKYO--ATOMS FOR PEACE ONLY: REPORT ON THE 9TH GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY] Die IAEO in Tokio--Atome nur für den Frieden. Bericht von der 9. Generalkonferenz der Internationalen Atomenergie-Organisation. Atomwirtschaft--Atomtechnik, v. 11, Jan. 1966: 24-26.
TK9001.A97, v. 11

For the first time since its foundation the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1965 held its General Conference in a place other than its home town of Vienna, in Tokyo. At the invitation of the Japanese Government 315 delegates from 71 member countries met from 21 to 28/9/65 under the chairmanship of K. Asakai of Japan. In spite of wider prevailing differences of opinion between various countries and the political blocks the sessions took place in an harmonious atmosphere. Nevertheless political aspects were more predominant than at any previous General Conference. This was particularly true in respect of the safeguarding of the use of nuclear fuels and nuclear energy plants from military purposes. The revised system of security control that was finally accepted unanimously by the General Conference is simpler and more easily understandable. At the moment 14 IAEA inspectors control 46 nuclear installations in 21 countries. In the field of aid for research and technological development the IAEA is encountering new problems. Although 86% of the technical help effected by the IAEA goes into the loan of technical specialists and the provision of salaries and equipment to individual member countries, a new trend in international collaboration is observable in the form of mutual projects involving several international organisations and of regional projects. Financing within the limited framework of the IAEA budget of $11.2 million causes continuing concern. The desalination of water using reactor heat was also stressed in Tokyo as a new centre of activity for the IAEA. The holding of the General Conference in Tokyo also symbolised a further task of the IAEA--the possible bridging of the gap between East and West, a process which is beginning to be observable in the peaceful use of atomic energy and not least through the commercialisation of this field.
(Abstract supplied)

1461
Šahović, Milan. INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF THE USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. Journal of peace research, no. 4, 1965: 297-306.
AS9.J6, 1965

In the first part the author analyzes the methods of control of the uses of nuclear energy including those provided for in the bilateral treaties as well as in the framework of the existing international organizations. Assessing these methods in the light of international law, he concludes that the leaving of the control of the utilization of nuclear energy to the international bodies can be considered one of the vital features of the development of interstate cooperation, while entrusting of control to national bodies of other states is tolerated as an expression of the actual state of affairs and as a necessity of its acceptance, but cannot be considered adequate for compliance to the principles of equal cooperation. The second part is dedicated to international control in the light of the tasks which it is to serve. In this respect two components are analyzed: one refers to the objectives of control and the other to the relationship of the control systems toward third countries. After that, turning to various attempts to classify the control systems, the author holds that such classifications can only obscure the exceptional dangers which should always be borne in mind where the production of nuclear energy is involved, and pleads for a common treatment of international control in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament. Finally, in the third part the author asserts that systems of control in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy--based on international agreements now in force--constitute components of a modern international legal order. However, the specific nature of nuclear energy has not promoted the adoption of particular legal solutions. The world is experiencing a process of gradual change which has not, until now, altered the fundamental position of states as sovereign subjects of international law. In this process, we are now witnessing the appearance of a number of mixed solutions which indicate a specific process of development, whose initial manifestations have only recently appeared. The characteristic legal nature of existing systems of control in the nuclear field, the author concludes, is an expression of the relationship between contemporary possibilities for cooperation between states and the corresponding level of development of international law. (Summary supplied)

b. BY OTHER MEANS

D. CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

1. General Analyses

2. Military

1462
[A CHANCE FOR WAR] Chance für den Krieg. Soldat im Volk, v. 16, Mar. 1966: 9.
P&GP RR

Soviet interest in a nuclear nonproliferation treaty "as well as in an international agreement barring any further dissemination of nuclear weapons" can be explained by Moscow's plan to strengthen, through such arrangements, the military position of the Warsaw Pact Organization. Significant in that respect is the recent suggestion by Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin that a nonproliferation treaty forbid use of nuclear arms against any signatory state that does not have nuclear weapons on its territory. West European security has clearly been based on an effective deterrent system of both conventional and nuclear forces. With the denuclearization of Central Europe, as proposed by Moscow, NATO would be stripped of its defenses. Its limited conventional forces and lack of sizable hinterland would prevent it from unfolding large-scale military operations. It would also lack adequate hinterland in which to store military supplies. None of these shortcomings would be experienced by the Warsaw Pact Organization in consequence of the nuclear nondissemination agreement proposed by the Soviet Union.

3. Political

1463
Boguslaw, Robert, Robert H. Davis, and Edward B. Glick. A SIMULATION VEHICLE FOR STUDYING NATIONAL POLICY FORMATION IN A LESS ARMED WORLD. Behavioral science, v. 11, Jan. 1966: 43-61. illus.
BF1.B4, v. 11

Persons responsible for the formulation and direction of national policy are constantly confronted with problems of predicting the future under unknown or unanticipated social and psychological conditions. Basic issues in the processes of negotiation behavior involve such questions as: If a particular course of action is adopted, how will the environment respond? Given the social pressures and human prejudices that are operative, what is feasible? Would some other course of action be more productive for the nation as a whole or for some particular interest groups? Here the authors present a simulation vehicle and supporting experiments to study problems of national policy planning and negotiation. (Abstract supplied)

4. Economic

1464
Baade, Fritz. [GERMANY'S PLACE IN THE WORLD OF TOMORROW] Deutschlands Stellung in der Welt von morgen. Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, v. 17, Jan. 1966: 1-17. tables. HD4809. G38, v. 17

In the absence of total war four factors will decide whether the world will still be habitable at the end of this century. They are: unprecedentedly rapid population growth; a potential radical shift of population between the world's main political blocs; a cataclysmic famine threatening one-third of the global population; and growing disparity between the rich and the poor nations of the world. By the year 2000 the world population will double to reach at least 6 billion. In all probability one-half of the nonalined world will by the end of the century belong to one or another Communist bloc, which, jointly, will embrace about one-half of the global population. The danger of an uninhabitable world would come about in the event the nonalined nations opted for Red Chinese communism and against coexistence with the Western world. Hence the West's chances for causing Red China to change its attitude toward the rest of the world are of paramount importance for man's future. By the year 2000, with its 500- to 600-million-strong industrial cadres, China will be the world's greatest economic power. One-third of the world's population in underdeveloped countries will soon be threatened by an acute famine. To avert that eventuality the West must double or triple its present free supplies of food to hungry peoples and give those nations the modern agricultural equipment, chemicals, and fertilizers needed for the radical improvement of their food production. In the decade 1955-64 the gross national product of the world's most important industrial nations (except the United States) increased more than it had in the preceding 85 years. Countries with the lowest armament outlays (e.g., Japan) showed the highest increase, while those with a heavy percentage of their gross national product invested in armament (e.g., Great Britain) had the smallest increase. An exception to that rule is the Soviet Union, which finances its relatively rapid economic growth by heavy retardation of its consumer goods. A parallel disarmament of the Soviet Union and the West, combined with Western assistance to underdeveloped countries, should enable the West, without adverse effects on its own economy, to ward off the danger of the world becoming uninhabitable in the next 35 years. To that end the German Federal Republic should orient both its foreign and its economic policy.

1465
Goodman, Geoffrey. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF STAYING ALIVE. [London, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 1964] 28 p. (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Discussion pamphlets)
HC260. D4G65

It is absurd to claim that there is no economic profit in preparing for war. Will disarmament, if it comes, then prove the ruination of the economy? Although the government will not disclose to the British people exactly where its defense expenditures are going, it is clear they run extraordinarily high. About one-third of the sum pays servicemen; the other two-thirds is spent in industry. Of the entire British working population, one-twelfth is affected by defense spending. The aircraft industry takes the largest single share of the defense pie, with smaller and medium-sized firms most heavily dependent on government spending. This industry would be quite hard-hit by disarmament, and would probably require subsidization to remain viable. The British electronics industry has become increasingly important in defense production, but it could be more easily converted to civilian production than the aeronautics industry. Shipbuilding, which together with the aforementioned industries makes up two-thirds of spending on defense production, is already in financial difficulty and will probably need government aid in any case. Total disarmament would certainly create some local economic problems, but they would exist primarily in "regions where unemployment is already high--Northern Ireland, Scotland, the North East and possibly parts of the North West." In any case, disarmament is unlikely to be achieved "in one dramatic swoop," and a plan for gradual conversion has a high probability of success. Britain must begin by "renouncing any banal pretensions to being a great nuclear power." From thence, demobilization of the armed forces and industrial conversion would have to proceed. In order to counter the impact on Government-owned defense industries, the British Government would probably have to enter the field of general manufacturing. Increased investment in civilian sectors will invariably bring about a higher standard of living for all Britons and for the underprivileged of all nations.

1466
Lall, Betty (Goetz). NEW FRONTIERS OF URBAN EXCELLENCE? Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Mar. 1966: 37-40.
TK9145. A84, v. 22

Suggests that the American populace might lend more support to arms control and disarmament efforts if the economic boons to be realized through arms reductions and defense cutbacks were more clearly elucidated. Mrs. Lall summarizes those reports and panel discussions of the recent Troubled Environment Conference that testify to the rapid advances possible in urban development through diversion of funds now used for military purposes to domestic social and economic needs.

1467
Moch, Jules. [THE PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT] Le problème du désarmement et celui du développement économique. In L'Adaptation de l'O.N.U. au monde d'aujourd'hui: [Colloque international de Nice, 27-29 mai 1965, sponsored by the Association pour le développement du droit mondial] Paris, A. Pedone, 1965. p. 143-150. JX1977. A646

The science of universal death has advanced enormously. To destroy France's population would require 120 million World War II conventional bombs, 6,000 Hiroshima-type atomic bombs, or 15 one-megaton thermonuclear bombs. Conversely, progress in disarmament has been very slow, but this is not cause for despair. In 15 years the United States and the

Soviet Union have moved from qualitative to discussable quantitative disagreements over the principles of a disarmament treaty. General agreement has been slowed by politics. "Disarmament specialists are in advance of diplomatic specialists and must mark time . . . . The day foreign affairs decisionmakers agree on a Berlin solution acceptable to the Germans or on a settlement of the future of Vietnam or Korea will be the day progress is made on the road to disarmament." Disarmament is needed not to avert nuclear war, which is improbable, but to eliminate the plague of the 20th century: underdevelopment. Seventy-five percent of the world suffers from hunger. To effectively raise global living standards a total annual investment of about $30 billion (compared to the present $5 billion) is needed. The single plausible source for this increased investment is the $120 billion now expended on armaments. The Disarmament Treaty could surely contain a clause insisting that 20 percent of national military savings go into an international fund for the war against underdevelopment. If not, the gap between the rich and the poor will increase, and small wars between the exploiter and proletarian states will proliferate.

1468
U.S. Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament. REPORT. Washington, For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965. 92 p. HC110. D4A5

Changing patterns in defense expenditures and weapons requirements have necessitated economic readjustments for communities, workers, and industries. Currently another change is taking place in the defense community. Defense expenditures have stabilized at a determinable level, and a shift "in the composition of defense spending" has occurred. Also the defense share of the gross national product and of employment has declined. "However, neither the shifts from one kind of defense spending to another (for example, from strategic weapons to weapons of limited war), nor the resumption of the gradual shift away from defense presents major problems for our economy. Even general and complete disarmament would post no insuperable problems; indeed, it would mainly afford opportunities for a better life for our citizens." Economic growth can be maintained by the fiscal-monetary tools presently available; it will not be stunted by general and complete disarmament. Certain communities heavily dependent for their survival on defense industries will require more comprehensive readjustments than will the economy on a national scale. Federal programs attuned to these problems are already in force and do not require major overhaul or intensification at this time. The responsibility for adjustment programs rests with the Federal Government along with defense firms, private groups, and State and local governments. The Federal Government is encouraged to assist even more than it is doing at present. Scientific and technical resources are slowly being diverted from defense responsibility for strategic weapons innovations. "Release of these resources provides a growing opportunity to use them for the improvement of civilian technology and government operations and for the strengthening of basic science." The Committee feels that much work can still be done and recommends that it or a similar group continue its activities of "analysis, coordination, evaluation, and stimulation."

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